PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES
TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Second session

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 3rd MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 28 April 1998, at 10 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. WYZNER (Poland)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS (continued)

Ms. SCHICK (Australia) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remained the single most significant arrangement underpinning global peace and security, and her delegation shared the high expectations placed by many other delegations in what it could deliver as a powerful instrument for shaping the world's security environment well into the next century. Australia's overriding goal was to maintain the effectiveness of, and where necessary strengthen, the Treaty and the international non-proliferation regime of which it was the cornerstone, and to that end it supported a thorough and balanced review of all aspects of Treaty performance in the spirit of the decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

The period since the Preparatory Committee's first session had seen progress in carrying forward the principles and objectives adopted in 1995. The further ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) were a welcome development and Australia hoped to be in a position to ratify that Treaty well before the end of 1998.

Australia welcomed the announcement concerning accession made in June 1997 by the Brazilian Government and was pleased that the report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons continued to contribute to the debate on how to pursue the goal of nuclear disarmament. Together with other members of the South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, Australia was pleased, moreover, to welcome the ratification of the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga by France and the United Kingdom and looked forward to their early ratification by the remaining nuclear-weapon State. It also considered that the statement by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Central Asian States in September 1997 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia was a significant step and it stood ready to offer the sponsors of that new zone initiative any practical assistance they might require.

The safeguards system administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had proved remarkably effective in providing assurances of non-proliferation and as a means for parties to the NPT credibly to demonstrate their adherence to their commitments. In 1997, the IAEA Board
of Governors had adopted a new safeguards standard in the form of a model additional protocol, partly in response to isolated cases of betrayal of the confidence engendered by the NPT but also as part of the natural evolution of such systems stemming from improvements in technology and from a wider understanding of their contribution to international security. Australia was proud to have led in the implementation of strengthened safeguards, as the first State to have ratified an additional protocol, and had lodged its expanded declaration, again the first to have been submitted by any State to IAEA, earlier that month. Australia hoped that strengthened safeguards would shortly become a global norm and welcomed the progress made by IAEA in concluding protocols with a range of parties to the NPT.

Australia strongly supported the work of IAEA in bolstering the nuclear non-proliferation regime through its ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's nuclear programme. It also continued to attach importance to the Agency's work in verifying that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea returned to compliance with its safeguards agreement, as it had committed itself to do in the Framework Agreement of October 1994.

Developments to be welcomed also included the agreement by nine countries and IAEA on guidelines for the management of plutonium stocks in civilian inventories, the Nuclear Suppliers Group seminar held in Vienna in October 1997, the conclusion of the negotiations on the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, as well as the adoption of a protocol to amend the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and of a Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage. In the Asia-Pacific region, regional nuclear cooperation had been given further impetus by the December 1997 Seoul Conference on Nuclear Safety in Asia.

While all such developments were evidence of success in pursuing the objectives embodied in the NPT, no decisive progress had been made towards the goal of universal Treaty membership. That goal continued to be obstructed in particular by regional tensions in South Asia and the Middle East. The need for one more accession before the Treaty of Tlatelolco could come into force was also a source of concern. Her delegation furthermore hoped that it would be possible to resolve through dialogue the issues which had prevented the nuclear-weapon States signing the relevant protocols of the Treaty of Bangkok.
It above all regretted and was mystified that there had still been no commencement of negotiations on the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT), which all States acknowledged to be a right, proper and urgent undertaking.

Her delegation hoped that the Committee would recommend to the Review Conference language which would call on all States parties to sign and/or ratify the CTBT at the earliest possible date in order to demonstrate the strength of international support for the Treaty and facilitate its entry into force at the earliest possible time. Australia also supported the consideration by the Review Conference of possible further measures to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The 1995 “Principles and objectives” document identified an internationally legally binding instrument as one option in that regard. She also reminded delegates of the ideas contained in the paper on security assurances negotiated in 1995, under the guidance of Australia's then ambassador for disarmament, which was part of the wealth of material that could be drawn on to nourish the debate on that important subject.

Australia also attached importance to reiterating the call on States parties to the NPT which did not have comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA to put them in place and on States not parties to the NPT which continued to have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities also to enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. The Review Conference should furthermore urge all countries which had not yet done so to conclude an additional protocol to their bilateral safeguards agreement with IAEA as soon as possible, and should also call for a strong but transparent nuclear export control regime designed to fulfil States parties' obligations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by bolstering and making more effective the international non-proliferation regime. Australia shared South Africa's view that it would be logical and desirable to work for a new “Principles and objectives” document to guide nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in the period after the 2000 Review Conference.

The States parties to the Treaty which collectively subscribed to the 1995 decision on principles and objectives had a responsibility also to work outside the framework of the NPT review process to achieve outcomes which served the basic objective of promoting a strong and effective Treaty. If
the 2000 Review Conference was to result in a stronger, more effective Treaty, they should dedicate themselves immediately, rather than wait for the Review Conference to adopt decisions on action which parties could only begin to implement after the year 2000.

Most importantly, States parties should individually or jointly be working for the urgent commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Her delegation also strongly supported the commencement and early conclusion of negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States on a START III agreement immediately after START II entered into force. START III would represent a new and qualitatively different phase in the process of nuclear disarmament and the realization of article VI of the NPT.

The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones through agreements freely arrived at among the States concerned and ratification of the relevant protocols to existing nuclear-weapon-free zones by nuclear-weapon States was another important objective. Finally, all available and appropriate means should be employed to persuade the five States Members of the United Nations not parties to the NPT to accede to it. Australia was committed to the strengthened review process and would do everything possible to contribute to a successful meeting of the Preparatory Committee and thus to the success of the 2000 Review Conference.

Mr. WIBISONO (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the NPT, said that he had the honour to introduce a document entitled “Working paper presented by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries parties to the Treaty” which addressed various aspects related to the NPT that were of paramount importance to the current and subsequent meetings of the Preparatory Committee and to the 2000 Review Conference. The paper took the form of draft recommendations to be considered by the Preparatory Committee. He requested that it should be circulated as an official document.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would arrange for the working paper to be circulated as an official document of the Preparatory Committee.

