

Summary of the 14 th Heads of State Summit, Havana, Cuba (2006)	
DISARMAMENT	General Views on Disarmament and NAM Involvement
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Purposes and Principles, Para 8) ...the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement... stated that the Purposes of the Movement in the present international situation are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (l) To continue pursuing universal and nondiscriminatory nuclear disarmament... (m) To oppose and condemn the categorization of countries as good or evil based on unilateral and unjustified criteria, and the adoption of a doctrine of preemptive attack... • (Final Document, Para 73) The Heads of State or Government expressed their strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and in this context, underlined that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the UN Charter, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. • (Final Document, Para 74) They reiterated deep concern over the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear weapons-States (NWS) to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. • (Final Document, Para 77) They reaffirmed that efforts toward nuclear disarmament, global and regional approaches and confidence building measures complement each other and should...be pursued simultaneously... • (Final Document, Para 116) The Heads of State or Government commended the work of the NAM Working Group on Disarmament, under the chairmanship of Indonesia, in coordinating issues of common concern to the Movement in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation.
	Verification
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 84) The Heads of State or Government...called on the [US] and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, under the [Moscow] Treaty. • (Final Document, Para 97) They recognised that the IAEA is the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with the obligations under the respective safeguard agreements of the Member States.
	Nuclear Weapons Convention
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 81) The Heads of State or Government again called for an international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear dangers, at the earliest possible date,

DISARMAMENT	with the objective of arriving at an agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons...
	Nonproliferation and Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 71) ...[the Heads of State or Government] called for renewed efforts to resolve the current impasse in achieving nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects.
	Nuclear Weapons States, Arms Race and Bilateral Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 75) The Heads of State or Government remained deeply concerned at strategic defense doctrines of NWS, including the “NATO Alliance Strategic Concept”, which not only set out rationales for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but also maintain unjustifiable concepts on international security based on promoting and developing military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies. • (Final Document, Para 84) The Heads of State or Government...called on the [US] and the Russian Federation to apply the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verifiability to further reduce their nuclear arsenals, both warheads and delivery systems, under the [Moscow] Treaty.
	Disarmament and the Environment
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 90) [The Heads of State or Government] reaffirmed that international disarmament forums should take fully into account the relevant environmental norms in negotiating treaties and agreements on disarmament...
	Disarmament and Development
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 115) The Heads of State or Government stressed the importance of the symbiotic relationship between disarmament and development... • (Final Document, Para 115) The Heads of State or Government...expressed concern at the increasing global military expenditure, which could otherwise be spent on development needs.
	Modernization of Nuclear Weapons
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 76) The Heads of State or Government reiterated that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the [US] Nuclear Posture Review contravene the security assurances provided by the NWS. • (Final Document, Para 76) They further reaffirmed that these 	

DISARMAMENT	<p>improvements as well as the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the NWS at the time of the conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).</p>
	<p>Missiles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 87) The Heads of State or Government remained convinced of the need for a multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive, transparent, and non-discriminatory approach toward missiles in all its aspects as a contribution to international peace and security. • (Final Document, Para 87) They expressed their support for efforts to be continued within the UN to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects. In this regard, they emphasized the need to keep the issue under the agenda of the UN General Assembly and that in accordance with its Resolution 59/67 a Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects would be established in 2007.
UN FORA	<p>UN General Assembly and Special Sessions on Disarmament</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 34) The Heads of State or Government expressed disappointment at the provisions contained in the 2005 World Summit Outcome that did not fully take into account the concerns and interests of developing countries... • (Final Document, Para 34) They further expressed their disappointment at the inability of the World Summit to agree on the issue of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. • (Final Document, Para 37.2) [The Heads of State or Government agreed to undertake the following measures] ... [p]ursue the issues of fundamental importance to the Movement in the context of follow-up to the 2005 World Summit Outcome and the Millennium Declaration, that have been omitted from the outcome document or yet to be explored in the UN such as disarmament, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and arms control... • (Final Document, Para 72) ...the Heads of State or Government expressed determination to promote multilateralism as the core principles of negotiations, and welcomed the adoption of [UNGA] Resolution 60/59 on Promotion on multilateralism in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation. • (Final Document, Para 80) The Heads of State or Government reiterated their support for the convening of the Fourth Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted to Disarmament... • (Final Document, Para 87) They expressed their support for efforts to be continued within the UN to explore further the issue of missiles in all its aspects. In this regard, they emphasised the need to keep the issue under the agenda of the UN General

