
**Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons**

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Summary record of the 1st meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 4 May 2009, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Chidyausiku (Zimbabwe)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Opening of the session

1. **The Chairman** declared open the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Statement by the Secretary-General

2. **The Secretary-General** said that, for too long, the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda had been stagnating in a cold war mentality. In 2005, the world had experienced what might be called a disarmament depression. The Review Conference that year had ended in disappointment, while the 2005 World Summit Outcome contained not a single line on weapons of mass destruction. Today, the world seemed to be emerging from that low point. However, the change seen in recent weeks was unfolding against a backdrop of multiple threats that, while themselves urgent, tended to obscure the urgency of the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. The global economic crisis, climate change and the outbreak of the influenza A (H1N1) virus served as reminders of the interdependent nature of today's world and demanded a full and forceful multilateral response. At the same time, nuclear weapons remained an apocalyptic threat. The international community could not afford to place disarmament and non-proliferation on the back burner. States must not be lulled into complacency or miss the opportunity to make their societies safer and more prosperous.

3. As Secretary-General, he had been using every opportunity to push for progress. He had discussed non-proliferation and disarmament with Russian President Medvedev and United States President Obama and welcomed the joint commitment they had announced the previous month to fulfil their obligations under article VI of the NPT. He was particularly encouraged that both countries were committed rapidly to pursuing verifiable reductions in their strategic offensive arsenals by replacing the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty) with a new, legally binding pact. He hoped their example would serve as a catalyst in inspiring other nuclear powers to follow suit.

4. He encouraged the Islamic Republic of Iran to continue its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), with a view to demonstrating the entirely peaceful nature of its nuclear programme, and to re-engage in negotiations with the so-called E3+3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom plus the United States, the Russian Federation and China) and the European Union's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and in line with the package of proposals for cooperation with the country.

5. With respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and despite the current serious challenges, he continued to believe that the six-party process was the best mechanism for achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner. He therefore urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return to the talks so that respective concerns could be resolved through dialogue and cooperation, on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions and multilateral and bilateral agreements.

6. Furthermore, he urged all States to end the stalemate that had marked the international disarmament machinery for so long. To strengthen the NPT regime, it was essential for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) to enter into force without further delay and for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a verifiable fissile material treaty. He commended the commitment of the United States to ratifying the CTBT and urged all countries that had not yet done so to ratify the Treaty without conditions.

7. Hopes for a breakthrough on the deadlocked disarmament agenda had been building. There had been a cascade of proposals. Elder statesmen, leaders of nuclear-weapon States, regional groups, various commissions and civil society representatives had elaborated proposals for slaying the nuclear monster. Their voices, though varied, belonged to a rising chorus demanding action on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Concerns about nuclear terrorism, a new rush by some to possess nuclear arms and renewed interest in nuclear power as an alternative to fossil fuels had only heightened the need for urgent action.

8. The Committee's work over the next two weeks would be critical. Delegations must seize the moment

and show their seriousness. The current session must be used to generate agreement on key procedural issues and substantive recommendations to the Review Conference, which in turn must produce a clear commitment by all States parties to comply fully with all their obligations under the NPT. He urged delegations to adopt a spirit of compromise and flexibility and, rather than taking absolute positions that had no chance of generating consensus, to build bridges and to be part of a new multilateralism.

9. People knew intuitively that nuclear weapons would never make the world more secure and that real security lay in responding to poverty, climate change, armed conflict and instability. People wanted Governments to invest in plans for growth and development, not in weapons of mass destruction. If the Committee could pave the way for a nuclear-weapon-free world, it would send a desperately needed message of hope. He wished States parties every success, both at the current session and at the Review Conference.

Statement by the Chairman

10. **The Chairman** said that the current session came at an opportune time in the history of the NPT. There was abundant political will among States parties for the Review Conference to succeed. The Committee must not miss the current window of opportunity. It must focus on the core business of the NPT so as to prepare for a successful Review Conference that resulted in a stronger and more effective Treaty. As Chairman, he would do his utmost to guide the session towards a successful outcome. To do so, however, he would require the cooperation, advice and assistance of States parties. In that connection, he reminded delegations that the Committee must provide an agenda for the 2010 Review Conference to prevent a repeat of the 2005 Review Conference.

Organization of work

11. **The Chairman** recalled that the agenda for all Preparatory Committee sessions had been adopted at the first session in 2007 and issued as document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/15. It was also reproduced in the Committee's report on its second session (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.II/13, para. 7).

12. He drew attention to the indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.3), which should be read

in conjunction with the programme of work (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.2). He took it that the Committee wished to take note of the indicative timetable (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.3).