Mr. de ICAZA (Mexico) said that the NPT was of capital importance for international security. The obligations assumed by non-nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty meant that the number of States possessing nuclear
weapons, whose mere existence was a threat to mankind, would not increase. However, an end to horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons was not the sole purpose of the Treaty. Its aim was also to put an end to the nuclear arms race, to halt and reverse the quantitative and qualitative proliferation of nuclear weapons, and above all to free the world from nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation regime was merely the indispensable cornerstone and the purpose of the Review Conferences was to ensure that not only the Treaty's provisions, but also its aims, were fulfilled. That accounted for the importance of the decisions on the strengthening of the Treaty review process and on the principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, agreed upon at the 1995 Conference, which had highlighted and reasserted the importance and role of the NPT during the current period of diminished tension and greater confidence among States.

At the Committee's first session progress had been made towards identifying those elements that would serve as starting points for preparing draft recommendations on the implementation of the NPT addressing the issues of universality, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, security assurances, safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the issue of the resolution on the Middle East still had to be addressed and his delegation hoped that the current session would debate how the Preparatory Committee should present its recommendations concerning the implementation of that resolution. At the 1997 session a first draft had been produced to describe the lowest common denominator of the positions set out in the various official proposals made by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, the European Union and other delegations, and that document could serve as a benchmark for the current negotiations. A more ambitious undertaking nevertheless lay ahead, in terms of both scope and content, if the Preparatory Committee was to fulfil its mandate.

It had been argued that the recommendations the Preparatory Committee was to make to the 2000 Review Conference should provide a balanced reflection of the various obligations contained in the Treaty. However, the question arose whether a balance could be struck between obligations that were not themselves balanced, and whether it would not be more reasonable for the Committee's recommendations and the conclusions of the Review Conference to endeavour to correct the Treaty's imbalances in order further to strengthen
the non-proliferation regime. In his delegation's view, that regime would gain strength though systematic and gradual progress towards the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The priority for the preparatory work was to achieve progress towards that aim and to determine the means of organizing it, by means of a plan or scheme, into a coherent set of ideas, principles and concrete measures.

The Review Conference's primary responsibility would be to undertake a full and detailed review of how States parties complied with each of the Treaty's provisions. For its part, the Preparatory Committee should develop the necessary recommendations in order fully to achieve the Treaty's aims, its universality, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and above all nuclear disarmament. Noteworthy proposals had been made in that respect, particularly with the statement of the Indonesian delegation on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties, and his delegation would take up those proposals in the debate.

Mr. AL-HUSSAMI (Syrian Arab Republic) said that Syria set great store by the current session of the Preparatory Committee and would abide by the position of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in the field of nuclear weapons. His delegation wished in particular to emphasize the significance of the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and called on States to help to achieve that goal.

At the 1995 Review Conference it had been decided to extend the NPT indefinitely, without setting a deadline for the achievement of universality or for nuclear-weapon States to abide by their commitments. Those failings had had negative repercussions on the objectives and principles of the Treaty. However, a window of hope had been left open and his delegation congratulated both the States concerned and the international community as a whole on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones under the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok, which were all noteworthy contributions to the establishment of worldwide peace and security.

With regard to the Middle East, the fact that Israel alone had a nuclear programme, remained outside the non-proliferation regime and refused to submit to the IAEA verification process was a threat to peace and security and a source of imbalance in the non-proliferation regime, preventing the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. For that reason, Syria believed
that the issue of Israel's nuclear capability and the danger represented by its nuclear weapons should be on the agenda of the IAEA General Conference in 1999.

Syria and the other Arab States could not accept that Israeli nuclear terror should be allowed to threaten the region. Nor could they shoulder alone the obligations deriving from their membership of the NPT. The international community must realize the risks posed for the future of the region. Syria and the other Arab States had called repeatedly, in various international and regional forums, for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The General Assembly had also adopted several resolutions underscoring the risks inherent in the fact that Israel was the sole possessor of weapons of mass destruction in the region and urging it to accede to the NPT and accept the IAEA safeguards regime. Failure to implement those resolutions would mean that Israel could maintain its aggressive expansionist policies, continue to occupy Palestinian and other Arab lands and reject the peace process which had begun at the Madrid conference, perhaps leading the region to the brink of a catastrophe with unprecedented consequences.

Mrs. KARIMOVA (Uzbekistan) said that Uzbekistan had consistently supported the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction and the implementation of the provisions contained in the NPT and in other international instruments reinforcing the Treaty. Uzbekistan was also one of the countries that had ratified the CTBT.

The idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia had been determined by the need to strengthen peace and stability in the region, to elaborate an effective mechanism for cooperation in the field of regional security and to reduce the risk of nuclear war and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Central Asian region had complex political, economic, military, transport and ecological problems which, in combination with the protracted Afghan conflict, could pose a global threat. Illegal drug trafficking, the supply of arms to areas of local conflict, mass migration and religious extremism were the main sources of both regional and global threats. The Central Asian States fully understood that the regional community was not immune to the threat of nuclear terrorism. In February 1997, at a meeting of the Heads of Central Asian States in Almaty, a declaration had been signed
reflecting the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and to combat leaks of nuclear technology and materials. The Central Asian initiative was the result of a careful study of international experience of non-proliferation and of the Central Asian States' perception of their responsibility for the region's future. It also reflected their aspiration to define their role in building a secure world for the twenty-first century.

In September 1997, an international conference attended by the representatives of 59 States and 16 international organizations had been held at Tashkent as a step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The participants had been guided by the consideration that nuclear security was an integral part of comprehensive security and of survival. By promoting the creation of the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone, States were actively committing themselves to the universal regime of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. At the Tashkent Conference, a joint declaration had been signed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and a political agreement had been reached among participants on the idea of building a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. The delegations at the Conference had demonstrated their determination to extend and deepen cooperation as a means of strengthening regional and global security.

