Summary record of the 1st meeting
Held at the Austria Center Vienna, on Monday, 30 April 2007, at 10 a.m.

Temporary Chairman: Ms. Hoppe ........ (Officer-in-Charge, Office for Disarmament Affairs)
Chairman: Mr. Amano .............................................. (Japan)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

Opening of the session
1. Ms. Hoppe (Officer-in-Charge, Office for Disarmament Affairs) said that the first session of the Preparatory Committee had been convened pursuant to General Assembly resolution 61/70 of 6 December 2006. As had been the practice in the past, the first session of the Preparatory Committee would be chaired by a representative from the Western Group of States, which had nominated Mr. Amano of Japan.

Election of the Chairman
2. Mr. Amano (Japan) was elected Chairman by acclamation.
3. Mr. Amano (Japan) took the Chair.

Statement by the Chairman
4. The Chairman said the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime but had faced numerous challenges in recent years. The 2005 Review Conference had failed to reach agreement on substantive issues. There had been some reduction in nuclear arsenals worldwide but progress in disarmament had been disappointing, especially to non-nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear developments in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to arouse concern. The situation in the Middle East had deteriorated without any progress in establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone there. As a result of the many challenges and failures to agree on action, confidence in the Non-Proliferation Treaty had weakened. The 2010 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee provided opportunities for thorough discussion on all three pillars of the Treaty, namely, non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. He invited delegations to use the debate in the Preparatory Committee for dialogue and to participate in a spirit of mutual respect and dignity. The issues were complicated and had a long history. He hoped that the session would deepen understanding of the issues and positions through dialogue and build confidence in the Treaty.

5. Ms. Plassnik (Austria) welcomed participants to Vienna, a city that had developed into a centre of competence in security issues, hosting various bodies that focused on monitoring, verification and assistance. The non-proliferation agenda was in rather dangerous disarray after the unsuccessful 2005 Review Conference and she hoped that the present meeting would go beyond tactics and technicalities. The situation was urgent, as about a dozen countries possessed or were developing enrichment facilities and over 40 had the technical expertise to produce a nuclear weapon. There was widespread concern over the misuse of allegedly peaceful nuclear programmes, the disregard for disarmament obligations, potential illicit trade in sensitive nuclear technology and nuclear terrorism. Developing countries protested their exclusion from the nuclear club, as they faced energy hunger and insecurity at home.

6. Austria had renounced nuclear energy at home and internationally stressed nuclear safety through multilateral cooperation on the nuclear fuel cycle. An example of success in overcoming mistrust had been the European cooperation that had begun with coal and had led ultimately to the European Union. She proposed the establishment of a new international mechanism based on full transparency and mutual control. All States would declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all their existing nuclear programmes and future development plans. In a second parallel track, a kind of nuclear fuel bank would guarantee equal access to and control of the sensitive technologies of the nuclear fuel cycle, in particular enrichment and reprocessing, and would ensure, monitor and verify safe, secure and fair distribution, so that States could obtain the nuclear fuel they needed. Such an approach would provide a strong incentive to States to refrain from national enrichment and reprocessing.

7. She urged participants to embrace the Vienna spirit of consensus, dialogue and openness so as to allay suspicions, defuse tensions and work towards mutual trust and confidence.

Message from the Secretary-General
8. Ms. Hoppe (Officer-in-Charge, Office for Disarmament Affairs) read out a message from the Secretary-General, in which he said that the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was a valuable instrument that committed the nuclear States to disarmament while affirming the right of all States to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. There was, however, widespread evidence of a crisis of confidence in the Treaty, following the disappointing outcome of the 2005 Review Conference, the insufficient progress in nuclear disarmament, the lack of universal adherence to safeguards agreements of the International Atomic Energy Agency and cases of non-compliance with the Treaty. There had been new tests of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles and a number of failures in efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. Creative responses were needed to keep the Treaty in step with changing times and to strengthen the accountability of States parties. The Secretary-General called on participants to build on the Vienna spirit of multilateral cooperation with its non-confrontational approach to difficult issues.

