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North Korea Special Collection

By Daniel A. Pinkston and Stephanie Lieggi[1]

Despite tough rhetoric from North Korea regarding its nuclear program and its withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), official government statements proclaim the country does not posses nuclear weapons. However, some North Korean officials and media have said the official policy is to "neither confirm nor deny" any accusations about the status of its nuclear program. Several editorials in the North Korean media have said that North Korea "has the right to self-defense and to produce nuclear weapons in order to defend against the American nuclear threat." And in late December 2002, Defense Minister Kim Il Ch'ol said North Korea has something even more powerful than an atomic bomb--"the single-hearted unity of the military and people behind the invincible Commander Kim Jong Il."[2] Whether any of these claims are true or not, it is clear that the North Korean program has advanced to a stage where the possession of a small nuclear arsenal is within reach.

Short-Term Concerns and Potential Developments[3]

In December 2001, the U.S. National Intelligence Council reported its assessment that North Korea had produced one to two nuclear weapons. The fissile material for these weapons came from plutonium that North Korean technicians extracted from spent-fuel rods removed from the 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear complex in 1989. While North Korea has not conducted a full nuclear test, various reports indicate that the DPRK has successfully completed the high explosives tests required for nuclear weapons. There has also been speculation that North Korean scientists were present during nuclear tests in Pakistan, and that Pyongyang may have been able to use previously tested designs for their own weapon production. However, creating a first-generation nuclear weapon does not necessarily indicate an ability to produce a nuclear warhead that will work with a given delivery system. While the DPRK's missile development efforts are relatively advanced, its Nodong (range about 1,000 km) and Paektusan-1 (Taepodong-1; range 2,000-2,500 km) missiles have only been flight-tested once, and the Taepodong-2 is still under development. It is unclear if Pyongyang's nuclear devices could be used successfully with these delivery systems, or with any limited-range aircraft in the North Korean inventory.

Most of the key facilities for the DPRK's plutonium-based nuclear program are located in or near the Yongbyon-kun complex, about 100 km north of the capital Pyongyang. The primary immediate concern is the 8,000 spent-fuel rods in a temporary storage pond in Yongbyon-kun. With International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring devices removed or disabled and IAEA inspectors having been expelled, North Korea can reprocess these spent-fuel rods into enough plutonium for about five bombs in approximately one month. The reprocessing would likely be done a reprocessing plant known as the "Radiochemistry Laboratory," which is also in the Yongbyon complex. This Radiochemistry Laboratory is estimated to be capable of reprocessing 200-250 tons of spent fuel and extracting 100 kilograms of plutonium annually, but the possibility that North Korea has additional reprocessing facilities elsewhere cannot be ruled out.

North Korea's 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor, also located in the Yongbyon complex, has been under IAEA safeguards and frozen under the terms of the Agreed Framework. This reactor produced the 8,000 spent-fuel rods that are in temporary storage. Once operational, it could produce about 5.5 kilograms of plutonium per year, or enough for about one bomb. A recent statement by a North Korean representative to the IAEA claimed that the Yongbyon-kun facilities could be able to produce electricity "in a few weeks, not a few months." If this claim is true, the production and extraction of weapon-grade plutonium may occur even sooner than most analysts had estimated.[4]

Another facility of concern is the fuel fabrication plant, which is also in the Yongbyon complex. Prior to the Agreed Framework, this plant was reportedly manufacturing fuel rods that contained 100 tons of uranium per year. This facility is probably capable of producing much more, possibly up to 200-300 tons, which would be enough to supply the 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun and two larger reactors that were under construction before being frozen by the Agreed Framework.

