

# 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

7 June 2010

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## Summary record of the 3rd meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 4 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

*President:* Mr. Cabactulan . . . . . (Philippines)  
*later:* Mr. Benmehidi (Vice-President) . . . . . (Algeria)  
*later:* Mr. Woolcott (Vice-President) . . . . . (Australia)  
*later:* Mr. de Macedo Soares (Vice-President) . . . . . (Brazil)  
*later:* Mr. Cabactulan (President) . . . . . (Philippines)

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General debate (*continued*)

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*The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.*

**General debate** (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Gryshchenko** (Ukraine) said that 16 years earlier, Ukraine had made an unprecedented move by voluntarily renouncing its inherited nuclear arsenal, which had been the world's third largest at that time. In 1994 it had joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon State and since then had consistently promoted nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Government of Ukraine was deeply convinced that nuclear weapons did not strengthen security but rather created more tensions and risks for States who strove to acquire them.

2. Ukraine's decision had been made with the understanding that security assurances, which it had received through the Budapest Memorandum, constituted an integral part of its nuclear disarmament policy. Security assurances must be reflected in a legally binding international document. States had a basic right to choose the means for providing for their national security and interests, and that right should be taken into account in the elaboration of international and regional security structures.

3. Ukraine had announced in April 2010 that it would eliminate all its stocks of highly enriched uranium by 2012, provided it received sufficient international assistance. Its voluntary step showed that it took nuclear non-proliferation seriously and was proof of its commitment to implement Security Council resolution 1887 (2009).

4. Because of the Treaty, much progress towards nuclear disarmament had been achieved during the past 40 years. However, existing nuclear arsenals and the many gaps in the non-proliferation regime remained as threats to world peace and security.

5. Recent events gave reason to hope that States realized the seriousness of those threats and were committed to addressing them. The Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the signing in April 2010 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms were two milestones that set the tone for further actions. Ukraine also welcomed the decision of the United States to provide legally binding security assurances to the countries belonging to the nuclear-

weapon-free zones established in Africa and the South Pacific.

6. Ukraine strongly advocated comprehensive, universal disarmament and strict compliance with the Treaty. There was an urgent need to build on the results of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. It was necessary not only to reaffirm the validity of the 13 practical steps of nuclear disarmament but also to review them thoroughly and, if necessary, to update and extend them. The Treaty system had been under severe strain in recent years and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had been struggling with verification, enforcement and compliance challenges. The Review Conference should pay proper attention to the implementation of non-proliferation commitments.

7. The Treaty required a more efficient mechanism to respond to current challenges and would be strengthened by the elaboration of modalities under which States could implement its article X. Moreover, strict compliance with Security Council resolutions on the prevention of trafficking and acquisition of nuclear materials by non-State actors needed to be enforced. Additionally, due to the increased risk of terrorism, physical protection of nuclear material and facilities must be strengthened.

8. Ukraine regretted the continuing deadlock concerning a fissile material cut-off treaty. In addition, it hoped that the renewed commitment of key States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would finally allow it to enter into force.

9. Access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology was vital to sustainable development, provided that such uses were subject to IAEA full-scope safeguards. His delegation welcomed the recent agreement between IAEA and the Russian Federation to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium for supply to IAEA, which could facilitate the supply of nuclear fuel and services while minimizing the risk of proliferation.

10. Strengthening the safety and security of nuclear material and facilities was of even greater importance, as demonstrated by the accident that occurred in Ukraine 24 years earlier at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. An international conference would be convened in April 2011, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the accident, to mark progress towards the goal of a

return to normal life and to address the issue of the safe use of nuclear energy.

11. To ensure a successful 2010 Review Conference, decisions must be implemented, requiring key players to plan beyond 2010, develop effective action plans and allocate resources to meet proliferation challenges.

12. **Mr. Jeremić** (Serbia) said that his delegation supported the full implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and stressed that concerted efforts were required by the international community to achieve its universality.

13. The first of the Treaty's three core objectives, non-proliferation, was the most immediate challenge to be addressed. Since the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty could play a complementary role in that regard, the Secretary-General's initiative to host a ministerial meeting to bring that instrument into force as soon as possible was particularly welcome. However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty itself needed to provide greater protection against the threat posed by non-State actors acquiring weapons-grade material through more stringent accountability and transparency mechanisms, including agreed modalities to enhance IAEA verification activities. At the same time, special care must be taken to ensure that IAEA technical cooperation activities were not subject to undue politicization.

