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On 18 April 2003, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the official North Korean news agency, published a statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesperson about the recently announced Beijing talks. According to KCNA’s English translation, the North Korean spokesman declared that North Korea was “successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase as we sent interim information to the U.S. and other countries concerned early in March after resuming our nuclear activities from December last year.” Several Western media sources have reported this statement as an official declaration that North Korea has started to reprocess its 8,000 spent fuel rods. However, a close look at the original Korean text shows that KCNA provided an inaccurate English translation of the original statement. The Korean-language text should be translated as “We are successfully making progress in the last stages towards the task of reprocessing the approximately 8,000 spent fuel rods.” The Korean text implies progress is being made in the final stages necessary to begin reprocessing, but does not specify what tasks remain to be completed before plutonium can be separated from the spent fuel rods. This text is somewhat ambiguous, but is definitely not a straightforward declaration that reprocessing has started [which would be phrased differently in Korean]. After the Foreign Ministry statement was released, a U.S. official told Reuters the United States had “no information to indicate that North Korea has begun reprocessing.”

Given the controversy over the different implications between the Korean and English versions of the Foreign Ministry statement, KCNA issued a corrected version of the English translation on April 21st. It corrected the original translation to read “We are successfully going forward to reprocess work of more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase...” South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency reported that a KCNA employee claimed to have made the correction based on his personal judgment in order to better reflect the original Korean text in the English translation. He stated that the corrected translation was made without any instruction from or discussion with the North Korean government. Despite the correction, the statement still remains ambiguous.

The North Korean statement was the first official comment by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) about the upcoming trilateral meetings between the United States, North Korea and China that began in Beijing on April 23rd. According to the North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson, the Chinese government’s role was solely as host and “the essential issues related to the settlement of the nuclear issue will be discussed between the DPRK and the U.S.” Despite this rhetoric, the inclusion of a third party is a concession by North Korea, which had previously demanded bilateral talks with Washington. The Bush administration had also made a significant concession in agreeing to limit the talks to three parties, instead of the multilateral talks including Japan and South Korea that Washington had originally demanded. Despite being excluded from this initial round of talks, both the South Korean and Japanese governments have come out in favor of the meetings. The Bush administration has given clear indications that Washington expects both Seoul and Tokyo to take an active part in future rounds of discussions.

“The DPRK-U.S. talks for the settlement of the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula is slated to open in Beijing shortly. At the talks the Chinese side will play a relevant role as the host state and the essential issues related to the settlement of the nuclear issue will be discussed between the DPRK and the U.S.

There is a wide range of international opinion on the Beijing talks as they are to open at a time when the Iraqi war was fought.

The Iraqi war teaches a lesson that in order to prevent a war and defend the security of a country and the sovereignty of a nation it is necessary to have a powerful physical deterrent force only.

We have already clarified our stand that if the U.S. has a willingness to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy, we will not stick to any particular dialogue format, and we would like to confirm the U.S. intention in the forthcoming talks.”

Corrected version of paragraph 4 of the original translation, as of 21 April 2003

As we have already declared, we are successfully going forward to reprocess work of more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase as we sent interim information to the U.S. and other countries concerned early in March after resuming our nuclear activities from December last year.

Questions and Answers about the North Korean statement

1) Does this statement give any firm indications about North Korea’s nuclear intentions?
The timing of the statement suggests that North Korea is trying to develop additional leverage prior to the start of talks with the United States next week. By announcing its readiness to begin reprocessing—but not actually starting to reprocess—North Korea is signaling the United States that if negotiations do not produce an acceptable deal, it can proceed quickly to produce additional plutonium that could be used in nuclear weapons. This brinksmanship is consistent with past North Korea negotiating tactics, such as North Korea’s 1993 announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (which was ultimately suspended one day before it took effect).

An alternative interpretation is that North Korea may attempt to use its willingness to negotiate with the United States as cover for beginning to reprocess its 8,000 spent fuel rods. By indicating a willingness to resolve the crisis through negotiations, North Korea could try to defuse the international reaction to reprocessing and reduce the chance of a U.S. pre-emptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities.

