

Summary of the 13 th Heads of State Summit, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (2003)	
DISARMAMENT	General Views on Disarmament and NAM Involvement
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 71) Reiterated deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards disarmament • (Final Document, Para 71) Stressed their concern at the threat to humanity from continued existence of nuclear weapons. • (Final Document, Para 71) Underscored the need to commend negotiations without delay for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. • (Final Document, Para 73) Reaffirmed that in efforts towards the objective of nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence building measures complement each other and should, wherever possible, be pursued simultaneously to promote regional and international peace and security. • (Final Document, Para 99) They expressed their firm support for unilateral, bilateral and multilateral measures adopted by some governments aimed at reducing military expenditures, thereby contributing to strengthening regional and international peace and security. They recognize that confidence building measures (CBMs) assist in this regard. They took note of the measures being examined by some governments such as the Andean Community of Nations. • (Final Document, Para 101) The Heads of State or Government commended the co-ordination carried out by the NAM Working Group on Disarmament and encouraged delegations to continue their active work on issues of common concern to the Movement, particularly towards ensuring respect for the principles of multilateralism and transparency in the areas of disarmament and non-proliferation
	Nuclear Weapons Convention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 74) Emphasized the necessity to start negotiations on elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. • (Final Document, Para 75) Called for an international conference with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
	Nonproliferation and Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 71) The Heads of State or Government reiterated their principled positions on nuclear disarmament and the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation.
Nuclear Weapons States, Arms Race and Bilateral Disarmament	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 69) Concerned at strategic defense 	

DISARMAMENT	<p>doctrines that set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. They remained deeply concerned over the "Alliance Strategic Concept" adopted by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in April 1999, which not only maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and policies of nuclear deterrence, but also includes new elements aimed at opening even more the scope for possible use or threat of use of force by NATO.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 72) While noting the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the Russian Federation and the United States on 24 May 2002, stressed that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.
	Disarmament and Development
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 99) The Heads of State or Government stressed the importance of the reduction of military expenditures, in accordance with the principle of undiminished security at the lowest level of armaments, and urged all States to devote resources made available there from to economic and social development, in particular in the fight against poverty.
	Modernization of Nuclear Weapons
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 70) They restated that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention with the assurances provided by the Nuclear Weapons States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons
Missiles	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 78) Welcomed report prepared by the Panel of Governmental Experts on the Issue of Missiles in all its aspects, which marked the first time the United Nations considered this issue. • (Final Document, Para 78) Remain convinced of the need for a multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory approach towards missiles in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace and security. 	

UN FORA	UN General Assembly and Special Sessions on Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 68) Welcomed the adoption of Resolution 57/63 by the General Assembly on the “Promotion of Multilateralism in the Area of Disarmament and Non-proliferation.” • (Final Document, Para 80) They urged States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive sessions • (Final Document, Para 98) Reiterated support for the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the UN SSOD, and reiterated deep concern on lack of consensus on deliberations held by the 1999 UN SSOD.
	Test Ban and CTBT
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 70) They restated that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention with the assurances provided by the Nuclear Weapons States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that the Treaty would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons • (Final Document, Para 79) Stressed the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT.
	18-Nation Committee on Disarmament & Conference on Disarmament
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 74) Reaffirmed the importance of the CD as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. • (Final Document, Para 74) Regretted that continued inflexible postures of some NWSs continue to prevent the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament. • (Final Document, Para 77) In accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 57/57, they emphasised the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. 	
UN Disarmament Commission	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 97) Reaffirmed the importance of the UNDC as the sole specialized, deliberative body within the UN multilateral disarmament machinery that allows for in-depth deliberations on specific disarmament issues. 	

UN FORA	International Atomic Energy Agency
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 84) Expressed strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA’s Statute. • (Final Document, Para 81) [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they demanded on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards • (Final Document, Para 122) Noted with great interest the establishment of a special working group by the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC on the crime of aggression, open on an equal footing to all States Members of the United Nations or members of specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for the purpose of elaborating proposals for a provision on aggression.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS	Chemical Weapons
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 103) States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) invited all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible with a view to its universality. They reiterated their call on the developed countries to promote international cooperation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention.
	Biological Weapons
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 102) States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) reaffirmed that the possibility of any use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons should be completely excluded, and the conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind.

OUTER SPACE	General Views on Outer Space
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 77) The Heads of State or Government continued to be concerned over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of being deployed in outer space
	Missile Defense Systems
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 77) The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-ballistic Missiles (ABM) brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
NONPROLIFERATION	International Cooperation on Outer Space
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 77) In accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolution 57/57, they emphasised the urgent need for the commencement of substantive work, in the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.
	General Views on Nonproliferation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 71) The Heads of State or Government reiterated their principled positions on nuclear disarmament and the related issue of nuclear non-proliferation • (Final Document, Para 84) Emphasized that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements.
NONPROLIFERATION	Nonproliferation and Noncompliance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 85): Regretted unsubstantiated allegations of non-compliance with relevant instruments on Weapons of Mass Destruction and called on States Parties to such instruments that make such allegations to follow the procedures set out in those instruments and to provide the necessary substantiation for their allegations.
	Non-proliferation and Peaceful Uses
NONPROLIFERATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 84) Nonproliferation control agreements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries. • (Final Document, Para 84) Expressed strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA's technical