14. The Treaty's second core objective was disarmament. In that connection, his delegation welcomed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed recently by the United States and the Russian Federation. However, it stressed that negotiations still needed to be intensified with a view to the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

15. The Treaty's third core objective concerned the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As part of its commitment to peaceful nuclear applications, his Government had recently signed an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Furthermore, in May 2009, the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia had adopted a law on ionizing radiation protection and nuclear safety in order to bring domestic legislation into line with the strictest international standards. The same law had also led to the establishment of an independent national nuclear agency that would become operational in mid-2010.

16. For several years, Serbia had been working closely with IAEA to transfer 48 kilograms of irradiated highly enriched uranium from Serbia to the Russian Federation for safe storage under the Vinča Institute Nuclear Decommissioning (VIND) project — a model for multilateral cooperation in three crucial fields: spent fuel removal; low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste management; and large-scale facility decommissioning. Serbia was prepared to share its expertise under the VIND project with other interested countries.

17. Lastly, he stressed that only courageous leadership, a global vision and strategic foresight would eliminate the ongoing threat of collective annihilation posed by nuclear weapons. Action must be taken today to make the world a safer place tomorrow.

18. **Ms. Moni** (Bangladesh) said that while her Government welcomed several recent positive developments, it was not convinced that enough was being done to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. It continued to call for the implementation of the consensus decisions adopted by the Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000, particularly the 13 practical steps.

19. Her country, which had an impeccable non-proliferation record, had unconditionally opted to remain non-nuclear and was committed to full compliance with both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test-Ban Treaty. Indeed, Bangladesh not only had an additional protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement, it was also the first annex 2 State from South Asia to have ratified the Test-Ban Treaty.

20. Bangladesh was constitutionally committed to achieving general and complete disarmament and her Government had steadfastly supported a multilateral approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Accordingly, the Parliament of Bangladesh had recently adopted a resolution supporting the 2010 Review Conference; emphasizing the need to implement all three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; expressing concern about the multiple threats and challenges posed by nuclear weapons; and considering nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation to be mutually reinforcing processes.

21. IAEA could help developing countries to achieve sustainable development through its technical cooperation activities. Undue restrictions on such

activities, which were contrary to the spirit of the Treaty, must be removed. To that end, her delegation called for a constructive dialogue with all stakeholders during the Review Conference with a view to implementing the provisions of articles I, II and IV of the Treaty in an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence.

22. Lastly, she noted that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty also had a legitimate right to receive negative security assurances from nuclear-weapon States. It was a matter of concern that the latter were not only adding more precision capability to their existing nuclear weapons stockpiles, but also developing new types of weapons. Renewed and vigorous efforts must therefore be pursued to develop a legally binding framework for the provision of such negative security assurances.

23. *Mr. Benmehidi (Algeria), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

24. **Mr. Alkalaj** (Bosnia and Herzegovina) said that, despite the setbacks witnessed over the past decade, recent initiatives had given a new impetus to the process of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, particularly Security Council resolution 1887 (2009), the outcome of the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington and the successful conclusion of the new treaty on strategic arms reduction between the United States and the Russian Federation.

25. The current Review Conference provided an invaluable opportunity for States parties to renew their commitments to the main principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States parties should work together in a spirit of compromise and flexibility so that a constructive outcome could be reached on the Treaty's three mutually reinforcing and equally important main pillars.

26. His delegation particularly wished to emphasize the importance of nuclear disarmament and thus its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which represented a positive step towards the goal of attaining global nuclear disarmament.

27. While all States parties to the Treaty had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, they also needed to comply with the legally binding instruments established to ensure its safe and responsible use, particularly IAEA safeguards agreements. The Agency

had shown itself to be a reliable, impartial and efficient international supervisor of nuclear safeguards.

28. **Mr. Medelci** (Algeria) said that while the ultimate goal of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was global disarmament, there was general agreement that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation helped to build confidence and maintain international peace and security, and that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were increasingly essential for development and progress. On that basis, participants at the current Review Conference should seek to build consensus by adopting balanced decisions that met the expectations of all States parties without discrimination.

