Spring 2001 • Volume 8 • Number 1
Abstracts
Special Section: New Approaches to Compliance with Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Agreements
Introduction
by Michael Moodie & Amy Sands
Since the end of the Cold War, the daily national security agenda of the
United States has been shaped in significant measure by disputes with
other nations over compliance with arms control and nonproliferation
agreements. Assessing compliance with such international agreements has
assumed great importance. If not handled effectively, noncompliance issues
can undermine the regimes embodied in those agreements, make management of
problem states more difficult, and ultimately create more uncertainty and
instability in the global security environment.
To address some of the gaps in the literature and in the policy
community’s attention to compliance issues, the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies and the Chemical and Biological Arms Control
Institute developed a joint project entitled “Arms Control
Compliance: The Need for a New Approach.” This project sponsored a
workshop that examined specific case studies in which arms control
compliance was the critical question. This introduction to the special
compliance section outlines the problems addressed by the project and
cites to the historical cases. It first looks at the current status of
compliance with arms control and nonproliferation measures. Next, it
reviews the challenges to compliance efforts. Finally, it sets out the
project’s recommendation for enhancing arms control compliance. The
project concluded that assuring compliance with arms control and
nonproliferation treaties must be seen as the responsibility of all states
and recognized as an important priority by all world leaders.
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Revisiting Fred Iklé’s 1961 Question, “After
Detection—What?”
by Brad Roberts
In 1961, Fred Iklé in a Foreign Affairs article posed
the fundamental arms control compliance question: “after
detection—what?” This article assesses Iklé’s
article four decades later and adds valuable perspective and insight into
the challenges of contemporary arms control compliance in Iraq, North
Korea, Russia, and elsewhere. It looks at how the compliance problem has
changed and asks whether Iklé’s pessimism about the ability of
international processes to secure arms control compliance by egregious
treaty violators remains valid today.
In an effort to answer these questions, the article begins with an
assessment of the salient differences between 1961, when Iklé
wrote, and 2000 as they relate to the compliance problem. This analysis
chronicles the emergence of a substantial set of political, military, and
economic tools for coping with noncompliance. But it also identifies the
emergence of a set of extant compliance problems that are of genuine
historical significance because they threaten the future viability of the
entire arms control regime. The article then explores the role of the U.N.
Security Council in dealing with these compliance challenges. This is a
role that Iklé hardly anticipated, Roberts notes. The capacity of
the major powers to enforce the treaty regime is emerging as a critical
dimension of their special status in the U.N. system. Roberts concludes
that whether optimism or pessimism is in order hinges on whether those
major powers have enough of a stake in utilizing the arms control regime
to lead them to cooperate on noncompliance challenges that are also
threats to the peace.
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The “Yellow Rain” Controversy: Lessons for Arms Control
Compliance
by Jonathan B. Tucker
In 1981, U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig accused the Soviet Union
of supplying mycotoxins—poisonous compounds synthesized by fungi—to
its Communist allies in Southeast Asia for military use against resistance
forces in Laos and Cambodia. The U.S. allegations implied that the Soviet
Union was violating both the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use in war
of chemical and biological weapons and the 1972 Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention. The United States based its allegations on a variety
of evidence compiled by a task force of analysts from several U.S.
government intelligence agencies. The task force concluded that the
presence in environmental and biomedical samples of mycotoxins in high
concentrations and unusual mixtures suggested that this material—dubbed
“Yellow Rain”—was not of natural origin. A group of
academic scientists proposed an alternative explanation for the material,
arguing that the mycotoxins occurred naturally in Southeast Asia and that
the alleged attacks were actually showers of yellow feces from swarms of
Southeast Asian honeybees. To date, however, the United States has not
retracted its allegations of toxin weapons use.
The article examines in detail the public evidence on which the U.S.
government allegations are based and the alternative explanations offered
by the scientific critics. Beyond describing the historical controversy,
it offers lessons for the process of assessing compliance with arms
control treaties. Also, it recommends evidence-gathering procedures for
allegations of treaty violations and discusses the appropriate burden of
proof that should be met before the international community takes
responsive humanitarian or punitive action.