2) Would the United States know if North Korea actually started reprocessing?
Yes. There are two major signatures for reprocessing. The first is the emission of krypton-85 (Kr-85), a radioactive gas, from a reprocessing facility. The second is thermal signatures emanating from the facility. Both signatures can be detected remotely. Kr-85 can be detected by air sampling relatively far from the site, and the thermal signature can be detected by infrared sensors on satellites. The United States is capable of using both methods. U.S. government officials have expressed confidence that North Korean reprocessing would be detected quickly. However, no signatures have been detected to date that would indicate actual reprocessing has started.

3) If North Korea decided to begin reprocessing, how much plutonium could they produce and how quickly could they produce it?
U.S. intelligence officials claim that North Korea already possesses enough fissile material for one to two nuclear weapons. This material came from plutonium extracted from spent fuel rods removed from the 5MW(e) Experimental reactor in 1989. Both China and Russia have expressed doubts that the DPRK has the technical capacity to construct a working nuclear warhead. North Korea has not tested nuclear weapons, although there are indications that they successfully completed high explosive tests necessary for triggering a nuclear weapon. North Korea’s nuclear program appears to be capable of at least developing a small nuclear arsenal. The most immediate concern, as evident from the North Korean statement, is the 8,000 spent-fuel rods still held in storage at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. If these spent-fuel rods were to be reprocessed, Pyongyang would have enough plutonium for approximately five nuclear weapons, and the process would only take a few months once reprocessing began. In the medium-term, the 5MW(e) Experimental Reactor could also produce enough plutonium for approximately one nuclear device per year. North Korea’s capacity could be further expanded with the addition of the currently unfinished 50MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun and a 200MW(e) reactor in T’aech’on-kun. These facilities could be operational within five years and together have the potential to produce enough plutonium for 35 to 50 bombs annually.

Although less developed than the plutonium program, North Korea’s HEU program may be capable of producing enough fissile material to construct six bombs annually within the next few years. Unlike plutonium facilities, HEU facilities are difficult to detect. It is unclear how far the North Korean HEU program has progressed. However, a CIA estimate from late 2002 claimed that North Korea might have a gas-centrifuge enrichment facility within three years. If that estimate is accurate, a North Korean HEU program could produce enough fissile material for six weapons per year starting in 2006. (See North Korea's Nuclear Program: Key Concerns, http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/index.htm.)

4) If North Korea begins reprocessing, how will the United States respond?
The United States has not publicly stated how it would respond if North Korea began reprocessing. However, the United States is widely believed to have privately warned North Korea not to take this step. Possible U.S. responses might include withdrawing from further talks, efforts to get the United Nations Security Council to authorize sanctions against North Korea, or a pre-emptive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities. (See Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Program, http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm.)

5) What implications will the North Korean statement have for the scheduled talks?
The statement suggests that North Korea will adopt a tough negotiating position in the talks and is not intimidated enough to make major concessions without getting anything in return. North Korea is also signaling its willingness to move forward with reprocessing if the United States proves unwilling to negotiate an acceptable deal.

The impact will also depend on how the Bush administration reacts. If the Bush administration was seeking an excuse to back away from the talks, the North Korean statement did provide one. However, the United States could instead respond by demanding that North Korea not reprocess its spent fuel as a condition for U.S. participation in the talks. One option could be for China—the third party in the talks—to send personnel to the North Korean nuclear facilities to verify that reprocessing has not begun. In exchange, the United States could agree to forego any military options while North Korea is negotiating in good faith.

6) What impact will the North Korean statement have on U.S. policy toward the nuclear crisis?
The statement likely confirmed the views of many Bush administration officials that North Korea will be a difficult negotiating partner that cannot be trusted to live up to its agreements. This will increase U.S. demands for iron-clad verification clauses in any agreement.

More broadly, there are two key unresolved questions about the negotiations. Is North Korea willing to give up its current and potential nuclear weapons capability in a visible, verifiable, and irreversible way? If so, what is the United States willing to give North Korea in return? The answers to these questions will ultimately determine whether a diplomatic settlement of the crisis is possible.


This factsheet was prepared by Phillip C. Saunders, Daniel A. Pinkston, Stephanie Lieggi, Mari Sudo, and Charles Ferguson of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.