
2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Working paper presented by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Group of Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believes, in terms of the strengthened review process and in the context of fully implementing the Treaty and pursuant to the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, that outcomes that have been deliberated upon throughout the preparatory process should be considered at the 2005 Review Conference, with a view to their implementation.

The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty remain alarmed by the threat to humanity posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons. They are convinced that disarmament and arms control, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of dangers of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as for the economic and social advancement of all peoples. They therefore reiterate that the responsibility for managing and achieving worldwide economic and social development as well as for responding to threats to international peace and security must be shared among all nations of the world and exercised multilaterally.

The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty express their strong concern at the growing resort to unilateralism and unilaterally imposed prescriptions, as well as strategic defence doctrines that set out new rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, including elements aimed at enlarging the scope for possible use or threat of use of force even more. Therefore, they strongly underline and affirm that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues.

The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty recall that at the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Kuala Lumpur in 2003, the Heads of State or Government of the Movement recalled their principled positions on nuclear disarmament and the related issues of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear tests, which were contained in the Final Document adopted by the Summit. They expressed their concern at the slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament,

which constitutes their primary disarmament objective and remains their highest priority. In that context, they underscored the need for the nuclear-weapon States to implement the unequivocal commitment they provided in 2000, so as to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and emphasized, in this regard, the urgent need to commence negotiations without delay. At the 2004 ministerial conference in Durban, South Africa, the Foreign Ministers reiterated the Movement's long-standing principled position in favour of the total elimination of all nuclear testing and expressed concern at the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States towards accomplishing the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament, and at the recent negative developments regarding the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty also recall that, at the 1998 Durban summit, the Heads of State or Government of the Movement also considered positively the commitment by parties concerned in the South Asian region to exercise restraint, which contributes to regional security, to discontinue nuclear tests and not to transfer nuclear-weapons-related material, equipment and technology. The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty recall that the 2000 Review Conference noted that India and Pakistan have declared moratoriums on further testing and have expressed their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Conference urged both States to sign the Treaty, in accordance with their pledges to do so.

The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty believe that the 2005 Review Conference should engage immediately, in good faith, in substantive work for the speedy and meaningful implementation of the obligations under the Treaty and the commitments contained in the 1995 principles and objectives document and the resolution on the Middle East, as well as the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty recall that, at the ministerial meeting of the Movement held in Durban, South Africa, the Foreign Ministers called for the full implementation of, and the firm commitment by all States parties to, the package agreed to at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference at the 2005 Review Conference which comprises the decisions "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty", "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and "Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", the resolution on the Middle East, as well as to the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Treaty.

The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty recall that at its third session, the Preparatory Committee agreed to recommend to the Conference that the rules of procedure allow for the establishment of subsidiary bodies to the Main Committees of the Conference, so as to provide for focused consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty. The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty further recall that specific time was made available at the 2000 Review Conference and during its preparatory process for discussion on and consideration of proposals on the provisions in article VI and in paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and

Disarmament”, dealing with nuclear disarmament, as well as on the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. In this context, we reiterate that the Durban ministerial conference reaffirmed and underlined the importance of establishing at the 2005 Review Conference subsidiary bodies to the relevant Main Committees to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons, to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT and to consider security assurances.

The Non-Aligned Movement States parties to the Treaty believe that that kind of approach will strengthen the review process and will provide the basis for a successful outcome of the 2005 Review Conference. In that vein, the Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty propose the following draft recommendations to be considered by the Review Conference.

Preamble

1. The States parties to the Treaty emphasize the importance of the full and non-selective implementation of the Treaty in the areas of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The State parties remain fully convinced that the Treaty is a key instrument in the efforts to halt the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. States parties to the Treaty should work towards a fair balance between mutual obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty, with a view to achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
2. The States parties recall that the Treaty fosters the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by providing a framework of confidence and cooperation within which those uses can take place. The State parties reaffirm the inalienable right of States parties to the Treaty to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, and that free, unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes should be fully ensured. Therefore, the State parties emphasize that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this right.
3. The States parties underscore that the Treaty rests on three pillars — non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful nuclear cooperation — and agree that these pillars represent a set of interrelated and mutually reinforcing obligations and rights of State parties.
4. The States parties agree that, in order to ensure the effective implementation of the Treaty and of decisions, resolutions and documents adopted at the Review Conference, an open-ended standing committee, which would work intersessionally to follow up recommendations concerning implementation of the Treaty should be established by the 2005 Review Conference.
5. The States parties underscore that the indefinite extension of the Treaty does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals, and consider, in this regard, that any assumption of indefinite possession of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the integrity and sustainability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, both vertical and horizontal, and with the broader objective of maintaining international peace and security.

