James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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North Korea Special Collection

An op-ed for the South China Morning Post.
Tuesday, February 11, 2003.
Copyright (C) 2003. All rights reserved.

China's failure to take a more active, or leading, role in attempting to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis is something of a dilemma. Pundits and opinion leaders argue it has much at stake should the crisis deteriorate into war. The nuclear proliferation sakes would be raised, which could trigger a domino effect, with South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan taking the nuclear weapons route. Similarly, a resumption by North Korea of ballistic-missile tests could destabilise the region, justifying US deployment of missile defences. Both developments threaten China's core security interests.

China is believed to possess much influence over North Korea, to which it supplies significant amounts of energy and food. While bilateral relations are sometimes strained, the two erstwhile communist allies maintain reasonable, if sporadic, contact. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il visited China in May 2000, just before his historical summit meeting with South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. Kim Jong-il toured China again in early 2001 and began to introduce limited reforms at home. High-level official visits continue.

But in truth, China's current stance reflects a carefully orchestrated balancing act aimed at promoting its long-term security interests.

These are fundamentally anchored in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and keeping a lid on nuclear proliferation. China requires a stable international environment for expanding trade, attracting foreign investment and technology transfers, and its policy must be understood in this broader context. China has said that it wants to see the dispute resolved through diplomatic and political means. Officials in Beijing can be expected to support efforts contributing to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, but they would be reluctant to take action that could threaten the status quo.

China is wary of North Korea's reckless behaviour and does not want the crisis to spiral out of control. At the same time, it believes the North's nuclear gamble stems from its acute sense of insecurity and vulnerability, and, therefore, any resolution must address the issue. In this context, continued support for North Korea is no longer driven by the need to prop up an ideological bedfellow, but rather by China's long-term strategic interests. China will, therefore, oppose any measures likely to precipitate the collapse of the North.

The central government worries that hardline positions maintained by the North and the United States, which have created the stalemate, could push North Korea to take even riskier steps. A military confrontation on the Korean peninsula would not only cause devastation, but it would also bring down Kim Jong-il's regime, costing China a strategically important buffer. The environmental devastation would be severe, and there would be a massive influx of refugees into China, where an estimated 200,000 illegal North Koreans already reside. A hastily unified Korea would present China with tremendous uncertainty. In theory, there could be a US military presence right up to its border. A united Korea could inherit the North's nuclear and missile capabilities, and rising Korean nationalism could also pose a challenge to China's ability to manage its Korean ethnic minority in Jilin province.

As a key supplier of energy and food to North Korea, China has the ability to affect the North's behaviour. Some Western analysts have argued China should use the threat of cutting off economic assistance as a means of pressuring North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons programme. However, officials in Beijing believe outside pressure is unlikely to force North Korea to change its policies and could even be counterproductive.

Chinese officials and analysts maintain that the key to resolving the crisis is direct dialogue between North Korea and the US. Instead of blaming North Korea for the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, China has been calling for both sides to return to the agreement and resolve their dispute through dialogue. Chinese officials hope that face-saving ways can be found for a return to the negotiating table. Unlike its position on the Iraq crisis, where Beijing insists the United Nations Security Council should play a leading role, China has argued against taking the North Korean issue to the world body.

China is unlikely to openly pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons programme, believing that such tactics will only escalate tension without contributing to a resolution. But this does not preclude the possibility of behind-the-scenes engagement to work out a face-saving deal for the North. In the end, peace and stability, and a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, serve China's interests.