CNS Occasional Papers: #2

A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK

CONCLUSION

During the past 30 years, the DPRK has pursued a steadily expanding ballistic missile development program. This program has been pursued fully in line with its national philosophy of Chu’che and with single-mindedness and determination second only to that devoted to its nuclear program. This is being accomplished, however, at a high cost to both its economy and society as scarce human and natural resources are funneled into the program. These costs are, however, offset to a small degree by the monetary rewards of selling ballistic missiles systems, technologies, and components to other Third World nations. Moreover, the DPRK leadership believes that the possession of ballistic missiles is an essential component in preventing foreign aggression against it and that the international prestige and recognition that its ballistic missile program afford it more than justify the monetary and human costs.

Today, the DPRK fields the largest ballistic missile force in the Third World and possesses nascent SLV and ICBM capabilities. It is arguably also the world’s greatest proliferator of ballistic missile systems, technologies, and components. These proliferation activities provide the DPRK with a large proportion of its foreign trade and are the sole positive component of its ailing economy. Barring momentous domestic or international political developments, the DPRK will continue to pursue its ballistic missile program and sales for the foreseeable future.

 

Notes

(1) Important sources used in the preparation of this paper include: Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Taepo-dong Launch Brings DPRK Missiles Back Into the Spotlight,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10 (October 1998), pp. 30-32; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Koreans Test Two-stage IRBM Over Japan,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 9, 1998, p. 28; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “A Silent Partner,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 20, 1998, pp. 16-17; Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1998 (Seoul: 1999), pp. 66-67; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “N. Korea Set for More Ballistic Missile Tests,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 23, 1996, p. 5; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Special Report Number 3 - North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programme,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 6 (April 1994); Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Ballistic Missiles in Egypt,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 4 (September 1992), pp. 452-458; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Ballistic Missiles in the Third World—Iran’s Medium-Range Missiles,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 4 (April 1992), pp. 147-152; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Afghanistan: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 4 (February 1992), pp. 51-58; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Egypt: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 3 (December 1991), pp. 531-537; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “N. Korea on Way to ‘Decisive’ Weapon,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 12, 1991, p. 653; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Syria’s Acquisition of North Korean SCUDs,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 3 (June 1991), pp. 249-251; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “New Developments in North Korean Missile Programme,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review 2 (July 1990), pp. 343-345. In addition to these published sources, the author received the support of numerous people and organizations who granted interviews and provided valuable information. Due to the nature of their work, these people and organizations have requested anonymity. Wherever information obtained from these sources has been used it is cited as “author interview data” in the footnotes.

(2) Throughout this paper the national designator for a missile system will be used when it is known. With the first use of a national designator the US reporting name, along with common variations, will follow the designator within parentheses. When no national designator is known the US reporting name will be used followed by common variations within parentheses. For a detailed analysis concerning Soviet SAMs and their development see, Steven J. Zaloga, Soviet Air Defence Missiles (London: Publishing Company Ltd., 1989).

(3) Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Korea’s Air Defense Missile Forces,” Defense Asia-Pacific (May 1988), pp. 37-43; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.,“North Korea’s Air Defense Expansion,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 25, 1988, pp. 1289-90.

(4) Defense Intelligence Agency, “USSR Continues Military Aid to North Korea,” Defense Intelligence Digest (June 1963), p. 43.

(5) Sok-hwan Kim , “North Korea Attempted To Dispatch Manpower To Learn Missile Technology From Former Soviet Union in 1963,” Chungang Ilbo, August 29, 1999, <http://english.joongang.co.kr/>.

(6) Author interview data; and US Senate, Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs, Statement of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, October 21, 1997.

(7) Ibid.

(8) Ibid.

(9) It is probable that several 3R9 (FROG-3) artillery rockets were also provided. Such a practice would not be unusual for the Soviets, with the earlier variants being utilized for familiarization and training. A January 1989 statement by Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci indicated that the KPA has nine “FROG 3-5” launchers. Report of the Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to the Congress on the FY 1990/FY 1991 Biennial Budget and FY 1990-94 Defense Programs, January 17, 1989. The Soviet index number and name for the FROG-3 are 3R9 and Luna-2, respectively.

(10) Author interview data; and Benjamin Welles, “North Korean Militancy Linked to 1966 Meeting,” New York Times, February 1, 1968, p. 15.

(11) By 1971 the Korean People’s Navy had four osa-class and 10 komar-class combatants. Defense Intelligence Agency, “North Korean Navy: Compact, Capable, Growing,” Defense Intelligence Digest, November 1971, pp. 4-7.