29. Accordingly, the participants should recognize that a selective and discriminatory approach had led to the failure of the 2005 Review Conference; reiterate that the rights and obligations of States were based on the Treaty's three fundamental, complementary and indivisible pillars; and seek to rehabilitate the Treaty by ensuring the effective implementation of all its articles without discrimination. Their starting point should be the implementation of the decisions and resolutions adopted at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

30. Lastly, his delegation particularly wished to draw attention to the need for nuclear-weapon States to provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States; the Algerian proposal for article I of the Treaty to be reinforced to ensure that nuclear-weapon States refrained from cooperating in the civilian nuclear field with States not parties to the Treaty; and Algeria's full support for the IAEA mandate to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

31. **Ms. Espersen** (Denmark) said that while the Treaty had made a significant contribution to global security since its entry into force, shortcomings and uncertainties persisted. Recent developments nevertheless indicated that positive momentum was building. She expressed her Government's support for a balanced Conference outcome that would facilitate progress on the three interdependent pillars of the Treaty, the success of which was a matter of concern both for nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States like Denmark.

32. Differences in States' priorities and perspectives with respect to the Treaty, while legitimate, must not be exploited selectively to neglect issues or block consensus. It was her hope that States parties at the

Conference would confirm the basic principles of the Treaty; agree on a set of concrete, effective and consensual measures along the lines of the working paper submitted by the European Union to the Preparatory Committee in 2009; and consider ways of improving upon Treaty implementation procedures.

33. Denmark supported efforts to create a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It also welcomed the signing of the new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 and encouraged the parties to negotiate additional reductions. Noting the commitments undertaken at the recent Nuclear Security Summit, she called on the international community to make every effort to bring about the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and to begin negotiating a fissile material cut-off treaty.

34. The objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty could not be fully achieved without universal adherence; to that end, non-States parties must be persuaded to accede to the Treaty. In addition, it would be necessary to consider what specific measures might be appropriate in the event of a withdrawal from the Treaty — a potential threat to international peace and security, particularly if the State party in question was in breach of Treaty obligations. Withdrawal did not exempt a country from those obligations.

35. As a member of the IAEA Board of Governors, Denmark strongly supported the Agency's safeguards system and would work to promote recognition of the additional protocol to safeguards agreements as the verification standard.

36. *Mr. Woolcott (Australia), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

37. **Mr. Judeh** (Jordan) said that the Treaty struck a delicate balance between security and development in the context of international consensus. The recent signing by the United States of America and the Russian Federation of a treaty on strategic arms reduction, while a step in the right direction, needed to be consolidated by further action, broadening the initiative to facilitate accession by other States. Universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be achieved first and foremost. While awaiting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which must be achieved at the earliest possible date, Jordan urged States to refrain from

conducting nuclear tests of any kind, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. General Assembly resolution 64/35, which declared 29 August the international day against nuclear tests, might be used to raise awareness of the need to abolish nuclear testing.

38. The climate of détente and the sense of responsibility demonstrated by the two major nuclear-weapon States would certainly help the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to expedite the conclusion of a comprehensive fissile material cut-off treaty. While a review of the level of commitment to article IV of the Treaty would demonstrate it to be excellent overall, the sole situation that deviated from that general rule was cause for serious concern.

39. Given that IAEA was the competent organ for verifying compliance with the non-proliferation regime, it must be given full support in the conduct of its duties and its powers must not be diminished. Moreover, voluntary implementation of the additional protocol would bolster confidence in the Agency's safeguards system. However, none of those steps should in any way affect the inalienable right of States parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses without discrimination.

40. Jordan would cooperate with all States parties and IAEA to ensure that its peaceful nuclear programme was fully compliant with the Treaty and all other relevant international instruments. At the Nuclear Security Summit held in April 2010, Jordan had affirmed its commitment to cooperation on nuclear issues and to preventing nuclear materials from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations or other irresponsible parties, possibly through the establishment of an international mechanism for the exchange of information on their activities.

41. President Obama's renewed commitment to multilateral diplomacy and his vision of a world free of weapons of mass destruction had helped to dispel the mistrust surrounding the non-proliferation regime in past years, and, in view of the positive response of his Russian counterpart, there was cause for optimism about the Conference's prospects for success.

42. The indefinite extension of the Treaty was being questioned due to the inexplicable inertia in implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Furthermore, reluctance to give non-nuclear-weapon States negative assurances and to implement the 13 practical steps were matters for debate. Israel's failure

to accede to the Treaty and to submit its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards system undermined the credibility of the Treaty and made it a source of instability in the Middle East. Tensions in the region underscored the need for States parties to intensify efforts to implement the resolution. Doing so would salvage the credibility of the review process and contribute to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the region, as well as to the establishment of an independent Palestinian State.