Article I

6. The States parties agree that strict observance of the terms of article I remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing, under any circumstances, further proliferation of nuclear weapons and of preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security. The States parties recall that the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed their commitment not to transfer to any recipients nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly or indirectly, and not, in any way, to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon States to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. The States parties call upon them to adhere to this commitment.

7. The nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirm their commitments to the fullest implementation of this article and to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon States and with States not party to the Treaty.

8. The States parties remain concerned about the ability of certain States not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The States parties call for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to States non-parties to the Treaty without exception.

Article II

9. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirm their commitment to the full implementation of this article and to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements with the nuclear-weapon States, non-nuclear-weapon States and States not party to the Treaty.

Article III

10. The States parties reaffirm that IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and its safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of IAEA in this regard.

11. The States parties call on the nuclear-weapon States and all States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

12. The States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any States party should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the inalienable rights of all States parties, under the provisions of the preamble and articles of the Treaty, are fully protected and that no State party is limited in the exercise of this right based on allegations of non-compliance not verified by IAEA.

13. The States parties support the principles that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance by all States parties of IAEA full-scope safeguards, and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA safeguards.

14. Every effort should be made to ensure that IAEA has the financial and human resources necessary in order to meet effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

Article IV

15. The States parties reaffirm their inalienable right to engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; and that free and unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all States parties should be fully ensured.

16. The States parties to the Treaty emphasize once more that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. The States parties stress that this right constitutes one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. In this connection, the States parties confirm that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycle policies.

17. The States parties note with concern that undue restrictions on the export to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes persist. They emphasize that proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be transparent and open to participation by all States, and should ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes required by developing countries for their continued development. They express their strong rejection of attempts by any member State to use the IAEA technical cooperation programme as a tool for political purposes in violation of the IAEA statute. The States parties recall that the 2000 Review Conference recognized the benefits of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and nuclear techniques in the fields referred to in articles II and III of the IAEA statute, and their contribution to achieving sustainable development in developing countries and for generally improving the well-being and the quality of life of the peoples of the world.

18. The States parties reaffirm the responsibility of nuclear supplier States parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate needs of nuclear energy of the States parties to the Treaty, with preferential treatment rendered to developing ones, by allowing the latter to fully participate in possible transfer of nuclear equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for peaceful purposes, with a view to

achieving the largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable development in their activities.

19. The States parties reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful nuclear activities emanating from the international norms prohibiting the use of force in international relations, in particular Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations, in considering that any attack or threat of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy constitutes a grave violation of international law, principles and purposes of the Charter and regulations of IAEA, and would entail highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications, particularly for civilian inhabitants; and believe that they bear a solemn responsibility to continue to play a leading role towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and standards specifically prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks, on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

20. The States parties encourage the adoption of appropriate measures to regulate international maritime transportation of radioactive waste and spent fuel to the highest standards in international security and support current efforts within IAEA to adopt and improve international regulations in that regard. The States parties call for effective implementation of the IAEA Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste as a means of enhancing the protection of all States from the dumping of radioactive wastes in their territories.

Article V

21. The States parties will take into account all the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty related to this article.

22. The States parties call upon the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from conducting all types of tests, in conformity with the objectives of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. They also call upon nuclear-weapon States to provide transparency on site and other confidence-building measures in the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty in order to meet international concerns.

23. The States parties stress the significance of achieving universal adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, including by all nuclear-weapon States, which, inter alia, should contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament.

24. The States parties reaffirm the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The States parties call upon all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Pending its entry into force, the States parties call upon the nuclear-weapon States to comply with its letter and spirit and to refrain from any actions that run contrary to the objectives and purposes of this international instrument.

25. The States parties reiterate that if the objectives of the Treaty are to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to nuclear disarmament is essential. The States parties express their concern at the recent negative developments with regard to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Article VI

26. The States parties note with regret that, despite the conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of article VI and the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. The States parties stress the need to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in achieving that objective.

27. The States parties reaffirm the need for nuclear-weapon States to fully comply with all their obligations and commitments under article VI, including the 13 practical steps, to which they agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, with a view to accomplishing the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

28. The States parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. Halting and reversing the nuclear arms race in all its aspects is essential in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The goal is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving nuclear disarmament, all States parties bear responsibility, in particular those nuclear-weapon States possessing the most important nuclear arsenals. The States parties remain alarmed by the threat posed by the continued existence of nuclear weapons and convinced that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of dangers of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security, as well as for the economic and social advancement of all peoples.

29. While noting the signing of the Moscow Treaty on 24 May 2002, the States parties stress that reductions in deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. The States parties express their concern that the non-entry into force of START II is a setback to the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference.

