
2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

9 June 2010

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Main Committee

Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 7 May 2010, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

Organization of work

1. **The Chairman** said that Main Committee I had the task of dealing with agenda items 16 (a) and (b) and 17 (NPT/CONF.2010/1). In addition, the plenary Conference had established a subsidiary body which would focus on nuclear disarmament and security assurances. He drew attention to the proposed programme of work for the Committee and its subsidiary body, contained in document NPT/CONF.2010/MC.I/INF/1.

2. *The programme of work was adopted.*

3. **Mr. Marschik** (Austria), speaking as Chairman of Subsidiary Body I, said that the subsidiary body would elaborate a forward-looking action plan on nuclear disarmament for inclusion in the report of Main Committee I to be submitted to the Conference.

General exchange of views

4. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, noted that the wording of agenda item 16 made it clear that Main Committee I should not only review the Treaty but also take into account the decisions and resolutions agreed upon at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

5. The Group of Non-Aligned States, which remained fully committed to the ultimate goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament, viewed the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation as a step in the right direction. However, such reductions remained below the expectations of the international community. The Group therefore encouraged the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their disarmament obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty transparently, irreversibly and verifiably at a significantly faster pace.

6. The Group intended to work with Main Committee I with a view to reaching agreement on a strong and coherent plan of action for nuclear disarmament within a specified time frame. To that end, it would shortly be proposing to the subsidiary body a three-phase action plan.

7. Furthermore, the Group believed that the final document of the 2010 Review Conference should, inter alia: note with deep concern the security doctrines of

nuclear-weapon States, including the Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); reaffirm that every effort should be made to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty in all its aspects without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States parties to the Treaty; emphasize, in that context, the particular importance attached to the strict observance of articles I and II of the Treaty; and stress the importance of the reaffirmation by nuclear-weapon States of their obligations to fully implement articles I and II of the Treaty.

8. Second, in the area of nuclear disarmament, the final document should reconfirm that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would be conducted in accordance with the mandates of the Shannon report; reaffirm the importance of the application of the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility by nuclear-weapon States in all measures relating to nuclear disarmament; voice concern about the potential for an arms race in outer space; and agree that the development of new types of nuclear weapons undermined disarmament commitments and contravened the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

9. Third, with regard to nuclear testing, the final report should reaffirm that the only way to rid the world of the threat of use of nuclear weapons was their total elimination; support the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and stress the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to take the lead in that endeavour.

10. Lastly, the final report of the 2010 Review Conference should recall that States parties to the Treaty had agreed by consensus at the 2000 Review Conference that the nuclear non-proliferation regime would be strengthened by the provision of legally binding security assurances from the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States; reiterate that improvements to existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons contravened the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapon States and violated the commitments undertaken by them at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute safeguard against the use of such weapons. Accordingly, efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument providing security assurances to all

non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority.

11. **Mr. Garcia** (Philippines) said that the 2010 Review Conference must reinforce the undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate their nuclear arsenals and to implement the 13 practical steps by reaching agreement on specific benchmarks and timelines for action, including a nuclear-weapons convention or a series of mutually reinforcing legal instruments.

12. In particular, the nuclear-weapon-States should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; provide unconditional and legally binding negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States; and become parties to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

13. Lastly, his Government supported initiatives to strengthen the work of the Conference on Disarmament, particularly with a view to the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty; called on all States not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accede to the Treaty; and strongly urged States not to withdraw from the Treaty.

14. **Mr. Badr** (Egypt), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that while the Coalition remained fully committed to the implementation of all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, its primary focus was on nuclear disarmament.

15. The Coalition had been instrumental to the successful adoption of the 13 practical steps at the 2000 Review Conference, which had sadly not been carried forward to the 2005 Review Conference. While the Group was encouraged by recent positive developments, particularly the new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the United States and the Russian Federation, all nuclear-weapon States should work towards further substantial reductions with a view to the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.

16. Greater progress was therefore required to implement the Treaty's disarmament obligations under article VI, particularly the implementation of the commitments agreed upon previously at the 2000 Review Conference relating to the role of nuclear weapons in security policies; the upgrading of existing nuclear weapons or the development of new types of nuclear weapons; and the negotiation of a fissile

material cut-off treaty by the Conference on Disarmament.

17. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, all nuclear-weapon States should put in place the necessary verification arrangements and legally binding instruments. Furthermore, the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability must apply to all disarmament efforts to ensure their success.

18. **Mr. Lauber** (Switzerland) said that the 2010 Review Conference provided a unique opportunity to build on the current positive momentum towards nuclear disarmament. The final document of the Conference should be balanced and must reaffirm the previously agreed commitments, recognize the results obtained to date, request further progress and explain how it would be achieved. With regard to the latter point, the Review Conference should adopt a plan of action to move the nuclear disarmament process forward in a specific, progressive and pragmatic way. The 13 practical steps could be updated for that purpose, together with a specific time frame for implementation.

19. Such an action plan, in order to be successful, should include both quantitative and qualitative elements. In that regard, Switzerland encouraged all nuclear-weapon States to engage fully in the arms reduction process; to put an end to nuclear weapons development programmes; to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems; and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines.

20. Furthermore, the action plan adopted should call on all States to begin negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament with a view to the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty, the provision of legally binding negative security assurances and the swift ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

21. **Mr. Quinlan** (Australia), welcoming the current momentum towards nuclear disarmament created by recent positive developments, called for the 2010 Review Conference to reaffirm the unequivocal undertakings made by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. In that connection, Australia and Japan had submitted a working paper (NPT/CONF.2010/WP.9) which contained a new package of practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures for the 2010 Review Conference.

22. The outcome document of the current Conference should, in particular, reflect the irreversibility and verifiability of the nuclear disarmament process; reaffirm the commitments made by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies; and provide strengthened negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The Review Conference should also demonstrate clear support for nuclear-weapon-free zones and work with the nuclear-weapon States to resolve any outstanding issues currently preventing them from granting negative security assurances to the members of those zones.

23. Lastly, the Conference should affirm that the nuclear-weapon States must take all reasonable steps to reduce the risk of the accidental or unauthorized launch of their weapons; support the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and express disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to implement its agreed programme of work for 2009. In that context, the Review Conference should reaffirm the urgent need for negotiations, without preconditions, on a fissile material cut-off treaty. In the meantime, it should call on all nuclear-weapon States to declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

24. **Mr. Matjila** (South Africa) said that States parties needed to undertake an accelerated process of negotiations, as agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, in order to give real content to their obligations under article VI of the Treaty. Notwithstanding commendable measures to reduce nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons continued to be relied on in strategic doctrines; such measures must be distinguished from steps towards nuclear disarmament: they would not automatically translate into a nuclear-weapon-free world. South Africa welcomed recent positive signs of a renewed commitment to the arms control process, which called, however, for deeper cuts in both strategic and non-strategic weapons on a basis of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability. It was clear that, regardless of their legal obligations and political commitments, some nuclear-weapon States wished to retain their nuclear weapons indefinitely. It was inadmissible that some States should assume their responsibilities only selectively: the fundamental principles of the Treaty and the outcomes of previous Review Conferences must be fully respected, including

the unequivocal commitment of nuclear-weapon States to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons. He expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of tangible evidence of that commitment, which called for further progress in implementing the necessary step-by-step approach. His delegation appreciated the willingness of some nuclear-weapon States to share information about their nuclear arsenals and disarmament objectives; it called on all those States to do more to enhance transparency and confidence-building.

25. South Africa was concerned about the stalemate in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, which should make every effort to launch negotiations towards a verifiable universal ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, in the interests of disarmament and non-proliferation alike. The Test-Ban Treaty was a further important contribution to those objectives. His delegation welcomed the intention of China and the United States to pursue ratification of that instrument, especially since the non-ratification of certain States was blocking its entry into force.