13. *It was so decided.*

14. **The Chairman** recalled that, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 2005 Review Conference, which were applied *mutatis mutandis* to the work of the Committee, representatives of the United Nations and of IAEA were entitled to attend the meetings of the Committee and to submit material, both orally and in writing. He further recalled that, at its first session, the Committee had adopted the following decision, based on previous decisions and the relevant rules of procedure of the 2005 Review Conference:

“Representatives of States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their countries' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit documents to the participants in the Committee.

“Representatives of specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations should be allowed, upon request, to attend as observers the meetings of the Committee other than those designated closed meetings, to be seated in the Committee behind their organizations' nameplates and to receive documents of the Committee. They should also be entitled to submit, in writing, their views and comments on questions within their competence, which may be circulated as documents of the Committee. Furthermore, the Committee decides, based on the agreement at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which would be applied *mutatis mutandis*, that specialized agencies and international and regional intergovernmental organizations be invited to make oral presentations to the Committee upon the decision of the Committee, on a case-by-case basis.

“Representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should be allowed, upon request, to attend the meetings of the Committee

other than those designated closed, to be seated in the designated area, to receive documents of the Committee and, at their own expense, to make written material available to the participants in the Committee. The Committee shall also allocate a meeting to non-governmental organizations to address each session of the Committee.”

15. In that regard, he said that requests to attend the meetings of the Committee had been received from Palestine; from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the League of Arab States, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO); and from 77 NGOs (listed in document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.4). He took it that the Committee wished to take note of those requests.

16. *It was so decided.*

17. **The Chairman** drew attention to the financial report contained in NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/1, which had been submitted pursuant to a decision of the Committee at its second session. At that session, the Committee had also agreed that assessed and outstanding dues must be paid in proper time. As the report indicated, a significant amount of outstanding dues remained, some dating back to 1995. He was pleased to report that there were adequate funds for the holding of the current session. The agility shown by many States parties in recent months in paying their outstanding dues on time should ensure that the requisite funds for the Review Conference were deposited with the Secretariat well in advance and that the necessary arrangements could therefore be made. Payments made by States parties subsequent to the processing and printing of the financial report would be reflected in an addendum to the report, to be finalized by the Secretariat towards the end of the current session.

18. He also drew attention to document NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/INF.1, in particular paragraphs 8 and 9 on documentation. The Committee must conform to the guidelines for the submission of documentation mandated by the General Assembly to ensure timely translation and distribution of documents. To expedite the processing and issuance of in-session documents, it was strongly recommended that documents should not exceed five pages. To

comply with those requirements, delegations were encouraged to provide only new information when submitting reports. Working papers and proposals already submitted in the review cycle need not be resubmitted. At the Committee’s first session in 2007, there had been an almost threefold increase in documentation compared to the first session in the previous review cycle. At its second session in 2008, the number of documents had fallen by over half. The production of official documentation in six languages was one of the most expensive budget items and a major factor in escalating costs.

19. Lastly, the representative of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission and of the League of Arab States had asked to make a statement during the Committee’s general debate. He took it that, in accordance with the decision taken at its first session, the Committee wished to invite them to make a statement at the end of the general debate.

20. *It was so decided.*

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee

21. **Mr. Moreno Fernández** (Cuba), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the NPT, said that an opportunity to make progress on the Treaty’s disarmament pillar was within sight. He welcomed the recent commitment by the United States and the Russian Federation to work towards implementation of article VI of the NPT. Now, nuclear-weapon States must take concrete steps to eliminate nuclear weapons in an irreversible, verifiable and transparent manner. Every effort must be made to create an environment conducive to strengthening the NPT regime and providing humankind with the security it needed. Procedural issues must be resolved during the current session. States parties should focus not on their differences, but on reaching common objectives.

22. Despite some promising signs, nuclear disarmament remained a long way off. The non-aligned States parties remained convinced of their long-standing positions on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and committed to meeting their obligations under both the NPT and the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. The only way to guarantee that no party would use or threaten to use nuclear weapons was to eliminate them. Full

implementation of the 13 practical steps agreed in 2000 remained crucial. The Review Conference should call for the establishment of a specific time frame for article VI implementation and of a mechanism for verifying nuclear-weapon State compliance. To that end, a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament should be established within Main Committee I.

23. Until such time as nuclear weapons were eliminated, non-nuclear-weapon States should be granted universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference should establish a subsidiary body on such assurances.

24. For the objective of the NPT to be met, its three pillars must be implemented in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner. The NPT sought to ensure a balance between the mutual obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States and those of non-nuclear-weapon States. The indefinite extension of the NPT did not imply indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States.

