49. Switzerland was legally and structurally prepared to implement both the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it had ratified in 1996, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, which it had ratified in 1999 and whose drafting group had been chaired by a Swiss professor. Fine-tuning national regulations on the elimination of radioactive waste was the only remaining step to be taken in Switzerland’s implementation of the latter Convention. Lastly, Switzerland participated actively in IAEA discussions on whether to amend the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and extend it to nuclear power plants.

50. **Mr. Lilland (Norway)** said that his delegation was strongly committed to the nuclear non-proliferation obligations set out in article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty. The NPT Exporters Committee, later known as the Zangger Committee, had since its inception in 1971 established a common understanding on how to implement that article with a view to ensuring a consistent interpretation of the obligations contained therein. As a member of the Zangger Committee, his Government implemented the basic understanding of the Committee in its national export control policy. His Government urged other countries not members of the Zangger Committee to adopt the IAEA trigger list and full-scope safeguards as a minimum requirement within their national export control system.

51. Article III, paragraph 2, had certain limitations; for instance, it did not include technology, or dual-use items, nor did it explicitly require full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply. With a view to better promoting the nuclear non-proliferation efforts, his Government had joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and abided by the collective policy agreement of the member States. Paragraph 17 of the “Principle and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament” adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference stated that transparency in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within the framework of dialogue in cooperation among all interested States parties to the Treaty. Since 1995 NSG had, in addition to its ongoing outreach activities, strengthened its dialogue with non-members in 1997 and 1999, it had organized international seminars on the role of export controls and nuclear non-proliferation.

52. **Mr. Thamrin (Indonesia)**, speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, drew attention to the Non-Aligned Movement’s working paper (NPT/CONF.2000/18, annex) and, in particular to its position as outlined in: paragraph 2, on the non-discriminatory transfer of materials, equipment and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and paragraphs 13 to 18, on the inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy; the need to remove unilaterally enforced restrictive measures on peaceful nuclear development; undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes; States parties’ strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use IAEA technical cooperation programmes as a tool for political purposes; the responsibility of nuclear supplier States to developing countries with regard to the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes; comprehensive and universal norms and standards prohibiting attacks or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses; and measures to regulate international maritime transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel.

53. **Mr. Issa (Egypt)** said that while preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons was one half of the issue, the other half was technology transfer and technical cooperation for the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as the NPT itself stated. The placing of arbitrary obstacles in the way of such transfer and cooperation, in an effort to hinder non-nuclear States parties, especially in the developing world, from obtaining nuclear know-how, was a clear and unjustifiable breach of article IV of the NPT. It would be more relevant to restrain nuclear cooperation with States that were not parties to the Treaty and did not abide by its provisions, instead of rewarding such States for their rejectionist attitude.

54. The IAEA technical cooperation programmes relating to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in accordance with articles II, III and IV of the NPT, were admirable and benefited all concerned. All the more reason, then, for States to pay their assessed contributions for the Agency’s work in full and on time.

55. Nuclear safety was a fundamental component of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and consequently the IAEA was rightly seeking to enhance the