

Summary of the 14 th Heads of State Summit, Havana, Cuba (2006)	
DISARMAMENT	General Views on Disarmament and NAM Involvement
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Purposes and Principles, Para I) Continue pursuing universal and nondiscriminatory nuclear disarmament. • (Purposes and Principles, Para M) Condemn the categorization of countries as good or evil based in unilateral and unjustified criteria, and the adoption of a doctrine of preemptive attack. • (Final Document, Para 73) The Heads of State or Government expressed their strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and in this context, underlined that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the UN Charter, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. • (Final Document, Para 74) They reiterated deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear weapons-States (NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. • (Final Document, Para 77) Efforts toward nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence building measures complement each other, and should be pursued simultaneously when possible. • (Final Document, Para 116) Commended the work of the NAM Working Group on Disarmament, under the chairmanship of Indonesia, in coordinating issues in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation.
	Verification
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 84) Called on the US and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, under the Moscow Treaty. • (Final Document, Para 97) The IAEA is the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with the obligations under the respective safeguard agreements of the Member States
	Nuclear Weapons Convention
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 81) Called for an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers and to achieve agreement on a phased disarmament program. 	
Nonproliferation and Disarmament	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 71) called for renewed efforts to resolve the current impasse in achieving nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects. 	

DISARMAMENT	Nuclear Weapons States, Arms Race and Bilateral Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 75) deeply concerned at strategic defense doctrines of NWS, including the “NATO Alliance Strategic Concept”, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies. • (Final Document, Para 84) Called on the US and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, under the Moscow Treaty.
	Disarmament and the Environment
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 90) International disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament.
	Disarmament and Development
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 115) The symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development is important. • (Final Document, Para 115) Expressed concern at increasing global military expenditures, which could otherwise be spent on development needs.
	Modernization of Nuclear Weapons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 76) Improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the US Nuclear Posture Review contravene security assurances and violate commitments undertaken by NWS at the conclusion of the CTBT. 	
Missiles	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 87) The Heads of State or Government remained convinced of the need for a multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive, transparent, and non-discriminatory approach toward missiles in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace and security. • (Final Document, Para 87) They expressed their support for efforts to be continued within the UN to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects. In this regard, they emphasized the need to keep the issue under the agenda of the UN General Assembly and that in accordance with its Resolution 59/67 a Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects would be established in 2007. 	

UN FORA	UN General Assembly and Special Sessions on Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 34) The Heads of State or Government expressed disappointment at the provisions contained in the 2005 World Summit Outcome that did not fully take into account the concerns and interests of developing countries • (Final Document, Para 34) They further expressed their disappointment at the inability of the World Summit to agree on the issue of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. • (Final Document, Para 37.2) [The Heads of State or Government agreed to undertake the following measures] ... [p]ursue the issues of fundamental importance to the Movement in the context of follow-up to the 2005 World Summit Outcome and the Millennium Declaration, that have been omitted from the outcome document or yet to be explored in the UN such as disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms control. • (Final Document, Para 72) Expressed determination to promote multilateralism as the core principles of negotiations, and welcomed the adoption of UNGA Resolution 60/59 on Promotion on multilateralism in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation. • (Final Document, Para 80) Reiterated support for the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. • (Final Document, Para 87) They expressed their support for efforts to be continued within the UN to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects. In this regard, they emphasised the need to keep the issue under the agenda of the UN General Assembly and that in accordance with its Resolution 59/67 a Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects would be established in 2007.
	Test Ban and CTBT
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 76) Improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the US Nuclear Posture Review contravene security assurances and violate commitments undertaken by NWS at the conclusion of the CTBT • (Final Document, Para 83) Stressed the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, especially by the NWS.
	18-Nation Committee on Disarmament & Conference on Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 79) Reaffirmed the importance of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating

UN FORA	<p>body on disarmament, and reiterated call on the CD to agree on a balanced and comprehensive program of work by establishing an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 79) They emphasized the necessity to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. • (Final Document, Para 82) Called for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to NNWSs, and noted a 1998 Ad Hoc Committee in the CD on effective international arrangements for security assurances to all NNWS.
	UN Disarmament Commission
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 78) Reaffirmed the importance and the relevance of the UN Disarmament Commission as the sole specialized, deliberative body within the UN multilateral disarmament machinery
	UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 91) The Heads of State or Government emphasised the importance of the UN activities at the regional level to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three regional centres for peace and disarmament.
International Atomic Energy Agency	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they demanded Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without delay, to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards • (Final Document, Para 94) Expressed strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA technical cooperation program as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA Statute. • (Final Document, Para 97) Stressed that any undue pressure or interference in the IAEA's activities should be avoided. • (Final Document, Para 97) The IAEA is the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with the obligations under the respective safeguard agreements of the Member States • (Final Document, Para 97) Emphasized importance of the NAM's positive role in the IAEA. • (Final Document, Para 98) Congratulated Director General El 	