25. He welcomed efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions. States must cooperate and consult with a view to concluding agreements in that regard. The establishment of such zones and Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status constituted a positive and important step towards nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

26. Noting that nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the NPT continued to develop and to modernize their nuclear arsenals at the expense of international peace and security, particularly in the Middle East, he called for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. He also called for the establishment within Main Committee II of a subsidiary body responsible for considering, and making proposals on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and of the 2000 Review Conference outcome, which reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the NPT and of the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

27. He reiterated the inalienable right of States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. The free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology should be assured. According to the 2000 Review Conference

outcome, each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected. Article VI was very explicit in that regard, leaving room for neither interpretation of the Treaty nor the establishment of conditions. The damage caused by the excessive restrictions applied to developing country States parties should be remedied.

28. Nuclear-weapon States must refrain from sharing nuclear know-how for military purposes. Moreover, the transfer of nuclear equipment, information, material, facilities, resources and devices and the provision of nuclear, scientific and technological assistance to States not parties to the Treaty should be prohibited. The nuclear cooperation agreement recently concluded with a State not party to the Treaty was a matter of great concern since it would allow nuclear material to be transferred to non-safeguarded facilities, in violation of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty and the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995.

29. Article X of the Treaty was very clear regarding the right of States parties to withdraw from the Treaty. The Non-Aligned States parties' position had not changed: proposals in that regard went beyond the Treaty's provisions and the right of States parties to withdraw from treaties or conventions should be governed by international treaty law.

30. The failure of the 2005 Review Conference had been extremely disappointing. To avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, the Committee should seek to achieve early consensus on outstanding procedural issues.

31. As the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, the NPT protected the world from nuclear war. States must work tirelessly to make the regime universal, attach equal importance to the Treaty's three pillars, and work together to ensure that the three nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, without preconditions. He called on delegations to work towards strengthening the NPT regime with a view to eliminating nuclear weapons. For the current window of opportunity to be fully realized, all States parties must do their part. The non-aligned States parties would work constructively and actively to ensure that the current session achieved concrete outcomes.

32. **Mr. Pojar** (Czech Republic), speaking on behalf of the European Union; the candidate countries Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey; the stabilization and association process countries Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia; and, in addition, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, said that the NPT provided a unique framework for maintaining and strengthening international peace, security and stability. The current challenges in the field of international security made the NPT more important than ever. The international community had a duty to maintain and strengthen its authority and integrity and to continue to advocate its universality. To that end, the European Union would continue to promote all the objectives contained therein.

33. He welcomed the renewed engagement of the United States and the Russian Federation, and the renewed commitment by the international community to the entry into force of the CTBT and to beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. He also noted with interest the renewed international debate on ways to advance the Treaty's objectives. The year 2009 presented serious proliferation challenges and would be decisive in finding negotiated solutions, particularly for the Iranian nuclear issue.

34. The current review cycle presented an opportunity to foster a sense of common purpose among States parties and to create a more secure international environment. The European Union would continue to work to make it a success. Expressing support for the resolution and decisions adopted in 1995, the final document adopted in 2000 and the universality of the NPT, he called on States not parties to the NPT to join it as non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. At the current session, the European Union would work with all States parties to agree on the provisional agenda and rules of procedure of the Review Conference and the nomination of its president; to identify areas of convergence under each pillar; and to achieve consensus on recommendations to the Review Conference.

36. To be successful, the Review Conference must attach equal importance to all three pillars and adopt concrete, effective, pragmatic and consensual measures in that regard. To that end, the European Union had elaborated proposals on each pillar for inclusion in an action plan to be adopted by the Review Conference.

37. Strengthening the non-proliferation regime was a key priority. The European Union would continue to promote the universalization and implementation of rules and instruments preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. NPT States parties must strictly comply with their obligations in that regard and respond quickly and effectively to non-compliance by others. The proliferation risks presented by the nuclear programmes of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea remained a matter of serious concern. A negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear issue was cardinal, since the acquisition by the Islamic Republic of Iran of a military nuclear capability would constitute an unacceptable threat to regional and international security. The universalization and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system was also important. To be effective, international action against proliferation must be based on operational cooperation. To that end, in 2008 the European Union had adopted new lines for action in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

38. The European Union was committed to nuclear disarmament. It welcomed the reductions in nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since the end of the cold war; the commitment by the United States and by the Russian Federation to replace the START I Treaty with a new, legally binding treaty before it expired in December 2009; and the nuclear disarmament measures adopted by its two nuclear-weapon member States. The international community should promote the disarmament initiatives by the European Union to the General Assembly in 2008. In the short term, it was particularly important to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT and to launch negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

39. The European Union supported the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It also supported the activities of IAEA in the field of technical cooperation and assistance and was the prime contributor to its technical cooperation fund.