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Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in
Noncompliance
by Javed Ali
The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War imposed enormous human costs, as each side
sustained hundreds of thousands of casualties as well as economic
devastation. One of the darkest chapters of the war was Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons (CW) against Iran. The use of CW by Iraq, and possibly by
Iran in response, created a number of dangerous precedents that continue
to resonate. From a global perspective, the use of CW demonstrated that
Third World weapons of mass destruction proliferators could potentially
generate significant tactical military and strategic political benefits
from the use of such weapons in conflict.
This article explores the use of CW during the Iran-Iraq War and
assesses the impact of that use on the issue of arms control compliance.
It first describes the legal regime, primarily the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
which existed against the use of CW. Next, it examines the strategic
environment that existed prior to the Iran-Iraq War and sets forth the
motivations, policies, and developments that drove Iraq to forge ahead
with its CW program. It then chronicles the use of CW by Iraq and assesses
the reactions of Iran, Iraq, and the international community to numerous
allegations of CW use by both combatants. The article concludes by
assessing the lessons learned during the Iran-Iraq War and the impact the
war had on the future of arms control and compliance.
[top]
The Soviet Union, Russia, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention
by Michael Moodie
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) opened for signature
in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. The BWC prohibits the development,
production, and stockpiling of biological agents or toxins and bans “weapons,
equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” For 20 years—beginning
almost from the moment Moscow signed the BWC—the Soviet Union
sponsored a clandestine program in violation of these obligations. The
United States and other countries had suspicions regarding the program,
and Washington publicly alleged Soviet noncompliance with the BWC
throughout much of the 1980s. It was not until the defection of a
scientist involved in the program in the late 1980s, however, that the
United States realized the size and scope of the Soviet program and
elevated the question of Soviet noncompliance into a major political
issue. Although some progress was made toward resolution of the problem in
the early days of the new Russian Federation, concerns about the program
remain. At the present time, however, no one either in Washington or
Moscow appears greatly interested in bringing the question to closure.
This article raises several questions regarding how the United States
and other countries should approach the issue of arms control
noncompliance in the future. Those questions relate to the effectiveness
of certain strategies to resolve disputes over noncompliance, the ability
to mobilize the international community, and the gap that sometimes exists
between publicly articulated policy and governmental action.
[top]
Viewpoints
South Korea’s Shifting and Controversial Interest in Spent Fuel
Reprocessing
by Jungmin Kang & H.A. Feiveson
From the beginning of its nuclear power program in the 1970s, the
Republic of Korea (South Korea) has been intermittently interested in the
reprocessing of nuclear-power spent fuel. Such reprocessing would
typically separate the spent fuel into three constituent components: the
unfissioned uranium remaining in the spent fuel, the plutonium produced
during reactor operation, and the highly radioactive fission products and
transuranic elements other than plutonium. The separated plutonium could
then be fabricated into reactor fuel or used to produce a nuclear weapon.
Initially, South Korea’s interest in reprocessing was sparked by the
general worldwide enthusiasm for plutonium breeder reactors, and then soon
afterwards by consideration of reprocessing as a potential route to
nuclear weapons. By the late 1980s, after ending its nuclear weapons
program, South Korea remained interested in reprocessing for its civilian
nuclear power program, focusing on the prospect that plutonium recycling
could reduce dependence on imported uranium. During the 1990s, the South
Korean government remained concerned about energy security but also began
to see reprocessing as a way to address South Korea’s spent fuel
disposal problem. Throughout this entire period, the United States
consistently and effectively opposed all South Korean reprocessing
initiatives on nonproliferation grounds.
After this review of South Korea’s evolving interest in spent fuel
reprocessing, the authors argue that there are alternatives to
reprocessing and recycling that can better achieve uranium savings and
better rationalize spent fuel disposal. They argue that South Korea has
alternatives to reprocessing nuclear-power spent fuels that are better
both from energy security and nonproliferation perspectives.
[top]
Making “No First Use” Work: Bring All WMD Inside the Tent
by Alan Dowty
Both the U.S. policymakers and the arms control community have preferred
to consider nuclear weapons issues separately from chemical and biological
weapons (CBW). From the arms control perspective, dealing separately with
different weapons simplifies already complex negotiations and frees CBW
talks from dependence on progress in the more problematic nuclear sphere.