Tribute to the memory of Mr. Iccho Itoh, Mayor of Nagasaki

9. At the invitation of the Chairman, the members of the Committee observed a minute of silence.

Adoption of the agenda

10. The Chairman said that more time would be needed to reach agreement on the provisional agenda.

Organization of work

11. The Chairman said that the precedent at previous conferences and their preparatory committees had been for chairmen of the sessions of the Preparatory Committee to serve as vice-chairmen of the Committee when not serving as chairmen. The Group of Eastern European States had nominated Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine) for the post of Chairman of the second session.

12. He took it that the Committee wished to elect Mr. Yelchenko as Chairman of the second session.

13. It was so decided.

14. The Chairman said that he would circulate a conference room paper with possible dates and venues for further sessions of the Preparatory Committee, taking into account the provisional calendars of other United Nations disarmament bodies.

15. He suggested that the Committee might wish to follow past practice and adopt its decisions at the current session by consensus. In the event that consensus could not be reached, the Committee would take decisions in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, which would be applied mutatis mutandis.

16. It was so decided.

17. The Chairman suggested, with regard to participation at sessions of the Preparatory Committee of entities other than States parties, that the Committee might wish to adopt the following decision, based on the practice of the previous Preparatory Committees, the relevant rules of procedure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference:

“Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee.

“Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee behind their organizations’ nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decides, based on the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which would be applied mutatis mutandis, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee, on a case by case basis.
“Representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee.”

18. It was so decided.
19. The Chairman said that Palestine had requested to attend the meetings of the Preparatory Committee as an observer; the following specialized agencies and intergovernmental organizations had requested to attend the Preparatory Committee: the European Commission, the League of Arab States, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization; and 66 non-governmental organizations, listed in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/INF.2, had submitted requests to attend meetings of the Committee.
20. He took it that the Committee wished to take note of those requests.
21. It was so decided.
22. The Chairman said that he took it that the Committee wished to continue its past practice of using Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish as its working languages.
23. It was so decided.
24. The Chairman noted that during the previous sessions of the Preparatory Committee summary records had been provided, at each session, for the Committee’s opening meeting, the general debate and the closing meeting. In addition, records had been kept of decisions taken at other meetings.
25. He took it that the Committee wished to proceed accordingly at the current session.
26. It was so decided.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee

27. Mr. Sekiguchi (Japan) said that Japan attached enormous importance to maintaining and strengthening the Treaty, which was the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation regime. The NPT regime faced serious challenges and the Preparatory Committee must prove to the international community that the review process could fulfil its key responsibilities of addressing the current challenges and fostering confidence in the Treaty. Nuclear disarmament must be promoted persistently while fully respecting the 1995 Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the 13 practical steps agreed in 2000. The pressing issues in nuclear disarmament were the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the speedy initiation and conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Japan strongly urged member States of the Conference on Disarmament to show flexibility and adopt a compromise proposal, such as the Six Presidents’ proposal, so as to enable the Conference to resume work in its primary role, including negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Nuclear-weapon States should also implement deeper reductions in their arsenals.

28. Regional nuclear issues raised by unilateral actions taken by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran posed serious challenges to the international non-proliferation regime and Japan welcomed the strong unified international response to those challenges. Japan strongly urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fulfil its obligations under Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and to take concrete steps towards denuclearization. His country would continue to work towards a peaceful diplomatic solution to the issue through the Six-Party Talks. Japan regretted that, despite repeated calls from the international community, the Islamic Republic of Iran had not complied with Security Council resolutions and urged it to suspend its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and return swiftly to the negotiation process. Japan also urged India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. In order for IAEA to perform its vital role effectively and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, the conclusion of Additional Protocols must be universalized.