(12) Defense Intelligence Agency, “North Korean Armed Forces Modernization,” Defense Intelligence Digest, December 1968, pp. 15-16; Defense Intelligence Agency, “North Korea, The USSR, Communist China: Operation Tightrope,” Defense Intelligence Digest, September 1968, pp. 37-40; Department of State, “Arms Suspension: A Big Stick or a Weak Reed,” INR-22, November 12, 1969; and Central Intelligence Agency, “The Threat of the Guided Missile Patrol Boat,” Weekly Review (Special Report), 17 November 1967, p. 4.

(13) It is interesting to note that the PRC never produced the SSC-2b samlet and only deployed it in limited numbers as they believed it was an obsolete system with limited effectiveness. Author interview data.

(14) HQ stands for Hong Qian (“Red Leader”) and SY stands for Shui Ying (“Water Eagle”).

(15) Bradley Hahn, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: Maritime Power—A Political and Economic Weapon?” Combat Craft 3 (January/February 1985), pp. 10-19.

(16) HY stands for Hai Ying (“Sea Eagle”).

(17) For an overview of PRC naval missiles see Bradley Hahn, “China’s Tactical Naval Missiles,” Navy International (June 1988), pp. 308-312.

(18) The Chinese character "Paek" is white, while the Korean "Kom" is bear. Paekkom can also be translated as “Polar Bear.”

(19) Author interview data; Kim Chae-hong, “What is the ‘Yulgok’ Project,” Tong-a Ilbo, April 26, 1993, p. 2, in FBIS-EAS-93-078; Yu Yong-won, “We Too Must Develop a Long Range Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM),” Wolgan Choson, April 1991, pp. 378-93, in FBIS-EAS-91-191; John J. Fialka, “Fighting Dirty: Chemical Weapons Spread in Third World, Pose Challenge to West,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 1988, pp. 1, 26; David C. Isby, “Weapons and Tactics of the Republic of Korea Army,” Jane’s Defence Review 3 (1982), pp. 55-61; Frederick P. Weichel, “The Last to Leave,” Air Defense Magazine (July-September 1982), pp. 31-32; and Pete Roming, “Partners in Defense,” Air Defense Magazine (July-September 1977), pp. 6-9.

(20) For information regarding the Arab use of tactical ballistic missiles during the 1973 War see Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Egypt’s Missile Development,” in William Potter and Harlan Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 23–46; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “The Syrian Missile Threat,” Marine Corps Gazette 69 (January 1985), pp. 54-62; and Saad El-Shazly, The Crossing of the Suez (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1980), pp. 79-80, 198, 268, 309.

(21) DF stands for Dong Feng (“East Wind”).

(22) Author interview data; Steven J. Zaloga, “Luna-M: A Source of Third World Thunder,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 8 (June 1996), pp. 249-253; Gordon Jacobs, “North Korea's Arms Industry: Development and Progress,” Asian Defense Journal (March 1989), pp. 28-35; Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korean Armed Forces Handbook (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, July 1977), pp. 2-13, 2-67 and 2-69; and United Nations Command, United States Forces Korea, United States Army, 1976 Annual Historical Report, HIST-S-77-6, 1977, pp. 50-51.

(23) CEP is a measure of accuracy. It is the radius of a circle drawn around the intended target point in which 50 percent of the rounds fired will impact. The smaller the CEP, the greater the accuracy.

(24) Reaction time is that period of time in which an average missile crew can prepare and launch a missile.

(25) At least one source states that the FROG-6 trainer vehicle consisted of a dummy missile permanently fixed to the launch rail. Author interview data.

(26) Zaloga, “Luna-M,” pp. 249-253.

(27) Author interview data.

(28) Ibid.

(29) Statement of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko.

(30) Ibid. The Soviet chemical warhead for the FROG-7 weighs 436 kg with 216 kg of VX agent. Conference on Disarmament, Information on the Presentation at the Shikhany Military Facility of the Standard Chemical Munitions and of Technology for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons at a Mobile Unit, CD/789, December 16, 1987, pp. 24-26.

(31) Author interview data.

(32) Steven J. Zaloga, “Back-Door BMs: The Proliferation Threat Posed by Converted SAMs,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 11 (April 1, 1999), pp. 51–53; Zaloga, Soviet Air Defence Missiles, pp. 36-109; and Chuck Hansen, US Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1988), pp. 187–189. The Nike-Hercules could use the W-31 nuclear warhead, with yields up to 40 kilotons, in the surface-to-surface role.

(33) Author interview data; Hua Di, “China’s Case: Ballistic Missile Proliferation,” in Potter and Jencks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar, pp. 163-164; Ling Yu, “Latest Development of CPC Missiles and Nuclear Weapons,” Xuang Chiao Ching, November 16, 1993, pp. 16-19, in FBIS-CHI-93-221; and John W. Lewis and Hua Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” International Security 17 (Fall 1992), pp. 5-40.