43. **Mr. Al Nahyan** (United Arab Emirates) said that despite the significant gains made under the Treaty regime in the previous 40 years, major challenges to its implementation persisted. In support of global non-proliferation efforts, the United Arab Emirates had acceded to the Treaty in 1995 and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 2000. His Government had also concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in 2003 and was in the process of ratifying an additional protocol. Other tangible steps included the decision to renounce enrichment and reprocessing capabilities and the recent adoption of a national policy on the evaluation and potential development of peaceful nuclear energy.

44. The United Arab Emirates supported the right of all States parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, in a world where nuclear proliferation was a source of worry, States seeking to do so should abide by IAEA verification and safeguards and address any concerns the international community might have regarding the nature of their nuclear programmes. It was equally incumbent upon technologically advanced States possessing nuclear capabilities to assist non-nuclear-weapon States in developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

45. In order to address the challenges facing the Treaty, it would be necessary to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system, the efficacy of which was crucial to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. States having ratified an additional protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement should receive priority for the export of nuclear technology. Moreover, States parties should revisit the Treaty's withdrawal provision, particularly as it pertained to States that had benefited from the transfer of nuclear knowledge and technology under the Treaty.

46. As the only way to guarantee the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was to eliminate them

altogether, he welcomed the recent signing of a new treaty on strategic arms reduction by the United States of America and the Russian Federation and urged nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their commitments to disarm. He once again called on non-States parties to accede to the Treaty, and pointed out that fulfilling the commitment to create a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, a matter of utmost priority, would attest to the effectiveness of the Treaty.

47. Through its own nuclear programme, his country sought to establish a model for the transparent and safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by non-nuclear-weapon States. Despite the challenges of the review process, he hoped that States parties at the Conference would work together constructively to produce a positive outcome.

48. **Mr. Smith** (Australia), speaking on behalf of the States members of the Pacific Islands Forum with Permanent Missions in New York, said that Forum members would strive to ensure that discussions at the Conference bore fruit. States parties must make a concerted effort to achieve balanced progress on the three pillars of the Treaty and to reinforce the Treaty regime that for 40 years had provided clear global security benefits. A repeat of the 2005 Review Conference would be unacceptable.

49. In 2000, Pacific Islands Forum leaders had called on nuclear-weapon States to take the steps leading to disarmament agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference, also welcoming the identification of measures to reinforce the international non-proliferation regime. In 2005, Forum members had encouraged nuclear-weapon States to provide updates on the steps taken. Noting with pleasure the progress made by some nuclear-weapon States on their Treaty obligations and commitments, he called upon them to continue those efforts. Forum members welcomed the long-standing ratification by the United Kingdom, France, China and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the protocols to the Rarotonga Treaty as well as the United States of America's recent declaration of intent to ratify.

50. Having faced the devastating effects of nuclear testing first-hand, Forum members attached particular importance to the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and urged countries, in particular those States mentioned in its

annex 2, to ratify it, also welcoming the commitment by some States to do so.

51. Forum members also gave priority to nuclear safety issues, including the application of IAEA safety requirements and guidelines. The 2000 Review Conference had taken note of the concerns of small island developing States and other coastal States with regard to the transport of radioactive material by sea, calling on States parties to work bilaterally and through the relevant international organizations to improve existing safety measures and regulations. Hailing the progress made over the past decade, he encouraged further efforts to enhance communication between shipping and coastal States on transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

52. Forum members fully supported the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy within a framework that reduced proliferation risk and adhered to international safety standards. In that connection, he endorsed the principles set out in the objectives of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme. Strengthened non-proliferation measures helped foster an environment conducive to sharing and enhancing the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, thereby facilitating its development.

53. The Pacific Islands Forum stood ready to work towards real and practical outcomes across the non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, the attainment of which required political will, a spirit of cooperation, and a genuine commitment to implementation of the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

54. **Ms. Heuheu** (New Zealand) said that in the 40 years since its entry into force, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been at the heart of collective efforts to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. New Zealand, which had long maintained an independent and principled voice on nuclear issues, recognized the need to implement fully its three pillars; although they had not gained the necessary universal acceptance, they offered a vehicle for a global solution. Her country was committed to all aspects of the Treaty, including the decisions and outcomes agreed at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, and would continue to work with all other States parties towards the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. However, the

only realistic option in that endeavour was an incremental approach: systematic and progressive steps must be taken and periodically evaluated.