29. Given the rising global demand for energy and the renewed interest in nuclear energy, the issues of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear safety and nuclear security must be resolved, for which the activities of
IAEA were crucial. Japan had sought to enhance nuclear security through its contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. Nuclear fuel supply assurances would also assist in advancing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy while still ensuring nuclear non-proliferation. Noting that withdrawal from the NPT could have serious ramifications for international peace and security, Japan called for more in-depth discussions on the issue. The effort to promote disarmament and non-proliferation should include education and campaigns to cultivate the spirit of peace, disarmament and non-proliferation through traditional and popular media. He noted that Japan had submitted a comprehensive working paper on the issues he had raised for consideration by the Committee, as well as one on disarmament education.

30. Mr. Meyer (Canada) said that the Treaty was at the core of the international regime that had established the norm of nuclear non-proliferation, the legal obligation to pursue good faith negotiations towards nuclear disarmament and the framework for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The authority and integrity of the Treaty were, however, facing extremely acute challenges that the current review process needed to deal with on an urgent basis.

31. Until recently, no non-nuclear-weapon State party had developed nuclear weapon capabilities, but the test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in October 2006 had changed that. Canada urged that country to build on the recent positive results of the Six-Party talks and return to the NPT family in good standing. The cumbersome international response to the events on the Korean peninsula had shown that the States parties to the Treaty should meet at least once a year with the authority to take decisions as required to deal with violations and other threats to the Treaty’s integrity. There should also be a mechanism that could meet in emergency session in the face of a critical threat and a small standing bureau to provide stewardship and continuity during the five-year cycles. Similarly, the actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran represented a prominent challenge to the NPT non-proliferation norm, an issue that should be dealt with by States parties in the Preparatory Committee. That country must work to restore confidence, resolve outstanding issues and demonstrate that it would work proactively and constructively with IAEA.

32. Nuclear disarmament posed another challenge to the Treaty. The current holdings of nuclear weapons remained far too high and the pathway and timetable for further reductions remained ill-defined. Key supporting agreements, such as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off agreement, had either not yet entered into force or had not been negotiated. Increasing attention was being devoted to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as global energy demand and concerns about global climate changes grew. New rule-based and non-discriminatory initiatives to harness that potential without weakening the non-proliferation regime would bring significant global benefits.

33. Only about two thirds of the States parties to the Treaty had concluded a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with IAEA. Those agreements were now the international nuclear safeguards standard, and universal compliance with that norm would increase international confidence in the peaceful intent of States parties’ nuclear programmes. However, initiatives aimed at bringing non-party States closer into line with international non-proliferation and disarmament norms must not be allowed to undermine those norms and must be based on clear proposals and adequate debate. The NPT and its support mechanisms must continue to evolve to ensure compliance in the face of new technological, security and geo-political developments. States parties should focus on ensuring comprehensive implementation of NPT obligations while promoting universalization. Improved accountability through upgrading of some of the Treaty’s institutional arrangements would assist in achieving those goals.

34. Ms. Millar (Australia) urged all NPT member States to grasp the opportunities offered by the new review cycle to rebuild faltering confidence in the non-proliferation regime established by the Treaty. There were inevitably differences in views and priorities but also much common ground, in particular the view that the security interests of all States were best served by renouncing nuclear weapons, joining the Treaty and complying faithfully with the obligations set by the Treaty and IAEA. If confidence in the Treaty was allowed to falter, strategically and economically damaging regional nuclear arms races could result, harming the interests of all.

35. The North Korean nuclear test in October 2006 illustrated the risk of NPT parties acquiring nuclear technology and then leaving the Treaty to pursue nuclear weapons. Parties to the Treaty should agree on
measures to strengthen disincentives to withdrawal and to ensure an appropriate response to such cases. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s failure to cooperate fully with IAEA inspections and to answer all questions about its past activities only further reduced international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. Peaceful use rights were not unconditional and must be in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. The Iranian nuclear programme had refocused international attention on the need to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies while respecting the right to benefit from peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Multilateral approaches concerning the nuclear fuel cycle would benefit both energy security and non-proliferation objectives. The IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, coupled with the Additional Protocols, represented the best verification standard and guarantee of the Treaty’s long-term effectiveness. She urged all uranium suppliers to insist, as Australia did, on States signing an Additional Protocol before supplying uranium to them.