NONPROLIFERATION	cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA’s Statute.
	Non-State Proliferation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 100) Welcomed adoption of UNGA Resolution 57/83 entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” and underlined the need for this threat to humanity to be addressed within the UN framework and through international NAM. • (Final Document, Para 100) While stressing that the most effective way of preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD is through the total elimination of such weapons • (Final Document, Para 100) Emphasized that progress was urgently needed in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation in order to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism.
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY	General Peaceful Uses
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 84) Nonproliferation control agreements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries.
	Matters on the UN and IAEA
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 84) Expressed strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA’s Statute.
	Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 91) The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities and that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities – operational or under construction – poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency. • (Final Document, Para 91) They recognized the need for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument, prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 	

NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES	General Views on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 80) The Heads of State or Government continued to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. • (Final Document, Para 80) It is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zone. • (Final Document, Para 80) They urged States to conclude agreements with a view to establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in regions where they do not exist, in accordance with the provisions of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-I) and the principles and guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission at its 1999 substantive session. • (Final Document, Para 80) Expressed their support to the initiative of convening an international conference of the States parties, ratifiers and signatories to the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba to discuss and implement further ways and means of co-operation among themselves, their treaty agencies and other interested States, at an appropriate time.
	Mongolia as a Nuclear-Weapon-Free State
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 80) Reiterated their support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status and considered that the institutionalisation of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.
	Southeast Asian NWFZ
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 80) They welcomed the on-going consultations between ASEAN and the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) on the Protocol of Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty and urged the NWS to become parties to the Protocol of the Treaty as soon as possible. 	
Central Asian NWFZ	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 80) welcomed the decision by all five Central Asian States to sign the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty as soon as possible. 	

NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES	Middle East NWFZ
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 81) The Heads of State or Government reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. • (Final Document, Para 81) To this end, they reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with UNSCR 487 (1981) and Paragraph 14 of UNSCR 687 (1991) and the relevant GA resolutions adopted by consensus • (Final Document, Para 81) They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfillment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone • (Final Document, Para 82) They emphasised the need for Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and security assurances.
NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES	General Views on Nuclear Security Assurances
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 70) expressed serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons are being considered and reiterated that the provision for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States is in contravention of the negative security assurances that have been provided by the Nuclear Weapons States.
	NWFZ and Security Assurance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 80) It is essential that Nuclear Weapon States should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones
NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES	International Convention or Instrument
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 76) Reiterated the conviction that the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to NNWSs should be pursued. • (Final Document, Para 82) Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, they also recalled that the 2000 Review Conference in its Final Document reiterated that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear weapons states to the non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the Treaty strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC	Israel
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 81) [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they demanded on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the NPT without delay, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards according to Security Council Resolution 487 (1981) and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime • (Final Document, Para 81) They expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States and condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. • (Final Document, Para 81) They also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel • (Final Document, Para 81) In this regard, they expressed their serious concern over the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one Nuclear Weapon State.
	Korea
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 83) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT noted the withdrawal of DPRK from the NPT • (Final Document, Para 83) They expressed the view that the Parties directly concerned resolve, through dialogue and negotiations, all issues related to the withdrawal of the DPRK from the NPT as an expression of their goodwill
	The United States of America
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 70) In the context of the Nuclear Posture Review that has been undertaken by the United States of America, the Heads of State or Government expressed serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons are being considered and reiterated that the provision for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States is in contravention of the negative security assurances that have been provided by the Nuclear Weapons States. • (Final Document, Para 70) The development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention with the assurances provided by the Nuclear Weapons States at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that the Treaty

	<p>would prevent the improvement of existing nuclear weapons and development of new types of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RELATED</p>	<p>NWS Obligation to Disarmament</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 82) called for full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the NWS's to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
	<p>Review and Extension of the NPT</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 82) The Heads of State or Government Parties to the NPT welcomed the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference of the parties to the NPT
<p>NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY</p>	<p>Specific Modalities for Specific Deliberations</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 81) [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they demanded on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons [and] to accede to the NPT without delay • (Final Document, Para 82) They emphasised the need for Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, and security assurances. They also welcomed the accession of Cuba to the NPT.
<p>NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY</p>	<p>General Nuclear Safety and Security</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) Affirmed the need to strengthen the Radiological Safety and Protection Systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials as well as at radioactive waste management facilities, including the safe transportation of these materials; • (Final Document, Para 89) Encouraged the design of an appropriate international regime for physical protection of radioactive materials during their transportation. • (Final Document, Para 90) Welcomed the importance of Resolution 56/24 L of the United Nations General Assembly on the Prohibition of the Dumping of Radioactive Wastes and called upon States to take appropriate measures to prevent any dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes that would infringe upon the sovereignty of States.

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Compiled by the NAM Project Task Force at the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP) of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, California).

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