A practical outcome of joint regional efforts had been the adoption, in 1997, of General Assembly resolution 52/38 S on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. A regional treaty on that subject was currently being drafted. In order to coordinate the work and ensure complete agreement on the positions of the parties concerned, the first session of the expert group of Central Asian States had been held on 24 April 1998 at the United Nations Office at Geneva. A proposal had also been made by the Kyrgyz Republic to hold an expert meeting at Bishkek in July 1998.

The idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia had gone through the political phase and was currently in the phase of implementation. The effectiveness of both phases had and would be entirely dependent on the understanding and support of the United Nations, the Security Council and all members of the international community. The creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia would contribute to strengthening international
cooperation and to the progress of the world community towards universal nuclear disarmament. She hoped that the Central Asian endeavour would be reflected in the final document of the Preparatory Committee.

Mr. DEMBRI (Algeria) said that his delegation supported all the proposals contained in the document introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the NPT.

Algeria had been a party to the Treaty since 1995; it had also signed the CTBT and had placed its nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards. Like most of the international community, therefore, it was fully committed to the preservation and promotion of non-proliferation.

As the backbone of the non-proliferation regime, the NPT comprised three indissociable aspects which must be continually strengthened and revitalized: non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The defects in the original drafting and concept of the Treaty should not be accentuated by imbalances in its global implementation. Non-proliferation, a universal and crucial requirement of collective security, could be properly preserved only if those who had helped set up and strengthen the non-proliferation regime showed the political will needed to craft the measures required for its active and systematic support.

On that basis, several points might be of interest to the Preparatory Committee. First, negative security assurances must be included in the non-proliferation regime. Failure to provide them would amount to jeopardizing non-proliferation in certain regions of the world. They must be granted on an unconditional, universal, multilaterally negotiated and legally-binding basis, and the Conference on Disarmament was the most appropriate forum for their negotiation. He welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc committee for that purpose at the current session of the Conference. Secondly, the banning of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices was an essential stage of the non-proliferation regime. In that connection, the Shannon report was a valuable reference for beginning negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament aimed at a universal, non-discriminatory and internationally-verifiable convention. The convention would help strength non-proliferation and disarmament by governing aspects of the production and stockpiling of fissile
material. Thirdly, the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was of even greater relevance than in 1995. Progress on security in that region of the world had been curbed by the repeated refusal of one party to assume an obligation that had become quasi-universal, with respect to its potential for chemical, biological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Fourthly, access, use of and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was an inalienable right that should apply without discrimination or restriction to all parties to the Treaty.

In order for the review process to be complete and objective, it must be conducted in coordination with the provisions of the Treaty itself, the declaration of Principles and Objectives of the 1995 Conference and the measures which had been achieved and remained to be achieved in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. The latter, in addition to the banning of fissile material, included the negotiation within the Conference on Disarmament, through an ad hoc committee, of a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. Such a measure was a political necessity, a legal obligation and the corollary of the need of all for security. It was ultimately a moral obligation imposed on the parties to the Treaty by international public opinion.

The cold war had become a part of history, and new international relations must be forged where nuclear deterrence had no role and the possession of nuclear weapons could no longer be justified. Bilateral efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals deserved recognition, but such efforts must also be built upon in the multilateral framework offered by the Conference on Disarmament so that all would be able to fulfil their mutual responsibility in the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

Legitimate grounds for satisfaction were the fact that, since the Review and Extension Conference in 1995, the southern hemisphere had become a fully demilitarized zone, nuclear tests had been completely banned and the number of States parties to the Treaty had increased. Nevertheless, cooperation would be required from all, both at the second session of the Preparatory Committee and throughout the review process, in order to meet the goals of the Treaty. He hoped that the new millennium would be the dawn of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Mr. MENDIS (Sri Lanka) said that effective implementation of the NPT in all its aspects was crucial to the security order of the next millennium. It was needed to ensure that the security framework for the elimination of nuclear weapons was an environment progressively free of nuclear threats, accidents, errors and proliferation. The new life given to the Treaty at the 1995 Conference, together with the principles and objectives adopted, represented a unique consensus on a road map towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons in a predictable and stable manner. The 2000 Review Conference would be the first test bed for the strengthened review process and all those who wished to safeguard and implement the NPT in all its aspects should therefore take care not to regress from the 1995 consensus, particularly on the agreed objectives and principles. The nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility in that regard.

At the 1997 session of the Preparatory Committee, two differing schools of thought had hindered more productive work. His delegation believed that the purpose of procedure was to facilitate substantive work, not to pre-empt it. The so-called cluster debates in the past had proved to be counter-productive, and substantive items such as nuclear disarmament and related issues had not been given sufficient focus and time.

His delegation hoped that the proposals submitted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries/Group of 21 would be revisited in the current session in the context of the document on principles and objectives. Due consideration should be given to the proposals and suggestions of all delegations. While grappling with familiar issues the Preparatory Committee should not lose sight of new challenges as well. The smuggling of nuclear material, nuclear terrorism, institutional support from IAEA, issues of safety and environment and export-import control of illicit nuclear material were some of the issues that needed to be addressed to ensure an environment dedicated to non-proliferation and disarmament in the coming era. He hoped that agreement could be reached on a time allocation format commensurate with the importance of issues new and old. It was self-evident that the nuclear disarmament cluster should have priority in that regard.

The NPT was perhaps the first multilaterally negotiated treaty that sought nuclear disarmament. The 1995 Conference had forcefully reaffirmed that need and set out the path towards the eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons. The conclusions of the forthcoming Review Conference concerning article VI would therefore be of great significance. The nuclear-weapon States' willingness to undertake a multilateral process on nuclear disarmament issues was vital to ensure that non-proliferation efforts did not remain open-ended and disarmament efforts paralysed. The Conference on Disarmament had an important but largely unexploited role to play in that regard. It was widely recognized that nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament represented a continuum critical to international stability and security. Security assurances and stability on a global, regional and country-specific basis were intertwined with economic growth and development. Article VI (nuclear disarmament) was not necessarily directed at the nuclear-weapon States, but held all parties to the Treaty accountable for its implementation. Review conferences provided a venue to advance that process and not to detract from it.