26. As the only country to date that had voluntarily and unilaterally destroyed its nuclear weapons capacity, South Africa remained concerned about States that retained such weapons, including some outside the Treaty with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It would continue to support all nuclear disarmament measures in order to achieve a world free of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

27. **Mr. Shushlebin** (Russian Federation) said that, aware as a nuclear power of its special responsibilities under article VI of the Treaty, his country was continuing deep, irreversible and verifiable reductions of its nuclear potential. The new arms reductions treaty it had signed with the United States of America was an important step in that process and part of the Russian Federation's growing contribution to the cause of nuclear disarmament. The new treaty had replaced one of the most historically significant disarmament agreements, the treaty of 31 July 1991 (START I), which had made the world safer and more stable and ushered in a period of partnership and cooperation. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had been parties to that treaty, along with the Russian Federation and the United States; it would not have played such a historic role had those three countries not agreed to remove nuclear weapons from their territories and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon

States: that had strengthened their security and enhanced their strategic stability.

28. The new treaty, besides limiting aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms within seven years of its entry into force, had brought deployed and non-deployed launchers as well as heavy bombers within its legal scope and provided an additional impetus for the elimination or conversion of such arms. The parties had agreed to reduce by one third the aggregate number of warheads, from the previous ceiling of 2,200, and by more than half the aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles, from the previous ceiling of 1,600. Nuclear disarmament could not be achieved without taking into account developments in the field of strategic defensive arms and the need for limits on the deployment of strategic missile defence systems. The Russian Federation remained committed to that goal, which should be pursued on a multilateral basis under the auspices of the United Nations. He recalled in that context the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, submitted by the Russian Federation and China for the consideration of the Conference on Disarmament, and his country's proposal to universalize the treaty between the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Similarly, the earliest possible entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty would be an essential step towards nuclear disarmament; a voluntary moratorium on nuclear tests, though significant, could be no substitute for the relevant legal obligations.

29. The ultimate goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament must entail a strengthening of strategic stability and compliance with the principle of equal security for all. In addition, all nuclear-weapon States should be involved in the arms reduction efforts already undertaken by the Russian Federation and the United States; steps should be taken to prevent the deployment of weapons in outer space; and there should be a halt to the build-up of conventional weapons, underpinned by efforts for the settlement of regional conflicts.

30. *Ms. Barbulescu (Romania), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

31. **Mr. Grinius** (Canada) said that the three pillars of the Treaty were bound to grow more interdependent as further progress was made towards the goal of a

nuclear-weapon-free world. Recent positive developments in that regard should be followed by others: transparent disarmament measures by all nuclear-weapon States were needed in support of commitments under article VI. He recalled the call by the Group of Eight major industrialized countries for the adoption by the Conference of a balanced and concrete outcome document containing a follow-up action plan. Since assuming the presidency of that Group, Canada had been urging countries that had not yet ratified the Test-Ban Treaty to do so; its entry into force was a key task for the international community. His country, through the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction led by the Group of Eight, had also been making substantial efforts to secure and, where possible, destroy such weapons in several regions of the world. It had also been pushing for negotiations towards a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; formal work on such a treaty should begin immediately, no matter how unsure its final outcome: lack of consensus must not be an obstacle to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

32. Canada's longstanding commitment to nuclear disarmament was pursued with all due regard for its membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; it remained firmly committed to a common nuclear policy within that organization and would continue accordingly to seek to advance discussions on such issues as nuclear posture and sub-strategic nuclear weapons in the context of its Strategic Concept Review. That did not, however, prejudice future developments, including consideration of practical disarmament measures. He called for detailed reporting by nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike in order to increase transparency and build confidence in their shared commitment to the implementation of the Treaty. Lastly, he stressed the need to build on the positive changes in the international security climate, the new package proposed by Australia and Japan and the working paper of the New Agenda Coalition in order to develop and agree on a disarmament action plan that would give renewed impetus to the 13 practical steps.

33. **Mr. Shushlebin** (Russian Federation), speaking on behalf of the delegations of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, said that the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on 8 April 2010, was an important step on the path towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. By signing the Treaty, both countries had once again demonstrated their unwavering commitment to fulfilling their obligations under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The verifiable and irreversible cuts agreed to by the parties would reduce their nuclear arsenals to levels last seen 50 years ago. Those reductions would have a positive impact on international stability and security, thereby benefiting the entire world community. In that context, the delegations of the Russian Federation and the United States of America called on all nuclear-weapon States to make an active contribution towards reducing and limiting their nuclear arms with a view to strengthening international stability and ensuring equal and indivisible security for all.

