

Summary of the 12 <sup>th</sup> Heads of State Summit, Durban, South Africa (1998)	
<b>DISARMAMENT</b>	<b>General Views on Disarmament and NAM Involvement</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Durban Declaration for new Millennium, Page 11)</b> We need to ensure our contribution to a new, just world order free from unilateral coercive measures, free from WMD, particularly nuclear weapons, a world based on tolerance and genuine co-existence, a world based on respect for the UN Charter and the full observance of its principles and purposes</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They once again called upon the international community to join them in negotiating and implementing universal, non-discriminatory disarmament measures and mutually agreed confidence building measures</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 115)</b> ... the Heads of State or Government reiterated that a number of Non-Aligned Movement countries had taken collective initiatives at the UNGA sessions to underscore the need for urgent action in the field of nuclear disarmament, as mandated by the Cartagena Summit</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 142)</b> The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed that global and regional approaches to disarmament are complementary and could be pursued simultaneously</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 147)</b> The Heads of State or Government expressed their satisfaction with the work of the Non-Aligned Working Group on Disarmament under the co-ordination of Indonesia and encouraged delegations to continue their active work in this regard</li> </ul>
	<b>Verification</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 119)</b> The Heads of State or Government reiterated their conviction of the validity of the unanimous conclusion of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict and effective international control”</li> </ul>
	<b>Nuclear Weapons Convention</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They recalled that the Cartagena Summit had called for the adoption of an action plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time bound framework</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They called for an international conference, preferably in 1999, with the objective of arriving at an agreement, before the end of this millennium on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time to eliminate all nuclear weapons, to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use, and to provide for their destruction</li> </ul>

<b>DISARMAMENT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 114)</b> They also insisted on the need to conclude a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement committing all States to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 119)</b> ... they reiterated their call upon all States to immediately fulfill that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of threat of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination</li> </ul>
	<b>Nuclear Weapons States, Arms Race and Bilateral Disarmament</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 4)</b> Great powers continue to endanger the future of humankind through the unjustified stockpiling and development of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and a rampant traffic in armaments continues to put in jeopardy the security and stability of vast regions of the world</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> The Heads of State or Government reiterated that with the end of the Cold War, there is no justification for the maintenance of nuclear arsenals, or concepts of international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence</li> </ul>
	<b>Disarmament and Development</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 4)</b> The Heads of State or Government emphasized that even when the spectre of a nuclear holocaust seemed more remote than in the recent past and several countries had resolved to reduce their military budgets in order to devote such resources to meet the social and economic development requirements of their people, great powers continue to endanger the future of humankind through the unjustified stockpiling and development of nuclear weapons.</li> </ul>
<b>International Humanitarian Law and International Court of Justice</b>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 119)</b> The Heads of State or Government reiterated their conviction of the validity of the unanimous conclusion of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ that “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all aspects under strict and effective international control”</li> </ul>	

<b>UN FORA</b>	<b>UN General Assembly and Special Sessions on Disarmament</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 115)</b> The Heads of State or Government took noted of the Declaration issued on 9 June 1998 entitled – “Towards a World Free of Nuclear Weapons: Time for a New Agenda,” supported and responded to by a number of States including some members of the NAM</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 143)</b> The Heads of State or Government took note of the relevant Paragraphs of the UNGA resolutions 52/12A &amp; B on international peace, security and disarmament, and insisted on the need that its implementation respects fully the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and nonintervention in the internal affairs of States.</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 144)</b> The Heads of State or Government continued to stress their hope that the decision to re-establish at the UN Secretariat, the Department of Disarmament, headed by an Under Secretary-General from a Non-Aligned Country should contribute to greater disarmament efforts towards achieving general and complete disarmament in conformity with priorities set out in SSOD I and relevant provisions of GA resolution 52/220</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 145)</b> The Heads of State or Government expressed once again their support for the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the UNGA devoted to Disarmament (Final Document, Para 136) They urged States to conclude agreements with a view to creating NWFZ’s in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the SSOD I</li> </ul>
	<b>Test Ban and CTBT</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They noted the complexities arising from nuclear tests in South Asia, which underlined the need to work even harder to achieve their disarmament objectives including the elimination of nuclear weapons</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They considered positively the commitment by the parties concerned in the region to exercise restraint, which contributes to regional security, to discontinue nuclear tests and not to transfer nuclear weapons related material, equipment and technology</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They further stressed the significance of universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all NWS</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 124)</b> The Heads of State or Government of State signatory to the CTBT expressed their satisfaction that 150 States have signed the Treaty and 20 States have ratified it thus far</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 124)</b> They further expressed their general satisfaction at the progress of establishing the international verification system thus far</li> </ul>