First, therefore, article VI of the Treaty must be allotted more time, focus and attention. Secondly, the Conference on Disarmament, which would commence its next session in 1998 shortly, needed to pursue nuclear disarmament as the highest priority in a meaningful way and not allow procedure to pre-empt substance. Thirdly, all States should promote the entry into force of the CTBT, which was an integral component of the principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 NPT Conference. Sri Lanka had always considered a true CTBT as an effective barrier against new nuclear weapons and more nuclear-weapon States. However, the continuation of testing under whatever pretext, technical or other, would be a blow to the CTBT regime. Fourthly, the START II Treaty should be implemented and the approval of the Protocols for START II executed without delay. The major nuclear inventories needed to be further scaled down, and the United States and the Russian Federation should begin negotiations on follow-up reductions of arsenals as agreed in Helsinki. All nuclear-weapon States should negotiate in good faith to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals, including the cessation of production of nuclear warheads. That process could be pursued both bilaterally and multilaterally. There should be a multilaterally negotiated and effectively verifiable regime on fissile material as well. All those parallel processes would form synergies that would realize the objectives set in the NPT and at the 1995 Conference.
Safeguards were of increasing importance. Since the end of the cold war, a series of events had transformed the dynamics of the safeguards systems. A distinct achievement had been reached when the IAEA Board of Governors had approved a model additional protocol to strengthen the existing measures on safeguards. However, limitations still existed as full-scope safeguards could not be applied to all nuclear-material facilities. It was of global interest to advance new technologies and international cooperation, in order to keep pace with the rapidly evolving sphere of nuclear technology. The 2000 Review Conference should therefore pay sufficient attention to the issue of safeguards.

Article IV of the Treaty, concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, embodied an inherent right of the States parties to obtain the nuclear technology for peaceful usage without any discrimination. In the next decade, nuclear technology would play a pivotal role in the realm of economic development. The developing countries would be particularly interested in seeing a greater and more creative role for IAEA to provide nuclear technology applications adapted to national development needs. As parties to the NPT, developing countries expected IAEA to place equal emphasis on nuclear technology applications under Article IV.

He hoped that the issue of negative security assurances would be meaningfully addressed in the strengthened review process. It was incredible that the negative security assurances debate was still bogged down in the perceived security requirements of the nuclear-weapon States and was not being addressed as a real issue faced by those States which had legally renounced the nuclear weapons option. The 2000 Review Conference provided an opportunity for the nuclear-weapon States to change that attitude. The non-nuclear-weapon parties to the NPT, the norm-setters for non-proliferation and disarmament in the nuclear age, would wait to see whether those nuclear-weapon States would constructively use the opportunity offered to them.

At the turn of the century, nations must realize that the time was ripe for diminishing nuclear dangers and arsenals. The utility of nuclear weapons needed to be played down constantly in order to deter proliferators as well as nuclear builders. Having indefinitely extended the NPT, the nuclear-weapon States should not give the impression that they were permanently bonded to the
utility of nuclear weapons. The 2000 Review Conference should project the positive message that an era of universal non-proliferation and multilateral disarmament was beginning. Any other message, particularly on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, would not enhance the credibility of the extended NPT regime.

Mr. RYBAK (Ukraine) said that, since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Ukraine had consistently abided by Conference decisions and supported nuclear non-proliferation in general. It had completed the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its territory, signed the CTBT and become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee. A system of export control was functioning, through which the Government regulated the transfers and transits of nuclear materials and missile products as well as relevant technologies, in particular according to the requirements of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. As the representative of the Russian Federation had recalled, Ukraine had actively participated in the implementation of START I and fully complied with the provisions of the Treaty. It appreciated the decision of the 1995 Conference on the indefinite extension of the Treaty as well as the set of other important decisions which had significantly influenced the international climate.

Ukraine had taken an active part in the preparatory work for the Conference decisions on principles and objectives strengthening the NPT review process, and on the resolution on the Middle East. They reflected the positions expressed by the vast majority of States parties to the NPT concerning subsequent instruments to prevent nuclear-weapon proliferation and to provide incentives for nuclear disarmament. Ensuring the universality of the NPT remained Ukraine's priority, and he called on all States not parties to the Treaty, in particular those possessing nuclear facilities to which IAEA safeguards were not applied, to join the NPT in the shortest possible time.

Ukraine was especially sensitive to the problem of nuclear safety and non-proliferation and had ratified the Convention on Nuclear Safety at the end of 1997. Its decision to forswear the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world, inherited from the former USSR, and to become a non-nuclear-weapon State, had caused controversial debates in the parliament of Ukraine during the discussion of its accession to the NPT. As a result of the accident at
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, nuclear safety issues had become a matter of concern not only for politicians but for the public at large. In a speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1996, the President of Ukraine had noted that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central and Eastern Europe could substantially enhance the development of the European process in all its dimensions.

Ukraine assessed positively the NATO Declaration on the non-deployment of nuclear tactical weapons in the territories of the new members of the expanded Alliance, and believed that a further important step might be the adoption of an appropriate mandatory document on that issue. Consultations with all interested parties on possible approaches to the realization of such a document were an urgent necessity.

Ukraine supported the efforts of the world community to strengthen the non-proliferation regime at the regional level. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia were examples of the implementation of article VII of the Treaty. He believed there was still a possibility to achieve such a zone in the Middle East.

On 21 September 1995 Ukraine had signed with IAEA the Agreement on the Application of Safeguards in connection with the Treaty; the Agreement had entered into force for Ukraine on 17 January 1998.

Ukraine believed that dialogue should be intensified between nations willing to establish equal partnership relations on both bilateral and multilateral bases in the sphere of peaceful use of nuclear energy within the framework of IAEA and the international non-proliferation regime of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The current political environment placed on the international agenda one of the main global security issues - the non-nuclear-weapon-world concept. That required immediate practical measures to provide for universal adherence to the NPT; active steps by all nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear potential (with the commencement, after START II entered into force, of negotiations on the future reduction of nuclear weapons, involving all the nuclear-weapon States); ensuring a reliable verification regime (IAEA safeguards, control regimes for transfers of sensitive items and technologies); ensuring the entry into force of the CTBT as soon as possible; elaboration of an international convention for the suppression of acts of
nuclear terrorism; decisive measures for the comprehensive implementation of the treaties on existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the establishment of new zones; and the early start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off convention.

