November 2007 • Volume 14 • Number 3 Table of Contents
ARTICLES
- Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Christopher A. Ford
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The author offers a close analysis of
Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the
treaty's only article dealing with disarmament, focusing upon both its
text and negotiating history, and assesses its applicability as a standard for
judging treaty compliance. The author critiques comments on Article VI made by
the International Court of Justice in a 1996 case as legally ill founded and
conceptually incoherent as a compliance yardstick. The only interpretation of
Article VI consistent with its text and history, the author argues, is that
it--as it says--merely requires all states to pursue negotiations in
good faith; specific disarmament steps are not required. Claims that the 2000
NPT Review Conference imposed new legal obligations for disarmament or altered
the meaning of Article VI are found to be mistaken; although the conference
could theoretically have adopted interpretive criteria for understanding the
meaning of Article VI, it did not in fact do so. Applying his Article VI
compliance standard to the case of U.S. compliance, and comparing modern
circumstances with those during the Cold War, the author also describes what he
says is an excellent U.S. record of Article VI compliance.
[See also: a briefing event based on this article.]
- U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation: Better Later Than Sooner
Leonard Weiss
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On July 5, 2005, President George W.
Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signed an agreement pledging their
governments to actions designed to culminate in a formal nuclear cooperation
agreement that would end a three-decade U.S. nuclear embargo against India.
Although the formal agreement has not yet received final approval from Congress,
concerns about the consequences of the agreement, particularly its possible
adverse effect on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
and the worldwide nonproliferation regime, have made the agreement
controversial. This article traces the events that led to the Bush-Singh
meeting, explicates the current situation, examines the arguments for and
against the proposed agreement, and makes some preliminary judgments regarding
the agreement's effects on the nonproliferation regime. The failure to
prevent India's 1998 nuclear tests with the threat of sanctions (because
the Indians calculated that long-term U.S. resolve was not sustainable) set in
motion a chain of events that would ultimately end the nuclear embargo. However,
the conditions for a better U.S.-India nuclear agreement--from a
nonproliferation perspective--will inevitably arise if the current proposed
agreement is not adopted.
- The Nexus of Globalization and Next-Generation Proliferation: Tapping the Power of Market-Based Solutions
Kenneth N. Luongo and Isabelle Williams
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Although globalization
has created opportunities for nuclear and biological proliferation dangers to
take root and grow, it also has opened the door to new solutions. Original ideas
and approaches are needed to develop a stronger, more flexible next-generation
nonproliferation strategy that accounts for the increasingly important
integration of economic, political, and technological issues. The foundation of
this strategy should focus on tapping the power of market-based mechanisms,
understanding how commercially driven decisions affect proliferation threats,
establishing new partnerships, and forging cohesion among the current
nonproliferation mechanisms. The implementation of such a strategy will require
forceful leadership, a cultural shift from both policymakers and the range of
stakeholders, and consensus building within the international community.
- Unwarranted Influence? The Impact of the Biotech-Pharmaceutical Industry on U.S. Policy on the BWC Verification Protocol
Karen Winzoski
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This article examines the effects
that the U.S. biotech-pharmaceutical industry has had on U.S. government policy,
specifically on the 2001 decision to reject the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention verification protocol. It concludes that the biotech-pharmaceutical
industry's concerns for the protection of trade secrets contributed to the
weakening of the proposed inspection regime, particularly through its demands
for managed access. This added to doubts among U.S. policymakers regarding the
protocol's effectiveness. However, this article cautions against blaming
industry for the rejection of the verification protocol, when most of the
responsibility lies with government. A poorly handled 1994 visit to a Pfizer
facility coordinated by the State Department resulted in increased wariness of
international inspections within industry. Furthermore, both the Department of
Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency had reasons to object to the
proposed regime because it could result in the exposure of their own secret
biodefense research. Finally, though the biotech-pharmaceutical industry's
lobbying efforts may have led to the rejection of the protocol, it should be
expected that any industry will try to minimize regulation. It is the
responsibility of government, not industry, to decide the best way to achieve
national interests, whether through the enhancement of the biological weapons
regime or through the continued support of favored industries. If government
chooses poorly, then government ought to be criticized.