<b>UN FORA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 124)</b> They agreed that if the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all State signatories, especially the NWS, to nuclear disarmament would be essential</li> </ul>
	<b>18-Nation Committee on Disarmament &amp; Conference on Disarmament</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> [They further stressed the significance of] commencement of negotiations in the CD on fissile materials (decision CD/1547), which, inter alia, should accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 114)</b> The Heads of State or Government reiterated their call on the CD to establish, as the highest priority, an ad-hoc committee to start in 1999 negotiations on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 114)</b> They underscored the flexibility, which on the other hand has been demonstrated by the members of the NAM, members of the CD, in accepting the proposal to establish an ad-hoc committee under item 1 of the CD's agenda to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 114)</b> They also emphasized that this flexibility should be reciprocated by others through their agreement on the establishment of an ad-hoc committee on nuclear disarmament as well as during the course of the negotiations in the CD on fissile materials (Decision CD/1547)</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 117)</b> The Heads of State or Government noted the establishment of an ad-hoc committee on effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons in the CD to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding assurances to all NNWS</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 118)</b> The Heads of State or Government commend the establishment in the CD of an ad-hoc committee, under agenda item 1, entitled "The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 141)</b> Such deviations [determining noncompliance inconsistent with UN Charter] would also call into question the value of painstaking multilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control treaties in the CD</li> </ul>

<b>UN FORA</b>	<b>UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 146)</b> The Heads of State or Government welcomed the decision adopted by the GA on maintaining and revitalizing the three Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament in Nepal, Peru and Togo</li> </ul>
<b>CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS</b>	<b>International Atomic Energy Agency</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 120)</b> In this regard they also expressed their strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA's Statute</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 121)</b> They also emphasized the need to ensure and facilitate the exercise of the inalienable right of all States to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination under IAEA safeguards</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 125)</b> The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities-operational or under construction – poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 138)</b> [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they called on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, and to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full scope safeguards</li> </ul>
	<b>Chemical Weapons</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 126)</b> The Heads of State or Government of States party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and invited all States who have still not ratified it to do so as soon as possible with the view to its universality</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 126)</b> They also underlined the urgency of satisfactorily resolving the unresolved issues in the framework of the OPCW with a view to paving the ground for the effective, full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Convention</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 126)</b> In this context, they reiterated their call on the developed countries to promote international co-operation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 127)</b> The Heads of State or Government of the States party to the CWC, while stressing the importance of the full implementation of the Convention, and in this context, the</li> </ul>

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS</b></p>	<p>provisions of Art. X on Assistance, expressed their concern at the small number of responses received from the States parties to the Voluntary Fund on Assistance established by the OPCW and called upon all States parties to the Convention that had not yet acted in accordance with Art. X, to reply to the OPCW and contribute to redress this situation</p>
	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Biological Weapons</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 128)</b> ... the Heads of State or Government reiterated the decision by the BWC Review Conference that the use by States parties, in any way and under any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a violation of Art. I of the Convention</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 128)</b> In this connection, they noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran has formally presented a proposal to amend Art. I of the Convention to include the prohibition of use of biological weapons and urged an early reply from the States parties to the inquiries by the depositaries on this proposal</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 128)</b> They noted the progress achieved so far in negotiating a Protocol to strengthen the BWC and reaffirmed the decision of the Fourth Review Conference urging the conclusion of the negotiations by the Ad Hoc group as soon as possible before the commencement of the Fifth Review Conference and for it to submit its report ... to be considered at a Special Conference</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 128)</b> They also expressed concern at any attempts to reduce the scope and importance of issues related to Art. X of the convention</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 128)</b> Ensured access for peaceful purposes to the relevant materials, equipment and technology is essential to safeguard the economic interests of developing countries</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 128)</b> Substantive progress in strengthening the application and full operationalization of Article X is thus crucial for the conclusion of a universally acceptable and legally binding instrument designed to strengthen the Convention</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>NONPROLIFERATION</b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b>General Views on Nonproliferation</b></p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 120)</b> They emphasized that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 141)</b> The Heads of State or Government stated that in order to enhance international security and stability, all States parties to non-proliferation, arms limitations and disarmament treaties should comply with and implement all provisions of such treaties.</li> </ul>

<b>NONPROLIFERATION</b>	<b>Nonproliferation and Noncompliance</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 141)</b> They emphasized that questions of non-compliance by States Parties should be resolved in a manner consistent with such treaties</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 141)</b> They further emphasized that any deviation from the role envisaged for the Security Council under the UN Charter or in certain circumstances under relevant provisions of multilateral treaties on non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament would undermine the provisions of these treaties and conventions, including the inherent mechanisms for securing redress of violations of their provisions</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 141)</b> ... they also underlined that they were opposed to the assumption of a role by the UNSC inconsistent with the UN Charter</li> </ul>
<b>NONPROLIFERATION</b>	<b>Non-proliferation and Peaceful Uses</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 120)</b> The Heads of State or Government noted with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 120)</b> Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 120)</b> In this regard they also expressed their strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA's Statute.</li> </ul>
<b>PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY</b>	<b>General Peaceful Uses</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 120)</b> Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 121)</b> They also emphasized the need to ensure and facilitate the exercise of the inalienable right of all States to develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination under IAEA safeguards</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 121)</b> Undertakings to facilitate participation in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be fully implemented</li> </ul>

