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North Korea Special Collection

By Jing-dong Yuan

North Korea's announcement of its immediate withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on January 10 has triggered a frantic flurry of diplomacy by the United States, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and China in an effort to head off a pending disaster. While Beijing has to date kept a low profile, North Korea's closest ally has increasingly become a hub of diplomatic activities as the international community seeks a way to defuse the nuclear crisis. How China views the situation and responds to the crisis not only has an important impact on the resolution of the current nuclear impasse, but also reflects Beijing's fundamental interests in the future evolution of the peninsula's peace and stability.

CHINESE REACTIONS TO THE NUCLEAR CRISIS

The revelation of North Korea's covert nuclear weapons program, announced just days before Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to Crawford, Texas for his third summit meeting with President George W. Bush, caught Beijing off guard. Jiang offered to cooperate with the United States on working out a peaceful solution of the issue and declared that China supports a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.[2]

As the Korean nuclear crisis deepened and positions hardened in Pyongyang and Washington, Beijing stated its three positions on the issue: (1) peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula should be preserved; (2) the peninsula should remain nuclear-free; and (3) the dispute should be resolved through diplomatic and political methods. These positions form the core of Chinese approaches to the resolution of the nuclear issue.[3]

China has been more forthcoming in echoing international concerns over nuclear developments on the peninsula. The Jiang-Putin joint statement last December expressed concern about the North Korean nuclear program and called on North Korea and the United States to normalize their relations through "constructive and equal" dialogue.[4] China supported an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board meeting resolution in early January calling on North Korea to reverse its nuclear weapons program. Beijing urged Pyongyang and Washington to return to the 1994 Agreed Framework and resolve their dispute through dialogue. After Pyongyang declared it would pull out of the NPT, a Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman stated that China was "concerned about the DPRK's announcement to withdraw from the treaty, as well as consequences [sic] possibly caused by the withdrawal."[5]

Beijing has been engaged in more active diplomacy to seek a peaceful resolution of the issue. Presidents Jiang and Bush exchanged views during their recent telephone conversation, and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxun has held numerous rounds of consultations with his American and other foreign counterparts. China has become a diplomatic hub as officials from the United States, Russia, and South Korea traveled to Beijing to enlist its assistance in finding a workable solution. Beijing has also offered to provide the venue for North Korea and the United States to hold talks.[6]

CHINESE INTERESTS IN DEFUSING THE KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

Beijing is seriously concerned about the prospect of a nuclear North Korea and its proliferation consequences. A nuclear North Korea and the potential fallout -- nuclearization of Northeast Asia (with South Korea, Japan, and even Taiwan following suit) -- threaten China's core security interests. Similarly, a North Korea that resumes ballistic missile tests could also cause instability in the region, justifying U.S. deployment of theater missile defense.

Beijing also worries that hard-line positions maintained by Pyongyang and Washington and continued stalemate could push North Korea to take even riskier steps. A military showdown is not completely out of the question, although the United States has not yet developed contingency plans acceptable to South Korea and Japan, its major allies in the region who are most likely to bear the brunt of North Korean reactions to military attacks on its nuclear facilities. Military options might result in massive North Korean refugee flight into China, gravely disrupting Chinese economic development. There are already an estimated 200,000-300,000 North Koreans in China.

Another possible consequence of a military confrontation is the potential demise of the North Korean regime and the loss of a strategic buffer. A hastily unified Korea following the collapse of the North Korean regime would present Beijing with tremendous uncertainty. Beijing would prefer to see a neutralized future unified Korea.[7] However, depending on how the future strategic alignment of Northeast Asia evolves, China could face the prospect of a U.S. military presence right up to the Chinese-Korean border. A united Korea might inherit the North's nuclear and missile capabilities and rising Korean nationalism could also pose a challenge to Chinese control over the Korean ethnic minority in Jilin Province.