UN FORA	<p>Assembly and that in accordance with its Resolution 59/67 a Panel of Governmental Experts on the issue of missiles in all its aspects would be established in 2007.</p>
	Test Ban and CTBT
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 76) The Heads of State or Government reiterated that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the US Nuclear Posture Review contravene security assurances provided by the NWS. They further reaffirmed that these improvements as well as the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the NWS at the time of the conclusion of the [CTBT]. • (Final Document, Para 83) The Heads of State or Government stressed the significance of achieving universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all NWS, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.
	18-Nation Committee on Disarmament & Conference on Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 79) The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the importance of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, and reiterated call on the CD to agree on a balanced and comprehensive program of work by establishing, inter alia, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament... • (Final Document, Para 79) They emphasized the necessity to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified framework of time, including a Nuclear Weapons Convention. • (Final Document, Para 82) ...they called for the conclusion of a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances to [NNWS] as a matter of priority. • (Final Document, Para 82) They noted the establishment in 1998 of an Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure [NNWS] against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate universal, unconditional and legally binding security assurances to all non-NWS.
UN Disarmament Commission	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 78) The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the importance and the relevance of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) as the sole specialised, deliberative body within the UN multilateral disarmament machinery. 	

UN FORA	UN Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 91) The Heads of State or Government emphasised the importance of the UN activities at the regional level to increase the stability and security of its Member States, which could be promoted in a substantive manner by the maintenance and revitalization of the three regional centres for peace and disarmament.
	International Atomic Energy Agency
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] [the Heads of State or Government] demanded on Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the [NPT] nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without delay, to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards... • (Final Document, Para 94) ...they also expressed their strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA technical cooperation program as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA Statute. • (Final Document, Para 97) They recognised that the IAEA is the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with the obligations under the respective safeguard agreements of the Member States. • (Final Document, Para 97) The Heads of State or Government, while emphasising the importance of the positive role played by the Non-Aligned Members in the IAEA, stressed the necessity that all members of the IAEA strictly observe its Statute. • (Final Document, Para 98) The Heads of State or Government congratulated the IAEA and its Director General, Dr. Mohamed El Baradei, for being awarded the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize. They expressed full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the Agency. They also congratulated the Agency on its Fiftieth Anniversary in 2007 • (Final Document, Para 99) The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed...that any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities—operational or under construction—poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA. • (Final Document, Para 100) ...they called for effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste of the IAEA... • (Iran Statement, Para 3) The Heads of State or Government recognized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole competent authority for verification of the respective safeguards obligations of Member States and stressed that there should be no undue pressure or interference in the Agency's

<p style="text-align: center;">UN FORA</p>	<p>activities, especially its verification process, which would jeopardise the efficiency and credibility of the Agency.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Iran Statement, Para 4) The Heads of State or Government welcomed the cooperation extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA including those voluntary confidence-building measures undertaken, with a view to resolve the remaining issues. • (Iran Statement, Para 8) The Heads of State or Government strongly believed that all issues on safeguards and verification, including those of Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on technical and legal grounds. They further emphasized that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA.
<p style="text-align: center;">CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS</p>	<p>Chemical Weapons</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 103) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) invited all States that have not yet signed or ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible with a view to its universality. They reiterated their call on the developed countries to promote international cooperation through the transfer of technology, material and equipment for peaceful purposes in the chemical field and the removal of all and any discriminatory restrictions that are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Convention.
	<p>Biological Weapons</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 102) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) reaffirmed that the possibility of any use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins as weapons should be completely excluded, and the conviction that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of humankind. 	
<p style="text-align: center;">OUTER SPACE</p>	<p>General Views on Outer Space</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 86) The Heads of State or Government recognised the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and emphasised that prevention of an arms race in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace and security. • (Final Document, Para 86) They further emphasized the paramount importance of strict compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament agreements relevant to outer space, including bilateral agreements, and with the existing legal regime concerning the use of outer space.

