A refereed journal concerned with the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. Featuring viewpoints, articles, and reports on programs, treaties and export controls, terrorism, and the economic and environmental effects of weapons proliferation.

Updated: Jul 13, 2008

Fall/Winter 2001 • Volume 8 • Number 3
Abstracts

Articles

Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons: History, Deterrence, and Arms Control
by Avner Cohen

In April 1948, David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first prime minister, began recruiting East European Jewish scientists to work on unconventional weapons and other projects. A 30-year old epidemiologist and colonel in the Soviet Army named Avraham Marcus Klingberg was among the first recruits. Klingberg became one of Israel's leading scientists in the area of chemical and biological weapons (CBW). He helped found the Israel Institute of Biological Research (IIBR) in Ness Ziona, a dozen miles southeast of Tel Aviv. Decades later in 1983, Klingberg, was secretly arrested, tried, and convicted as a Soviet spy. The subsequent disclosure of the Klingberg espionage case, the impact of the 1991 Gulf War, and revelations about the Iraqi CBW program, have aroused public curiosity and speculation regarding Israeli CBW capabilities. Yet details about Israeli CBW programs--their history, strategic rationale, and technical capabilities--remain shrouded in secrecy.

In this article, Dr. Avner Cohen of the University of Maryland attempts to penetrate the "black box" of the Israeli CBW programs. Using open sources, he recounts the evolution of Israeli attitudes and perceptions of non-conventional weaponry. Cohen traces, decodes, and interprets Israeli history, attitudes, and current capabilities in the area of CBW, especially biological weapons. Cohen examines Israeli CBW policy in the broader context of Israeli defense policy, deterrence, and arms control, vis-à-vis both Iraq and other hostile states in the region. Cohen concludes with a consideration of the Israeli approach to CBW arms control and disarmament, and analyzes how accession to the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention would affect Israeli security and economic interests.
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Management, Abolition, and Nullification: Nuclear Nonproliferation Strategies in the 21st Century
by Robert Ayson

As the 21st century opens, the international community must choose how to address the challenge of nuclear proliferation. Roughly speaking, there are three main strategies available for tackling these challenges. One is the "management" strategy, which relies upon arms control, especially the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The second is the "abolition" strategy, which seeks complete nuclear disarmament. The third is the "nullification" strategy that advocates military counter-measures, such as missile defense, to cancel out the threats that arise from proliferation.

Robert Ayson, of Massey University in New Zealand, analyzes the prospects of these three traditional approaches to nonproliferation, assessing their key successes and failures as well as their current support. Ayson also considers the prospects for mixed strategies, including the potential for cooperation between missile defense advocates, who espouse a variant of the nullification strategy, and disarmament advocates, who seek abolition. Although these approaches seem incompatible, Ayson argues that a close examination reveals potential synergies that deserve further study.
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Limited War and Nuclear Escalation in South Asia
by V.R. Raghavan

The status of India and Pakistan as declared nuclear powers has raised the risks of a nuclear exchange between them, if the two countries engage in a large military conflict. The political leadership in both countries does not seem to fully grasp the implications of nuclear weapons in relation to the ongoing conflict in Kashmir. This conflict, which has triggered three wars in the past, could lead to a limited war between India and Pakistan.

In this article, Lieutenant General V.R. Raghavan (retired), a director at the Dehli Policy Group who served as Indian Director-General of Military Operations from 1992 to 1994, analyzes the potential for a limited Indian-Pakistani war over Kashmir to escalate into a nuclear conflict. Raghavan examines how both India and Pakistan plan to fight such a limited war. His analysis reveals several elements of Indian and Pakistani military and nuclear doctrine that would contribute to the rapid escalation of a limited war into a nuclear conflict. Raghavan concludes that the risk of nuclear escalation has been insufficiently appreciated in both New Dehli and Islamabad, and urges both countries to reexamine their policies and take steps to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation.
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Viewpoints

Multilateralism and the Future of the Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
by Jayantha Dhanapala

Today, many observers of the international scene are at loggerheads over some of the most fundamental principles by which the world is to run--including the principles governing nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. This debate concerns the various ways in which such principles are established and maintained, and can be characterized as a struggle between unilateralism and multilateralism, the two leading approaches available to states in pursuit of their ideals and interests.

