11. The United States continued to provide material and technical assistance to Israel and other countries and maintained large stockpiles of nuclear warheads. The use by the United States and the United Kingdom of depleted uranium weapons in 1991 had caused a human catastrophe in Iraq, and the IAEA verification and monitoring teams had been used to spy on Iraq. The aerial attacks on Iraq's civil and military infrastructure since 1998 were a violation of Iraq's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, guaranteed by all relevant resolutions, and the United States and the United Kingdom continued to use Security Council resolutions to perpetuate the inhuman embargo against Iraq, which had led to the deaths of some one and a half million Iraqis.

12. In 1994, IAEA had removed all weapons grade nuclear materials from Iraq in accordance with the appropriate safeguards and had reported in August 1997 that Iraq had never had any real nuclear weapon potential. In October 1998, the Director-General of IAEA had reported to the Security Council that there was no reason to believe that Iraq had any real capability of producing nuclear weapons. In addition, in March 2000, IAEA had reported that Iraq was in compliance with the safeguards regime and, in a letter dated 10 April 2000 (S/2000/300) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the IAEA Director-General had said that, during a verification visit from 22 to 25 January 2000, Agency inspectors had verified the nuclear material subject to safeguards and that the Iraqi authorities had cooperated with the inspection team. In that context, he supported the contents of the working paper presented by the Islamic Republic of Iran on safeguards and export controls (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.14), in particular paragraph 1, concerning the sole responsibility of IAEA for verifying compliance with the NPT and the need for IAEA to verify any allegations of non-compliance.

13. The Chairman, noting that the sub-headings would not be included in the final version, invited comments on the "conclusions and recommendations" section of the draft report (paragraph 7, subparagraphs 1-58).

14. Mr. Zahran (Egypt) proposed that in subparagraph 3, the words "and dialogue" should be deleted. In the second sentence of subparagraph 4, the words "only the" should be inserted before the word "universal", the words "is the best way to" should be replaced with the word "can", the word "all" should be replaced with the words "the four", and the words "unconditionally and without any further delay" should be inserted after the words "accede to it". The last sentence of subparagraph 4 should be deleted. In subparagraph 5, at the end of the second sentence, the word "energy" should be replaced with the word "material"; in the fourth sentence, the words "States parties that have" should be replaced with the words "Any State party that has". In subparagraph 7, after the first reference to "IAEA", the words "and after the decision by the Board of Governors" should be inserted.

15. Mr. Wiranata-Atmadia (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, proposed that, in subparagraph 1, the words "and article VII of the Treaty, in particular paragraphs 5-7 and paragraph 1 of the Principles and Objectives, as well as the Resolution on the Middle East" should be added at the end of the sentence. The Non-Aligned Movement supported the amendments to subparagraphs 3 and 4 proposed by Egypt, although it favoured the words "without delay" rather than "without any further delay" in the proposed amendment to subparagraph 4. In the first sentence of subparagraph 4, the word "spread" should be replaced with the word "proliferation". The Movement agreed with Egypt that the phrase "nuclear material" was more appropriate in subparagraph 5. The first sentence of subparagraph 5 should form a separate subparagraph, and the words "are a fundamental pillar of" should be replaced with the words "is an essential element in guaranteeing compliance with". He would be submitting a final version of the proposed separate subparagraph in writing.

16. The Chairman explained that he had merely sought to group all the proposed references to the importance of IAEA safeguards within the one paragraph.

17. Mr. Hossein (Islamic Republic of Iran), fully endorsing the amendments proposed by Indonesia on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, proposed, in addition, that subparagraph 7 should be deleted. The relationship agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) already governed the access of its Director-General to the principal organs of the United Nations.