Summer 2002 • Volume 9 • Number 2
Abstracts
Special Section on Missile Proliferation
U.S.-DPRK Missile Negotiations
by Gary Samore
Although North Korean WMD programs have long concerned U.S.
policymakers, the North Korean nuclear program has traditionally
dominated U.S. policy. Only after the August 1998 Taepodong-1 test
did missile issues become the main focus of U.S. diplomacy toward
North Korea. The clock ran out on the Clinton administration, however,
before a comprehensive missile deal with North Korea could be completed,
and the Bush administration has adopted a different strategy, seeking
more North Korean concessions while offering fewer inducements for good
behavior.
In this article, Gary Samore, Senior Fellow of the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, London (formerly Senior Director for Non-Proliferation
and Export Controls at the U.S. National Security Council), reviews past and
current U.S. efforts to negotiate limits on the indigenous missile program and
missile exports of North Korea. Samore argues that the Bush administration's
current negotiating stance is unlikely to produce near-term progress on the
missile issue, although North Korea will remain under strong pressure to
extend its current moratorium on long-range missile tests beyond 2003. Without
a comprehensive missile deal, however, North Korean missile exports are likely
to remain a continuing problem, and European countries, Russia, and China
should join the United States in urging restraint on North Korea, Samore concludes.
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The Neglected Dimension: Controlling Cruise Missile Proliferation
by Dennis M. Gormley
Cruise missile proliferation is currently regarded by many as a
second-class threat. Existing treaties and informal export control
regimes--such as the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR)--primarily address the spread of ballistic missile technology and
have done little to counter the spread of cruise missiles. Nevertheless, because
they are accurate, accessible, and relatively inexpensive, cruise missiles
represent a growing threat independent of ballistic missiles.
In this
article, Dennis M. Gormley of the International Institute of Strategic Studies
outlines the factors that have contributed to cruise missile proliferation. He
explains that export controls have not kept pace with rapid technological
expansion. Cruise missiles can be adapted from dual-use technologies ranging
from kit airplanes to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to reconnaissance drones.
This availability, combined with cruise missiles' precise delivery and
ability to evade radar detection, makes them ideal for third-world and sub-state
actors seeking to challenge a U.S.-led coalition with conventional air
superiority. Gormley suggests that the United States consider modest defenses
against off-shore cruise missile launches and advocate strengthened control of
cruise missile technology by the MTCR.
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The Global Control System and the International Code of Conduct: Competition or Cooperation?
by Yuri E. Fedorov
The growing horizontal and vertical proliferation of missiles and
missile technology is among the principal factors shaping the global political
climate and strategic milieu. Because it is closely linked with the spread of
weapons of mass destruction, missile proliferation magnifies the risks of
regional and local conflicts and wars. Consequently, missile proliferation can
be highly damaging to both global and regional strategic stability.
In
this article, Yuri E. Federov of the PIR Center (Moscow, Russia) examines two
leading proposals to enhance the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which
critics contend is not currently adequate to meet the threat of missile
proliferation. Russia has suggested a Global Control System for the
Nonproliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS), while MTCR members
have drafted an International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation (ICoC). Federov analyzes whether the GCS and the ICoC will compete
with or complement each other. He concludes that the proposals could form the
basis for a more effective missile nonproliferation regime, but that even if
fully implemented, they would still not address the full range of factors
driving missile proliferation.
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Layered Defense-Layered Attack: The Missile Race in the Middle East
by Mohamed Kadry Said
The
Middle Eastern political environment in the past ten years has been shaped by
conflicting forces. Although important progress has been made toward improving
regional security through dialogue and conflict resolution, the prevailing
approach to security in the region emphasizes arms acquisition and preparation
for war.
Since the 1957 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars, Middle Eastern
countries have competed in the development of both offensive and defensive
missile systems. In this article, Mohamed Kadry Said, Military and Technical
Advisor at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo,
describes the various factors that have compelled countries in the Middle East
to engage in an arms race--one that has triggered the development of a
layered-attack architecture of long-range missile systems, medium-range
precision-guided munitions, and short-range guided and unguided munitions. Said
concludes that only time will tell whether the search for stability in the
region through nonmilitary means will ultimately bear fruit. For the moment, it
appears that terrorism, war, and weapons proliferation continue to endanger a
vision of peace, stability, and cooperation.
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Missile Issues in South Asia
by Naeem Ahmad Salik
The current standoff between the
two South Asian nuclear rivals, India and Pakistan, underscores the dangerous
missile race in the region. Owing to the geographical contiguity of the two
antagonists, short ballistic missile flight times may leave little time for
decisionmakers to respond during a crisis. In this situation, the proliferation
of short- and medium-range missiles highlights the volatility of the regional
security environment and is justifiably viewed as a destabilizing
element.