OUTER SPACE	Missile Defense Systems
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 85) The Heads of State or Government continued to be concerned over the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of being deployed in outer space which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. The abrogation of the ABM Treaty brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of the arms race in outer space. • (Final Document, Para 86) They remained concerned that the implementation of a national missile defence system could trigger an arms race(s) and the further development of advanced missile systems and an increase in the number of nuclear weapons.
	International Cooperation on Outer Space
NONPROLIFERATION	General Views on Nonproliferation
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 94) Nonproliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States... • (Final Document, Para 101) The Heads of State or Government stressed that the issue of proliferation should be resolved through political and diplomatic means, and that measures and initiatives taken in this regard should be within the framework of international law; relevant conventions; the UN Charter, and should contribute to the promotion of international peace, security and stability. • (Final Document, Para 105) While stressing that the most effective way of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is through the total elimination of such weapons, [the Heads of State or Government] emphasized that progress was urgently needed in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation in order to help maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism
	Nonproliferation and Noncompliance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 97) [The Heads of State or Government] recognised that the IAEA is the sole competent authority for verification of compliance with the obligations under the respective safeguard agreements of the Member States. • (Final Document, Para 104) The Heads of State or Government

NONPROLIFERATION	<p>regretted unsubstantiated allegations of non-compliance with relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction and called on States Parties to such instruments that make such allegations to follow procedures set out in those instruments and to provide necessary substantiation for their allegations. They called upon all States parties to the respective international instruments to implement fully and in a transparent manner all their obligations under these instruments.</p>
	Nonproliferation and Peaceful Uses
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 94) ...[the Heads of State or Government] also expressed their strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA technical co-operation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA Statute. • (Final Document, Para 97) [The Heads of State or Government] stressed that any undue pressure or interference in the Agency’s activities, especially its verification process...should be avoided.
	Non-State Proliferation
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 105) [The Heads of State or Government] welcomed the adoption by consensus of the General Assembly Resolution 60/78 entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction” and underlined the need for this threat to humanity to be addressed within the UN framework and through international co-operation • (Final Document, Para 105) While noting the adoption of resolution 1540 (2004) and resolution 1673 (2006) by the Security Council, the Heads of State or Government underlined the need to ensure that any action by the Security Council does not undermine the UN Charter and existing multilateral treaties on weapons of mass destruction and of international Organisations established in this regard, as well as the role of the General Assembly. • (Final Document, Para 105) In this regard, the Heads of State or Government stressed the importance of the issue of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction to be addressed in an inclusive manner by the General Assembly, taking into account the views of all Member States.
	General Peaceful Uses
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 94) The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the inalienable right of developing countries to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. • (Final Document, Para 95) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT emphasized once more that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY	<p>right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 95) In this connection, they confirmed that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international co-operation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies. • (Purposes and Principles, Para 8) ...the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the Non-Aligned Movement...stated that the Purposes of the Movement in the present international situation are: (o) to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to facilitate access to nuclear technology, equipment and material for peaceful purposes required by developing countries. • (Final Document, Separate Statement on Iran, Para 2) The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States, to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations.
	Access to Nuclear Technology
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 96) The Heads of State or Government stressed particularly the responsibility of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of nuclear energy of the developing countries, by allowing them to participate to the fullest possible [extent in] the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technology information for peaceful purposes... • (Final Document, Para 131) They continued to note with concern that undue restrictions on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology, for peaceful purposes persist. • (Final Document, Para 133) The Heads of State and Government stressed particularly the responsibility of developed countries to promote the legitimate need of nuclear energy of the developing countries, by allowing them to participate to the fullest extent possible in the transfer of nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.
	Matters on the UN and IAEA
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 94) [The Heads of State or Government] also expressed their strong rejection of attempts by any Member State to use the IAEA technical co-operation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA Statute.