36. A credible nuclear-weapon State commitment to nuclear disarmament was essential for maintaining the Treaty’s political strength and vitality. Australia looked to the nuclear-weapon States to identify areas for progress, such as further reductions in nuclear weapons and their operational status. Nuclear-weapon-free zones were an effective means by which negative security assurances could be given to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Transparency was crucial for confidence-building and she urged nuclear-weapon States to be as open as possible about their nuclear weapons policies and disarmament actions and to pursue their NPT nuclear disarmament commitments vigorously. Similarly, non-nuclear-weapon States should, in the interest of confidence-building, support an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime and reinforcing mechanisms, such as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a fissile material cut-off treaty. In that connection, she urged members of the Conference on Disarmament to support the Six Presidents’ proposal containing a draft programme of work for the Conference.

37. Noting the renewed global interest in nuclear energy, she pointed out that the Treaty facilitated access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while providing the non-proliferation assurances needed for peaceful nuclear trade and cooperation. The work of IAEA had enabled many countries to access the benefits of nuclear technology in areas ranging from food, agriculture and human health to industry and resource management. Australia was a significant uranium exporter; it had just opened a new research reactor supplied by an Argentine company and participated actively in multilateral and bilateral peaceful nuclear cooperation.

38. She called for constructive engagement and realism in the current review process, respecting the concerns of all NPT parties and focusing on practical steps and areas of agreement.

39. Mr. Antonov (Russian Federation) said that the NPT continued to be at the core of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts and to minimize the risk of nuclear conflict. Nevertheless, the nuclear non-proliferation regime was facing considerable challenges. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was deadlocked; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was absent from the meeting; regional non-proliferation issues remained unresolved; and black market proliferation networks were still operating. No State, no matter how powerful, was capable of maintaining or strengthening the regime on its own, much less by force. Setbacks to the regime could be prevented only through the diplomatic and political mechanisms of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council.

40. First, the international community should cooperate in ensuring a steady supply of nuclear fuel as an alternative to the spread of sensitive technologies. As the IAEA Director General had noted, there was no need for any new uranium enrichment or nuclear reprocessing facilities. The initiative put forward in 2006 by the President of the Russian Federation, envisaging the establishment of multilateral centres for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services could promote the development of such cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a first step towards implementing that initiative, the Russian Federation was establishing an international uranium enrichment centre under IAEA safeguards. The participants in the centre would have guaranteed access to needed enrichment services, which would obviate the need for them to develop their own production facilities. Other such initiatives included the United States proposal for a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership and fuel supply assurances made by six supplier States.
41. Secondly, it was important to improve the effectiveness of IAEA verification activities, including through the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreements between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. The Protocol should become a universally accepted standard for the verification of NPT member States’ implementation of their non-proliferation obligations and for nuclear exports. His delegation called on all States which had not yet done so to conclude Additional Protocols as soon as possible. The Russian Federation would continue to provide assistance in strengthening the IAEA safeguards system, inter alia, through the financing of national programmes for that purpose. His Government had cooperated for many years in the development of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology by States, including for the construction of accelerators and neutron generators and other equipment.

42. Thirdly, it was important to continue nuclear disarmament efforts. The Russian Federation had fulfilled its obligations to reduce its strategic offensive arms under the START Treaty ahead of schedule and continued to reduce its strategic delivery vehicles and warheads. To date, it had reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapons by three quarters of the number inherited from the Soviet Union. Overall, nuclear weapons had decreased by a factor of five since 1991. The Russian Federation was fulfilling its obligations under the Treaty with the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions. As the START I Treaty would expire in December 2009, work was being done on a new arrangement, in accordance with the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation. It should be noted that there was a clear link between strategic offensive and defensive arms. The global anti-ballistic missile defence system threatened to encourage the proliferation of missiles and jeopardize nuclear disarmament. The placement of weapons, including anti-missile weapons, in outer space might trigger a new arms race.