40. The development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses must take place in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions. The European Union was committed to strengthened international cooperation in that regard. It supported IAEA in helping States develop the necessary infrastructure, and had set up an

instrument for nuclear safety cooperation to help countries benefit from its significant experience in that regard.

41. The establishment of multilateral mechanisms offered a credible alternative to the development of national capabilities for sensitive fuel cycle technologies. The European Union stood ready to contribute up to €25 million to the creation of a nuclear fuel bank under IAEA control and looked forward to discussing other similar proposals.

42. The European Union fully supported the work of IAEA as a unique organization for promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation, ensuring nuclear safety, preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and countering nuclear terrorism.

43. Lastly, the European Union remained committed to the full implementation of the resolutions on the Middle East adopted by the Security Council, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the IAEA General Conference, and called on the States of the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

44. **Mr. Ahlström** (Sweden), speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that the Coalition remained fully committed to the objectives and to all three pillars of the NPT. The long-term success of the Treaty depended on full implementation of all its aspects. At the current session, the Committee must finalize the procedural arrangements for, and agree on substantive input and recommendations to, the Review Conference. At the very least, it must agree on a framework for approaching the Review Conference. The mistakes that had caused the 2005 Review Conference to fail must not be repeated.

45. He welcomed the progress made on nuclear disarmament, but noted with concern that most of the weapons reductions made thus far were not irreversible, transparent or verifiable; that the role of nuclear weapons in security policies had not been diminished; that the CTBT had still not entered into force; and that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had still not begun. In addition, no real progress had been made towards creating a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. The Review Conference should adopt practical measures leading to implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

46. That said, he welcomed the increased support for the resolution on nuclear disarmament that the coalition had submitted to the General Assembly at its current session; the recent joint statement by the Presidents of the United States and the Russian Federation; the commitment by the new United States administration to ratify the CTBT; and the gradual rebuilding of the consensus on launching negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. He looked forward to concrete and transparent progress on those and other issues before the Review Conference, which would provide an opportunity not only to review the operation of all aspects of the Treaty, but also to forge a renewed commitment to realizing its objectives.

47. The Coalition had submitted a working paper on nuclear disarmament at each of the Preparatory Committee's two previous sessions. The first identified seven areas requiring urgent attention. The second focused on transparency, confidence-building and operational readiness. At the current session, the Coalition would submit a further working paper containing additional reflections and recommendations. All three papers remained current and could be used to build consensus on recommendations to the Review Conference.

48. **Mr. Antonov** (Russian Federation) welcomed recent efforts to move nuclear disarmament forward, in particular the statement of President Medvedev delivered to the Conference on Disarmament in March and the joint statement issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April. In that regard, he stressed that the parties to the START I Treaty undertook not to base arms outside their national territories. President Medvedev had clearly defined the conditions for nuclear disarmament: the militarization of outer space must be prevented; nuclear reductions must not be compensated for by developing strategic systems equipped with conventional weapons; and the impossibility of creating recoverable nuclear capabilities must be ensured. A situation in which nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the NPT disarmed while those not bound by the Treaty increased their nuclear-weapon capability was unacceptable.

49. His delegation supported the early launch of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The moratorium on nuclear testing, while important, was not a substitute for the CTBT. Annex 2 States that had not yet done so should sign and ratify the CTBT as

early as possible. He welcomed the commitment by the United States in that regard.

50. Much progress had been made in preventing non-State actors from accessing nuclear weapons and materials. His delegation welcomed the recent establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and stood ready to discuss the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East with all interested parties with a view to developing recommendations for adoption by the Review Conference.

51. One way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime was to make IAEA verification activities more efficient. The additional protocol provided opportunities in that regard and, along with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, should become the universally accepted standard for verifying States' compliance with their NPT non-proliferation obligations and an essential new standard in the area of nuclear exports.

52. Lastly, multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle were becoming increasingly important. The Russian President had proposed developing a global nuclear energy infrastructure, while the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan had established the International Uranium Enrichment Centre in Angarsk.

