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North Korea Special Collection

By Katsu Furukawa
Senior Research Associate

Japan's Korea policy has been characterized as a mix of "strategic caution" and "opportunistic policy." Although the Korean Peninsula has long been critical to Japanese national interests, observers predicted Japan was "unlikely to play a proactive role" and would remain "cautious, reactive, and adaptive to the process of reunification as it develops."[1] Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's surprise trip to Pyongyang in September 2002 confounded these expectations. Koizumi's meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and signing of the Pyongyang Agreement appeared to signal a break from Japan's traditional "opportunistic" posture toward a new, more proactive "engagement diplomacy."

Japan's bold initiative inadvertently created new difficulties for bilateral relations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) pressed North Korea to admit to the past abduction of Japanese citizens to provide political cover for Koizumi's visit. However Kim Jong-il's admission of the abductions and the return of some abductees to Japan have created strong public resentment in Japan. The Japanese public has demanded further investigations into the alleged deaths of some abductees and the whereabouts of additional suspected abductees. The public also wants family members of the abductees who returned to Japan in October 2002 to be allowed to leave North Korea. The abduction issue has become highly politicized, so much so that compromise is regarded as political suicide for both politicians and journalists. The Japanese public has come to support a hard-line approach toward North Korea similar to that of the Bush administration. However, Japanese public attention is almost exclusively dominated by the abduction issue, with relatively limited focus on the North's nuclear weapons programs.

The MOFA's attempt at a dramatic opening to North Korea has stumbled, with no clear prospects for Japan to resume direct negotiations with the North. One U.S. expert close to the North believes that the North Korean officials who had urged negotiations with Japan may have lost political ground within the Kim Jong-il regime. The MOFA is now faced with the consequence of its political miscalculation and has learned that "surprise diplomacy" will not work given the influence of domestic politics and public opinion on the foreign policy-making process.

Japan is now stuck between its hopes to resume normalization negotiations with North Korea and its determination to halt normalization talks until the abduction issues are cleared up. Although a majority of the public supports normalization of Japan's diplomatic relationship with North Korea, they oppose doing so until the North addresses the abduction issues in a satisfactory manner. As a result, the Japanese government will likely be forced to return to its previous posture of "strategic caution," while waiting for a new opportunity for another round of negotiations with the North.

Japan's View: Further Escalation of the Nuclear Crisis is Likely

In contrast with the public's preoccupation with the abduction issue, Japanese experts and officials are concerned that the Korean nuclear crisis may continue to escalate. Japanese experts believe North Korea is interested in making a deal, not just having dialogue, with the United States. The United States hinted at its willingness to talk directly with the North, but completely rejected any deal-making at the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group's (TCOG) meeting in early January 2003. North Korea may perceive this outcome as evidence that the United States might compromise its position if threatened. The North believes that escalation of threats is effective in forcing the United States to respond, especially when coupled with diplomatic pressure from South Korea. The new South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun will be inaugurated on February 25, 2003, and is expected to visit Washington after his inauguration. North Korea may escalate its threats before Roh's visit in order to increase South Korean diplomatic pressure on the United States for a compromise solution, for example, allowing North Korea to resume operation of its spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility.

Japanese policymakers are also gravely concerned about North Korea's approximately one hundred Nodong missiles, which are believed to be targeted against Japan. A combination of chemical or nuclear warheads and medium-range missiles represents a nightmare scenario for the Japanese government. Moreover, another North Korean launch of its long-range Taepodong missile is a real possibility. A Japanese expert close to the MOFA estimates that such an attempt could be carried out sometime between late spring and mid-summer.

Japan's Objectives and Interests

Historically, Japan has had a national interest in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula, especially given the peninsula's geographical position as a "dagger aimed at the heart of Japan." Japan has a number of other interests at stake in the deepening crisis in North Korea. The objectives of Japan's North Korea policy are summarized below.

Short- and mid-term objectives:

• avoid military conflict on the Korean Peninsula;
• terminate and/or freeze North Korea's nuclear weapons programs;
• terminate North Korea's missile programs, including development, production, and deployment of medium- and long-range missiles and exports of missiles, missile components, and related technologies;
• resolve the estimated 40-120 remaining cases of suspected abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea;
• ensure that the families of Japanese abductees are allowed to visit Japan;
• ensure that Japanese wives who went to North Korea with their North Korean husbands in 1960s are allowed to visit Japan;
• prevent North Korean spy ships from intruding into Japanese territorial waters;
• prevent North Korean narcotic trafficking and counterfeiting of foreign currencies; and
• prevent nuclear accidents or radiation leaks in North Korea, even if the North resumes operations of its graphite reactors and/or reprocessing facilities.