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Page 131) The Heads of State and Government expressed their full confidence in the impartiality and professionalism of the IAEA and strongly rejected attempts by any State to politicize the work of the IAEA, including its technical co-operation programme, in violation of the IAEA Statute. • (Final Document, Para 134) The Heads of State and Government emphasized that decisions should be made by consensus, with the participation of all IAEA member States, and any proposal from IAEA must be consistent with its Statute, without any prejudice to the inalienable right of its member States to research, develop and use for peaceful purposes of nuclear sciences, in all its aspects.
	Attack or Threat of Attack Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 99) The Heads of State or Government reaffirmed...any attack or threat of attack against peaceful nuclear facilities—operational or under construction—poses a great danger to human beings and the environment, and constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the UN Charter and regulations of the IAEA.
NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES	General Views on Nuclear Weapon Free Zones
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Purposes and Principles, Para 8n) The establishment if NWFZs is a positive step and important measure towards strengthening global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. • (Final Document, Para 88) The Heads of State or Government believed that the establishment of NWFZs created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba and Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free-status are positive steps and important measures towards strengthening global disarmament and non-proliferation. • (Final Document, Para 88) They reiterated that in the context of [NWFZs], it is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of a zone. • (Final Document, Para 93) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT called upon the NWS to implement their commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-NWS parties to the Treaty or NWFZs at any time or under any circumstances, pending the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on security assurances.
	Central Asian NWFZ
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 88) [The Heads of State or Government] considered the establishment of [the Central Asian NWFZ] as an effective contribution to strengthening regional and global peace

NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES	and security.
	Middle East NWFZ
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) The Heads of State or Government reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction. • (Final Document, Para 89) To this end, they reaffirmed the need for the speedy establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East in accordance with [UNSCR] 487 (1981) and Paragraph 14 of [UNSCR] 687 (1991) and the relevant [GA] resolutions adopted by consensus. • (Final Document, Para 89) They called upon all parties concerned to take urgent and practical steps towards the fulfillment of the proposal initiated by Iran in 1974 for the establishment of such a zone... • (Iran Statement, Para 6) The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone...
NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES	General Views on Nuclear Security Assurances
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 76) The Heads of State or Government reiterated that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the United States Nuclear Posture Review contravene the security assurances provided by the NWS.
	NWFZ and Security Assurance
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 88) [The Heads of State or Government] reiterated that in context of [NWFZs], it is essential that NWS should provide unconditional assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of a zone. • (Final Document, Para 93) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT called upon the NWS to implement their commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-NWS parties to the Treaty or NWFZ's at any time or under any circumstances, pending the conclusion of a legally binding instrument on security assurances.
	Nuclear Security Assurances and the NPT
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 92) [The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT] emphasised the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC	Iran
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Iran Statement, Para 1) [The Heads of State or Government] considered the developments regarding the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran. • (Iran Statement, Para 2) [The Heads of State or Government] reaffirmed the basic and inalienable right of all States, to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations. • (Iran Statement, Para 3) The Heads of State or Government recognized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole competent authority for verification... • (Iran Statement, Para 4) The Heads of State or Government welcomed the cooperation extended by the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA including those voluntary confidence-building measures undertaken, with a view to resolve the remaining issues. • (Iran Statement, Para 4) In this regard, the Heads of State or Government encouraged Iran to urgently continue to cooperate actively and fully with the IAEA within the Agency's mandate to resolve outstanding issues in order to promote confidence and a peaceful resolution of the issue. • (Iran Statement, Para 5) The Heads of State or Government emphasized the fundamental distinction between the legal obligations of States to their respective safeguards agreements and any confidence building measures voluntarily undertaken to resolve difficult issues. • (Iran Statement, Para 6) The Heads of State or Government considered the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament and reiterated the support for the establishment in the Middle East of a nuclear-weapon-free zone... • (Iran Statement, Para 8) The Heads of State or Government strongly believed that all issues on safeguards and verification, including those of Iran, should be resolved within the IAEA framework, and be based on technical and legal grounds. They further emphasized that the Agency should continue its work to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue within its mandate under the Statute of the IAEA. • (Iran Statement, Para 9) The Heads of State or Government also strongly believed that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means must continue to find a long term solution to the Iranian nuclear issue.
	Israel
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] they demanded Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the [NPT] nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the