<p>UN FORA</p>	<p>Baradei for being awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, and expressed full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the IAEA.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 99) Any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities—operational or under construction—poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA. • (Final Document, Para 100) Called for effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the International Trans-boundary Movement of Radioactive Waste of the IAEA. • (Iran Statement, Para 3) The Heads of State or Government recognized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole competent authority for verification • (Iran Statement, Para 4) The Heads of State or Government welcomed the cooperation extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA including those voluntary confidence-building measures undertaken, with a view to resolve the remaining issues. • (Iran Statement, Para 8) The Heads of State or Government strongly believed that all issues on safeguards and verification, including those of Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on technical and legal grounds. They further emphasized that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA 				
<p>CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS</p>	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; background-color: #e0e0e0;">Chemical Weapons</td> </tr> <tr> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 103) States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) invited all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible with a view to its universality. They reiterated their call on the developed countries to promote international cooperation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention. </td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; background-color: #e0e0e0;">Biological Weapons</td> </tr> <tr> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 102) States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) reaffirmed that the possibility of any use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons should be completely excluded, and the conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind. </td> </tr> </table>	Chemical Weapons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 103) States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) invited all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible with a view to its universality. They reiterated their call on the developed countries to promote international cooperation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention. 	Biological Weapons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 102) States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) reaffirmed that the possibility of any use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons should be completely excluded, and the conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind.
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OUTER SPACE	General Views on Outer Space
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 86) They further emphasized the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space. • (Final Document, Para 86) The Heads of State or Government recognised the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and emphasised that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security.
	Missile Defense Systems
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 85) The Heads of State or Government continued to be concerned over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of being deployed in outer space which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. The abrogation of the ABM Treaty brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of the arms race in outer space. • (Final Document, Para 86) The Heads of State or Government continued to be concerned over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of being deployed in outer space • (Final Document, Para 86) The abrogation of the ABM Treaty brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of the arms race in outer space. • (Final Document, Para 86) They remained concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons.
	International Cooperation on Outer Space
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 86) They also emphasized the urgent need for the commencement of work in the CD on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

NONPROLIFERATION	General Views on Nonproliferation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 94) Nonproliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open. • (Final Document, Para 101) Proliferation should be resolved through political and diplomatic means, and measures and initiatives taken in this regard should be within the framework of international law, relevant conventions and the UN Charter. • (Final Document, Para 105) Total elimination of weapons is the best method of prevention.
	Nonproliferation and Noncompliance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 97) The IAEA is the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with the obligations under the respective safeguard agreements of the Member States. • (Final Document, Para 104) Regretted unsubstantiated allegations of non-compliance with relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction and called on States Parties to such instruments that make such allegations to follow procedures set out in those instruments and to provide necessary substantiation for their allegations. They called upon all States parties to the respective international instruments to implement fully and in a transparent manner all their obligations under these instruments.
	Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 94) Expressed strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA technical cooperation program as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA Statute. • (Final Document, Para 97) Stressed that any undue pressure or interference in the IAEA’s activities should be avoided. 	
Non-State Proliferation	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 105) Welcomed adoption of UNGA Resolution 60/87 entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” and underlined the need for this threat to be addressed within the UN framework. • (Final Document, Para 105) The adoption of resolution 1540 and resolution 1673 underlined the need to ensure that any Security Council actions do not undermine the UN Charter and existing multilateral treaties on WMD and of international organizations established in this regard. • (Final Document, Para 105) Issue of non-state actors acquiring WMD should be addressed by the UNGA. 	

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY	General Peaceful Uses
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 94) Reaffirmed the inalienable right of developing countries to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. • (Final Document, Para 95) Emphasized the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty... • (Final Document, Para 95) ... and that each country's decisions in this field [nuclear energy] should be respected without jeopardizing its fuel cycle policies • (Purposes and Principles, Para o) Promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to facilitate access to nuclear technology, equipment and material for peaceful purposes required by developing countries. • (Final Document, Separate Statement on Iran, Para 2) reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States, to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations
	Access to Nuclear Technology
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 96) Stressed the responsibility of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of nuclear energy of the developing countries by allowing them to participate to the fullest possible extent in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technology information for peaceful purposes. • (Final Document, Para 131) They continued to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist. • (Final Document, Para 133) The Heads of State and Government stressed particularly the responsibility of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of nuclear energy of the developing countries, by allowing them to participate to the fullest extent possible in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.
	Matters on the UN and IAEA
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 94) Expressed strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA technical cooperation program as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA Statute. • (Final Document, Page 131) The Heads of State and