Looking Toward the Future: Continued Development and Expanding Concerns

If North Korea decides to resume its nuclear weapons program, existing facilities give Pyongyang ready access to weapons-grade plutonium and the ability to restart the plutonium production process within weeks or a few months. However, this capacity could be greatly expanded within a few years as new facilities become operational, including the two nuclear reactors that were under construction but frozen by the Agreed Framework. If North Korea resumes construction of the reactors, a 50MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun and a 200MW(e) reactor in T'aech'on-kun, they could probably be operational within two to five years. The 200MW(e) reactor could produce about 220 kilograms of plutonium per year, or enough for about 30-40 bombs, and 50MW(e) reactor could produce about 55 kilos of plutonium, or enough for about 7-10 bombs per year.

An additional area of concern is North Korea's suspected highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, which is a completely different path to nuclear weapons. According to a US State Department delegation, DPRK Foreign Ministry officials admitted in October 2002 that Pyongyang had a development program to produce HEU. However, the North Korean government denies this and instead claims it acknowledged "a plan to develop nuclear weapons" and that this admission is nothing new. In comparison to plutonium-production facilities, HEU facilities are difficult to detect. It is therefore difficult to accurately assess an HEU program's capacity or stage of development if measures are taken to conceal the facility. According to Larry A. Niksch of the U.S. Congressional Research Service, North Korea's secret HEU program began after 1995, possibly with the assistance of Pakistan.[5] Some evidence suggests, however, that North Korea may have had an HEU program as early as the 1980s, although the start date of this program remains unclear. The North Korean HEU program likely employs gas-centrifuge technology. Reports have surfaced that the North Korean government is seeking or experimenting with laser-isotope separation technology, but this technology is unlikely to be available for use in the North Korean program in the foreseeable future. Suspected locations for North Korea's HEU program include a uranium milling facility under Mt. Ch'onma in Taegwan-kun, North P'yong'an Province, and other suspected underground facilities at "Ha'gap," Pakch'on-kun, and T'aech'on-kun. According to recent CIA estimates, North Korea may be able to complete a gas-centrifuge enrichment facility by "mid-decade."[6]

With the departure of IAEA inspectors, North Korea is now poised to re-institute its plutonium-based program and speed up its HEU program in order to establish a sizeable arsenal of nuclear weapons. The table below is an indication of how rapidly North Korea could build weaponry in the next four to five years. The dates given are based on the premise that the program would restart immediately. These estimates assume the facilities in question will be operated at maximum capacity and no significant slow downs will occur due to insufficient technical capabilities or material availability. Whether or not the ultimate intent of the North Korean government is to restart its nuclear weapons program, the table illustrates that the DPRK does have significant resources available in the near-term for an active nuclear weapons program, and would have an increasingly capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons as time passed and more facilities become operational.

[1] The authors would like to thank Phillip C. Saunders for his comments.
[2] "DPRK Ready to Punish Yankees in Singlehearted (sic) Unity More Powerful than A-Bomb," Korean Central News Agency," 25 December 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.
[3] For a comprehensive overview of the North Korean nuclear program see the 'North Korea Country Profile' prepared by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at <http:/www.nti.org>.
[4] "N.Korea Says Nuke Plant Weeks Away from Electricity Production," Agence France Presse, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
[5] Larry A. Niksch, "Korea Nuclear Weapon's Program," Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Updated 7 January 2003, p 1, <http://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf>.
[6] "Beyond the Agreed Framework: The DPRK's Projected Atomic Bomb Making Capabilities, 2002-09," An Analysis of The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), 3 December 2002, <http://www.npec-web.org/projects/fissile2.htm>.
[7] Calculations are based on assumption that 5.5 kilograms of plutonium or 16 kg of HEU are required for each bomb.
[8] According to the NPEC report from 3 December 2002, the Bush administration claims that "the DPRK may have enough centrifuges on line in one ... to three years ... to begin to make as much as six bombs worth of HEU (about 100 kg) per year."
[9] This assumes that the 50MW(e) reactor would be operational in two years.
[10] This assumes sufficient reprocessing capacity.
[11] This assumes that the 200MW(e) reactor would be operational in three years.

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