While concentrating attention on the global aspects of general disarmament, Ukraine was convinced that it was necessary to take decisive steps towards the implementation of international arrangements for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The NPT was a single international binding document uniting the international community around the concept of global nuclear security and its efficiency might be enhanced by more active efforts by such global forums as the United Nations, in particular IAEA. NPT universality depended as never before on the solution of sensitive political problems at the regional level. In that connection, political and functional interactions should be established between the work being conducted by the United Nations and efforts in the framework of international non-proliferation agreements. Those steps should be a major prerequisite for achieving the high level of universality of the non-proliferation regime.

Mr. ALBORZI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that the NPT would be the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime in the years to come. Consolidated efforts were needed to strengthen the regime through realization of the goals and objectives of the Treaty. In that respect, further elaboration of the main objectives of the Treaty as envisaged in the Principles and Objectives provided a sound basis for collective endeavours towards that goal.

In accordance with the terms of its mandate, the Preparatory Committee must consider ways and means to promote the full implementation of the Treaty and to ensure its universality by making concrete recommendations to the Review Conference thereon. That could not be achieved until and unless the implications of developments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation were examined.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995, the conclusion of the CTBT, in spite of its shortcomings, its signature by 149 countries to date and the willingness expressed by some more countries to adhere to the Treaty were clear indications of the political will of the international community to take further steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
However, a good many concerns remained. The conducting of sub-critical testing by some nuclear-weapon States was undermining confidence in the provisions of the CTBT and would certainly open the door to similar undertakings by other nuclear Powers, further removing the goal of a total ban on the development of all nuclear-weapon systems and their elimination. Continued nuclear testing had put the very objectives of the CTBT, enshrined in its preamble, to a severe test. Criticism by the international community of nuclear testing was mounting, and he sincerely hoped that would discourage further tests.

Progress in the field of bilateral arms control agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation was sluggish. While START I was being implemented, START II had yet to enter into force. The beginning of negotiations on START III remained in limbo. If momentum waned, further nuclear arms reduction would be but an optimistic goal.

However, nuclear disarmament remained the first priority of the international community. Resistance by some nuclear-weapon States to the commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament had led to a stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. That had adversely affected the negotiated disarmament agenda and had delayed negotiations on some specific issues, in particular a fissile material cut-off treaty.

A fundamental issue was that some nuclear-weapon States declined even to consider changing their nuclear deterrence doctrines dating from the cold war period. To them the end of the cold war simply dictated changes in the positioning of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and the taking of steps to develop new nuclear-weapon systems to meet the geopolitical requirements of the new international system. In his delegation's opinion, the time had come to give serious thought to real and time-bound nuclear disarmament.

The starting point should be the assertions made by all nuclear-weapon States at the 1995 Conference that the indefinite extension of the NPT was not a justification for maintaining nuclear weapons for ever. Nuclear weapons, which merely caused tension and conflict, persistently threatened international peace and security and inhibited the confidence necessary for the reform of international relations and improved cooperation. If they were
to meet their obligations, the possessors of nuclear weapons were required and bound to pursue systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of their elimination.

In order to stimulate structured discussion of such efforts, 28 non-aligned members of the Conference on Disarmament had proposed a practical programme of action. Time should be allocated for a discussion of the issue.

The States parties to the NPT had a responsibility to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which contributed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. It was encouraging that new nuclear-weapon-free zones had been established in Africa and Central Asia. However, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which had been specifically called for by the 1995 Conference, was blocked by Israel's nuclear policies, and diplomatic efforts to persuade Israel to renounce the nuclear option had failed. A fresh impetus to promote the issue was needed from the sponsors of the draft resolution on the Middle East at the 1995 Conference, and every means available in the review process should be used in defining the practical steps to be taken to establish such a zone.

After more than a decade of negotiations on security assurances, little progress had been made. The decision of the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on negative security assurances was to be welcomed, since it held out the hope of real negotiations taking place. It would not, however, be easy to reach agreement on the issue at the Conference on Disarmament, given the basic conceptual differences among the members of that Conference regarding non-proliferation, and his delegation considered that negotiations could be conducted within the NPT framework. Support was growing for the proposal to annex a protocol on security assurances to the NPT. Iran and 11 other States parties to the NPT had submitted a draft protocol to the Conference on Disarmament in 1994.

The Treaty balanced the rights and obligations of the States parties and ensured the inalienable right of all States parties, without discrimination, to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and technology for peaceful use. Its provisions, or allegations not verified by IAEA, should not be used as grounds for interfering with such peaceful use by States parties, or with their trade relations. The IAEA safeguards system had been designed to verify the compliance of the States parties with their
obligations under the Treaty, including peaceful use, and the decision of the 1995 Conference on Principles and Objectives clearly recognized IAEA as the competent authority in that respect and requested States parties that had concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty to direct such concerns to the Agency, thereby avoiding unilateral action that could undermine the credibility of IAEA or the Treaty.

The export control regime established by a few nuclear countries, and in which developing countries had no say, ran counter to the basic provisions of the Treaty, since it inhibited the peaceful use of nuclear technology by developing countries. Guidelines for the transfer of equipment and technology should be developed in a transparent manner with the broad participation of States parties, in accordance with the decision on Principles and Objectives. Thus far, no practical steps had been taken towards implementation of that decision, owing largely to the reluctance of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to heed the concerns of other States parties. He invited the Group to review its modalities by inviting other interested States parties to participate in its proceedings and decision-making process.

It was regrettable that years of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament had yielded no tangible result on the question of securing safeguarded nuclear facilities against attack or threats of attack, the security and environmental consequences of which would transcend national boundaries. In the light of the risks involved, no effort should be spared to explore ways of ensuring the safety of all peaceful facilities, particularly those under IAEA safeguards.