53. **Mr. Cheng** Jingye (China) said that the international community must seize the opportunity presented by the Review Conference to promote, in a comprehensive and balanced way, the Treaty's three main objectives. As a nuclear-weapon State, China had worked tirelessly for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. It was the only nuclear-weapon State to have undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. It had exercised restraint in developing nuclear weapons; had never deployed a nuclear weapon in another country; and had never participated in a nuclear arms race. It had been among the first States to sign the CTBT and had adhered strictly to the moratorium on nuclear testing. It also supported an early start to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

54. Nuclear disarmament should be a fair and reasonable process of gradual reductions. Measures taken in that regard should promote international

strategic stability and undiminished security for all. Nuclear-weapon States should commit to the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and should conclude an international legal instrument to that end. In the meantime, they should reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies and those States should assume a self-defensive approach to nuclear-weapon use. The United States and the Russian Federation bore particular responsibility and should continue drastically to cut their nuclear arsenals. He welcomed their agreement to begin negotiating a new bilateral nuclear disarmament treaty and hoped they would further reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

55. Noting that nuclear disarmament was closely linked to international strategic stability, he said that the Conference on Disarmament should conclude an international legal instrument prohibiting the deployment of weapons in outer space. With regard to anti-ballistic missile systems, the countries concerned should consider the security interests of others and refrain from taking actions that might undermine international nuclear disarmament. He welcomed the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia and supported the early establishment of such a zone in the Middle East.

56. The international community should adopt a holistic approach to nuclear proliferation. An effort should be made to build an international environment of cooperation and trust. Regional nuclear issues should be addressed through dialogue and negotiation, the universality and integrity of the international non-proliferation regime further strengthened, and the practice of selectivity discarded. His Government was in favour of strengthening the IAEA safeguards function and of promoting the universality of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The six-party talks remained an important mechanism for addressing the Korean peninsula nuclear issue. The parties concerned should exercise restraint and work together to maintain the process and to safeguard peace and stability in the peninsula. China also supported a proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomatic negotiations. The parties concerned should seize the current opportunity and step up their diplomatic efforts and relaunch negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3+3.

57. The relationship between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and non-proliferation should be handled in a balanced manner to ensure that they mutually reinforced rather than conflicted with each other. His Government supported recent initiatives to establish a multilateral nuclear fuel supply mechanism. The international community should work together to find a practical solution acceptable to all. China also supported IAEA efforts to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

58. **Ms. Swords** (Canada) said that achieving a realistic and balanced agenda for the Review Conference should be a priority, with the 2000 Review Conference's agenda possibly serving as a starting point.

59. The challenge posed by the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had yet to be adequately addressed. Her delegation welcomed the progress made by the six-party talks, but was discouraged by that country's recent missile launch. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must comply with Security Council resolutions, meet its commitments under the six-party talks and recommit to the NPT. The Islamic Republic of Iran, meanwhile, should comply with Security Council resolutions and work proactively with IAEA. As for allegations that the Syrian Arab Republic had clandestinely constructed a nuclear reactor, she stressed that the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes came with obligations.

60. She welcomed the nuclear weapons reductions of recent years. The renewed momentum of disarmament talks between the Russian Federation and the United States was particularly encouraging. She hoped they would be able to meet the goal set out in their recent joint statement. That said, disarmament negotiations were the responsibility of all States. She also noted with regret that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet begun, that the CTBT had not yet entered into force and that the disarmament commitments made in 1995 remained unfulfilled. All States were urged to take steps to advance those three initiatives.

61. Canada believed that nuclear energy was critical in increasing prosperity, promoting sustainable development, limiting greenhouse gas emissions and reducing disparities between developed and developing

countries and had therefore supported peaceful nuclear cooperation with India.

62. The international community was entering a promising new era. It should think seriously about how to improve the effectiveness of diplomacy and multilateral cooperation. Some of the recent challenges to the NPT could be addressed by bolstering the review process through permanent political and administrative support. Her delegation found it disquieting that the NPT lacked the permanent institutional support enjoyed by even modest multilateral conventions and had therefore submitted a working paper advancing recommendations designed to strengthen its structure and meeting schedule.

63. **Mr. Abdelaziz** (Egypt) said that the continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons both within and outside the framework of the NPT called into question its viability as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. The Committee's recommendations to the Review Conference must stress the importance of implementing the Treaty in a balanced manner and of taking practical steps to meet the obligations contained in the Treaty and in previous review conference outcomes. That, in turn, required the speedy achievement of NPT universality, particularly in the Middle East, where States were subjected to a growing nuclear threat.