(34) Wayne S. Kiyosaki, North Korea’s Foreign Relations: The Politics of Accommodation, 1945-1975 (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1976), pp. 102-105; “Kim Il-song Bids US Get Out of Korea,” New York Times, April 20, 1975, p. 26; “North Korea’s Kim Leaves Peking,” New York Times, April 27, 1975, p. 7; and “North Korea Gets Peking’s Support,”New York Times, April 29, 1975, p. 35.

(35) Author interview data.

(36) Author interview data.

(37) The exact date of this reorganization is presently unknown. The 1979 date used here represents the best estimate currently available.

(38) Some HQ-2/SA-2 units undoubtedly retained a secondary surface-to-surface mission.

(39) Due to both monetary and political restraints Egypt was unable to act upon these studies until 1984 when the Badr-2000 program was initiated. Bermudez, “Egypt’s Missile Development,” pp. 23–46; Bermudez, “Ballistic Missiles in Egypt,” pp. 452-458; and US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on Ways and Means, Administration and Enforcement of US Export Control Programs: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., April 18 and May 1, 1991, pp. 134–153.

(40) Hyonmu is a mythical Chinese animal with the body of a turtle and a head of a dragon. The Chinese character “Hyon” is translated as black, while the Chinese character “mu” is weapon.

(41) The United States withdrew its last tactical ballistic missiles from the ROK in 1978 when the 4th Missile Command was deactivated.

(42) Author interview data; Yong-won Yu, “We Too Must Develop a Long Range Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM),” pp. 29-37; “Lance Back in South Korea,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 22, 1986, p. 1203; and “Lance Missiles to South Korea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1987, p. 56.

(43) There is considerable confusion concerning the national designators for the DPRK’s missiles. One defector claims that the first DPRK produced copy of the R-17E is identified as the Hwasong 1, while the No-dong 1 and Taep’o-dong 1 are Hwasong 5 and Hwasong 6, respectively. Another defector identifies the Hwasong 1, 2, and 3 as surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles respectively. Usually reliable non-DPRK sources identify the DPRK produced “Scud B” as Hwasong 5 and the “Scud C” as the Hwasong 6. This paper will use these latter designations.

(44) For a detailed description of the R-17 and its development see Steven J. Zaloga, “Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, Scud and Beyond,” International Defense Review, November 1988, pp. 1423–1427.

(45) There is some debate as to the exact year in which the DPRK received the Scud B missiles from Egypt. This transfer may actually have been a DPRK purchase, or part of an Egyptian barter agreement for DPRK arms and spare parts. Author interview data; “Merchants of Death: How to Curb the Weapons Trade,” Moscow News, November 19, 1990, p. 13; and Yong-chin Nam, “DPRK Advanced Weapons,” Korea Times, February 8, 1991, p. 8, in FBIS-EAS-91-090 (May 9, 1991), pp. 30-32.

(46) Hwasong means Mars.

(47) For details concerning the early Iranian missile program see Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Iran’s Missile Development,” in Potter and Jencks, Missile Bazaar, pp. 47-74.

(48) “Iranian Prime Minister Arrives in North Korea,” Reuters, October 24, 1983.

(49) Author interview data.

(50) Author interview data; Nam, “DPRK Advanced Weapons”; and Yin-taek Yu, “North’s Military Reorganization, Mobilization,” Pukan 6 (June 1985), pp. 132-141, in JPRS-KAR-85-070 (October 31, 1985), pp. 1-9.

(51) Press reports during January 1987 report ROK Defense Minister Lee Ki-Baek as stating that the DPRK had recently conducted a “secret test” of a long-range guided missile. While this suggests a test launch in 1986, subsequent information indicates that Minister Lee was referring to the 1984 tests. Author interview data; “North Korea Deploys Romeo-class Submarine in East Sea: Min. Lee,” Korea Herald, January 29, 1987, p. 1; and “Asia: North Korea Launches Submarine/Tests Missile,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, February 9-15, 1987, p. 2.

(52) Author interview data; “DPRK Developing Improved Scud Missile,” Kyodo, September 20, 1991, in FBIS-EAS-91-183 (September 20, 1991), pp. 2-3; David B. Ottaway, “Egypt Drops Out of Missile Project,” Washington Post, September 20, 1989, p. A32; and David B. Ottaway, “State Department Official Offers No Details on Iraqi Program,” Washington Post, September 20, 1989, p. A32. The latter article indicates it has “a 190-mile [306 km] range and is capable of carrying an 1,100-pound [500 kg] warhead.”

(53) There is some speculation that there is a biological warhead, but this remains unconfirmed.

(54) Nam, “DPRK’s Advanced Weapons Analyzed;” “Measures Against Possible Scud Attack,” Yonhap, April 12, 1991, in FBIS-EAS-91-071; and “Merchants of Death: How to Curb the Weapons Trade.”