But these advantages are increasingly illusory. According to the author,
linkages that have developed across categories threaten to stall arms
control progress on all fronts unless they are recognized explicitly and
incorporated into the negotiating process.
The author reviews the history of the stigmatization of genocidal
weapons and proposes that the next logical step in the process of
eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) would be to universalize the
ban against any use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons other than
in response to the use of WMD by another party. He argues that at this
time, it would make sense to proceed by drafting mandatory legal
arrangements rather than by relying on voluntary adherence to
international conventions. Just as the U.N. Security Council declared in
1968 in Resolution 255 that any nuclear attack on a non-nuclear state
would require the Council to come to the aid of the victim, it could
extend this protection to punish any initial nuclear, chemical, or
biological attack in a conventional conflict—i.e., any first use of
WMD. Furthermore, agreements among states could reinforce the “no-first-use”
commitment by requiring appropriate revisions in force structures and
doctrines, that is, reducing these forces to a “minimum deterrence”
role without first-strike capabilities. The universalization of “no
first use” could then serve as a platform for further progress toward
the ultimate goal: the reduction and elimination of all WMD.
[top]
Ending the Production of Highly Enriched Uranium for Naval Reactors
by Chunyan Ma & Frank von Hippel
The proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), as currently
envisioned, would prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons
but would permit production for other military purposes, including the
production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for naval-propulsion-reactor
fuel. Since International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors would be
forbidden to verify military uses of such materials, permitting the
continuation of production for such purposes would create a loophole in
the treaty. The authors therefore propose that the FMCT be broadened to
ban the production of fissile material for all military uses.
They argue that expanding the ban would not cause a disruption in the
fuel supply for U.S., Russian, and British naval reactors designed to use
HEU. There is enough HEU available from nuclear weapons made excess by the
end of the Cold War to fuel such reactors during a transition period of
several decades, they argue. Newly designed naval reactors could be fueled
with low-enriched uranium without significantly reducing their power,
sacrificing the goal of lifetime cores, or significantly increasing the
sizes of reactor compartments.
Also, the authors note that the number of nuclear-powered ships and
submarines has been declining and can be expected to continue to decline
in the future. Nuclear-powered ships are costly, require a huge dedicated
support infrastructure, and can cause serious safety and environmental
problems if that infrastructure breaks down. At the same time, the
endurance and range that can be achieved with non-nuclear, air-independent
propulsion systems is increasing. Nuclear propulsion is not necessary for
countries that do not send their fleets across oceans. For all these
reasons, they conclude that the FMCT should ban production of fissile
material for naval reactors.
[top]
Tamper Detection for Safeguards and Treaty Monitoring: Fantasies,
Realities, and Potentials
by Roger G. Johnston
Tamper detection has an important role to play in domestic nuclear
security and safeguards, as well as in international verification and
treaty monitoring. Unfortunately, ideas about tamper detection often seem
to be based on misconceptions, fuzzy goals, and wishful thinking. Current
tamper detection programs are hampered by these problems among others such
as poor training, limited analysis, vague (or nonexistent) standards, and
unacknowledged vulnerabilities. Better approaches, more sophistication,
improved hardware, and greater understanding are sorely needed for both
current and future applications.
In this viewpoint, the author reviews tamper detection devices,
particularly tags and seals, and then discuss the erroneous beliefs held
by many nuclear security practitioners about the effectiveness of these
devices. Next, he explores the general problems that plague the use of
seals and other tamper devices in the United States and worldwide, and
then looks at specific problems related to the use of tags and seals in
U.S. and Russian material protection, control, and accounting programs and
in the inspection activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. He
concludes with a survey of new tamper detection applications and
recommendations for improving tamper detection both for both domestic
security and international transparency and treaty monitoring. Throughout,
the author argues for a more realistic assessment of the possibilities and
vulnerabilities of tamper detection devices.
[top]
Reports
Downsizing Russia’s Nuclear Warhead Production Infrastructure
by Oleg Bukharin
Over a period of 50 years, the Soviet Union built a giant infrastructure
dedicated to designing, manufacturing, and maintaining nuclear bombs and
warheads for a wide variety of strategic and tactical weapons systems.