Long-term objectives:

• disarm any North Korean nuclear weapons and terminate the North's nuclear weapons program;
• sustain and strengthen the credibility of international nonproliferation regimes;
• constrain the ability of any regime on the Korean Peninsula to conduct a direct military attack against Japanese territories, especially by medium-range missiles, and develop the ability to protect the Japanese homeland in the event of such an attack;
• prevent China or Russia from having dominant influence over the Korean Peninsula; and
• avoid negative "spill-over" effects of North Korea's nuclear weapons program on Japan's plutonium recycling policy.

Japan's Preferred Way of Resolving the Crisis

In order to achieve the above objectives, Japan would prefer a gradual diplomatic approach that avoids a military confrontation. The Japanese government is concerned that too much pressure on the North could lead Kim Jong-il and his associates to take unpredictable actions. Most Japanese policymakers hope to see positive changes gradually take place in the DPRK's political and economic systems in the future; only a few people seriously expect a sudden collapse or change of the Kim Jong-il regime. In November 2002, for example, Japan's Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister issued its final report, "Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy" which states:

There will be no normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea until North Korea itself resolves the many problems that it has caused: abductions, development of nuclear weapons and missiles, spy boats, narcotics smuggling, etc. The resolution of these problems would bring peace, which would lead to greater prosperity for East Asia as a whole. North Korea itself needs to make substantial efforts if it is to become a member of the international community. Japan's objective is not to overturn the regime in North Korea but to gradually change the nature of its political and economic systems.[2]

Within the MOFA, opinions are divided regarding the intentions behind North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The mainstream view within the MOFA is that the North intends to use its nuclear program as a diplomatic card in negotiations. Because these officials believe North Korea may eventually agree to terminate a major portion of its nuclear weapons program in return for security assurance, they prefer to pursue a gradual, diplomatic approach. However, some in the MOFA and most Japan Defense Agency officials believe that North Korea is determined to develop nuclear weapons in order to assure its security. As a result, they do not support making major compromises unless North Korea terminates its nuclear weapons program first.

There is a consensus within the MOFA that the issue of North Korea's nuclear weapons program should be multilateralized and should not be limited to U.S.-DPRK talks. From this perspective, Japan supports U.S. efforts to take a multilateral diplomatic approach toward North Korea. However, Japan is concerned that if the UN Security Council should decide to enforce economic sanctions against the North, North Korea's reactions to such sanctions could become unpredictable, and the dim prospects for resuming Japan-North Korea dialogue might fade away entirely. On the other hand, if the North Korean nuclear crisis is handed over to the UN Security Council, Japan wants to join a "Five Plus Two" mechanism to discuss North Korean nuclear-related issues along with South Korea and the UN Security Council's Permanent Five member countries.

With respect to the future of the 1994 Agreed Framework, Japan may agree to acknowledge that this framework has been abrogated and support a new comprehensive agreement with the North. The Japanese and U.S. governments have reportedly been discussing a new mechanism for "five-party talks" (together with South Korea, China, and Russia) in order to negotiate a new "package deal" with North Korea.[3] The United States hopes this would address the North's weapons of mass destruction programs, missile programs and exports, and conventional forces.[4] Japan also hopes negotiations would freeze North Korean missile development programs and remove Japan as a target of Nodong missiles.[5] The United States would provide North Korea with security assurances (in the form of a written document, not a treaty) and energy assistance in return for a reduction of North Korea's military threats and termination of all nuclear weapons programs.[6]

If North Korea accepted the deal, both the Japanese and U.S. governments, in close coordination with the South Korean government, would propose a new agreement to provide energy assistance to the North. Three pillars are envisioned: 1) establishment of a new international organization to replace the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) (with China and Russia participating along with the United States, Japan, and South Korea); 2) abandonment of the light-water reactors in favor of construction of thermal power generation facilities; and 3) resumption of provision of heavy fuel oil.[7]

A new package deal would require North Korea to terminate all nuclear weapons programs in a verifiable manner that would include a strict inspection scheme. It is unclear at this stage whether the MOFA would support an intrusive inspection scheme similar to UNMOVIC, because the MOFA is not sure whether it would be feasible. In general, the MOFA prefers a more conciliatory approach to inspections. North Korea would also be required to transfer its spent nuclear fuel to a third country, a proposal that the North rejected in 1994.

Japan is not confident that the current hard-line approach of the Bush administration will ultimately succeed in disarming North Korea's WMD. Although a majority of the Japanese public is comfortable with the Bush administration's hard-line policy toward the North, the Japanese government recognizes that at least one country has to continuously talk directly with North Korea. However, the public reaction to the abduction issue and North Korea's provocative behavior make it difficult for the Japanese government to take the initiative. Japan expects that the Bush administration will continue to experience difficulty in forging an internal consensus to start negotiations, as opposed to dialogue, with the North unless North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program. Japan views the South Korean government as too conciliatory toward the North and therefore unable to deliver a strong message about international concerns. Japan is especially unhappy that ROK officials have not brought up the 1992 South-North joint declaration of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in their negotiations with the North, suggesting that the South Korean government does not want to rule out a future nuclear option. This lack of diplomatic leadership is not a desirable situation. Japan has urged China and Russia to reach out to the DPRK, only to learn that their influence and/or willingness to act are also limited.