55. New Zealand continued to call for nuclear arms reduction leading to the elimination of nuclear arsenals, the negotiation of a fissile material treaty, lowered operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems, security assurances and the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. She urged all States that had not yet ratified that Treaty to do so as a matter of priority, particularly annex 2 States, following the recent example of Indonesia.

56. Accountability, through the NPT safeguards system, was a key element in an effective non-proliferation regime and entailed the obligation for all States parties to provide assurances that nuclear activities undertaken by them were purely for peaceful purposes. New Zealand called on Iran to meet its international obligations. In the same spirit, her country supported robust safeguards agreements, including the Additional Protocol, as well as strong export controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear material, equipment and technology. Nuclear technology should be accessible to all, provided that it was managed safely and securely and did not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The physical protection of nuclear material and facilities must be effectively ensured and efforts must be made to combat illicit trade in nuclear materials and other radioactive substances.

57. New Zealand welcomed several recent landmark developments, including the vision outlined by President Obama in Prague, the new treaty signed by the United States and the Russian Federation in April 2010 and the decision of the United States Administration to seek Senate consent to ratification of the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the Treaties of Rarotonga and Penlindaba, as well as its intention to improve the transparency of its nuclear arsenal. Together with the Secretary-General's five-point plan, those developments lent significant momentum to the work of the Review Conference.

58. **Mr. Ajumogobia** (Nigeria) said that his country was firmly committed to the ideals and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which remained the key bulwark against nuclear insecurity in the world. Nigeria had continued to demonstrate that commitment

and would remain ever supportive of initiatives to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones; they helped to advance the twin pillars of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. While there had been positive developments in that connection, including the signing by the United States and the Russian Federation of the new treaty on strategic arms reduction, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review of the United States Department of Defense and the recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., an urgent need remained for other measures. Non-ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty by annex 2 States remained a barrier to its entry into force. In the meantime, it was important to maintain the moratorium on nuclear testing, establish a legally binding instrument to prohibit the production of nuclear materials and explosive devices and lower the operational readiness of existing nuclear weapon systems. Non-nuclear States such as Nigeria had a particular interest in a legally binding framework to protect them from such weapons.

59. He accordingly reiterated Nigeria's endorsement of the 13 practical interim steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, while recalling its desire for international cooperation in the application of nuclear technology for peaceful uses. His country looked to the Review Conference for an endorsement of practical measures to preserve its and other countries' right to exercise their entitlement under the NPT framework to use nuclear energy for development purposes. In conclusion, he stressed the need for all States parties to agree to the full implementation of the appropriate international safeguards.

60. *Mr. de Macedo Soares (Brazil), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

61. **Mr. Nujoma** (Namibia) said that important global developments should be turned to account in order to sustain the momentum towards implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. The current level of nuclear arsenals was unacceptable. It was illogical to assert that the possession of nuclear weapons was good for some but bad for others; those who possessed them should destroy them. In the meantime, universal legally binding measures must be put in place to prevent their use and greater attention should be given to disarmament and non-proliferation education. The best means of promoting non-proliferation was the Test-Ban Treaty. Namibia therefore urged all annex 2 States that had not yet ratified it to do so. Namibia welcomed the

entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty, which it was in the process of ratifying. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world was an important step towards complete nuclear disarmament. The Review Conference should accordingly renew the commitment of all States parties to implementing the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review Conference calling for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. The NPT pillars were interdependent and the balance among them must be upheld at all times. All signatory States without comprehensive safeguards agreements should therefore conclude such agreements without further delay; indeed, the IAEA safeguards should be an obligation for all nuclear-weapon States.

62. Every country had an inalienable right to develop its nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It was essential in that regard to implement article IV of the Treaty without discrimination, and IAEA was to be commended for assisting developing countries in gaining access to nuclear technology for nuclear energy. That Agency was also making a welcome effort to the fight against cancer, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and should receive greater support to strengthen its technical cooperation. The efforts of IAEA to assist Member States in developing their national nuclear power programmes were also highly appreciated, particularly by Namibia which would continue to seek the Agency's help in that area in order to draw the maximum benefits from its uranium. Namibia supported the multilateralization of the nuclear fuel cycle, provided that it did not lead to attempts to concentrate nuclear technology in the hands of a few; a consensus must continue to be sought among IAEA member States in that regard. Moreover, national security challenges had increased the responsibilities of the Agency, which should accordingly be strengthened.