34. **Mr. Danon** (France) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a linchpin of collective security and must for that reason be strengthened. Attached as it was to the implementation of all its obligations under the Treaty, in particular under article VI, France had sought to set an example to other States by assuming its responsibilities to the full. It could not advance alone, however: progress towards the ultimate goal of the Treaty required the concerted efforts of all, although that should not be a pretext for inaction.

35. France had accordingly proposed a number of measures to usher in a nuclear-weapon-free world marked by peace and stability. Those measures, which had been taken up by the European Union, included an immediate halt to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; the dismantlement of nuclear installations and test sites, but also of decommissioned nuclear warheads; a reduction of all nuclear arsenals, in the spirit of the new treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation; a limiting of the role of nuclear weapons in defence doctrines to extreme cases of self-defence; greater transparency as to the number of nuclear weapons held by each State, following the example of France and the United States; prompt ratification of the Test-Ban Treaty by all States, particularly annex II States, that were not yet parties to that instrument; and immediate negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

36. It was also essential to take into account the political and strategic conditions for progress towards nuclear disarmament. That entailed, first and foremost,

a halt to proliferation, with particular reference to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran. If the Iranian question was not settled, there was a risk of nuclear anarchy in the region and in the world; that would put an end to all hopes of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and, in the long term, gravely jeopardize any prospect of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, efforts were called for in every field, in order to reduce regional tensions and promote collective security.

37. Part of the work of the Conference should also be devoted to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. France's doctrine of nuclear dissuasion was one such assurance. His country had also granted unilaterally both positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. More than a hundred States enjoyed such assurances from his country within a regional framework under nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. France was thus a party to the relevant protocols of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba and looked forward to a resumption of the constructive dialogue with all concerned parties to resolve outstanding difficulties presented by other such treaties. He called, in conclusion, for the Review Conference to recommend practical disarmament measures that could be implemented within a short time frame in order to make tangible progress towards the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.

38. **Mr. Suda** (Japan) said that the tragic experience of the Japanese people had created in them an unwavering resolve to realize a safe world free from nuclear weapons, a goal that was shared by the whole world. Leadership by the two States possessing the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons was important in that regard, and Japan thus welcomed the signing of the new treaty on the reduction of nuclear weapons between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. In addition to those bilateral reductions, his delegation commended the unilateral measures taken by France and the United Kingdom to reduce their nuclear arsenals and increase transparency. Japan also attached importance to the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and called on States not parties to the Treaty to accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States without delay and without conditions.

39. Japan, in cooperation with Australia, had submitted a joint policy proposal outlining a new package of practical nuclear disarmament and

non-proliferation measures, which was intended to build on the current positive developments in the area of disarmament and the agreements and accomplishments of the 1995 and 2000 review conferences while looking to a future without nuclear weapons. A first measure proposed in that package was for States parties to reaffirm the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

40. The package also included an appeal for the hitherto bilateral disarmament initiative between the Russian Federation and the United States to be expanded to involve the other States possessing nuclear weapons. It called on all States possessing nuclear weapons to reduce their nuclear arsenals, and on those that were increasing and expanding their arsenals to reduce, or at the least, hold them at the current level. All nuclear-weapon States were also to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies and to provide stronger negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The package also contained a proposal calling on nuclear-weapon States to take measures to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized launch. The principles of irreversibility and verifiability must be applied to the process of reducing arsenals. Increased transparency regarding nuclear weapon capabilities, for example through regular reporting to the NPT States parties, was also called for. Another essential measure for global nuclear disarmament, the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, was of prime concern to States parties.

41. It was regrettable that despite some positive developments the Conference on Disarmament remained deadlocked and that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet begun. Japan called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of that treaty, while urging all States possessing nuclear weapons to declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

42. With the failure of the last Review Conference in 2005, another failure would be a devastating blow to the NPT regime and a major setback in the collective effort to free the world from nuclear armaments. States parties must recognize past agreements and to seek new measures that reflected current circumstances. In that regard, Japan hoped that the proposals it had submitted in cooperation with Australia would

contribute to a balance and forward-looking final document.