(55) Author interview data; and “Measures Against Possible Scud Attack Detailed.”

(56) “N Korea Denies Tehran Reports,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October 19, 1985, p. 857; and Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., “Iraq, Iran Acquiring Chinese-Built Fighters,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 11, 1983, pp. 16-18.

(57) Shehab means “meteor” in Farsi. Author interview data; Pejamn Peyman, “International News: Iran,” UPI, September 18, 1987; “P'yongyang Missile Sale to Tehran Reported,” Washington Times, June 1, 1988, p. A2; John M. Broder, “Five Key Nations Sold Arms to Iran,” Los Angeles Times, January 20, 1988, p. 5; and “Ramadan Interviewed,” Al-Musawwar, May 20, 1988, pp. 20-21, in FBIS-NES-88-100 (May 24, 1988), p. 18.

(58) Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Iraqi Missile Update,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review 2 (July 1990), p. 329; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Seth W. Carus, “Iraq’s al-Husayn Missile Programme, Part II,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review 2 (June 1990), pp. 242-248; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Seth W. Carus, “Iraq’s al-Husayn Missile Programme, Part I,” Jane’s Soviet Intelligence Review 2 (May 1990), pp. 204-209; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Seth W. Carus, “Iran’s Growing Missile Forces,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 23, 1988, pp. 126-131.

(59) For information on Iranian missile chemical warfare capabilities during this period see Farzad Bazoft and Allan George, “Missiles Armed With Chemical Warheads ‘in Sight’,” Observer, March 13, 1988, p. 23.

(60) Author interview data. Some sources suggest that the total number of missiles supplied was less than 25. Others have speculated that the UAE arms purchase agreement was, in part, a covert intelligence operation by the United States to acquire a number of the DPRK’s latest weapons systems.

(61) Author interview data.

(62) Egypt was at the time involved in the Condor II/Vector missile project, which included cooperation with Iraq during certain stages of development.

(63) Author interview data; Chang-uk Chin, “North Korea’s War Preparedness,” Chungang Ilbo, August 20, 1985, p. 3, in JPRS-KAR-86-008 (February 21, 1986), p. 9; “Soviet Base in North Korea,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 21, 1985, p. 612.

(64) US Navy, Current Naval Intelligence Issues (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, March 1987); US House Armed Services Committee, Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, US Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, Before the Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in Intelligence Issues, March 1, 1988; Committee on Appropriations, Statement by General Louis C. Menetrey, US Army, Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command/US Forces Korea, Before the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, May 26, 1988; and Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988). Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence, testified in 1991 that the DPRK produces the Scud B. See US House Armed Services Committee, Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks before the Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, March 7, 1991, p. 47.

(65) “Egypt,” Military Powers 1 (February 1987), p. 73.

(66) HJ stands for Hong Jian (“Red Arrow”) and HN stands for Hong Nu (“Red Cherry”).

(67) Author interview data; Bill Gertz, “N. Korea Building Missiles That Could hit American Forces in Alaska,” Washington Times, October 22, 1997, p. A1; C. W. Lim, “Korea,” AP, August 24, 1993; and “Korea-Defector,” UPI, August 24, 1993.

(68) John Lewis and Hua Di note that, “In practice, the designers were neither told nor supposed to worry about the possible strategic purposes of their missiles. They were simply given the range and payload requirements for striking, sequentially, Japan (DF-2), the Philippines (DF-3), Guam (DF-4), and the continental United States (DF-5). Although their world was essentially technology driven, a strategic retaliatory doctrine was implicit in the target selection….” Lewis and Di, “China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals,” p. 20.

(69) Author interview data; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 10, 1993, pp. 20-22; Barry Schweid, “Washington News: US-Missile Projects,” AP, September 19, 1988; and “US/Allies Seek to Curb Argentine/Brazil/North Korean Missiles,” Defense Daily, September 21, 1988, p. 109.

(70) Author interview data; Bill Gertz, “Pakistan Gets Help with Missile,” Washington Times, September 14, 1998, p. A1; Bill Gertz, “CIA Seeks Missile Data from Defector,” Washington Times, August 27, 1997, p. A1; and Bill Gertz, “Russia Sells Iran Missile Metals Contract Contrary to Official Denials,” Washington Times, October 20, 1997, p. A1.

(71) As with the Hwasong 5, there is some speculation that the Hwasong 6 could also be armed with a biological warhead. This remains unconfirmed.

(72) Author interview data; “DPRK Developing Improved Scud Missile;” Brendon McNally, “Pentagon Seriously Reviews Ability of Patriot to Defeat New N. Korean Scuds,” Inside the Army, August 5, 1991, p. 12; and Steven Emerson, “The Postwar Scud Boom,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 1991, p. A12.