63. **Mr. Gaye** (Gambia) said that Africa's support for the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Pelindaba Treaty was anchored in its commitment to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. The Gambia looked forward to the establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy as an additional means of encouraging such uses in the continent. His country also looked forward to stronger cooperation with IAEA as it expanded its technical cooperation programmes with African countries in the fields of education, health, medicine



and agriculture. Greater support was required in particular for the Agency's Education for Cancer in Africa project and its Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy. Nuclear technology could play a significant role in developing improved soil, water and nutrient management practices in developing countries, thereby greatly increasing food security in areas like sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, a reduction in the production of nuclear weapons could liberate substantial resources for peaceful uses. He called on nuclear-weapon States to enhance the non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty so as to ensure that other States parties could benefit from nuclear technology accordingly. He concluded by encouraging the Director General of IAEA to redouble his efforts to follow up on resolutions for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East with a view to the achievement of a lasting peace in the region.

64. **Ms. Heuheu** (New Zealand), speaking on behalf of Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria and Switzerland, (the De-alerting Group), said that there was an urgent need to decrease the current high operational readiness of significant numbers of nuclear weapons systems. That would be an important interim step towards the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world and would reflect the marked improvements in the international security climate since the end of the cold war. It would also demonstrate a palpable commitment to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons and minimize the risk of unintended use or use in error. Those benefits had been recognized by all States parties at the 2000 Review Conference. The group of countries she represented had therefore submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.10) with a view to achieving an outcome on operational readiness that would build on that result.

65. **Mr. Pham Binh Minh** (Socialist Republic of Viet Nam), speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), said that the run-up to the current Review Conference had been marked by positive developments, including the Secretary-General's five-point action plan, the signing of the new strategic arms reduction treaty by the United States and the Russian Federation, and the Nuclear Posture Review recently concluded by the United States. The ASEAN countries urged nuclear-weapon States to take further measures to give effect to their commitments on complete nuclear disarmament and, to that end, to

propose actions with timelines that would effectively advance their implementation of the Treaty. The current proliferation of nuclear materials remained a matter of global concern. Nuclear energy for peaceful purposes could be used by developing countries for the betterment of their peoples. To that end, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike must undertake to abide by their Treaty obligations, which could not be dissociated from their rights under that same Treaty. The Review Conference offered a critical opportunity to shore up its provisions.

66. In accordance with their Charter, the ASEAN countries fully supported nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the abolition of all weapons of mass destruction; they were therefore committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the balanced, comprehensive and non-discriminatory implementation of its three pillars. They urged all nuclear-weapon States to carry out the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive implementation of article VI in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Pending the achievement of full nuclear disarmament, they urged all such States to declare a moratorium on nuclear testing, lower the operational readiness of their nuclear-weapon systems, adopt a "no first use" policy and provide legally binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States. They called on nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike to consolidate efforts to prevent the spread and proliferation of nuclear materials and support the strengthening of the work of the IAEA and urged States not yet parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States.

67. The ASEAN countries were all signatories to the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ Treaty) and had undertaken to intensify their efforts to promote it under the related Plan of Action. They welcomed the recent entry into force of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty and supported the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East, in accordance with relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions.

68. Viet Nam continued to call for the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and their total elimination. It had acceded to all major multilateral treaties on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction and, since the last Review Conference, had ratified the Test-Ban Treaty and signed the Additional Protocol. Furthermore, the

Vietnamese Government had recently decided to accede to the Convention on Nuclear Safety and endorse the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. His country recognized both the benefits and requirements of safety and security in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and supported efforts for their promotion, including the measures put forward at the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C., while at the same time attaching great importance to the expansion of assistance to developing countries in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

69. *Mr. Cabactulan (Philippines), President, resumed the Chair.*

70. **Mr. Ryabkov** (Russian Federation) said that he would begin by reading out the message of greeting from the President of the Russian Federation to the participants at the Review Conference. President Medvedev wanted participants to know that further strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime on the basis of its three fundamental pillars was of the utmost importance for strategic stability and security. The international community needed to work together to counter emerging proliferation threats and challenges on the basis of the Treaty. Against that background, the current Review Conference took on particular relevance.