43. **Ms. Kennedy** (United States of America) said that the Review Conference provided an opportunity for all States parties to rededicate themselves to the central purpose of the Treaty: to prevent the devastating effects of nuclear war. Her Government's recent Nuclear Posture Review had stressed the importance, not just to the United States of America but to all nations, of extending forever the 65-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear war was not something that any nation could accomplish alone, however. Every nation — indeed every person on the planet — benefited from efforts to confront global nuclear dangers, and every nation could contribute to their success. There were three areas where the international community needed to work together to reduce nuclear dangers: disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security.

44. On disarmament, her Government had reaffirmed its commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, a vision that would require patience and persistence to achieve. Specific steps towards that goal included the signing of the Treaty with the Russian Federation on nuclear arms reductions and efforts towards the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The United States had also redoubled its efforts to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty.

45. On non-proliferation, the United States was committed to strengthening the Treaty as the basis for international cooperation to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The key bargain for non-nuclear-weapon States was that, in exchange for their commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, they gained a commitment from the nuclear-weapon States to disarm. The bargain worked both ways: the non-proliferation undertakings by non-nuclear-weapon States helped to create a stable and secure international environment that made it possible to work towards the goal of nuclear disarmament. Those efforts could not succeed, however, if violators were allowed to act with impunity, and effective, internationally supported mechanisms for discouraging and reversing non-compliance would need to be established. The international community must also work together to resolve regional disputes that might motivate rival States to acquire and maintain nuclear weapons, in

order to reduce mistrust and build momentum for their further reduction and eventual elimination.

46. To extend the security benefits of the Treaty as broadly as possible, her Government remained committed to the goal of universal adherence. It called on those States that had yet to sign the Treaty to adopt the standards and practices embodied in the Treaty and the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime. It also called on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the one State that had announced its withdrawal, to return to compliance with the Treaty and with IAEA safeguards.

47. IAEA verification provided an important connection between the non-proliferation and disarmament goals of the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States could choose to place under IAEA verification material they identified as no longer needed for weapons purposes. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States had down-blended nearly 118 tons of highly enriched uranium removed from defence programmes to produce low-enriched reactor fuel, much of it under IAEA safeguards and inspection. Together with the Russian Federation, it was working to dispose of at least 68 tons of plutonium from weapons programmes, and IAEA would play a critical verification role in that effort. The Agency should also be given the responsibility to verify that States were not producing new fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

48. The third element of the agenda was nuclear security. The use of nuclear weapons not just by States but by violent non-State actors must be prevented. The potential availability of weapons-grade materials and the widespread knowledge of how to manufacture a simple nuclear explosive made that a real and pressing threat. President Obama had thus established the goal of securing the most sensitive nuclear materials in the world within four years. Nuclear security was an essential part of efforts to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.

49. The three pillars of the Treaty provided a solid architecture for broader efforts to confront nuclear dangers worldwide, but the structure could not endure if some parts rather than others received support. The choice was clear: the world must work together to reinforce all three pillars of the Treaty to ensure that its benefits endured for future generations.

50. **Mr. Puja** (Indonesia) said that the lack of progress on the global disarmament agenda in the past must not be allowed to detract from emerging signs of optimism. Indonesia was proud of its status as a non-nuclear-weapon State; it had recently initiated the ratification process for the Test-Ban Treaty.

51. It was his delegation's conviction that there was no place for security doctrines based on nuclear weapons. The international community instead should collaborate to achieve peace and prosperity based on the principles of multilateralism and international law. As long as one nuclear weapon existed, the risk that it could be used by design or by accident would remain. Member States must therefore work together to conclude a universal nuclear weapons convention containing a specific time frame for complete nuclear disarmament.