Lastly, he emphasized the need for a follow-up mechanism to ensure the implementation of the NPT and of the recommendations of the 2000 Review Conference. An open-ended standing committee could be established, for example, not only to provide such follow-up but also to function as an institution that could address all aspects of the Treaty, including compliance issues. That proposal could be considered during the second session.

Mr. GARCIA (Colombia) said that his delegation fully supported the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Group of Non-Aligned and other States parties to the Treaty. The NPT was an essential instrument in
combating the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a vital tool in nuclear disarmament, and he re-emphasized the undertakings set forth in articles I and II.

IAEA was responsible for verifying compliance with the Treaty, and its safeguards system played a vital role in the fulfilment of the obligations set forth in article III. It was therefore of the utmost importance that all States parties that had not yet done so should conclude agreements as provided for in that article. Moreover, the balanced interpretation and implementation of the Treaty meant that it was of particular importance to ensure the exercise of the inalienable rights of all parties under the Treaty.

The developing countries should be given preferential treatment in the exchange of equipment, materials and information. It was unacceptable that restrictions should be imposed or unilateral and discriminatory standards applied in the exchange of technology for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Observance of the letter and spirit of the CTBT would entail conducting no tests of any kind and a different interpretation of that Treaty would weaken it and undermine its credibility, thereby detracting from its value in combating nuclear proliferation and its contribution to the nuclear disarmament process.

Nuclear weapons remained the greatest danger to humanity and to the very existence of life on the planet, and the ultimate goal could only be their complete elimination. The greatest responsibility lay with the nuclear-weapon States, and particularly those with the largest arsenals. His delegation supported the positions of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and of the Group of 21 within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament in reaffirming the priority of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in accordance with the Final Document of the tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament.

In the context of the undertakings set forth in article VI, and in particular the responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, he recalled the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, to the effect that there was an obligation to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

The indefinite extension of the NPT had renewed the impetus for its implementation, since it meant that the non-nuclear-weapon States had renounced the nuclear option and that the nuclear-weapon States must comply with the provisions of article VI and observe the letter, the spirit and the aims of the Treaty. Any other interpretation would run counter to the principle of the equal sovereignty of States and the principles and norms of international law.

His delegation supported the call for the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework and a convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons.

Colombia furthermore supported the proposal of 28 delegations to the Conference on Disarmament that were members of the Group of 21 for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and a broad mandate for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament to negotiate a universal, legally binding agreement committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons; an agreement on further measures towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons; and a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, taking account of the report of the Special Coordinator on the subject and the opinions as to the scope of such a treaty submitted by 26 delegations to the Conference on Disarmament that were members of the Group of 21.

His delegation supported the initiation of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty prohibiting the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, provided such a treaty was non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally applicable.

As a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone, Colombia welcomed the establishment of similar zones in other regions under the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, on the basis of agreements freely entered into by the States of those regions.
It also supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, such as the Middle East, and welcomed the initiative of the Central Asian States to establish such a zone in that region.

The NPT would not be able to fulfil its objectives until it had achieved universality and it was therefore important to persist in the task of persuading those States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty.

It was 20 years since the issue of negative security assurances had first been considered by the General Assembly at its special session on disarmament. Only the complete elimination of nuclear weapons would provide absolute assurance to all non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons. In the meantime, every effort should be made to establish a legally binding negative security assurance regime, and his delegation considered that the ad hoc committee established to examine that issue in the Conference on Disarmament should devote itself to that task.

Mr. ZAHRAHAN (Egypt) said that the changes in the international security situation brought about by the end of the cold war had led to outstanding achievements in disarmament negotiations, arms control and non-proliferation, but much remained to be done before the principles and objectives of nuclear disarmament could be fully implemented. It was necessary to move away from outmoded nuclear deterrence strategies and doctrines. Recent initiatives to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones, with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, had underscored the demands from international public opinion for the delegitimization of such weapons.

The Preparatory Committee's role should now be to focus on ways of implementing all the provisions of the NPT, as well as the three decisions and the resolution on the Middle East adopted in the 1995 Conference. The sessions of the Committee could be thought of as mini-review conferences, which could monitor the progress achieved in the implementation of the Treaty, identifying shortcomings and impediments and finding ways to redress any imbalances. The review of implementation should also embrace decisions 1 and 2 and the resolution on the Middle East, and each session of the Committee should make recommendations for updating and extending the principles and objectives to the 2000 Review Conference, in order to strengthen implementation and compliance.
Only a truly universal regime could guarantee security for all parties at both the regional and the international levels, for no country could feel secure as long as nuclear weapons existed. Under such a regime, all parties should be able to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear technology on an equal basis, without discrimination. The Preparatory Committee should consider ways of promoting universal adherence to the NPT and its full implementation, for, unless that was achieved, the non-proliferation regime would become discriminatory and would benefit some at the expense of others, while excluding yet others.

The 1995 Conference had decided to extend the NPT indefinitely even before undertaking a review of the implementation of article VI or agreeing on a phased programme to eliminate nuclear weapons. Now that the CTBT had been concluded, the Committee should focus on ways of achieving the ultimate goal of elimination, as expressed in the programme of action contained in the decision on principles and objectives agreed to by the international community. One method could be to request the States parties to submit written reports on their progress to date and on their future plans for implementation of the principles and objectives. The nuclear-weapon States should make a legally binding commitment to provide additional assurances for mankind, for the safety and security of present and future generations.

He expressed concern at the lack of implementation of the decision on principles and objectives, since it appeared to indicate that nuclear-weapon States still considered such weapons to have a role to play in international relations. If nuclear disarmament was to be the exclusive business of the officially declared nuclear-weapon States, how would it be possible to deal with any nuclear weapons in the possession of other States not parties to the NPT? An answer to that question must be found if the desire to rid the planet of nuclear weapons was genuine.