BEIJING'S BALANCING ACT: THE RATIONALES

There are ample reasons for Beijing to join international and regional efforts to defuse the current nuclear crisis.[8] However, China has been hesitant to take a leading role and has limited itself to calls for dialogue and cautions against any actions that could further escalate the tension.[9] This carefully orchestrated balancing act reflects China's fundamental interest in maintaining the status quo on the peninsula. Beijing would support efforts that contribute to peninsular peace and stability, but would be reluctant to take actions that threaten the status quo.

While the Bush administration has sought to bring international pressure to bear on the Pyongyang regime, China has repeatedly emphasized the need for peaceful resolution of the crisis. Beijing worries that Pyongyang may be pushed into taking even more reckless actions. Concern over potential instability derives partly from China's delicately balanced two-Korea policy, but also reflects its overall strategic considerations in the post-Cold War era. As economic development takes command, China requires a stable international environment for expanding trade, attracting foreign investment and technology transfers, and hence has a particular interest in seeing a stable, even if divided, Korean Peninsula.

Chinese analysts maintain that Washington also bears responsibility for the current nuclear crisis. They acknowledge North Korea's frustration over U.S. implementation of the Agreed Framework and North Korea's security plight as a designated member of the "axis of evil" and a potential target for U.S. nuclear preemptive attack (according to leaked versions of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review). Some even suggest that the Bush administration's hard-line policy toward North Korea is to blame for Pyongyang's reckless behavior.[10] While conceding that Pyongyang has misplayed its nuclear card, they nonetheless argue that North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship is aimed at getting U.S. attention and obtaining a security guarantee from Washington.[11]

Chinese officials and analysts maintain that the key to resolving the crisis is direct dialogue between North Korea and the United States. While remaining outside the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) consortium, China nevertheless regards the Agreed Framework as a stabilizing factor in helping defuse nuclear tension; providing the energy supplies Pyongyang desperately needs for generating electricity; and maintaining contact between the United States and the DPRK that could eventually lead to the normalization of bilateral relations.[12] Instead of blaming North Korea for the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, Beijing has been calling for both Pyongyang and Washington to return to the agreement and resolve their dispute through dialogue.[13] The Chinese hope that face-saving ways can be found for Pyongyang and Washington to return to the negotiating table.

As a key supplier of energy and food to North Korea, China has leverage that it could exercise to affect Pyongyang's behavior.[14] Indeed, western analysts have argued that China should use the threat of cutting off economic assistance as a means of pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program.[15] However, the Chinese believe outside pressure is unlikely to force North Korea to change its nuclear policies and that it might destabilize the situation by driving Pyongyang to desperate measures or by causing the regime to collapse.

Indeed, China's attitude toward the Korean issue must be seen in a broader strategic context. One objective is the survival of the North Korean regime and the maintenance of a strategic buffer zone. China is wary of North Korea's reckless behavior and certainly does not want the nuclear crisis to get out of control. At the same time, Beijing believes that Pyongyang's nuclear gamble stems from its acute sense of insecurity and vulnerability and hence any resolution must address this issue. In this context, continued support for North Korea is no longer driven by the need to prop up an ideological bedfellow, but rather by China's long-term strategic interests. China will therefore oppose any measures likely to precipitate the collapse of the North.[16]

China could face serious dilemmas should the issue be brought before the United Nations Security Council. It could not afford being seen as indifferent to continued North Korean intransigence and open defiance of the international nonproliferation regime. That rules out a veto. But Beijing does not want to approve the possible use of force against North Korea. Endorsing a UN Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions against North Korea could seriously damage ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, force China to cut off the energy and food supplies it now provides to North Korea, and require China to face the grim prospect of dealing with massive numbers of North Korean refugees. Even abstaining from voting would tarnish China's image as an emerging, responsible power.

