James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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North Korea Special Collection

An op-ed for the Chosun Ilbo.
February 7, 2003

As North Korea accelerates its efforts to build new nuclear weapons, options for averting a tragic outcome are disappearing one by one.

It would be tragic, indeed, if Pyongyang cannot be deflected from its current course. By year end, with four to six weapons in hand, it would likely conduct a nuclear test to demonstrate to the world its status as a nuclear power.

Meanwhile it would continue its nuclear build-up, adding one new weapon each year using the Yongbyon reactor and potentially many more, as its uranium enrichment program comes to fruition. Sales of weapons to Iran and Iraq or to terrorist organizations could well follow, along with the nuclear arming of the No-Dong missile to threaten Japan and, eventually, the nuclear arming of the Taepo-Dong II, to threaten the United States. Moreover, North Korea would surely intensify pressure on Seoul to provide economic aid and political support.

For the United States and its allies this outcome must be recognized as unacceptable. But what choices remain to prevent it?

Former U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Donald Gregg, and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator Richard Lugar, among others, are pressing the Administration to open direct talks with Pyongyang. Negotiations with North Korea, standing alone, no longer remain a realistic alternative, however.

If the United States comes to the bargaining table ready to offer concessions, such as large-scale economic assistance or a non-aggression pact, it will look weak and desperate to find a solution to the crisis. If, as is more likely, the Bush Administration begins talks by refusing to consider such concessions until North Korea verifiably ends its nuclear weapons program, the negotiations will quickly stall.

In either case, North Korea has little reason to slow its advance toward a significant nuclear arsenal. Now that North Korea has begun moving plutonium-bearing spent nuclear fuel from its storage place in Yongbyon, it can take the next step processing the fuel to extract its plutonium at little diplomatic, economic, or military risk.

In effect, it can adopt a "talk and fight" negotiating strategy, discussing elimination of its nuclear program with the United States, while simultaneously building up its nuclear potential.

To regain the initiative and to make Pyongyang fearful that further delay in ending its nuclear program may carry very serious costs, the United States must adopt the recommendation of former Defense Secretary William Perry and accompany any negotiations with a credible threat that it will use force, if necessary, to prevent the unacceptable outcome of a fully nuclearized DPRK.

Perry has made clear that he is not calling for an immediate preemptive strike on DPRK nuclear facilities. Rather he is urging Washington to employ the threat to use force as part of an overall negotiating strategy, as it did during the crisis of 1994.

There have been hints in recent days that the Bush Administration is inching in this direction by seeking to increase the pressure on Pyongyang. On February 12, the United States is expected to press the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to forward North Koreas rejection of IAEA inspections to the UN Security Council for further action. This will be seen in Pyongyang as the first step toward possible international sanctions against it, paralleling developments in 1994.

At the same time, the United States is strengthening its forces in the region and letting this fact leak to the press. Bush Administration spokesmen say that the reinforcement is for the purposes of deterring DPRK adventurism at a time when the United States is preoccupied with a possible war against Iraq.

In coming weeks, Washington must take further steps to warn North Korea that it may face U.S. military action if it continues its nuclear build-up. This may not be easy to do as conflict in the Persian Gulf approaches, but it is essential if negotiations are to have any hope of success.

It is also crucially important that the new government in Seoul and leaders in Tokyo support such an intensification of pressure in coming months. Time will remain to recalibrate this strategy, if necessary, to reduce the risk of actual hostilities. But without such pressure now, Northeast Asia will soon confront an erratic and highly dangerous new member of the nuclear club.