43. The Russian Federation consistently sought the strengthening and universalization of the NPT. There was a need for joint efforts to include countries outside the scope of the Treaty, inter alia by expanding IAEA verification activities in their territories and enhancing national legislation in the area of nuclear material accounting, control and physical protection, and export controls.

44. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was important for the promotion of non-proliferation efforts. However, a moratorium on nuclear testing could not substitute for the legal obligations arising from the Treaty, which would achieve much-needed predictability. His Government therefore urged all the States on which the entry into force of the Treaty depended to ratify it as soon as possible.

45. The time had also come for the Conference on Disarmament to begin work on a draft of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Consideration should also be given to strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear States. His Government’s proposal to concentrate nuclear weapons within the national territories of the nuclear-weapon States remained pertinent in that respect. His delegation welcomed the signing of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and called on all nuclear States to support it. It was committed to the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/7, annex) and consistently supported efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the region.

46. The situation concerning the Iranian nuclear programme remained tense. His Government was awaiting a positive response from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the appeals by IAEA and the Security Council to clarify pending questions on its past nuclear activities and to restore confidence in its current nuclear efforts. Teheran must seek a negotiated solution in cooperation with IAEA, in accordance with the statement by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1747 (2007) (S/PV.5647).
47. There were genuine prospects for a negotiated settlement to the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula. His Government supported the arrangements agreed at the Six-Party Talks on 13 February 2007 and trusted that all parties would implement them promptly and fully.

48. More attention should be given to such issues as non-compliance with the Treaty, the emergence of black markets and the prospects of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorists. His delegation noted with appreciation the wide support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which was aimed at mobilizing States to implement their obligations under the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and other international instruments related to combating nuclear terrorism. Lastly, it stood ready to cooperate with all other delegations in strengthening the Treaty and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

49. **Ms. Gabr** (Egypt) emphasized that her country would seek to ensure that the Review Conference was a success and so contribute to maintaining the coherence and credibility of the Treaty, which was one of the major objectives of Egyptian foreign policy.

50. Her delegation had agreed to refer to the outcomes of previous Review Conferences in the proposed agenda because the 1995 Review Conference outcomes relating to the indefinite extension of the Treaty, specifically, were of considerable importance to the success of the work of the Preparatory Committee, as were the 2000 Review Conference outcomes and the agreement reached with respect to nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the Middle East.

51. She emphasized that the issue of compliance applied to all clauses of the Treaty, including the commitments of nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament and of all parties to the Treaty not to provide non-party States with nuclear materials and technologies.

52. The non-proliferation regime was passing through a critical phase. Numerous breaches of the regime were calling its credibility and coherence into question. Serious consideration of the current challenges was necessary in order to contain signs of a split in the regime, which was fundamental to the maintenance of international peace and security.

53. The Treaty was based on a delicate balance between the rights and mutual duties of States parties. The achievement of its fundamental goal depended on the objective, balanced and non-selective commitment of the States parties to the Treaty to its three pillars, namely, nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Loss of that balance threatened the credibility of the Treaty.

54. The nuclear-weapon States had failed to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty with regard to nuclear disarmament, ignored the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference, failed to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security and military strategies and deliberately developed new generations of such weapons, thus undermining the Treaty, increasing the risk of the use of nuclear weapons and jeopardizing the objective of universal nuclear disarmament. Some States were seeking to impose further obligations and constraints on non-nuclear-weapon States that had renounced the nuclear military option and were bound by their non-proliferation duties and to impose unjustified conditions that would limit their access to nuclear materials and technology for peaceful uses, as well as apply additional pressure with respect to verification activities. The achievement of a universal system of comprehensive guarantees included a ban on any cooperation on nuclear technology with States not parties to the Treaty.

55. Those factors had upset the balance and created confusion over priorities at a critical point, when the Treaty faced more pressing challenges that required the unified efforts of the international community. There had been recent time-consuming and distracting initiatives to establish parallel entities with limited membership, insufficient transparency and vague institutional structure that undermined multilateralism.