India's status as a major missile power puts great
pressure on its main regional rival, Pakistan, to follow suit. In this article,
Naeem Ahmad Salik, a Brigadier in the Pakistan Army and currently Director of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Directorate at the Strategic Plans Division,
Joint Staff Headquarters, traces the development of the Indian and Pakistani
missile programs. Salik argues that while Pakistan has been subject to sanctions
for missile development, testing, and technology transfer, similar Indian
activities have gone virtually unchecked. He contends that efforts to negotiate
a settlement of Indian-Pakistani differences will have better chance for success
if an equitable, evenhanded, and unbiased approach is adopted. He also concludes
that unless the underlying conflicts--such as Kashmir--that divide the
two countries are resolved, the incentives for them to continue their arms race
will remain powerful.
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A Japanese Perspective on Missile Defense and Strategic Coordination
by Ken Jimbo
Since the 1998 Taepodong-1 missile test by North Korea, Japan has moved
toward joint development of missile defenses with the United States. More
recently, U.S. President George W. Bush's policy of modifying the
traditional concept of nuclear deterrence--which
has served as the basis of the U.S.-Japan alliance--to include both
offensive and defensive elements has posed new challenges for Japanese
policymakers. They must carefully consider the implications of working with the
United States on a layered missile defense system that integrates theater and
national missile defenses.
In this article, Ken Jimbo, Research Fellow at
the Japan Institute of International Affairs, explains the history of
U.S.-Japanese collaboration on theater missile defense research. Jimbo outlines
the regional and strategic considerations that have shaped Japanese policy.
While Japan originally supported joint missile defense for political reasons,
since 1998 Japanese policy has become threat driven. Jimbo assesses the economic
and political costs of Japanese participation in the new, layered missile
defense system, and also considers its advantages, including increased
military-technological cooperation with the United States, and possible
bargaining leverage in future negotiations with China. He concludes that the
U.S.-Japan alliance should move forward cautiously with developing shared
ballistic missile defense technology while also seeking to build a new
relationship with China.
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Missile Issues in East Asia
by Zhong Jing
Although the Cold War has been over for a decade, the proliferation of
missiles is producing new instabilities and potential conflicts. Existing export
controls and defenses are not adequate to deal with the threat posed by
missiles. In particular, when equipped with weapons of mass destruction,
missiles can inflict devastating damage. In these circumstances, the acquisition
and development of missiles and missile technology have become a shortcut for
many countries to augment their military power.
As in several other
regions of the world, missile proliferation presents significant risks in East
Asia. Zhong Jing, a fellow at the National Defense University (Beijing, China),
argues that missile proliferation in Northeast Asia poses particular
difficulties. Zhong contends that a number of countries in the
region--including North Korea and Japan--have overt or covert missile
programs. If there is a breakthrough in the acquisition of long-range ballistic
missiles by one country in Northeast Asia, she maintains, other countries are
almost certain to follow. Zhang concludes that a unilateral, confrontational
approach to missile issues in East Asia will prove counterproductive and urges
all concerned countries to adopt a multilateral, cooperative
approach.
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Articles
Missile Defense: More May Be Better--for China
by Wade L. Huntley
When the United States announced plans in December of 2001 to
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in order to pursue an
ambitious missile defense system, the People's Republic of China expressed
strong opposition. Chinese leaders objected to the disregard for multilateral
cooperation demonstrated by the U.S. decision and worried that even theater
missile defenses in East Asia would pose a threat to China's small nuclear
deterrent force.
In this article, Wade L. Huntley of the Institute of
East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, argues--in contrast
to conventional wisdom--that a larger missile
defense system constructed outside the confines of the ABM Treaty may impinge on
Chinese strategic interests less than the limited system the United States
originally favored. China perceives that any ballistic missile defenses will
undermine its ability to use short-range ballistic missiles to deter Taiwanese
independence. Since pursuing the one-China policy is central to the legitimacy
of the ruling regime, a small-scale theater missile defense system is as
threatening to China as a large-scale layered one. But, a more complex system
presents China with possible advantages, since it will consume more U.S.
resources, generate greater international controversy, and be more likely to
drive Russia to seek strategic cooperation with China. Huntley concludes with a
discussion of post-September 11, 2001, scenarios in which construction of an
ambitious missile defense system by the United States would positively impact
Chinese security.
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Transparency and Predictability Measures for U.S. and Russian Strategic Arms Reductions
by Oleg Bukharin & James Doyle
On May 24, 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush and Russian
President Vladimir Putin signed the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive
Reductions. Under this new treaty, the United States and Russia will reduce
their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by nearly two-thirds by
December 31, 2012. Although it has been criticized for lacking verification
measures, the implementation of the Moscow Treaty provides an opportunity for
the development of transparency measures that could build mutual confidence and
provide the basis for more comprehensive future agreements.
This article,
by Oleg Bukharin of Princeton University and James Doyle of Los Alamos National
Laboratory, provides a detailed proposal for the phased implementation of
transparency and monitoring measures that could support the new treaty. Such
measures can provide mutual confidence that nuclear arms reductions are taking
place as declared, serve as building blocks for establishing more comprehensive
transparency and predictability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear posture, and provide
a solid foundation for bilateral cooperation in furthering an improved strategic
relationship.