<b>PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY</b>	<b>Access to Nuclear Technology</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 120)</b> The Heads of State or Government noted with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist</li> </ul>
	<b>Matters on the UN and IAEA</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 120)</b> In this regard they also expressed their strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA's Statute.</li> </ul>
	<b>Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 125)</b> The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities-operational or under construction – poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 125)</b> They recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument, prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy</li> </ul>
<b>NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES</b>	<b>General Views on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 136)</b> The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of NWFZs as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 136)</b> They urged States to conclude agreements with a view to creating NWFZ's in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the SSOD I</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 136)</b> They welcomed the establishment of NWFZs established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 136)</b> It is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat or use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone[s]</li> </ul>
	<b>Mongolia as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free State</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 137)</b> The Heads of State or Government welcomed and supported Mongolia's policy to institutionalize its single State nuclear weapon free status</li> </ul>



<b>NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES</b>	<b>Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 252)</b> Welcomed the progress of ASEAN’s continuing efforts to realize the objective of establishing a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in South-East Asia (ZOPFAN) and the entry into force of the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ).</li> </ul>
<b>NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES</b>	<b>Middle East NWFZ</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 138)</b> The Heads of State or Government reiterated their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all WMD</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 138)</b> They reaffirmed the need for a speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council resolutions 487 (1981) and 687 (1991) and the relevant GA resolutions adopted by consensus</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 138)</b> They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the establishment of such a zone</li> </ul>
<b>NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES</b>	<b>Nuclear Weapon States Role</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 116)</b> expressed concern over the failure of the NWS’s to demonstrate a genuine commitment with regard to universal, unconditional, and legally binding negative security assurances to all NNWS</li> </ul>
	<b>NWFZ and Security Assurance</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 136)</b> It is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat or use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones [NWFZ’s]</li> </ul>
<b>NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES</b>	<b>International Convention or Instrument</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 117)</b> The Heads of State or Government noted the establishment of an ad-hoc committee on effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons in the CD to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding assurances to all NNWS</li> </ul>
<b>COUNTRY SPECIFIC</b>	<b>Israel</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 138)</b> [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they called on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, and to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full scope safeguards</li> </ul>

<b>COUNTRY SPECIFIC</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 138)</b> They expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighboring and other States and they condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 138)</b> They also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel</li> </ul>
	<b>Pakistan</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They noted the complexities arising from nuclear tests in South Asia, which underlined the need to work even harder to achieve their disarmament objectives including the elimination of nuclear weapons</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They considered positively the commitment by the parties concerned in the region to exercise restraint, which contributes to regional security, to discontinue nuclear tests and not to transfer nuclear weapons related material, equipment and technology</li> </ul>
<b>NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RELATED</b>	<b>India</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They noted the complexities arising from nuclear tests in South Asia, which underlined the need to work even harder to achieve their disarmament objectives including the elimination of nuclear weapons</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 113)</b> They considered positively the commitment by the parties concerned in the region to exercise restraint, which contributes to regional security, to discontinue nuclear tests and not to transfer nuclear weapons related material, equipment and technology</li> </ul>
	<b>NWS Obligation to Disarmament</b>
<b>NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RELATED</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 121)</b> Consistent with the decisions taken by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of Parties to the NPT, the Heads of State or Government of States party to the NPT called upon all States party, particularly the NWS, to fulfill their commitments, particularly those related to Art. VI of the Treaty</li> </ul>
	<b>Review and Extension of the NPT</b>
<b>NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RELATED</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 122)</b> The Heads of State or Government of States party to the NPT took note with regret at the outcome of the deliberations of the Second Preparatory Committee held in</li> </ul>

<b>NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RELATED</b>	<p>Geneva from 27 April to 8 May, 1998</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 122)</b> They further regretted that the Committee could not achieve a substantive result due to the insistence of one delegation to support the nuclear policies of a non-party to the NPT</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 122)</b> They called upon the Preparatory Committees up to and including the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT to engage immediately, in good faith, in substantive work for the speedy and meaningful implementation of the obligations under the Treaty and the commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives document, and the resolution on Middle East</li> </ul>
	<b>Specific Modalities for Specific Deliberations</b>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 122)</b> In this respect they further called upon the Preparatory Committee to make specific time available at its future sessions to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons and for the 2000 NPT Review Conference to establish a subsidiary body to its Main Committee I to deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 122)</b> The Heads of State or Government parties to the NPT, called for the establishment of a subsidiary body to its Main Committee I to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 123)</b> The Heads of State or Government Parties to the NPT also called for the creation on an open-ended standing committee which would work intersessionally, to follow up recommendations concerning the implementation of the NPT which would be agreed to at the Treaty's 2000 Review Conference Extension Conference of the NPT</li> <li>• <b>(Final Document, Para 138)</b> [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they called on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons [and] to accede to the NPT without delay</li> </ul>

*Compiled by the NAM Project Task Force at the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP) of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, California).*

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