56. Global energy needs were increasing. The inalienable right of the developing countries to use nuclear energy for development purposes made it necessary to consider the clause in the Treaty on cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and ways of assisting developing countries on a non-discriminatory basis to research, produce and use nuclear energy. The Treaty stipulated that the non-nuclear-weapon States were permitted to benefit from nuclear technology unconditionally, subject to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System.
57. Recent attempts had been made to reinterpret article IV of the Treaty on the right of non-nuclear-weapon States to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, through the classification of nuclear technology as sensitive, and initiatives to obstruct the self-reliance of developing countries with respect to the satisfaction of their nuclear fuel needs. Such attempts could upset the balance of the Treaty or, eventually, reorient the activities of IAEA, transforming it into an obstacle to the transfer of nuclear technology and reducing the value of the Comprehensive Safeguards System, rather than sharing the benefits under such a system.

58. The tension in the Middle East and the disruption of the balance of power were due to the nuclear capabilities that remained outside the monitoring system and challenged the credibility and effectiveness of the Treaty in supporting regional and international peace and security. Members of the international community had shown their appreciation of the gravity of that threat in their support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, pursuant to the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, which was one of the most important sources for the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

59. The direct link between the indefinite extension of the Treaty and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was widely recognized. The elimination of one element would undermine the other and open the door to unilateral measures, causing the politics of the region to spin out of control and drawing other regions into a tense series of unpredictable actions and reactions.

60. Regrettably, the international will to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons was not matched by practical measures to require Israel, the only Middle East State not party to the Treaty, to be bound by international agreement. On the contrary, the statement to the media recently made by a senior Israeli official on the military capabilities of his country represented a challenge to the international community. Undermining the Treaty in such a manner could catalyse a nuclear arms race that would destabilize the region and the future of the entire nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation system.

61. The States parties should create a practical, non-discriminatory programme for the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Middle East region and put pressure on Israel to accede to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and subject all its installations to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards System, in line with the relevant resolutions and decisions.

62. The only guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was their complete elimination, which was the principal aim of the Treaty and required both universal implementation and the cooperation of the nuclear-weapon States in fulfilling their obligations under article VI.

63. The General Assembly had reiterated its request at its sixty-first session to start negotiations on the provision of unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States through an international legal instrument binding on the nuclear-weapon States. It was to be hoped that the Preparatory Committee would give the necessary attention to that important issue in preparation for the Review Conference.

64. The issues before the Review Conference required decisive choices and actions, commitment to universal implementation of the Treaty and constructive cooperation. It was the responsibility of the States parties to meet the expectations of the peoples of the world and the civil society organizations, supported by their Governments, which represented their concerns and priorities and supported the aims of the Treaty.

65. Mr. Lüdeking (Germany), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said that the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was based on member States’ conviction that a multilateral approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, with shared commitments and obligations within the framework of the NPT, provided the best way to maintain international order. However, the NPT could fulfil its purpose only if parties were confident of the compliance of all States parties with the Treaty obligations.

66. The disappointment with the 2005 Review Conference should spur all States parties to redouble their efforts to achieve greater success in 2010. The European Union believed that the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament were essential for global peace and security. It
therefore encouraged efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime and supported the decisions and resolutions adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. It also attached great importance to achieving universal membership in and compliance with the NPT.

67. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by States outside the Treaty and non-compliance with the Treaty by States parties undermined non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The European Union was concerned about the serious nuclear proliferation incidents and the growing nuclear terrorism and illicit trade in sensitive nuclear technology in recent years. In that connection it supported the tightening of nationally and internationally coordinated export controls on such technology and equipment, restricting exports to countries that had signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and it urged all States to remain committed to implementing Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006).