It was not unreasonable to press for nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, even if it was not a short-term objective. It was not only the claim of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, but had been reflected also in the ICJ advisory opinion, the recommendations of the Canberra Commission and numerous General Assembly resolutions. Above all, it was an aspect of the protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms and above all the right to life for present and future generations, in line with resolution 1996/14 of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.

The “Proposal for a programme of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons”, which Egypt had submitted to the Conference on Disarmament on behalf of 28 delegations on 7 August 1996, had been intended to contribute to the start of negotiations in an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, which the Conference on Disarmament had been requested to establish. The programme of action recognized that active multilateral efforts were needed to identify and implement specific step-by-step measures for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. It contained concrete measures to be carried out by the proposed ad hoc committee in three phases, and ending in 2020. Egypt had also submitted a draft mandate for the proposed ad hoc committee to the Conference on Disarmament (document CD/1453). It took account of a number of concerns, calling for simultaneous negotiations on the phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as well as a comprehensive agreement banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices.

Egypt supported the main goals of the fissile materials ban, but such a ban could be effective only if it provided value added in the field of general disarmament, and especially if it took into account and banned future production as well as the existing stockpiles of such materials. Banning future production of fissile materials was only a limited non-proliferation measure, however, particularly for those countries with nuclear weapons potential and nuclear weapons, and would have no real disarmament value. Stockpiles of weapons - usable fissile materials that existed in any country would have to be declared and be subjected to very careful inventory and inspection under international supervision and control. Such a step should serve as the basis for any verification regime. Negotiations on a treaty to ban fissile materials could commence in the ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament with the mandate reflected in the Shannon report including the concerns expressed by all countries.

Despite the various proposals to establish such a committee within the Conference on Disarmament, an agreement had recently been reached to pursue intensive consultations under the Conference’s agenda item on cessation of the
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Egypt had already expressed its reservation on that modality, which raised several questions and concerns regarding those who were reluctant to proceed with the serious work under that item in the Conference on Disarmament.

Both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT equally recognized that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were a legitimate and inalienable right for all States and that the purpose of the safeguards measures to which all parties should be committed should be to guarantee peaceful uses of nuclear energy while preventing military uses of the technology. There was, however, a serious imbalance in international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as export control groups, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group, imposed various restrictions on the transfer of such technology to some nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, despite the fact that those States had subjected their nuclear facilities to international inspection and the IAEA safeguards mechanism, while other States that were not parties to the Treaty had been able to acquire the technology easily. Egypt took due note of the interesting Australian proposal of 1990 on full-scope safeguards as an assurance of supply.

The best security assurance to non-nuclear-weapon States was the elimination of nuclear weapons. The NPT did not, however, strike a balance between the haves and the have-nots, as it did not provide the latter with comprehensive, credible and sufficient security assurances. The assurances delivered thus far to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT on unilateral and plurilateral forms by the five nuclear-weapon States and which were reflected in Security Council resolutions 255 and 984 fell short of the needs and requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States, since such assurances were conditional, non-comprehensive, not legally binding — meaning they could be rescinded by any party — and had not been negotiated multilaterally. Therefore, the decision on principles and objectives adopted by the 1995 Review Conference should be implemented immediately by starting serious negotiations on a multilateral and legally binding instrument to provide non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty with comprehensive and unconditional assurances as soon as possible. Such an instrument could take the form of a protocol to be annexed to the NPT, which could be negotiated by
the ad hoc committee on negative security assurances that the Conference on Disarmament in March 1998 had agreed to establish. The 2000 Review Conference would be an excellent occasion for annexing such a protocol. Alternatively, an internationally legally binding instrument could be negotiated within the Conference on Disarmament, even if it did not take the form of the proposed protocol.

The IAEA safeguards regime was an essential element in fulfilling the objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of the “93 + 2” programme and the adoption of the model additional protocol provided a sound basis for making the Agency more effective in carrying out its mandate. All States parties which had not yet done so should sign the safeguards agreements required by article III of the Treaty without delay. There was also a need to start serious work on extending the full-scope safeguards regime to include all States which currently had no safeguards agreements, or only partial ones, with the Agency.

Regarding the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review Conference, Egypt again warned of the threat of a nuclear programme not subject to international guarantees on its eastern borders. How long would Israel continue to exercise its policy of nuclear obfuscation, which was completely contradictory to the purposes of the current age and which threatened the peace and security of all its neighbouring countries, as well as the right to life? Israel had refused to join the NPT or even to declare its intention to adhere to the Treaty or submit all of its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards regime. He stressed the need for the Preparatory Committee to issue a declaration calling on Israel to abide by those conditions. The Preparatory Committee should also follow up on implementation of the resolution, which called upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps aimed at making progress towards the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution also called upon all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the NPT as soon as possible and to place their nuclear facilities under the full-scope IAEA safeguards. All States parties to the Treaty, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, had a responsibility to extend their cooperation to attain the Treaty's objectives.
and were called upon to exert their utmost efforts. The depository States must shoulder the primary responsibilities as co-sponsors of the resolution.

Mr. JEENBAEV (Kyrgyzstan) said the Preparatory Committee should recognize that it was engaged in a qualitatively different review process from that of the 1995 Conference; no longer confined to a retrospective examination of implementation of the Treaty, and guided by the Principles and Objectives, it needed to look forward and identify practical means for strengthening the implementation of the NPT and achieving its universality. Regrettably, the initial high expectations after the 1995 Conference had been only partially fulfilled. Completion of the CTBT negotiations represented the most striking progress that had been made on the disarmament front, and his Government was proud to have signed that Treaty. It also took positive note of the progress made since 1995 in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia and in the growth of support for such zones in other regions. As those zones had evolved, they had generally become stronger. The Treaty of Rarotonga appeared stronger than that of Tlatelolco in terms of prohibiting the possession or testing of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. The Bangkok Treaty introduced new elements in the control system for nuclear-weapon-free zones, while the Treaty of Pelindaba prohibited the manufacture, testing, stockpiling or acquisition by all means, as well as the possession and control, of any nuclear explosive device. Such zones contributed greatly to the pursuit of a world free of nuclear weapons. Kyrgyzstan was especially pleased to note the significant progress towards establishing such a zone in Central Asia and attached particular importance to the General Assembly resolution adopted at the fifty-second session calling on all States to support the initiative aimed at establishing such a zone and drawing attention to the formation in April 1998, under United Nations auspices, of an expert group on the subject and to preparations for a consultative meeting to discuss the basic elements of such a treaty, involving the five Central Asian States, the five nuclear-weapon States and the United Nations, to be held at Bishkek in July 1998. He hoped the Preparatory Committee would take positive note of those developments.