In this viewpoint, Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, analyzes the contemporary debate between unilateralists and multilateralists over the importance of international regimes, including the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Dhanapala examines the strengths and shortcomings of both sides of this debate, and argues that if the global nuclear nonproliferation regime is to be maintained, both sides must come to a new realization about the common ground they share. Unilaterialists, Dhanapala contends, must be convinced that progressive nuclear disarmament will reduce external nuclear threats, although they also deserve credit for emphasizing the importance of more effective verification and enforcement measures. Multilateralists, Dhanapala concludes, must realize that norms do not enforce themselves and work harder to ensure that global norms are effectively translated into national policies.
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Thunder in the Air: Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense
by Wei-chin Lee

Military and missile exercises by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1995-96, combined with its frequently threatening military tactics since then, have reinforced Taiwanese insecurity in recent years. Owing to geographic proximity and the constant political tug-of-war over unification and separation between China and Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait is a flashpoint for potential military conflict. It is also a region with a high density of missile deployment. In this context, much recent debate about Taiwanese national security policy has centered on the possible development of a theater missile defense (TMD) system.

Professor Wei-chin Lee of Wake Forest University first provides a brief review of the PRC missile threat to Taiwan. He then outlines the basic elements of a potential Taiwanese TMD system, and reviews the debate over possible TMD deployment currently taking place in Taiwan. Lee analyzes the strategic implications of a potential Taiwanese TMD system in the context of the cross-strait military balance, regional stability in Asia, and the triangular U.S.-Taiwan-China relationship. On balance, Lee concludes that the benefits of TMD for Taiwan would not outweigh its drawbacks, and Taiwan should pursue alternative approaches to address the PRC missile threat.
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New Approaches to Nonproliferation: Supplementing or Supplanting the Regime?
by Phillip C. Saunders

In the view of many in the United States, traditional nonproliferation and arms control policies have failed to adequately address "hard cases" such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, and Pakistan. The result has been a loss of confidence in traditional arms control and nonproliferation measures and a search for new policies that may do a better job in protecting against ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.

Phillip C. Saunders, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, reviews the unilateral nonproliferation and counterproliferation measures including sanctions, missile defenses, and counter-force targeting that are gaining increasing support in Washington as alternatives to traditional arms control. While advocates claim unilateral measures can supplement and reinforce traditional nonproliferation approaches, Saunders points out that aggressive unilateral counterproliferation policies may cause a breakdown in great power cooperation and weaken the broader nonproliferation regime, possibly stimulating vertical and horizontal proliferation. Pointing to such examples as UNSCOM, and multilateral efforts to address North Korean WMD programs, Saunders contends that enhanced great power cooperation would be a more effective alternative to traditional arms control than unilateral measures. He concludes, however, that if other great powers hope to reverse the U.S. trend toward unilateral policies, they will have to make great power cooperation more effective in dealing with the hard cases.
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Reports

Strengthening Nuclear Security Against Terrorists and Thieves Through Better Training
by George Bunn, Fritz Steinhausler, and Lyudmila Zaitseva

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon showed the world that well-organized terrorist groups bent on mass destruction and mass murder are no longer hypothetical. If such terrorists could acquire weapons-usable nuclear material, there can now be little doubt that they would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons. If they could disperse radioactivity across a city by attacking a nuclear reactor with a truck bomb or building a radiation dispersal device, they would very likely do so. Measures taken to secure nuclear materials and nuclear installations must be adequate to meet this threat.

In this report, Professor George Bunn of Stanford University, Professor Fritz Steinhausler of the University of Salzburg in Austria, and Lyudmila Zaitseva of the National Nuclear Center of Kazakhstan review the need to strengthen protection of nuclear materials and nuclear reactors against terrorists and thieves. They examine the need for better training of those charged with protection responsibilities to meet this challenge, suggesting that security practices vary significantly from country to country, possibly giving thieves and terrorists opportunities to steal nuclear material or to sabotage nuclear facilities. To counter these forms of terrorism, the authors argue, increased international cooperation is required to improve protection practices around the world for weapons-usable material and for nuclear facilities. According to the authors, international cooperation should focus on: establishing new legally binding treaty standards for physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities; raising awareness that current national physical protection practices are often inadequate to meet existing threats; and improving the training of both physical protection specialists and policymakers.
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Statements of fact and opinion expressed in The Nonproliferation Review are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

The Nonproliferation Review ISSN 1073-6700
Copyright © 2001 by Monterey Institute of International Studies