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY	<p>Government expressed their full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the IAEA and strongly rejected attempts by any State to politicize the work of the IAEA, including its technical co-operation programme, in violation of the IAEA Statute.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 134) The Heads of State and Government emphasized that decisions should be made by consensus, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its Statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of its member States to research, develop and use for peaceful purposes of nuclear sciences, in all its aspects.
	<p style="text-align: center;">Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 99) Any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities—operational or under construction—poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA.
NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES	General Views on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Purposes and Principles, Para n) the establishment if NWFZs is a positive step and important measure towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. • (Final Document, Para 88) Establishment of NWFZ’s created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free-status are positive steps towards strengthening global disarmament. • (Final Document, Para 88) In context of NWFZ’s, it is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of a zone. • (Final Document, Para 93) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT called upon the NWS to implement their commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-NWS parties to the Treaty or NWFZs at any time or under any circumstances, pending the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on security assurances.
	Central Asian NWFZ
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 88) Considered signing of Treaty on a Central Asian NWFZ as an effective contribution to strengthening regional and global peace and security.
	Middle East NWFZ
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) The Heads of State or Government

<p style="text-align: center;">NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES</p>	<p>reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) To this end, they reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with UNSCR 487 (1981) and Paragraph 14 of UNSCR 687 (1991) and the relevant GA resolutions adopted by consensus • (Final Document, Para 89) They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfillment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone • (Iran Statement, Para 6) The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone
<p style="text-align: center;">NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES</p>	<p>General Views on Nuclear Security Assurances</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 76) The Heads of State or Government reiterated that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the United States Nuclear Posture Review contravene the security assurances provided by the NWS.
	<p>NWFZ and Security Assurance</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 88) In context of NWFZ's, it is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of a zone. • (Final Document, Para 93) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT called upon the NWS to implement their commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-NWS parties to the Treaty or NWFZ's at any time or under any circumstances, pending the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on security assurances.
<p style="text-align: center;">COUNTRY SPECIFIC</p>	<p>Nuclear Security Assurances and the NPT</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 92) Emphasized the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances.
<p style="text-align: center;">COUNTRY SPECIFIC</p>	<p>Iran</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Iran Statement, Para 1) They considered the developments regarding the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran • (Iran Statement, Para 2) reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States, to develop research, production and use of

COUNTRY SPECIFIC	<p>atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Iran Statement, Para 3) The Heads of State or Government recognized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole competent authority for verification • (Iran Statement, Para 4) The Heads of State or Government welcomed the cooperation extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA including those voluntary confidence-building measures undertaken, with a view to resolve the remaining issues. • (Iran Statement, Para 5) emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States to their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence building measures voluntarily undertaken to resolve difficult issues. • (Iran Statement, Para 6) The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone • (Iran Statement, Para 7) In this regard, the Heads of State or Government encouraged Iran to urgently continue to cooperate actively and fully with the IAEA within the Agency’s mandate to resolve outstanding issues in order to promote confidence and a peaceful resolution of the issue. • (Iran Statement, Para 8) The Heads of State or Government strongly believed that all issues on safeguards and verification, including those of Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on technical and legal grounds. They further emphasized that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA • (Iran Statement, Para 9) The Heads of State or Government also strongly believed that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means must continue to find a long term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue
	Israel
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they demanded Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without delay, to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards according to UNSCR 487 (1981), and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the nonproliferation regime. • (Final Document, Para 89) They expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States and condemned Israel for continuing to develop and

COUNTRY SPECIFIC	<p>stockpile nuclear arsenals.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) They also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel • (Final Document, Para 89) In this regard, they expressed their serious concern over the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one Nuclear Weapon State
	Korea
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 181) The Heads of State or Government expressed their desire for realization of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and continued support for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. • (Final Document, Para 181) In this regard, they further expressed their support for the Joint Statement of Principles on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 19 September 2005 and for its expeditious and faithful implementation
	The United States of America
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RELATED	NWS Obligation to Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 92) Called for full implementation of 13 practice steps for disarmament.
	Access to Technology Transfer
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 95) Emphasized the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty, and that each country's decisions in this field should be respected without jeopardizing its fuel cycle policies.

NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RELATED	Review and Extension of the NPT
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 92) The Heads of Stet or Government of the Disappointment at outcome of 2005 Review Conference.
NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY	Specific Modalities for Specific Deliberations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they demanded Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons [and] accede to the NPT without delay • (Final Document, Para 92) Underlined the importance to consider security assurances and to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2010 Review Conference to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. • (Final Document, Para 92) Emphasized the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances.
	General Nuclear Safety and Security
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 100) Need to strengthen the Radiological Safety and Protection Systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials as well as at radioactive waste management facilities, including safe transportation of such materials. • (Final Document, Para 100) Called for effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the International Trans-boundary Movement of Radioactive Waste of the IAEA.

Compiled by the NAM Project Task Force at the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP) of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, California).

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