(73) Author interview data; Peter Seidlitz, “Nuclear Threat Increases,” South China Morning News, December 19, 1993, pp. 1, 9, in FBIS-EAS-93-242 (December 20, 1993), p. 42; “P'yongyang Seeks Self-Sufficient Auto Industry,” Naewoe Tongsin, June 10, 1993, pp. D1-D4, in FBIS-EAS-93-145 (June 12, 1993), p. 14; and “North Developing Scud Mobile Launcher,” Yonhap, October 4, 1991, in FBIS-EAS-91-193 (October 4, 1991), p. 19.

(74) Author interview data.

(75) “2nd Sermon on Missile Attacks,” Tehran Domestic News Service, March 11, 1988, in FBIS-NES-88-049 (March 11, 1988), p. 8.

(76) Bermudez, “Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant,” pp. 20-22; “DPRK Developing Improved Scud Missile.”

(77) Bermudez, “Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant,” pp. 20-22; “North Developing Scud Mobile Launcher.”

(78) Author interview data; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Greg Gerardi, “An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing,”Jane’s Intelligence Review 7 (April 1995), pp. 184-191.

(79) Author interview data; David A. Fulghum, “North Korean Forces Suffer Mobility Loss,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 24, 1997, p. 62; “North Developing Scud Mobile Launcher;” and “North Reportedly Expands Scud Unit,” Tong-A Ilbo, August 25, 1991, p. 2, in FBIS-EAS-91-165 (August 26, 1991), pp. 32-33.

(80) “NK Builds Two New Missile Sites,” Digital Chosunilbo, November 21, 1998, <http:// www.chosun.com>; and Dana Priest and Thomas W. Lippman, “N. Korea Expanding Missile Programs,” Washington Post, November 20, 1998, p. A1.

(81) Author interview data; and Fulghum, “North Korean Forces Suffer Mobility Loss,” p. 62.

(82) Author interview data; US Marine Corps, North Korea Country Handbook (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, May 1997), p. 134; and Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea Handbook (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 5-22.

(83) Bill Gertz, “Iran Fired Ballistic Missile,” Washington Times, May 24, 1991, p. A5. For a report suggesting that the contract was for 200 Scud B and Scud C missiles, see Knut Royce, “The Gulf War Briefing: Iran’s Arsenal Worries Analyst,” Newsday, January 30, 1991, p. 16. In October 1991, reports surfaced indicating that the DPRK had exported 20 Scud missiles to Iran and that some of them already had arrived and were fully assembled. See Yong-Sok Chong, “DPRK Scuds Arrive in Iran,” KBS–1, October 13, 1991, in FBIS–EAS–91–199 (October 15, 1991), p. 26.

(84) Gertz, “Iran Fired Ballistic Missile”; and Emerson, “Postwar Scud Boom.”

(85) Bill Gertz, “Stop Arming Mideast, Bush Urges Iran Now Top Threat in Region,” Washington Times, May 30, 1991, p. A1; and Gertz, “Iran Fired Ballistic Missile.”

(86) Author interview data; Barbara Starr, “Iran Gets ‘Scud’ TELs From North Korea,” Jane's Defense Weekly, May 13, 1995, p. 5; Ron Ben-Yishay, “Al-Asad is Also Preparing for War,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, October 29, 1991, in FBIS-TND-91-018 (November 18, 1991), pp. 16-17.

(87) Bill Gertz, “Iran-Syria Deal Revealed as Scuds Near Gulf Ports,” Washington Times, March 10, 1992, p. A3.

(88) Bill Gertz, “Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles,” Washington Times, July 16, 1992, p. A3; and David Hoffman, Washington Post, “Israelis Say Syrians Test-fired New Scud,” August 13, 1992, p. A25.

(89) Michael R. Gordon, “US Says Russians Helped Damascus in a Missile Plan,” New York Times, December 12, 1993, p. A1; and David E. Sanger, “North Korea Buying Old Russian Subs,” New York Times, January 20, 1994, p. A6.

(90) Author interview data; and Barbara Starr, “US Aegis Cruisers Spy on Syrian Missile Launches,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 15, 1997, p. 3.

(91) “Better firepower for Syria's Assad,” US News & World Report, August 5, 1996, p. 20.

(92) Bill Gertz, “North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles,” Washington Times, October 28, 1999, <www.washtimes.com>.

(93) Author interview data; Sid Balman Jr., “US Probes Scud Shipments to Egypt,” UPI, June 21, 1996; “US-Egypt-N Korea,” AP, June 21, 1996; “US Probing Reports of Egypt-N. Korea Deal,” Reuters, June 21, 1996; and Ottaway, “Egypt Drops Out of Missile Project.”