71. The Russian Federation had consistently complied with the provisions of the Treaty and sought to make a substantive contribution to its noble goals, as demonstrated most recently by the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation. That instrument showed the international community the benefits of constructive cooperation as well as opportunities for further disarmament.

72. The “peaceful atom” now played an increasing role in meeting global energy needs: nuclear power plants were instrumental for economic growth and higher living standards. Nevertheless, the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty needed to find an appropriate response to the proliferation risks associated with the exercise by States of their right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The initiatives proposed during the current Review Conference should therefore help to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime.

73. The determination of the international community to improve nuclear security mechanisms had been

demonstrated by the Nuclear Security Summit held recently in Washington, D.C. In line with the Summit communiqué of 13 April 2010, the Russian Federation intended to share its extensive nuclear security experience with other States. It would also cooperate closely with the international community to establish a modern proliferation-resistant architecture for the peaceful use of nuclear energy on the basis of IAEA safeguards and multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

74. Turning to his statement, the speaker then said that his delegation was firmly convinced that it was in the interests of all States to abide by and contribute towards the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The recent positive developments noted by President Medvedev augured well for the ability of the Review Conference to address such pressing concerns as the need to comprehensively strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime; the danger of nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists; the emergence of clandestine proliferation networks and the growth of black markets in nuclear materials; and the need to build an international architecture for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy that would prevent the spread of sensitive technologies while also meeting States parties’ legitimate energy needs.

75. Current challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime should be addressed on the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the inviolability of its provisions, in strict compliance with the norms of international law and with due regard for the legitimate security and development interests of States.

76. The 2009 Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the recently held Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, D.C., had been important milestones for strengthening the Treaty. As a part of that process, the 2010 Review Conference should, *inter alia*: reaffirm the Treaty as the appropriate basis for addressing current proliferation threats and challenges; identify instruments to improve and universalize IAEA safeguards; facilitate the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; provide an impetus to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the Conference on Disarmament; and address the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

77. The States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should seek to further disarmament in all States without exception. For its part, the Government of the Russian Federation stood ready to work towards expanding nuclear-weapon-free zones, strengthening the non-proliferation regime in the Middle East and enhancing the effectiveness of mechanisms designed to combat nuclear terrorism.

78. Lastly, his delegation wished to stress that the final documents of the Conference should outline the best ways to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Delegations could familiarize themselves with the many steps taken by his country over the past five years in its national report, which, together with the specific proposals of the Russian Federation for further strengthening the Treaty contained in its various statements and working papers, would also be submitted during the 2010 Review Conference.

79. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt), speaking also on behalf of Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, members of the New Agenda Coalition, noted the Coalition's firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It had been working for over a decade to advance nuclear disarmament. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and the assurance that they would never be produced again was the only absolute guarantee against their use or threatened use.

80. The Coalition called on all States parties to fulfil all their Treaty commitments and obligations. Moreover, it called on China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States to comply with their disarmament commitments and obligations under article VI. Universal accession to the Treaty was of paramount importance. In that regard, the Coalition called on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty promptly and without any conditions as non-nuclear-weapon States and, pending their accession, to adhere to its terms. Furthermore, it urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to rescind its announced withdrawal from the Treaty.

81. The Coalition welcomed the signing in April 2010 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, thereby significantly reducing their deployed nuclear arsenals, and looked forward to its

early entry into force. As a next step, further deep cuts should be agreed on, including in the area of non-deployed and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Moreover, weapons reductions must be irreversible, transparent and internationally verifiable.

82. The Coalition also welcomed moves towards reducing the role and potential uses of nuclear weapons in the security strategies of some nuclear-weapon States, most recently as announced by the United States. However, further significant doctrinal shifts by all nuclear-weapon States were urgently needed to make progress towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

83. The Coalition had serious concerns regarding the continued existence of nuclear weapons so long after the entry into force of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had yet to enter into force, a treaty on fissile materials had still not been concluded, and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East remained unrealized. Those matters deserved urgent attention.

84. The increased global momentum to advance nuclear disarmament was a signal that the political will necessary to achieve shared nuclear-disarmament objectives might be forthcoming, and the Review Conference was a critical opportunity to turn rhetoric into action and herald a new era of progress on global disarmament. However, given the disappointing outcome of the 2005 Review Conference, it was necessary to look further back for a reference point from which to move forward. For the Coalition, those reference points were the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and the three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference.

