

to revise the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty had caused concern, since that could trigger a new arms race and even an arms race in outer space. There was widespread international consternation about the possible unravelling of years of painstaking efforts on a host of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.

39. The nuclear tests undertaken in May 1998 in South Asia had dealt a serious blow to nuclear disarmament efforts. Those tests should not be considered simply from the point of view of regional dynamics but in the overall context of global nuclear disarmament. They had been a wake-up call to which the nuclear-weapon States must respond appropriately or face dire consequences. The South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty had been signed by the heads of Government of the 10 countries in the region on 15 December 1995, seven months after the 1995 Conference. That Treaty had expressed the desire of all Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) members to free the region from the scourges of nuclear conflict and the nuclear-arms race. The Treaty had also been a declaration by the 10 signatory States of their commitment to the ultimate goal of the universal banning of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States must view that Treaty in its proper perspective, support its provisions and sign its Protocol. His delegation therefore welcomed the announcement by China that it would accede to the Protocol and encouraged the other four nuclear-weapon States to do likewise. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions would create further building blocks for the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

40. The Conference on Disarmament had been rendered impotent by its failure to adopt a programme of work for the preceding three years. It must strive to set up a working group on nuclear disarmament. In 1999, five new members had been admitted, including Malaysia, after seven agonizing years of waiting. The Conference must make a clean break with the mindset of the past and make membership universal in order to benefit from the wealth of ideas of the broadest possible membership. To that end, the appeal made by the Czech Republic should be heeded.

41. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was at a critical juncture; nuclear disarmament was still a pipe dream. Although that situation could not be changed overnight, actions taken to date had not been

convincing. The fears and concerns which had been expressed were real. The will and patience of the non-nuclear-weapon States were being severely tested and, inevitably and understandably, resentment and frustration were brewing among them. If the nuclear-weapon States persisted in following the path of self-destruction, their own non-proliferation objectives could be undermined. The Review Conference would provide parties with an opportunity to reaffirm their firm commitment to the Treaty and make any necessary corrections. At the first Review Conference of the new millennium responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the strengthened review process agreed upon in 1995, members should seize the opportunity to renew with vigour and determination the objective of achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. There should be an objective assessment of progress made in the implementation of the Treaty and its commitments during the preceding five years. It was also essential to make concrete but realistic recommendations for actions to be taken in the coming five years towards full implementation of the Treaty. The Review Conference must succeed in strengthening and extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty, since any failure would contribute to an erosion of confidence in the regime.

**Observations on articles I and II and the first to third preambular paragraphs of the Treaty and on item 17 of the agenda of the Conference**

42. **Mr. Thamrin** (Indonesia) said that the members of the Non-Aligned Movement which were parties to the Treaty had endeavoured to make a substantial contribution to the preparatory process for the Review Conference as well as to the Conference itself. The working paper submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement several days before had set out the hopes and expectations of the Movement with regard to the results of the Conference, expressed its views on the issues dealt with in the Treaty, recommended ways to strengthen the review process and identified areas where nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation could be promoted.

43. The members of the Non-Aligned Movement which were parties to the Treaty agreed that strict observance of article I remained central to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the advances made in peace and security since the Treaty's entry into force. They reaffirmed their commitment to

full implementation of the provisions of article I and to refrain from sharing with or transferring to non-nuclear-weapon States or States that were not parties to the Treaty any information or materials which might be used for military purposes, under any security arrangement. Concerned by the possibility that certain States that were not parties to the Treaty could obtain materials, technology and knowledge which would allow them to develop nuclear weapons, the States parties called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and of the provision of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to such States, without exception.

44. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment to fully implement the provisions of article II and to refrain from sharing with nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and States that were not parties to the Treaty any information or materials which might be used for military purposes, under any security arrangement.

*The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.*