64. Only through NPT universality and fulfilment of NPT obligations by nuclear-weapon States could the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons be attained. Recent declarations by some nuclear-weapon States of their renewed commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world, while welcome, did not in and of themselves suffice to protect the Treaty. The continued possession by nuclear-weapon States of nuclear arsenals for deterrence purposes, the development of new generations of such weapons, the provision of assistance to States not parties to the Treaty and the continued deployment of nuclear weapons in the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States undermined the Treaty's objectives and the presumed equality among non-nuclear-weapon States.

65. The Committee must recognize that nuclear disarmament had not been achieved. Recent statements on nuclear disarmament must be accompanied by time-bound measures based on the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000. Efforts to revive the Conference on Disarmament would hopefully lead to agreement on a

balanced and comprehensive programme of work that included negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. During the present review cycle, States parties must also conclude global, non-discriminatory, legally binding arrangements to protect non-nuclear-weapon States parties against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

66. Despite the efforts of Middle Eastern States to adhere to the NPT and to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Israel's rejection of any commitments and its continued involvement in non-peaceful nuclear activities outside the scope of the NPT subjected the region to the threat of a nuclear arms race. The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East had been central to Arab States' acceptance of the Treaty's indefinite extension. In the absence of any practical steps towards its implementation, Arab peoples questioned the utility of extending a treaty that had neither guaranteed their security nor led to Israel acceding to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State or placing its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. That some nuclear-weapon States had lent support to States not parties to the Treaty only compounded fears that such preferential treatment might be extended to Israel in the future. The sponsors of the Resolution were responsible for its full implementation.

67. The Arab commitment to regional peace and security had been at the core of the Arab Peace Initiative. Israel's rejection of that proposal and of the two-State solution and its refusal to accede to the NPT or to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards were the main obstacles to regional peace and security. While Israel unjustifiably pointed to Arab threats, the Arab States had legitimate security concerns vis-à-vis Israel's nuclear programme. Efforts to address regional non-proliferation issues were intrinsically linked to the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East and to the achievement of equality in the rights and responsibilities of all States in the region.

68. Egypt recognized the right of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nuclear-weapon States parties must facilitate access by such States to nuclear technology and materials. He noted with concern the attempts by some to restrict the ability of non-nuclear-weapon States to exercise that right by creating artificial categories of sensitive and non-sensitive nuclear technologies and of responsible and irresponsible

States, and attempts by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to impose additional restrictions on some but not all countries, to influence the determination of States' nuclear energy requirements and to restrict their fuel supply choices.

69. The NPT was clearly in need of a comprehensive review. His Government attached great importance to the adoption, by consensus, of a comprehensive review outcome that reaffirmed the commitment of all States parties and presented a time-bound plan of action for implementing the Treaty and the 1995 extension package.

70. **Mr. Sullivan** (Australia) welcomed the renewed commitment to a world without nuclear weapons and the disarmament measures recently announced by President Obama and the recent joint statement by Presidents Obama and Medvedev. Now non-nuclear-weapon States must commit not to acquire nuclear weapons and to place their nuclear facilities under international safeguards. Moreover, the Committee should adopt an agenda and identify key issues for consideration in 2010.

71. Australia had long supported nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In 2008, the Prime Minister had announced the establishment of an International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, which aimed to reinvigorate global efforts in that regard. He welcomed the decision by the United States and the Russian Federation to conclude a legally binding and verifiable successor to the START I Treaty, and the nuclear reductions made by France and the United Kingdom. China was encouraged to make reductions in a similarly transparent manner. He urged all nuclear-weapon States to commit to faster, deeper and irreversible reductions in all categories of nuclear weapon. To that end, all States should give priority to the entry into force of the CTBT. As one of the Conference on Disarmament Presidents for 2009, Australia was working hard to ensure that during the current year the Conference agreed to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the context of agreement on a balanced programme of work.

72. The unwillingness of some States to cooperate fully with IAEA raised concerns about the nature of their nuclear programmes. Prevention of nuclear terrorism was an important part of the agenda to

prevent nuclear proliferation. While its guarantee of access to peaceful nuclear energy was central to the strength of the NPT, the right to peaceful energy was not unqualified, but must be exercised in accordance with its provisions. His delegation was interested in hearing more about multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle that might help prevent the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies. He called on India, Pakistan and Israel to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States. Non-proliferation disciplines should be extended to those States to the maximum extent possible.

73. The Review Conference could usefully issue a blueprint for action, possibly along the lines of the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000. For States parties to have confidence in such a blueprint, they would need assurances that all States were implementing past Review Conference outcomes and that States parties would be able to monitor implementation of the NPT more effectively than they had in the past. To that end, the proposal to replace the Preparatory Committee process by shorter annual meetings of States parties was worth exploring. Lastly, the Review Conference outcome should assist progress towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and take into account the legitimate security concerns of all States in the region.