85. It was hoped that, in 2015, the basis from which to move forward would be the successes of the 2010 Review Conference; in the absence of such progress, the credibility and viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be in serious jeopardy. The Coalition was committed to working with all delegations to ensure that the Treaty was respected, strengthened and adhered to. That could only be achieved if the balance between all three pillars of the Treaty were respected. Further progress was therefore urgently needed on the disarmament pillar.

86. The Review Conference must move beyond mere words and political posturing and get to the heart of matters quickly and directly if success were to be

achieved. It was critical that the outcome include a reaffirmation of the unequivocal undertaking by nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. It must also include a call upon all States parties to the Treaty to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament that were agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, as well as a call for them to pursue policies that were fully compatible with the objective of achieving a world free from nuclear weapons.

87. States parties must also agree on an action plan that provided a clear framework and measurable benchmarks with which to evaluate the success of their upcoming work. With that in mind, the Coalition had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.8) to the 2010 Review Conference that contained a wide range of concrete and practical measures to achieve a world free from nuclear weapons. The fact that the working paper encompassed the views of a cross-regional grouping of countries should also help foster consensus around the elements and language it contained.

88. The Review Conference should welcome the entry into force of the treaties of Semipalatinsk and Pelindaba, and encourage the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones. In addition, the Coalition urged all concerned States to take all necessary measures to bring about the entry into force of the relevant protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the withdrawal of any related reservations or unilateral interpretative declarations that were incompatible with the object and purpose of such treaties.

89. The resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference was a matter of paramount importance. Since then, no progress had been achieved on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. The Review Conference should renew its support for the establishment of such a zone and should also renew its call to Israel, as the only State of the region not yet a party to the Treaty, to accede to it as a non-nuclear-weapon State promptly and without conditions, and to place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

90. **Mr. Askarov** (Uzbekistan), speaking also on behalf of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, said that the idea of establishing

nuclear-weapon-free zones had gained increasing international support, which was reflected in a number of multilateral instruments, including the outcome of the Review Conferences, the General Assembly special sessions on disarmament and other forums. Initiatives establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones had strengthened the movement towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

91. The promotion of nuclear-weapon-free zones had been announced as one of the main priorities of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. During the preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference, the States parties had attached great importance to regional aspects of implementing the Treaty, including the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

92. Security Council resolution 1887 (2009) had supported the steps taken to conclude nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and had reaffirmed the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones enhanced global and regional peace and security, strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and contributed towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

93. From the first years of their independence, the five Central Asian States had begun to implement article VII of the Treaty, which provided for the conclusion of regional treaties and agreements on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In order to strengthen the Treaty regime and ensure regional security, those States had agreed to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

94. The initiative to establish the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone had been further developed in the Almaty Declaration of the Heads of State of the Central Asian States, the statement adopted at Tashkent by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the five States of the region and in the Communiqué of the Consultative Meeting of the Experts of the Central Asian Countries, the Nuclear-Weapon States and the United Nations, adopted at Bishkek. A number of General Assembly resolutions and previous Review Conference documents had also demonstrated the broad international support for the determination of the Central Asian States to achieve their goal.

95. The five Central Asian States and the five nuclear-weapon States had held expert-level consultative meetings on the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and its Protocol. The

international community had provided considerable support to their efforts. The financial assistance extended by Japan had been particularly generous. The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty had been signed in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan in 2006. That location held symbolic importance because the Semipalatinsk site, which had been officially closed by Kazakhstan in 1991, had been one of the largest nuclear test sites in the world. The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty had been ratified by all five Central Asian States and had entered into force in March 2009. Later that same year, the first consultative meeting of the States parties to that Treaty had been held.

96. In April 2010, the Government of the United States had hosted the Washington Nuclear Security Summit with the participation of more than 40 states that had pledged to work together to ensure the security of nuclear materials and strengthen cooperation in the sphere of non-proliferation. Later that same month, the Second Conference of States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones and Mongolia had been held in New York.

97. It must be stressed that the current stage in the process of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones around the world was not final. The States parties to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty called on other States and regions of the world, including those of the Middle East, to follow their example. In order to promote the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Central Asian States suggested that nuclear-weapon States should provide existing zones with negative security assurances.

98. The Central Asian States were pleased to introduce a working document they had collectively prepared on the establishment of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, reflecting the progress made since the signing of the Treaty in 2006 and reaffirming the strong commitment of the parties to continue their efforts to implement it effectively.

*The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.*