REPORT
- Congress and U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Review and Oversight of Policies and Programs
Amy F. Woolf
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The U.S. Congress, charged with
overseeing U.S. nuclear weapons policy and programs, usually addresses such
policies and programs through the annual authorization and appropriations
process, focusing mostly on questions of how many and what types of weapons the
United States should deploy, with little attention paid to questions about
nuclear weapons strategy, doctrine, and policy. The oversight process has
brought about some significant changes in the plans for U.S. nuclear weapons,
including the elimination of funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator
study and the shift of that funding into a study of the Reliable Replacement
Warhead. But with the focus on authorizations and appropriations, along with the
divided jurisdiction over nuclear weapons policy and programs in congressional
committees, Congress has not, either recently or during the Cold War and
post-Cold War eras, conducted a more comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear
weapons strategy, policy, or force structure. Changes in committee jurisdictions
could affect the oversight process, but as long as nuclear weapons policy and
programs remain a relatively low priority for most members of Congress, and the
country at large, it is unlikely that Congress will pursue such a comprehensive debate.
VIEWPOINTS
- Achieving Nuclear Balance
Ellen O. Tauscher
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One of the most important
questions affecting U.S. national security is the future size of the U.S.
nuclear stockpile. While there is clear consensus within the U.S. government on
the need to reduce the size of the arsenal, there is none on the best path to
achieve these cuts; on the type of deterrent necessary to deal with future
threats; or on the size of the production complex needed to support that
arsenal. Creating a strategic commission to review these questions, as
contemplated in the Fiscal 2008 House Defense Authorization bill, is a necessary
first step to establish a sensible nuclear policy. The Reliable Replacement
Warhead, which has the potential to transform the complex while preserving the
current moratorium on nuclear testing, is a program worth exploring further if
it stays within congressionally mandated bounds. As Congress considers both
programmatic and policy matters related to U.S. nuclear weapons, it is vital
that we also renew and strengthen U.S. leadership on nuclear nonproliferation.
- Strengthening Safeguards and Nuclear Disarmament: Is There A Connection?
James M. Acton
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The nuclear weapon states see
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as an important means of
preventing proliferation and, therefore, of enhancing their own security. Many
non-nuclear weapon states are, however, reluctant to accept the IAEA's
Additional Protocol or even consider developing new safeguards instruments. They
frequently claim that this is because the nuclear weapon states have failed to
make sufficient progress toward their disarmament pledge, as embodied in Article
VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This
viewpoint discusses whether the nuclear weapon states should adopt a strategy of
working toward disarmament as a means of strengthening safeguards. Three
questions are explored. First, are the weapon states right to see safeguards as
an effective means of preventing proliferation? Second, will progress by the
nuclear weapon states toward disarmament strengthen the safeguards regime?
Third, what does that actually involve? There is a "political"
connection between safeguards and disarmament. The weapon states should
seriously consider exploiting that connection, with the aims of encouraging the
adoption of additional safeguards by some states and putting pressure on others
that use the slow pace of disarmament as an excuse for recalcitrance.
BOOK REVIEW
- The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, by William Langewiesche
Reviewed by Quincy W. Castro
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The Atomic
Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor stresses a fatalistic urgency for some
of the most pressing arms control problems in a format that is entertaining and
accessible to general audiences. William Langewiesche's primary assertion,
that the current nonproliferation regime is untenable and has failed to
delegitimize nuclear weapons as the currency of international power and
prestige, is intriguing and deserving of serious study. Yet his argument is lost
in a variety of anecdotes and hyperbole that are connected by only a few
narrative threads. The scope of The Atomic Bazaar encompasses nuclear
terrorism and black-market weapons, the proliferation of small nuclear powers,
and the rise and fall of Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, yet these explorations are
rarely exhaustive. Neophytes in arms control and nonproliferation will find the
conclusions compelling and foreboding; Langewiesche deserves credit for his
thoughtful and grave treatment of the subject. However, those more widely read
may be left wanting a deeper, more comprehensive approach to the book's
primary assertions.
Statements of fact and opinion expressed in The Nonproliferation
Review are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors,
the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
The Nonproliferation Review ISSN 1073-6700
Copyright © 2007 by Monterey Institute of International Studies
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