(94) Robert Karniol, “Vietnam Stocking Up 'SCUDs',” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 14, 1999, p. 63.

(95) Author interview data; Gertz, “North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles;” Pyong-Tae Hwang, “North to Develop Missiles With Libya,” Hanguk Ilbo, February 17, 1992, p. 1, in FBIS-EAS-92-032 (February 18, 1992), p. 37; “DPRK Developing Improved Scud Missile;” Bill Gertz, “Libya May Buy N. Korea Missiles,” Washington Times, June 4, 1991, p. A4; and “Qadhafi Financing Syrian Purchase of Scud-C Missile,” Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, January 28–February 3, 1991, p. 2.

(96) Gertz, “North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles.”

(97) Author interview data; “North Korea's Taepodong I Missile Priced at $6 Million,” Korea Times, October 29, 1999 <http://www.korealink.co.kr/times>; and “DPRK Reportedly Asking $6 Million Per Taepo Dong Missile,” Yonhap, October 29, 1999 <http:// www.ytn.co.kr>.

(98) Author interview data; Bermudez, “North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programme”; Central Intelligence Agency, Gordan C. Oehler, National Intelligence Officer for Science, Technology, and Proliferation and Director, Nonproliferation Center, Address to the Annual Soref Symposium of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 27, 1992; Chun-pom Kim, “State of North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Technology,” Chungang Ilbo, March 19,1992, p. 6, in FBIS-EAS-92-055 (March 20, 1992), p. 8; and “North Developing Scud Mobile Launcher.”

(99) Author interview data; and Barbara Starr, “No Dongs May Soon be Nuclear, Warns USN,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 18, 1994, p. 1.

(100) There is continuing debate about the dimensions for this system, with some reliable sources indicating a diameter of 1.25 m, a length of 15.3 m, and a weight of 15 tonnes. Author interview data; and “IRGC Commander Reveals Shahab-3 Missile's Size, Capability,” IRNA, August 4, 1998, World News Connection (FBIS) <http://wnc.fedworld.gov>.

(101) The author thanks Steven J. Zaloga for providing details concerning the development of the R-17E and R-21 and their engines. Author interview data; Vladimir Gubarav, “Miass Missile Center Designer on Industry Development,” Segodnya, January 25, 1995, p. 9, in JPRS-TAC-95-004-L; Bermudez, “North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Programme;” Andrei Kolesnikov, “Russian Scientists Accused of Wanting to Help North Korea Become a Nuclear Power,” Moscow News, April 2, 1993, p. 9, in JPRS-TND-93-O13 (May 10, 1993), pp. 5-7.

(102) Author interview data.

(103) Author interview data; and Bill Gertz, “Pentagon: N. Korea’s Missiles Operational US Forces in Japan Now Within Range,” Washington Times, June 10, 1998, p. A9.

(104) Nick Ludington, “Iran-Korea Missiles,” AP, April 8, 1993; and Ed Blanche, “Iran-Missiles,” AP, February 16, 1993.

(105) Gertz, “Libya May Buy N. Korea Missiles,” p. A4; and “Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful,” Yonhap, June 24, 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-120 (June 24, 1993), p. 19.

(106) Gertz, “Libya May Buy N. Korea Missiles,” p. A4.

(107) Bill Gertz, “General Spotlights N. Korean Threat,” Washington Times, September 15, 1993, p. A6.

(108) Iranians and “other potential buyers” were present at the June 1994 and May 1997 tests of the DPRK AG-1 anti-ship cruise missile. The AG-1 is believed to be based upon the CSS-C-3 seersucker. Author interview data; and Bill Gertz, “N. Korea as Nuclear Exporter?,” Washington Times, June 8, 1994, p. A1.

(109) Author interview data; “North Korea Strengthens Ties With Syria, Iran and Pakistan - Foreign Minister Makes Official Tours,” North Korea News, August 24, 1992, pp. 5-6; “Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam Visits Syria, Iran and Pakistan,” North Korea News, August 10, 1992, p. 5; “Kim Yong-nam Leaves For Syria, Iran, Pakistan,” P'yongyang KCNA, July 27, 1992, in FBIS-EAS-92-145 (July 28, 1992), p. 15; and Lally Weymouth, “In Israel, a New View of Syria,” Washington Post, July 6, 1992, p. A1.

(110) Author interview data; Bermudez and Gerardi, “An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing”; and Gertz, “Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles.”

(111) Agency for National Security Planning, Republic of Korea, NSP Issues Press Release on Hwang's Comments, Press Release, Seoul, May 9, 1997, in FBIS-EAS-97-091.