52. Security assurances had been extended by nuclear-weapon States through protocols to some of the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Although a welcome development, that was only a partial solution, as not all non-nuclear-weapon States were covered by such zones. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to find common ground to begin negotiations would provide a good opportunity to deal with security assurances in a transparent and comprehensive fashion. Global civil society also played an important role in advocacy for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

53. Any threat of proliferation, whatever its source, should be addressed squarely, but without discrimination and double standards. Cooperation in nuclear energy with the States not party to the Treaty, however, did not help its credibility and sent a discouraging signal to the parties. It was vitally important for Israel to come into the fold of the Treaty and place all its nuclear-related facilities under IAEA safeguards. He urged the remaining States outside the Treaty to join as soon as possible.

54. **Mr. de Macedo Soares** (Brazil) said that a decade earlier, Brazil and its partners in the New Agenda Coalition had participated in negotiations on a forward-looking, pragmatic programme of action which had come to be known as the "13 practical steps to disarmament". That had served as a crucial first test for the strengthened review process after the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

55. It was inconceivable that, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the concept of nuclear deterrence, with all its strategic implications, was still in use. Nuclear weapons were not needed to deter non-nuclear-weapon States and were still less useful to deter terrorist threats. The only logical conclusion was that deterrence and corresponding doctrines applied only to nuclear-weapon States in their relations among themselves. Sophisticated strategic doctrines that purportedly justified the possession of nuclear weapons had a more basic meaning: to enhance a sense of power and dominance for those who possessed them. The principle of undiminished security for all was not for all if it was based on nuclear weapons.

56. A successful outcome of the work of the Committee would require (a) an undertaking by nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals; (b) a commitment to the goal of concluding a nuclear weapons convention outlawing such weapons entirely; (c) a commitment to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in the strategic doctrines of military alliances; (d) further action by nuclear-weapon States towards full transparency and accountability regarding their nuclear arsenals; (e) reversal of the maintenance of thousands of nuclear weapons in high-alert status and an immediate start to irreversible demobilization; (f) resumption of the work in the Conference on Disarmament, in particular towards a fissile material cut-off treaty; (g) immediate steps to ensure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; and (h) withdrawal of any reservations or unilateral interpretive declarations by nuclear-weapon States that were incompatible with the object and purpose of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

57. Brazil and its partners in the New Agenda Coalition had presented a working paper with 22 recommendations on nuclear disarmament, building on the 13 practical steps. The vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States had never put their non-proliferation duties on hold, conditioning their fulfilment on indefinite, more favourable international conditions. A similar attitude was expected from the nuclear-weapon States regarding disarmament.

58. **Mr. Aguirre de Cárcer** (Spain), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the candidate countries Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the countries of the stabilization and

association process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, and the EFTA country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, as well as Georgia, Armenia and Ukraine, aligned themselves with that statement.

59. The European Union reaffirmed its commitment to seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. It welcomed the nuclear disarmament measures and initiatives taken by the two nuclear-weapon States members of the European Union. In a recent decision, the Council of the European Union had stressed the need for concrete advances in the nuclear disarmament process, especially through an overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons in accordance with article VI of the Treaty and for the rapid entry into force of the Test-Ban Treaty and the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

60. It welcomed the considerable nuclear arms reductions which had taken place since the end of the Cold War, including by the two nuclear-weapon States which were members of the European Union, and the significant new agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on strategic arms reduction. That was an essential step forward, as those countries still retained about 95 per cent of the world's nuclear weapon stockpiles. It recalled the continued existence of significant deployed and stockpiled non-strategic arsenals which were not covered by formal arms control agreements and the commitment contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Their reduction and final elimination were an integral part of the disarmament process under article VI of the Treaty.

61. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty would develop a global cap on nuclear arsenals crucial for further progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Pending its entry into force, the European Union called on States to abide by a moratorium on nuclear tests, to refrain from actions contrary to the Treaty and to dismantle as soon as possible all nuclear testing facilities in a transparent and open manner. The European Union would continue to offer practical support for the universalization of the Test-Ban Treaty and the credibility of its verification regime. It commended the progress achieved through the International Monitoring System, which had

demonstrated its efficiency in detecting clandestine nuclear tests by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

62. A fissile material cut-off treaty would be an important complement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Test-Ban Treaty, and the Review Conference must urge States to commence negotiations without further delay. Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, the European Union called on all States to uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear devices and welcomed the actions in that regard of the five nuclear-weapon States.