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Why Do States Rely on Nuclear Weapons? The Case of Russia and Beyond
by Nikolai Sokov
Although nuclear arsenals in
the United States and Russia have continued to shrink, nuclear weapons still
maintain a high profile in the national security policy of both countries,
despite the absence of a systematic superpower confrontation. In addition to
establishing the basis for mutual assured destruction, it has long been
recognized that nuclear weapons can serve to compensate for the weakness of
conventional armed forces. However, despite ongoing economic difficulties in
Russia and new reductions in conventional forces, the Russian government has
adopted a series of decisions to decrease reliance on nuclear weapons.
Conversely, recent U.S. discussions about greater reliance on nuclear weapons
come at a time when U.S. conventional armed forces have reached an unprecedented
level of efficiency.
Nikolai Sokov of the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies seeks to develop an explanatory framework for determining why states
rely on nuclear weapons. Without an answer to this question, observers cannot
predict whether the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy might
increase, nor can they predict under what circumstances it might do so. To this
end, Sokov outlines conditions that favor reliance on nuclear weapons and
delineates issues that require further examination. Sokov concludes that a
better understanding of these conditions can help reduce the probability that
nuclear weapons ever make the transition from virtual to actual instruments of
security.
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Illicit Nuclear Trafficking in the NIS: What's New? What's True?
by William C. Potter & Elena Sokova
Since
the events of September 11, 2001, news reports have suggested that the black
market for nuclear material is far more active than most in the Western
nonproliferation community had believed. Although few of these accounts provide
much concrete information, they have created the impression of a resurgence in
the trafficking of proliferation-significant nuclear material.
This
article by William C. Potter and Elena Sokova of the Center for Nonproliferation
Studies reviews the proliferation-significant cases of illicit nuclear
trafficking involving the former Soviet Union in the past ten years. The authors
compare cases in the 1998-2001 period--which have not yet received adequate
analysis--with those in the 1992-1997 period in an effort to discern
possible trends in illicit nuclear trafficking. They point out a number of
shortcomings with current efforts to collect information about illicit
trafficking, which seriously hamper systematic analysis. They conclude with
recommendations for the sharing and coordination of information and
intelligence, a reassessment of current data, and an improvement in the analysis
of cases involving low-enriched uranium and inventory
discrepancies.
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Viewpoint
Unilateral Security? U.S. Arms Control Policy and Asian-Pacific Security
by Xu Weidi
In the years following the Cold War, U.S. leaders have increasingly
turned away from established arms control agreements in order to pursue a
unilateralist security agenda. This trend has alarmed allies and adversaries
alike and has sparked intense debate about the goals of U.S. foreign policy in
the 21st century.
Colonel Xu Weidi of the National Defense University
(Beijing, China) presents a Chinese view of recent U.S. arms control policy.
Citing evidence such as the 1999 rejection by the U.S. Senate of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the refusal of the Bush administration to
continue negotiations on the Biological Weapons Convention verification
protocol, and U.S. abandonment of detailed arms control agreements in favor of
the brief Treaty of Moscow, Xu traces the evolution of arms control from a
central position in U.S. foreign policy to its current marginalization. He
examines the strategic logic of this change and concludes that it was driven by
the shift in the international power equilibrium in favor of the United States,
technological advances in missile defense research, and the pursuit of a lasting
Pax Americana. Xu argues that U.S. unilateralism has had a negative impact on
U.S. ties with China and North Korea. He concludes that to avoid antagonizing
China and provoking Muslim terrorists, the United States should further its
interests through cooperation with other states in a multipolar international
system.
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Report
Establishing Confident Accounting for Russian Weapons Plutonium
by Thomas W. Wood, Bruce D. Reid, John L. Smoot, & James L. Fuller
U.S.-Russian relations verge on unprecedented levels of cooperation, yet
significant uncertainty remains about Russian weapons-grade plutonium
production. During the last decade, cooperative U.S.-Russian programs have made
considerable progress in strengthening security and accounting systems,
providing secure centralized storage facilities, and planning programs for the
disposition of weapons plutonium. The agreements signed at the May 2002 Moscow
summit secure a continuing commitment to this agenda. Yet the fundamental
question of how much weapons-grade plutonium was produced in Russia remains
shrouded even as concern about terrorist groups underscores the need to
adequately monitor and guard fissile material stockpiles. Ultimately, confident
management and disposition of this material hinges on the development of some
sort of comprehensive transparency regime.
In this report, a team of
authors from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) provides a
detailed examination of a possible method of generating an accurate estimate of
Russian weapons plutonium. Such an estimate would be an essential element of any
meaningful transparency regime, which would demand that all plutonium has been
accounted for and remains either in existing nuclear weapons, in safe storage,
or has been rendered useless for weapons by disposal. The authors describe the
Graphite Isotopic Ratio Method (GIRM), and argue that it can provide such an
estimate. They conclude by suggesting steps that Russian and U.S. scientists
could take to begin the process of estimating Russian weapons plutonium
production using GIRM.
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Review are the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors,
the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, or the Monterey Institute of International Studies.
The Nonproliferation Review ISSN 1073-6700
Copyright © 2002 by Monterey Institute of International Studies