(112) Author interview data; Seidlitz, “DPRK May Have Several Nuclear Bombs,” pp. 1, 9; “P'yongyang Seeks Self-Sufficient Auto Industry,” pp. D1-D4; and “North Developing Scud Mobile Launcher.”

(113) There may actually be several different versions of decoy vehicles and decoys.

(114) It is interesting to note that from 1978 to 1987, the DPRK imported 156 heavy-duty log-carrier trucks from Nissan Diesel Industries, a subsidiary of Nissan Motors Corp. US intelligence sources stated that a number of these vehicles were subsequently converted into MRLs by the DPRK and deployed along the DMZ. Although there was nothing illegal concerning these Nissan sales, the company announced that henceforth “...we have decided to voluntarily control our sales to the country [the DPRK] and refrain from exporting large-size trucks which can be converted for military use.” Author interview data; John E. Peterson, “Nissan Truck Sales Probed,” Detroit News, June 12, 1987, p. A3; and Daniel Sneider, “Japanese Investigate Use of Trucks Sold to North Korea,” Defense News, June 15, 1988, p. 14.

(115) Author interview data; “P'yongyang Found Constructing 5 Underground Facilities,” Yomiuri Shimbun, January 8, 1999, <http://www. yomiuri.co.jp>; “US Military Detects Underground Bases in DPRK,” NHK, December 8, 1998, in FBIS-EAS-98-342; and “Says Long-range Missile Bases Built,” KBS-1, August 24, 1993, in FBIS-EAS-93-162 (August 24, 1993), p. 23.

(116) In January 1991,General John Tilelli, Commander of US Forces Korea, stated that, “We know that the Nodong missile has come out of [research and development] and is being produced….Whether or not we would categorize it as deployed or not, at this point is difficult to say....We believe they are building them.” See “US Commander Says DPRK's Military Posture Changed Little,” Korea Times, January 29, 1999, <http://www.korealink.co. kr/times>; Bill Gertz, “US Commander Voices 'Concern' Over N. Korea, Fears its Quest for Long-range Nuclear Missiles,” Washington Times, January 27, 1999, <http://www.washtimes.com>; Gertz, “Pentagon: N. Korea’s Missiles Operational US Forces in Japan Now Within Range”; Central Intelligence Agency (Oehler), Address to the Annual Soref Symposium of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and “DPRK Developing Improved Scud Missile.”

(117) Author interview data; “N.K. Building Bases for Scud-C Missiles,” Korea Herald, October 28, 1999; “S. Korea Denies Report North Deploys Missile Units,” Reuters, October 25, 1999; Kwon-hyun Jung “NK Deploys Rodong-1 Missiles,” Choson Ilbo, 24 October 1999; and “N. Korea Deploys 10 More Subs,” Korea Times, October 12, 1999.

(118) Author interview data; Bermudez and Gerardi, “An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing;” and Gertz, “Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles.”

(119) Author interview data; “North Korea Strengthens Ties With Syria, Iran and Pakistan - Foreign Minister Makes Official Tours,” pp. 5-6; “Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam Visits Syria, Iran and Pakistan,” p. 5; “Kim Yong-nam Leaves For Syria, Iran, Pakistan;” and Weymouth, “In Israel, a New View Of Syria.”

(120) Author interview data; Bermudez and Gerardi, “An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing;” and Gertz, “Iran-Bound Mystery Freighter Carried Parts for Missiles.”

(121) “Bhutto Holds News Conference, Departs for DPRK,” Radio Pakistan Network, December 29, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-248 (December 29, 1993), p. 19; “Bhutto Holds News Conference, Departs for DPRK,” Xinhua, December 29, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-248 (December 29,1993), p. 20; “Denies Possible Talks on Missiles,” Radio Pakistan Network, December 26, 1993, in FBIS-NES-93-246 (December 27, 1993), p. 24.

(122) An alternate spelling for Ghauri is Ghuri.

(123) “Foreign Ministry Group Leaves for Iran, Pakistan,” KCNA, March 31, 1994, in FBIS-EAS-94-063 (April 1, 1994), p. 13.

(124) “Science Delegation Leaves for Pakistan 26 Sept,” KCNA, September 26, 1994, in FBIS-EAS-94-187 (September 26, 1994), p. 18.

(125) Author interview data; “Delegation Visiting Pakistan Attends Banquet,” Korean Central Broadcasting Network, November 24, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-227 (November 25, 1995); “Choe Kwang Delegation Meets Pakistani President,” Korean Central Broadcasting Network, November 22, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-226 (November 23, 1995); “Choe Kwang-Led Delegation Arrives in Pakistan,” Korean Central Broadcasting Network, November 20, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-224 (November 21, 1995); and “Military Delegation Leaves for Pakistan,” Korean Central Broadcasting Network, November 19, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-223 (November 20, 1995).