LOOKING AHEAD

China's future policy toward the North Korean nuclear crisis will continue to be guided by its three principles: that China supports a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula; that the peninsular peace and stability should be maintained; and that the dispute should be resolved peacefully through dialogue. Despite the serious stakes, Beijing may find it difficult to pressure Pyongyang lest such an approach further alienate the North Korean regime, pushing it to ever more reckless behavior. Judging that Pyongyang's ultimate objective is to engage the United States in direct talks, China may bet that cooler heads will prevail in both capitols and that the two sides will return to the negotiation table. In this context, Beijing may be relieved to see the progress reportedly made during the Russian special envoy's trip to the DPRK and hope that both North Korea and the United States will soften their positions.[17]

Beijing is unlikely to openly pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program even though it has some leverage over Pyongyang. China believes that such tactics will only escalate tension without contributing to a positive resolution of the crisis. But this does not preclude the possibility that Beijing could engage the North Koreans behind the scenes to work out a face-saving exit for Pyongyang to get out of its current self-entrapment. China's efforts might involve calls for support of Russia's package deal so as to avert the submission of the issue to the UN Security Council for resolution or, worse still, a possible slippery slope toward war on the Korean Peninsula.

[1] The author would like to thank Phillip C. Saunders for his helpful comments.
[2] Kelly Wallace, "N. Korea the focus at Jiang, Bush summit," CNN.com, October 25, 2002, <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/10/24/china.us/>; Mike Allen and Karen DeYoung, "Bush Seeks China's Aid to Oppose N. Korea," Washington Post, October 26, 2002, p. A18.
[3] Xinhua, "Tang supports a nuclear free Korean Peninsula," January 21, 2003.
[4] "Jiang, Putin Sign Joint Statement," People's Daily, December 2, 2002, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200212/02/eng20021202_107790.shtml>.
[5] Xinhua, "Nations' reaction to DPRK's NPT withdrawal," January 10, 2003.
[6] Barry Schweid, "U.S. Drawing Chinese Support on N. Korea," AP, January 20, 2002; John Pomfret, "China Offers to Host U.S. Talks with N. Korea," Washington Post, January 15, 2003, p. A15.
[7] Xiaoxiong Yi, "A Neutralized Korea? The North-South Rapprochement and China's Korean Policy," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 12:2 (Winter 2000), pp. 71-118.
[8] Steve Tsang, "Why China should take the lead on North Korea," South China Morning Post, January 21, 2003; and Phillip C. Saunders and Jing-dong Yuan, "China's chance to sharpen its diplomacy," The Japan Times, January 12, 2003.
[9] Phillip P. Pan, "China Treads Carefully Around North Korea," Washington Post, January 10, 2003, p. A14.
[10] Renmin Ribao, "Chaoxian bandao zanuan haihan (nianzhong baodao) [After Suddenly Getting Warmer, the Situation on the Korean Peninsula Has Turned Cold Again], December 23, 2002, <http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/paper464/8058/763133.html>; "DPRK: Nuclear Program Makes Big Waves," Shijie Zhishi (World Affairs), No. 24, December 16, 2002, pp. 8-14.
[11] Piao Jianyi, "The DPRK Has Misjudged the Weight of the Nuclear Issue in U.S. Security Strategy," Shijie Zhishi, December 26, 2002, pp. 10-12; and Susan V. Lawrence et al., "North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Time to Talk," Far Eastern Economic Review, January 23, 2003.
[12] "DPRK: Nuclear Program Makes Big Waves," Shijie Zhishi (World Affairs), No. 24, December 16, 2002, pp. 8-14. See FBIS-CPP20030108000172.
[13] "AFP: PRC FM Statement on DPRK Nuclear Issue Calls for Implementation of 1994 Pact," December 25, 2002.
[14] Bonnie Glaser, "Beijing can rein in Pyongyang. But will it?" South China Morning Post, December 28, 2002.
[15] David Wall, "China cedes leadership chance," The Japan Times, January 18, 2003.
[16] Jiang Longfan and Piao Yanhua, "Zhongchao guanxi xianzhuang ji zhanwang [The Current Status of and Prospects for Sino-North Korean Relations]," Dongbeiya yanjiu [Northeast Asian Studies], No. 4 (November 2002), pp. 21-28.
[17] Reuters, "Russian Envoy: Talks with N. Korea's Kim Successful," January 20, 2003.

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