74. **Ms. Mosley** (New Zealand) said that the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation landscape seemed to be on the cusp of positive change. She welcomed the recent comments by Presidents Obama and Medvedev and their commitment to negotiate a new nuclear reductions agreement. The road map to a nuclear-free world recently announced by Japan contained much that resonated with New Zealand. Her delegation looked forward to the conference that Japan planned to host in early 2010.

75. New Zealand was pleased to contribute to non-proliferation efforts. It was a member of the IAEA Board of Governors and of the Proliferation Security Initiative and had implemented robust export controls. Complex verification issues must be addressed firmly by upholding the Treaty's integrity and by reinforcing the authority of the IAEA safeguards system. The IAEA Additional Protocol was key and, together with the comprehensive safeguards agreement, formed the contemporary verification standard.

76. Her delegation remained concerned about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme. The Islamic

Republic of Iran should cooperate fully with IAEA and comply without delay with all IAEA Board of Governor decisions and with Security Council resolutions. The nuclear weapons programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea posed a serious challenge to nuclear non-proliferation and to peace and stability in the Korean peninsula and beyond. That the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had responded to international condemnation of its recent missile launch by expelling IAEA inspectors was disappointing. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should rethink its decision and re-engage in the six-party talks.

77. It was important to ensure that peaceful uses of nuclear technology remained accessible to all States parties and that such technologies were managed safely and securely and did not contribute to nuclear proliferation. Waste management was a key consideration too. Her delegation stood ready to work with all States parties to ensure that the Review Conference comprehensively reviewed the NPT and agreed on a course of action that would strengthen the NPT and bring the world one step closer to being free of nuclear weapons.

78. **Mr. Jeenbaev** (Kyrgyzstan) said that, though the NPT was facing extraordinary challenges, international circumstances offered an opportunity to move the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda forward. The current session should be used to revive the spirit of cooperation evident in 2000. To that end, he hoped that procedural issues could be resolved quickly so that attention could turn to matters of substance.

79. Kyrgyzstan's high expectations following the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences remained only partially realized. His Government was particularly disappointed by the continued stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament, the failure to bring the CTBT into force, the lack of visible progress on a verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty and the halt to reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. He hoped that the current cycle would address implementation of the 13 practical steps and discuss ways to accelerate transparent and irreversible reductions in all categories of nuclear weapon. His delegation attached particular importance to the expeditious entry into force of the CTBT, which Kyrgyzstan had ratified in 2003.

80. He was pleased to report the recent entry into force of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, the parties to which undertook, inter alia, to assist in the environmental rehabilitation of territories contaminated as a result of past nuclear weapons activities and to conclude with IAEA an additional protocol.

81. The world had changed significantly in recent years. The nuclear non-proliferation regime must adapt. International safeguards and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities were the first line of defence against nuclear terrorism. As such, his delegation supported IAEA efforts to strengthen the international safeguards system; efforts to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004); and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

82. Inadequate attention had been paid in the past to mitigating the environmental impact of nuclear weapons programmes. He called on all Governments and international organizations with expertise in the clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider providing assistance for remedial purposes and drew attention to the regional conference on the uranium tailings held in Bishkek in April 2009 and to the high-level international forum on uranium tailings to be held in Geneva in June.

83. Lastly, he welcomed the recommendations contained in the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education (A/57/124) and endorsed the opinion expressed in General Assembly resolution 57/60. His delegation appreciated the leadership shown by Japan, among others, in raising the issue of education and training in the NPT context and looked forward to working with other interested Member States in developing practical steps to assist the implementation of the measures called for by the study.

84. **Mr. Benmehidi** (Algeria) said that recent statements by the leaders of nuclear-weapon States — in particular the United States and the Russian Federation — augured well for the implementation of international disarmament commitments, with a new approach that would impact positively on efforts to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

85. The current session was essential to the preparation and therefore to the success of the Review Conference. The Committee must make not only procedural recommendations but also substantive recommendations on all three pillars. To that end, he proposed reviewing the implementation of the outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, in particular the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000 and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted in 1995. States parties had a responsibility to send out a strong signal concerning the validity of the multilateral framework and to lend credibility to the NPT. The balanced implementation of the Treaty's three pillars was essential in that regard.

86. He called on nuclear-weapon States to implement article VI, including by implementing the 13 practical steps. Transparency, verifiability and irreversibility were essential in that regard. They must also undertake to reduce the role of, and ultimately to eliminate, nuclear weapons. He hoped that recent comments to that effect would translate into concrete action. Until such time as nuclear weapons were eliminated, non-nuclear-weapon States must be given security assurances. Given the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the lack of progress towards the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East was lamentable. Israel's refusal to accede to the NPT and to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards meant that the region was in a state of permanent insecurity.