63. The European Union would pursue the issue of legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, and called on all States to take appropriate practical measures to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war.

64. Lastly, the question of the proliferation of missiles that could be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction was also a matter of concern in the context of international security, a concern that had been deepened by recently conducted tests outside all existing notification schemes. A collective response to missile proliferation was required, which should begin with consultations on a multilateral treaty banning short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles. The enhancement of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation could significantly strengthen global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts by increasing confidence and transparency.

65. **Mr. Manfredi** (Italy) said that the twofold task before the Committee consisted of assessing progress achieved towards nuclear disarmament and drafting a plan of action for the future. The assessment should focus on actual goals met and proceed in as impartial a manner as possible, avoiding value judgments and political posturing. The plan of action — to be drafted in Subsidiary Body I — should be based on the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Review Conference. It should be ambitious but not overly so, in order to avoid repeating past failures to implement those steps. Moreover, the principles of irreversibility and verifiability of nuclear disarmament must be enshrined in the action plan as the constants in State party efforts to achieve the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

66. Nuclear disarmament was a complicated process that would entail several elements, namely, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the conclusion of a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty, the granting of negative security assurances, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and a consensus on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

67. The recent signing of a new strategic arms reduction treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, Powers that held over 90 per cent of the world's nuclear weapons between them, was a remarkable success that must be built upon rather than minimized, and that would facilitate the work of Main Committee I.

68. The world was at a critical juncture; as the five major nuclear-weapon States were realizing that the atomic deterrent was increasingly irrelevant to national defence and adapting their nuclear doctrines accordingly, some countries, still convinced of the indispensable nature of those weapons, were spending enormous sums of money to expand their already substantial arsenals, out of the erroneous belief that, failing such expansion, their national existence would be threatened or their voice would go unheard in the international arena. It was essential to ensure that the former view prevailed.

69. **Mr. García Moritán** (Argentina) said that despite such positive developments as the signing of a new strategic arms reduction treaty by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, States parties must redouble their efforts to fully implement the Treaty, in particular articles I and VI. Since the reduction of arsenals, though certainly important, did not in and of itself constitute an effort to disarm, the new bilateral treaty should be considered in the context of a broader, ongoing process of consistent reduction that would ultimately expand to include all nuclear-weapon States, with a view to the total elimination of their arsenals.

70. It should be acknowledged that the Review Conference was not in a position to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear disarmament programme, a task that fell to the Conference on Disarmament. Main Committee I should instead produce a road map that outlined specific priorities, namely, a sustained nuclear disarmament process involving all nuclear-weapon States; multilateral activity, with particular emphasis

on the immediate negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament of a fissile material cut-off treaty; entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and other instruments already negotiated; and full compliance with treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the withdrawal or modification of interpretive declarations thereto. His delegation would cooperate fully in preparing such a road map.

71. **Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that nuclear disarmament and security assurances had been among the main elements in the package of decisions leading to the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. The adoption of the 13 practical steps by the 2000 Review Conference had renewed hopes for the implementation of the Treaty pillar of nuclear disarmament. Regrettably, subsequent developments in that area had not been promising. Despite the obligations of nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the Treaty and the commitments made by those States at review conferences, the ongoing development, deployment and maintenance of thousands of nuclear warheads in their stockpiles continued to threaten international peace and security.

72. Notwithstanding the recent rhetoric concerning reduction of nuclear arsenals, a lack of practical action in that area and continued efforts to expand missile defence after abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were among the obstacles to implementation of the agreements made at the 2000 Review Conference, the Final Document of which called on nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material from their decommissioned weapons under IAEA safeguards. The new treaty on strategic arms reduction signed by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in April 2010 provided only for the decommissioning of the parties' nuclear weapons, the actual destruction of which remained optional. As it lacked a verification mechanism, the treaty did not incorporate the principles of increased transparency, a diminishing role for nuclear weapons or irreversibility agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference. In addition, nuclear-weapon States had failed to take practical steps towards reducing tactical nuclear weapons, thus breaking another commitment made at the 2000 Conference.