COUNTRY SPECIFIC	<p>NPT without delay, to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards according to [UNSCR] 487 (1981), and to conduct its nuclear related activities in conformity with the nonproliferation regime.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) They expressed great concern over the acquisition of nuclear capability by Israel, which poses a serious and continuing threat to the security of neighbouring and other States and condemned Israel for continuing to develop and stockpile nuclear arsenals. • (Final Document, Para 89) They also called for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear related scientific or technological fields to Israel. • (Final Document, Para 89) In this regard, they expressed their serious concern over the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one Nuclear Weapon State.
	Korea
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 181) The Heads of State or Government expressed their desire for realization of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and continued support for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks... • (Final Document, Para 181) In this regard, they further expressed their support for the Joint Statement of Principles on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 19 September 2005 and for its expeditious and faithful implementation.
	The United States of America
NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RELATED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 76) The Heads of State or Government reiterated that the improvement in the existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons as envisaged in the United States Nuclear Posture Review contravene the security assurances provided by the NWS. • (Final Document, Para 76) They further reaffirmed that these improvements as well as the development of new types of such weapons violate the commitments undertaken by the NWS at the time of the conclusion of the [CTBT].
	NWS Obligations on Disarmament
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 92) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT...called for the full implementation of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty, particularly an unequivocal undertaking by the NWS to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.
	Access to Technology and Technology Transfer

NONPROLIFERATION TREATY RELATED	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 95) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT emphasized... the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty. • ...they confirmed that each country's choices and decision in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international co-operation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.
	Review and Extension of the NPT
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 92) The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT, while reaffirming the package of agreements of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, expressed their disappointment at the inability of the 2005 Review Conference of the NPT to agree on substantive recommendations.
NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY	Specific Modalities for Specific Deliberations
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 89) [Pending the establishment of a Middle East NWFZ,] [the Heads of State or Government] demanded Israel, the only country in the region that has not joined the NPT nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce possession of nuclear weapons [and] accede to the NPT without delay... • (Final Document, Para 92) [The Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT] underlined the importance to consider security assurances and to establish subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees of the 2010 Review Conference to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons;... • (Final Document, Para 92) In this regard, [the Heads of State or Government of the States Parties to the NPT] emphasised the need for the Preparatory Committee meetings to continue to allocate specific time for deliberations on nuclear disarmament, implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and security assurances.
	General Nuclear Safety and Security
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • (Final Document, Para 100) The Heads of State or Government affirmed the need to strengthen the Radiological Safety and Protection Systems at facilities utilizing radioactive materials as well as at radioactive waste management facilities, including safe transportation of such materials.

**NUCLEAR SAFETY
AND SECURITY**

- **(Final Document, Para 100)** [The Heads of State or Government] for effective implementation of the Code of Practice on the International Trans-boundary Movement of Radioactive Waste of the IAEA...

Compiled by the NAM Project Task Force at the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Program (IONP) of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, California).

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