87. The CTBT was a key element of nuclear disarmament. Those nuclear-weapon States that had not yet ratified it should do so without delay. His delegation was encouraged by the international community's renewed commitment to beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and by the readiness of the United States to commit to a verifiable treaty.

88. On non-proliferation, he called for the non-selective, balanced and non-discriminatory implementation of the relevant provisions of the NPT. He also reiterated the inalienable right of all parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Current discussions on the establishment of a multilateral nuclear fuel cycle mechanism, meanwhile, should enjoy the broadest consultation possible among Member States.

89. Lastly, in its capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament, Algeria had submitted a comprehensive and balanced draft programme of work for that body which it hoped would enjoy the support of all Member States and thereby enable the Conference to resume its work.

90. **Mr. Oh Joon** (Republic of Korea) said that the disarmament debate had been reinvigorated by such initiatives as the Secretary-General's five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament and President Obama's vision for a nuclear-weapon-free world. The commitment by the United States and the Russian Federation to replace the START I Treaty by the end of the year was also encouraging. That said, the NPT faced grave challenges, particularly with regard to non-proliferation. It was regrettable that, despite strenuous efforts to denuclearize it, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had recently launched a missile and threatened further measures including nuclear tests and test-firing of intercontinental ballistic missiles. He urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply fully with its NPT obligations and with Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and to implement the 2005 Joint Statement and subsequent agreements adopted at the six-party talks.

91. To strengthen the NPT regime, the nuclear safeguards regime should be strengthened through universalization of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. Disarmament and non-proliferation required the early entry into force of the CTBT and the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. He welcomed the commitment by the United States to ratify the CTBT and urged countries that had not yet done so to follow suit.

92. The right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was key to achieving sustainable socio-economic development but required effective safeguards against misuse.

93. His delegation recognized the merit of multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle. States in need of peaceful nuclear energy might be discouraged from pursuing their own uranium enrichment technology if an international mechanism provided a guaranteed and sustainable supply of fuel. Such an approach should be based on objective and fair criteria and implemented in such a way that did not deny or limit the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Lastly, States

parties should consider an effective and collective response to withdrawal by a State party from the NPT.

94. **Mr. Streuli** (Switzerland) said that irreconcilable positions concerning the status of implementation of the NPT continued to prevent States parties from reaching agreement on how best to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Some concentrated on the risks of proliferation; others wanted more rapid disarmament; and a growing number did not accept that access to nuclear technology should be restricted by proliferation concerns.

95. Each concern was directly linked to one of the three pillars. The very sources of disagreement might, therefore, contain the makings of a compromise. The philosophy of compromise and the culture of multilateralism must be restored to their rightful place. States parties must commit to adjusting the emphasis placed on each of the three pillars, and implement, as soon as possible, the outcomes of previous review conferences, in particular the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 and the 13 practical steps adopted in 2000.

96. That said, there were grounds for optimism. He welcomed, in particular, the commitment by the presidents of the United States and of the Russian Federation to begin negotiations on a successor agreement to the START I Treaty and the prospects emerging at the multilateral level at the Conference on Disarmament.

97. He hoped that the current session provided an opportunity to confirm those developments and to give fresh impetus to the implementation of the NPT and to the multilateral machinery as a whole. He encouraged all States parties to work constructively to find a rapid solution to the procedural issues surrounding the Review Conference.

98. **Mr. Obisakin** (Nigeria), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, which aligned itself with the statement made on behalf of the Non-Aligned States parties to the NPT, said that the Group of African States remained committed to the three pillars of the NPT. He welcomed recent developments on nuclear disarmament. However, to be meaningful, disarmament must be transparent, verifiable and irreversible. A sound consensual basis for achieving that goal existed within the NPT context. It was important not to lose sight of past gains, including the implementation of the 13 practical steps of 2000.

99. Another shared goal was nuclear non-proliferation. African countries had played their part by adhering to the NPT and by concluding the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba). The establishment of such zones was a positive step towards the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world. He urged all nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their commitment to such zones and called for meaningful progress on the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. Until such time as nuclear weapons were eliminated, nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to give security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Such assurances should be finalized in a universal and legally binding instrument as a matter of priority.

100. Lastly, multilateral forums provided the most effective framework for disarmament negotiations. He called on all delegations to demonstrate the political will needed to enhance progress on all three pillars of the NPT.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.