Those encouraging non-proliferation steps were, however, insufficient by themselves to guarantee the continued integrity of the NPT. Regrettably, the slow pace of arms reductions since 1995 suggested that the nuclear-weapon
States were not pursuing their nuclear disarmament obligations in good faith. In order to eliminate that perception, it was important for those States to reaffirm and realize their commitment to nuclear disarmament as specified in article VI of the NPT.

His Government strongly endorsed the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system, based on the model additional protocol agreed to in 1997. He was pleased to report that on 18 March 1998, Kyrgyzstan had signed a safeguards agreement with the Agency. The process of disarmament required strict procedures for the safe handling, transport, storage and disposal of sensitive nuclear material. Attention must also be given to mitigating the environmental consequences of past and present nuclear weapons programmes. There had been exceptional instances in which serious environmental consequences had resulted from uranium mining and associated nuclear fuel-cycle activities in the production of nuclear weapons. That often-overlooked environmental problem, caused by nuclear weapons production and borne by Kyrgyzstan, among other States, was another reason why his Government attached such importance to the work of the Preparatory Committee. The 1995 Conference had called upon all Governments and international organizations with expertise in the field of clean-up and disposal of radioactive contaminants to consider giving such appropriate assistance as might be requested for remedial purposes in those affected areas. The Agency should provide a statement during the Preparatory Committee's current session about its relevant activities and the assistance programmes available for the purposes of environmental assessment, clean-up and the disposal of radioactive contaminants.

Mr. JU (Republic of Korea) said his Government supported an action-oriented, forward-looking approach that would enable the Preparatory Committee to set forth a concrete programme of action for the 2000 Review Conference. Fixing concrete and precise targets, such as those adopted for the CTBT negotiations, for example, would help the Committee to attain its stated goals. Universal adherence to the Treaty should continue to accelerate, with the successful implementation of Brazil's promising intent to accede. His Government, as an original signatory to and strong supporter of the CTBT, was ready to contribute to its early entry into force and expressed its ardent backing of the activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBT.
Organization and Provisional Technical Secretariat in Vienna and especially of their useful work in establishing an effective verification regime. He urged those States that had not yet done so to sign or ratify the CTBT at the earliest possible date.

His Government placed the highest priority on the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the context of the Conference on Disarmament. It supported the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee within the Conference to begin negotiations on such a treaty and believed that a clearer recommendation from the 1998 Preparatory Committee would be a positive indication to the world community that negotiations for a stand-alone treaty were indeed a next logical step after the CTBT towards the common goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

The Republic of Korea encouraged nuclear-weapon States to take initiatives in pursuing in good faith systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons. In particular, he hoped that the pursuit by the United States and the Russian Federation of their commitments in the context of the START process would bear more fruit in the foreseeable future. He welcomed the call voiced in the previous Preparatory Committee session for nuclear-weapon States to be more forthcoming in informing the international community of the activities and progress in their efforts towards nuclear disarmament. That form of increased transparency would contribute to building much needed confidence among States. The Presidential Declaration and the decision adopted by the Conference on Disarmament on 26 March 1998 were modest but encouraging signs that the Conference would tackle the complex issues of nuclear disarmament as its first priority.

On the issue of security assurances, he was pleased to note that the Conference on Disarmament had decided on 26 March 1998 to establish an ad hoc committee to negotiate an agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. The Republic of Korea would support the work of that committee. It also shared the overwhelming support expressed at the previous session of the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, as a complementary instrument to the NPT. In that regard, the
ongoing work of the Disarmament Commission in drawing up general guidelines and principles for the establishment of such zones was of particular interest. Such measures for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament must, however, be buttressed by States’ confidence in their verification regimes. For that reason, the role of IAEA in promoting safeguards must receive the wholehearted support of all States. As the issue of safeguards was of particular importance to his country, he wished to restate his Government’s strong support for IAEA’s efforts to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of its safeguards systems, and he welcomed the adoption of the “93 + 2” model protocol in May 1997 and looked forward to early implementation of the strengthened safeguards on a global basis.

Regarding the non-compliance by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the IAEA safeguards agreement, there were three interrelated elements. First was the implementation of the Agreed Framework between that country and the United States, and the new administration of the Republic of Korea had recently reaffirmed its strong commitment to the faithful implementation of that Framework by announcing that, despite current economic difficulties, it would carry out the promises made in connection with the construction of light water nuclear reactors in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He emphasized the importance of the continued support by the international community for the steady implementation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization project. The second issue was full compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The international community had reaffirmed that the agreement remained binding and in force and had called upon the Government to comply fully with it. His Government also urged that country to come into full compliance with its safeguards obligations.

Thirdly, there was the implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, signed by the two countries in 1992, with a view to eliminating the danger of nuclear war through denuclearization of the Peninsula, thus creating an environment and conditions favourable for the peaceful unification of the country. If implemented faithfully, the Declaration would remove any nuclear proliferation concern on the Korean Peninsula. In sum, implementation of the agreed framework by all parties concerned, full and complete compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement by
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and early implementation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula were complementary and mutually reinforcing. As the three components together constituted a strong underpinning for the Peninsula's denuclearization, their faithful implementation was a sine qua non for the consolidation of a nuclear non-proliferation regime on the Korean Peninsula and would make an important contribution to international peace and security. The Republic of Korea, as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, would contribute to promoting the transparency of export controls. He hoped that particular importance would be given to promoting high standards of nuclear safety, waste management and radiation protection.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.