Under the conditions of the Soviet economic and political system, this
nuclear weapons production complex developed into a self-sufficient,
vastly redundant, and highly integrated organization, which was managed in
an extremely secretive and centralized fashion.
At present, the complex is managed by the Russian Ministry of Atomic
Energy (Minatom) and consists of 17 research institutes and manufacturing
facilities. The complex remains oversized and is still configured to meet
Cold War requirements. Downsizing the complex is inevitable. The strategic
rationale for maintaining a massive weapons production infrastructure is
long gone. Moreover, the Russian economy cannot support it. The technical
infrastructure of the complex has already contracted owing to aging and
lack of maintenance, while demographic shifts and economic conditions have
shrunk its pool of scientific and technical talent. Russian and Western
interests dictate that the nuclear weapons complex must be made smaller,
safer, and more efficient. To achieve this goal, Russia must design and
implement a strategy of managed downsizing and consolidation of the
weapons complex.
Based on open source information about the Russian nuclear weapons
complex, this report discusses its core missions and associated
infrastructure requirements, reviews recent developments in the complex,
and outlines a long-term strategy for restructuring and consolidating the
Russian nuclear warhead production infrastructure. It touches on problems
related to excess nuclear workers, conversion of nuclear facilities, and
social stability in the closed nuclear cities, and how these factors
affect implementation of any downsizing strategy for the Russian nuclear
weapons complex.
[top]
Rebuilding Bilateral Consensus: Assessing U.S.-China Arms Control
and Nonproliferation Achievements
by Evan S. Medeiros
Shortly after normalization and beginning in the early 1980s, arms
control became a small but increasingly important part of U.S.-China
security relations. Officials from Washington and Beijing began to discuss
a variety of arms control and nonproliferation issues in both multilateral
and bilateral settings. Since then, Washington and Beijing have engaged in
extensive dialogues, extended negotiations, and private consultations.
These formal talks have been complemented by a growing number of contacts
between academic arms control and security specialists from both sides of
the Pacific. As a result of these two tracks, the arms control and
nonproliferation agendas of Washington and Beijing have, in broad terms,
gradually converged in the last two decades. China’s growing
participation in international treaties and agreements, as well as the
expanding coterie of arms control specialists in China, is a testament to
these trends.
To elucidate these positive trends, this report addresses two main
questions: (1) what were the most significant bilateral arms control and
nonproliferation achievements in the last 20 years, and (2) what factors
explain the gradual convergence in national agendas. The first part of
this report categorizes and assesses the arms control and nonproliferation
achievements in Sino-U.S. relations. The second section suggests a variety
of factors facilitating such cooperation. The author then reviews
continuing problems in the execution of U.S.-China arms control and
nonproliferation dialogues. The conclusion seeks to put these past
achievements and current difficulties in the context of the future of
Sino-U.S. security relations.
[top]
Prospects for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
by Scott Parrish
The initiative for a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) now
appears to have come full circle. When it was first proposed in 1993, its
realization appeared improbable, if not utopian. Four years later, in
1997, when the five Central Asian presidents endorsed the concept in the
Almaty Declaration, and the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution
supporting it, the prospects for the establishment of a CANWFZ appeared
solid. In 2001, however, its prospects again look gloomy. Developments
since 1999, including the increased importance of nuclear weapons in
Russian national security policy and the resurgence of regional rivalries
and insurgencies in the Central Asian region, have combined to place the
establishment of a CANWFZ in serious doubt. Although the Central Asian
states have negotiated almost all of a draft treaty establishing a CANWFZ,
they have reached deadlock on a few remaining provisions regarding
possible transit of nuclear weapons through the zone and the relationship
of the CANWFZ treaty to other international agreements. The Central Asian
states have made only minor progress on these issues in the past year, and
the underlying conditions blocking further steps forward seem unlikely to
change in the immediate future. This report reviews the background of the
CANWFZ concept, assesses the major terms of the current draft treaty,
explains the provisions still in dispute, and sets out the parties’
possible next steps.
[top]
Statements of fact and opinion expressed in The Nonproliferation
Review are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors,
the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
The Nonproliferation Review ISSN 1073-6700
Copyright © 2001 by Monterey Institute of International Studies
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