73. The Islamic Republic of Iran firmly believed that the current Conference should establish a standing committee to ensure and verify fulfilment of nuclear-disarmament obligations, given the absence of a

mechanism for that purpose. The international community rightly expected statements on the reduction of nuclear arsenals to be acted on in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner. Despite pledges by the current Government of the United States of America, its new Nuclear Posture Review, which provided for the development and modernization of that country's nuclear arsenal, along with its failure to take concrete measures towards ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, provided clear indications of its continued policy of evading its nuclear-disarmament obligations. The Review also stipulated the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, in contravention of the assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States in 1968 and 1995. Other distressing developments included the United Kingdom's Trident programme and France's addition of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine to its nuclear arsenals, as well as the latter country's silence on the underground Israeli nuclear programme.

74. The current Conference must urgently address the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery by considering a decision prohibiting research, development, modernization and production thereof as well as a ban on the construction of any facilities for that purpose. It must also attend to the avowed violation of article I of the Treaty contained in the new Nuclear Posture Review by the United States of America, which provided for deployment of nuclear weapons in European Union territory. Nuclear-weapon States should likewise refrain from nuclear sharing under any pretext, including security arrangements or military alliances.

75. The policy of inaction of the United States of America and other nuclear-weapon States regarding the genuine threats posed by the nuclear arsenal of the Zionist regime to regional and international peace and security demonstrated a clear double standard and constituted an act of horizontal proliferation. While the potential role of non-State actors in nuclear proliferation must be dealt with, it was unfortunate that such issues were used by some nuclear-weapon States as pretexts to retain nuclear weapons and neglect their own disarmament obligations.

76. As the international community could not wait indefinitely for the total elimination of nuclear weapons to come to pass, the Conference should adopt

a clear time frame for the full implementation of article VI. In that connection, his country firmly supported the proposal made by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to set 2025 as the deadline for total elimination of nuclear weapons. He reiterated his country's call for the establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee for the negotiation of a convention on nuclear weapons. Until such a convention was concluded, nuclear-weapon States must refrain from development and research on nuclear weapons; threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; modernization of nuclear weapons and their facilities; deployment of nuclear weapons in the territories of other countries; and maintaining their nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert.

77. Turning to the issue of security assurances, he recalled that in the early 1980s all five nuclear-weapon States had, with some qualifications, undertaken to refrain from using nuclear weapons against States parties to the Treaty and those who had renounced production and acquisition of such weapons, a pledge taken note of in the package of decisions adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and enshrined in Security Council resolution 984 (1995). The international community should not await the deployment or even the threat of use of such weapons to react. That abhorrent doctrine, officially proclaimed by the United States of America and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, indicated that no lesson had been learned from the nightmare of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

78. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that nuclear weapons should not confer political clout or capability to influence world events or to change the decisions of sovereign States. Certain nuclear-weapon States, such as France, had tried to create smokescreens in the Treaty review process, making baseless allegations against non-nuclear-weapon States in order to deflect attention from their own abysmal records and policies.

79. The current Conference must concretely address the failure of past review conferences to produce recommendations on the non-discriminatory provision of unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty. Any proposal that made such assurances conditional, using non-proliferation concerns as a pretext, was doomed to fail. To that end, his

Government proposed the establishment of an ad hoc committee that would draft a legally binding instrument on the illegality of nuclear weapons and the provision of unconditional security assurances, to be submitted to the Conference for consideration and adoption. The Conference should also adopt a decision prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

80. Iran had also held an International Conference on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in April 2010 in Tehran. The conference had examined current challenges to the implementation of nuclear-disarmament commitments. In a message addressed to the Tehran conference, the Supreme Leader of the country had stressed that it was incumbent upon all to protect humankind from the grave threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction. Maintaining the delicate balance between the three pillars of the Treaty was vital to preserving its credibility and integrity. Non-nuclear-weapon States could not accept any new obligations as long as those undertaken by nuclear-weapon States remained unfulfilled.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.