A refereed journal concerned with the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. Featuring viewpoints, articles, and reports on programs, treaties and export controls, terrorism, and the economic and environmental effects of weapons proliferation.

Updated: Jul 13, 2008

Spring 2003 • Volume 10 • Number 1
Abstracts

Articles

Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia
By Feroz Hassan Khan

Nearly five years after India and Pakistan demonstrated a nuclear weapons capability, debate rages on as to whether or not deterrence has "worked" in South Asia. The region has since witnessed a rise in religious extremism, a growing arms race, tense stand-offs, and even armed conflict. The specter of conventional war escalating into a nuclear conflict has raised questions about whether or not nuclear weapons have had a stabilizing effect in South Asia.

This article by retired Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan of the Pakistan Army examines the challenges to achieving nuclear stability in South Asia. He argues that in the absence of a regional framework, South Asia will continue to live under the threat of nuclear war. He suggests possible risk reduction and confidence-building measures to address these challenges. Khan concludes that in the current situation, enhancing Indian and Pakistani capabilities to ensure stability and peace and providing incentives to reduce the risks of nuclear war are goals that necessitate reconsideration of previously accepted nonproliferation principles and practices.
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Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security
By Jing-dong Yuan

While Chinese rhetoric opposing U.S. missile defenses has moderated, China's sense of vulnerability has not lessened. U.S. President George W. Bush's December 2002 announcement that the United States will deploy initial missile defenses in 2004 received a muted response from Beijing. This public reaction, however, may understate the challenges missile defense presents for China. Once operational, U.S. missile defenses--especially if they are further developed into a multi-layered system--threaten the credibility, reliability, and effectiveness of China's woefully inadequate strategic nuclear arsenal.

In this article, Jing-dong Yuan of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) analyzes a range of possible Chinese responses to U.S. missile defenses, and analyzes their and implications for global arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. He places Chinese concerns about missile defense into the broad context of Sino-U.S. relations and post-Cold War security in Northeast Asia. He contends that in the final analysis, Chinese concerns over U.S. missile defenses are driven by uncertainties about Washington's strategic intentions toward Beijing, China's nuclear vulnerability, and America's role in a potential military conflict between China and Taiwan over the issue of unification.
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Russian Commercial Nuclear Initiatives and U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Interests
By Oana C. Diaconu and Michael T. Maloney

Recent proposals put forward by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) aim to "privatize" Minatom's nondefense activities in hopes of making them commercially profitable. Through such reforms, Minatom is ostensibly seeking to generate funds that can be used to finance environmental remediation and nonproliferation activities, as well as support the vast social responsibilities (schools, hospitals, and the like) that it inherited from the Soviet era.

Oana C. Diaconu and Michael T. Maloney, both of the Department of Economics at Clemson University, examine the obstacles Minatom faces as it attempts to commercialize its civilian activities. The authors argue that Minatom's ambitious plans are likely to founder on the rocks of market competition, and that it is far from clear that it can turn a profit in such areas as nuclear power generation, nuclear power plant construction, and spent fuel management. As a result, Diaconu and Maloney conclude that Minatom is likely to remain financially strapped and may even become more responsive in the future to the concerns of U.S. nonproliferation programs that channel hard cash to its departments and divisions.
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Viewpoints

Securing Nuclear Capabilities in India and Pakistan: Reducing the Terrorist and Proliferation Risks
By Arian L. Pregenzer

Both India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and extensive civil and military nuclear infrastructure, but little is known about the security of their nuclear capabilities. In light of recent terrorist activities and fears about political instability in Pakistan, this lack of information has led to numerous discussions about how the international community might assist in enhancements to nuclear security in the region. However, there is little consensus among key players about the nature of the threats or the best approach to address them.

In this viewpoint, Arian L. Pregenzer of Sandia National Laboratories advocates multiple approaches to implement solutions, taking lessons from the experience of the United States and Russia in cooperative efforts on highly sensitive security matters between former adversaries. The author suggests ways that the United States, other countries, and international organizations can work with India and Pakistan to prevent unauthorized acquisition of nuclear weapons, material, and related technology or expertise. While the two countries may take different paths to secure their nuclear capabilities, Pregenzer concludes that they may develop sufficient common interest to work toward the larger effort of reducing the risk of nuclear war.
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Accelerate the Ratification of the Pelindaba Treaty
By Sola Ogunbanwo

Since the signing of the Treaty of Pelindaba in 1996, the ratification process has been disappointingly slow. There is broad agreement that the treaty, which establishes an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, will bring significant benefits for African security and development. Its provisions regarding physical protection of nuclear material, nuclear safeguards, transparency, and verification mark real progress toward establishing a comprehensive nuclear security regime on the African continent. However, for these benefits to be realized, the treaty must be ratified by 28 of the African states and enter into force. To date, only 17 states have ratified the treaty.

Sola Ogunbanwo, Chief Expert Advisor on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, argues that it is essential for both Africa and the international nonproliferation regime to speed up the ratification process and bring the Treaty of Pelindaba into force. For African states, the entry-into-force will help realize needed benefits of nuclear technology in medicine, agriculture, and industry. It will also provide them with important security benefits, including negative security assurances and improved verification and confidence-building measures. In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it has also become increasingly crucial to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime. Ogunbanwo contends that the entry into force of the Pelindaba Treaty will contribute to this objective in a number of ways.
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Reports

The FSB and the U.S.-Russian Nuclear Security Partnership
By Oleg Bukharin

Very little open information is available on Russia's internal security agency--the Federal Security Service (FSB). Any open-source analysis is therefore somewhat speculative. At the same time, the FSB occupies a critical position with respect to U.S. nonproliferation and anti-terrorism efforts in Russia. It has an important role in preventing nuclear terrorism involving Russian nuclear materials and facilities, and it influences U.S.-Russian cooperation by controlling its scope, as well as U.S. access to Russian nuclear facilities.

Oleg Bukharin of Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs argues that an effective strategy of nuclear security cooperation with Russia must seek a better understanding of the FSB and its role. Bukharin explores the FSB's role in nuclear security, and the history of its involvement in the Soviet and Russian nuclear programs. He contends that to improve U.S.-Russian cooperative nonproliferation efforts, the United States must identify credible engagement options to make the FSB a helpful partner in the war against terrorism and proliferation. Bukharin closes his report by considering options for and challenges to nuclear security cooperation with the FSB.
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Uranium Tailings in Kyrgystan: Catalyst for Cooperation and Confidence Building?
By Margarita Sevcik

The Central Asian states inherited an environmental legacy of contamination associated with the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Although nuclear weapons were never produced or deployed on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, the country provided a large share of the uranium used by the Soviet nuclear complex. And the waste products left behind by that industry, especially the uranium tailings at former Soviet uranium mining and milling facilities, now represent a challenge not just to environmental quality, public health, and domestic political stability in Kyrgyzstan, but also to regional, political, and economic stability in Central Asia.

This report by Margarita Sevcik of CNS outlines the development of the Soviet uranium mining and processing industry in Kyrgyzstan. It details the threats to environmental quality, public health, and domestic and regional security posed by inadequately maintained uranium tailings in Kyrgyzstan, emphasizing the potential regional impact of these threats. The report discusses current Kyrgyzstani efforts to deal with the uranium tailings issue, as well as international cooperative efforts to address it. It concludes with recommendations for how the Central Asian states can join together to meet this challenge, potentially catalyzing broader regional cooperation and also attracting international financial support.
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Statements of fact and opinion expressed in The Nonproliferation Review are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

The Nonproliferation Review ISSN 1073-6700
Copyright © 2003 by Monterey Institute of International Studies