68. IAEA was the world’s focal point for peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear safety and for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and countering new threats of nuclear terrorism. The universal adoption and implementation of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols was a prerequisite for an effective nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Additional Protocols raised the standard for compliance and made it easier to detect violations. The European Union was concerned about the implications for international peace and security of withdrawal from the NPT and urged the Preparatory Committee to adopt measures to discourage withdrawal. Of particular concern were the Islamic Republic of Iran’s increasing lack of cooperation with IAEA and its failure to comply with Security Council resolutions. While committed to a negotiated solution, the European Union was determined not to allow that country to acquire military nuclear capabilities. It was equally concerned about the situation on the Korean peninsula and urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles programme, to comply with obligations under the NPT, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to refrain from any further tests of a nuclear device and to re-establish the moratorium on long-range missile testing.

69. The European Union also supported the pursuit of nuclear disarmament through the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. In that connection, transparency served as a valuable confidence-building measure. Noting that the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms and the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions would both expire within the next five years, he expressed the hope that there would nevertheless be further progress in reducing the two largest nuclear arsenals through appropriate follow-on processes. In that connection, the European Union looked forward to the fulfilment of the United States and Russian Presidential Declarations of 1991 and 1992 on unilateral reductions in the stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons. European Union member States had participated in programmes to destroy nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and convert military stockpiles of fissile material into a militarily unusable state.

70. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty imposed a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and a credible verification regime, and the European Union called on all States, especially those listed in annex II of the Treaty, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay and to abide by a moratorium on testing pending the Treaty’s entry into force.

71. A new momentum had developed at the Conference on Disarmament as a result of the Six Presidents’ proposal and it was to be hoped that the deadlock in the work of the Conference could be overcome and significant work resumed, especially the negotiation in the Conference of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The European Union would continue to address the problems of regional insecurity and the situations of conflict that lay behind many weapons programmes. Positive and negative security assurances could play an important role in the NPT regime and serve as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, effective nuclear-weapon-free zones enhanced regional and global peace and security and promoted nuclear disarmament, stability and confidence. All States in the Middle East region should establish an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, accede to the NPT and the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions and
conclude with IAEA the appropriate safeguards agreements and protocols.

72. Noting the growing interest on the part of States in developing nuclear programmes to address their long-term energy requirements, he stressed the importance of continuing international cooperation to strengthen nuclear safety, safe waste management and the physical protection of nuclear material. In that connection, the European Union was actively engaged in the ongoing discussions on the multilateralization of fuel cycle activities and fuel supply guarantee mechanisms under the auspices of IAEA.

73. **Ms. Goicochea Estenoz** (Cuba), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions consonant with the Charter of the United Nations provided the only sustainable approach to disarmament and international security issues. The non-aligned States parties to the NPT remained fully committed to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and to the agreements reached at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The Movement had submitted to the Preparatory Committee eight working papers on questions pertaining to the operation and functioning of the Treaty and implementation of commitments and outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

74. The future of the Treaty was uncertain, as the initial agreement on the three pillars, namely, disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, remained unfulfilled. The concerns expressed by some in 1995 about indefinite extension of the Treaty had been justified, as the nuclear-weapon States continued to believe in nuclear weapons and, along with some States not parties to the Treaty, continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals. There was much global concern about weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, about horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation, and about nuclear terrorism by non-State actors. States were frustrated by the slow progress towards nuclear disarmament and anxious to protect their rights to peaceful nuclear research and access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

75. Members of the Movement called for full and non-selective implementation of all aspects of the Treaty. In particular, all States must fulfil their obligations in relation to arms control and disarmament and prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related technology. However, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, a universal and binding instrument should be concluded granting security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties. All efforts to establish nuclear-free-zones should be supported, especially in the Middle East. In that connection, it was especially important that Israel should accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Similarly, the two nuclear-weapon States in South Asia must be persuaded to accede to the Treaty.

76. The Movement also reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to engage in research, production and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and to benefit from transfers of nuclear technology for such purposes. On the other hand, nuclear-weapon States must refrain from sharing nuclear materials and technology with other States for military purposes and there must be no nuclear sharing of any kind with States not parties to the Treaty. All efforts to stem proliferation should be transparent and open to participation by all States.

77. She urged participants not to risk unravelling the NPT but to seek ways and means to ensure that the Treaty remained a cornerstone for global peace and security.

*The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.*