30. The States parties remain deeply concerned at strategic defence doctrines that set out rationales for the use of nuclear weapons. The States parties are concerned at the negative implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space, which have, inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. The abrogation of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems brings new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

31. The States parties reaffirm that the priority of disarmament negotiations shall be nuclear weapons, in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

32. The States parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with determination their obligations under article VI, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

33. The States parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of

Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

34. The States parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish, as soon as possible and as the highest priority, an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament, taking into account all proposals that have been submitted by members of the Group of 21 and the five ambassadors, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time, including a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.

35. The States parties renew their call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, taking into account both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives, within an appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament.

36. The State parties regret the continuing lack of progress on items relevant to nuclear issues an the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

37. The States parties call for the full implementation of the unequivocal commitment given by the nuclear-weapons States at the 2000 Review Conference to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament. They expect that that commitment will be demonstrated without delay through an accelerated process of negotiations and through full implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and progressively towards a nuclear-weapons-free world, as agreed to in 2000. They regret that, despite the expectation of the international community that the successful outcome of the 2000 Review Conference would lead to the fulfilment of the unequivocal commitment given by the nuclear-weapon States, as well as of the full implementation of the 13 practical steps, very little progress has been made.

38. The States parties express serious concern that the development of new types of nuclear weapons are being considered by one nuclear-weapons State, and reiterated that the provision for the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States is in contravention of the security assurances provided by the nuclear-weapons States. They reiterate that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is in contravention of the commitments provided by the nuclear-weapons States at the conclusion of the CTBT, ensuring that the Treaty would prevent improvement of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons.

39. The States parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee I of the 2005 Review Conference to deliberate on practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Article VII

40. The States parties welcome the efforts aimed at establishing new nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world, and call for cooperation and

broad consultation in order to achieve agreements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The States parties also welcome the decision by all five Central Asian States to sign the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty. The States parties reiterate their support for Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, and consider that the institutionalization of that status would be an important measure towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime in that region.

41. The States parties reiterate their support for the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and to this end, they reaffirm the need for the speedy establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) and the relevant General Assembly resolutions adopted by consensus. The States parties recall that the 2000 Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards, in realizing the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.

42. The States parties recall that the States parties and signatories to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment to promote the common goals envisaged in those Treaties and to explore and implement further ways and means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas. The States parties welcome the convening of the international conference of States parties and signatories to the treaties that establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Tlatelolco, Mexico, held from 26 to 28 April 2005. The States parties continue to consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones created by the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba as positive steps towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament.

Article VIII

43. The States parties will continue their endeavours to strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized.

Article IX

44. The States parties re-emphasize the urgency and the importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty, particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest possible date of States possessing nuclear capabilities. They will make determined efforts to achieve this goal. The States parties also recall that the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference urged India and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. The States parties call on Israel, the only country in the Middle East region that has not acceded to the Treaty, nor declared its intention to do so, to renounce the possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to the Treaty without delay as a non-nuclear-weapon State, to place promptly all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and to conduct all its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime.

Article X

45. The States parties note the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty, and express the view that the parties directly concerned should resolve, through dialogue and negotiations, all issues related to that withdrawal, as an expression of their goodwill.

Security assurances

46. The States parties reaffirm that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. They reiterate the agreement at the 2000 Review Conference that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The States parties call for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances at the 2005 NPT Review Conference.

Resolution on the Middle East

47. The States parties recall that the adoption of the resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference on 11 May 1995 constituted an integral part of the package of the 1995 outcome comprising three decisions and a resolution, and as such they reaffirm their firm commitment to work towards the full implementation of that resolution. The States parties recognize the special responsibility of the depository States, as co-sponsors of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

48. The States parties note that, since the adoption of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, all States in the region have become parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel. The States parties stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty without further delay, to place all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards and to conduct its nuclear-related activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and to avert the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.

49. The nuclear-weapon States, in conformity with their obligations under article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly, to Israel, and further undertake not to assist, encourage or induce Israel in any way to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices under any circumstances whatsoever.

50. The States parties, in conformity with the seventh preambular paragraph and article IV of the Treaty, hereby declare their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. The States parties express their serious concern at the continuing development whereby Israeli scientists are provided access to the nuclear facilities of one nuclear-weapon State. This development will have potentially serious

negative implications regarding security in the region and reliability of the global non-proliferation regime.

51. The States parties reaffirm once again their determination to extend their full cooperation and to exert their utmost efforts, with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

52. The States parties agree that specific time should be made available at meetings of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference to review the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.

53. The States parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2005 Review Conference to consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.