Japan has also been preparing for the possibility that diplomacy might fail. Japan has been preparing to enact a legal framework for this contingency and has been acquiring capabilities for consequence management and damage limitation, such as efforts to advance missile defenses and to prepare for bio- and chemical-terrorism attacks.

Japan's Future Policy toward North Korea

Japan's policy toward the North will be a combination of dialogue and deterrence with the objective of obtaining North Korean compliance with the 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.

If Japan resumes official negotiation with North Korea in the future, Japan will explain the potential economic benefits that the North might expect if it agrees to terminate its nuclear weapons programs. Possible "carrots" might include North Korea's admission into the Asian Development Bank, but economic aid will not be provided until the North clears up the issues of concern for Japan and the international community. Japan might also present a concrete scenario for post-normalization relations, explaining that Japanese economic assistance to South Korea after normalization was disbursed over a period of almost 10 years. However, if North Korea begins extracting plutonium from its spent nuclear fuel, Japan might seriously consider declaring that the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration has been annulled.

At the same time, Japan may strengthen its deterrence capability by reviewing its national security strategy and developing a more comprehensive approach that incorporates a range of diplomatic and military measures including preventive diplomacy, deterrence, strategic defense, and a denial capability. Japan's national security policy has evolved dramatically each time a crisis has surged on the Korean Peninsula. After the 1993-94 crisis, Japan agreed to redefine its roles and missions within the U.S.-Japan security alliance, announced the U.S.-Japan Joint Security Declaration in 1996, and created new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines in 1998. When North Korea launched the Taepodong missile over Japan in 1998, the Japanese government decided to embark upon joint missile defense research with the United States. China has regarded these changes in Japan's national security strategy as having negative implications for China's security. North Korea's "rogue" behavior has contributed to China's escalating sense of insecurity about Japan's security policy. Additional provocative behavior by the North would likely push Japan toward a more assertive security policy.

Japanese Self Defense Forces have already been coordinating closely with the U.S. military to develop a plan for logistic support for U.S. military actions if a military contingency occurs on the Korean Peninsula. Japan has been gradually deepening its interest in missile defenses, and will probably import the Patriot PAC-III system and new Standard missiles for the Navy Theater Wide system developed by the United States. Should North Korea launch another Taepodong missile, Japan will surely move toward development of robust missile defense systems. In addition, Japan has begun a preliminary discussion on the option of developing a denial capability against North Korea's medium-range missiles by conducting preemptive strikes against North Korean missile launchers if a strike appears imminent. The outcome of this discussion is still unclear.

Diplomatic Aspiration and Domestic Obstacles

Japan still hopes to lead negotiations with the North that address both Japan's and the international community's security concerns about North Korea's weapons programs and other illegal activities. However, the Japanese government has experienced difficulty due to public demands that the government give first priority to the abduction issue. Although there is some chance that Japan might be able to achieve a modest, tactical breakthrough in diplomatic negotiations with North Korea in the near future, a fundamental breakthrough will be difficult due to these domestic constraints. While Japan's overall national security strategy is likely to evolve steadily, Japan's ability to conduct preventive diplomacy toward North Korea will remain relatively constrained by domestic factors.

[1] Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination," in Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, eds., Korea's Future and the Great Powers (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001), pp. 141.
[2] Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, "Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy", November 28, 2002, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2002/1128tf_e.html.
[3] "Nichibei, Tai Kitachousen de Shin Goui (U.S. and Japan Agreed on A New Initiative toward North Korea)," Yomiuru Shimbun, January 18, 2003.
[4] "Kitachousen Fukashin, Bei ga Bunshoka no Youi, Kokumu Fukuchoukan ga Hyoumei (U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Announced that the United State is Ready to Prepare A Document that Assures North Korea of U.S. Non-agression)," Asahi Shimbun, January 18, 2003.
[5] "Nichibei, Tai Kitachousen de Shin Goui (U.S. and Japan Agreed on A New Initiative toward North Korea)," Yomiuru Shimbun, January 18, 2003.
[6] "Kitachousen Fukashin, Bei ga Bunshoka no Youi, Kokumu Fukuchoukan ga Hyoumei (U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Announced that the United State is Ready to Prepare A Document that Assures North Korea of U.S. Non-agression)," Asahi Shimbun, January 18, 2003.
[7] "Nichibei, Tai Kitachousen de Shin Goui (U.S. and Japan Agreed on A New Initiative toward North Korea)," Yomiuru Shimbun, January 18, 2003.

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