(126) Author interview data. A photograph illustrating the erecting arm of the TEL with the Ghauri upright prior to launch may be found at <http://www.pak.gov.pk /govt/Ghauri.htm>.

(127) Author interview data; and US Department of State, “Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in North Korea and Pakistan,” Federal Register, May 4, 1998.

(128) Ibid.

(129) It first imposed sanctions in August 1993 in response to Pakistan’s acquisition of PRC M-11 ballistic missiles.

(130) US Department of State, “Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against Entities in Iran and North Korea,” Federal Register, June 12, 1996.

(131) “P'yongyang Strongly Denies Reports of ‘An Agreement With Iran for Missile Exports’,” North Korea News, April 26, 1993, p. 5; and Douglas Jehl, “North Koreans Reported Selling Missiles to Iran,” New York Times, April 8, 1993, p. A9.

(132) Stephen J. Hedges and Peter Cary, “The Other Problem in the Persian Gulf,” US News & World Report, November 14, 1994, pp. 87-88.

(133) “Iran's Top Diplomat Visits P'yongyang,” North Korea News, February 7, 1994, p. 4; “North Korean Air Forces Chief Visits Iran,” North Korea News, January 24, 1994, p. 5; and Ed Blanche, “Iran-North Korea,” AP, February 24, 1994.

(134) Author interview data; and Starr, “Iran Gets ‘Scud’ TELs,” p. 5.

(135) Author interview data; Steve Rodan, “Iran Has Problems With Shihab-3,” Middle East News Line, March 1, 1999 <http://www.hania.com/menl.htm>; and Bill Gertz, “Longer Range on Iranian Missile Shehab-4 Could Hit Central Europe,” Washington Times, July 29, 1998, p. A12.

(136) Author interview data; Song-chae Ku, “North Korea’s Exports of Nodong-1 to the Middle East,” Choson Ilbo, July 10, 1993, p. 6, in FBIS-EAS-93-132 (July 13, 1993), p. 22.

(137) Author interview data; Michael Eisenstadt and Azriel Lorber, “Iran’s Recent Missile Test: Assessment and Implications,” Policywatch, Number 303, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 5, 1998; Bill Gertz and Martin Sieff, “Iran’s Missile Test Alarms Clinton,” Washington Times, July 24, 1998, p. A1; Tim Weiner, “Iran Said to Test Missile Able to Hit Israel and Saudis,”New York Times, July 23, 1998; and Bill Gertz, “Iran Tests Medium-Range Missile Weapon, Could Strike Israel, US Troops,” Washington Times, July 23, 1998, p. A1.

(138) Author interview data; Rodan, “Iran Has Problems With Shihab-3;” and James Risen, “C.I.A. Sees a North Korean Missile Threat,” New York Times, February 3, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

(139) Author interview data; “Iranian Defense Minister on Shehab-3 Missile,” IRIB Television, August 5, 1998, in FBIS-NES-98-217 (August 5, 1998); “Further on Khatami’s Visit to Defense Ministry,” IRIB Television, August 1, 1998, in FBIS-NES-98-217 (August 5, 1998); and “Iran’s Khatami on Military Issues, Missiles,” IRIB Television, August 1, 1998, in FBIS-NES-98-217 (August 5, 1998).

(140) Author interview data; and Gertz, “North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles.”

(141) “Better firepower for Syria's Assad,” p. 20.

(142) Author interview data; Bill Gertz, “China Assists Iran, Libya on Missiles,” Washington Times, June 16, 1998, p. A1; Gertz, “N. Korea as Nuclear Exporter?” p. A1; Gertz, “Libya May Buy N. Korean Missiles,” p. A4; Elmar Guseynov, “Scuds Known and Loved in the Gulf,” Izvestiya, November 13, 1993, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV-93-218 (November 15, 1993), p. 27; and Murat Yetkin, “Possible Missile Threat From Middle East Neighbors Detailed,” Turkish Daily News, July 30,1993, pp. 1, 11, in JPRS-TND-93-026 (August 10, 1993).

(143) Starr, “Iran Gets ‘Scud’ TELs,” p. 5; Barbara Starr, “Economics Could Undermine North Korean Capability,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 25, 1994, p. 15; Starr, “No Dongs May Soon be Nuclear, Warns USN,” p. 1; Barbara Starr, “North Korean Missile R&D Gains New Pace," Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 25, 1994, p. 10; Barbara Starr, Paul Beaver, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Korea Grasps at the Stage Beyond Nodong 1,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 19, 1994, p. 18; and Barbara Starr, “N Korea Casts a Longer Shadow With TD-2,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 12, 1994, p. 1.

(144) Ranges for both could be significantly increased with smaller warheads.

(145) Other sources suggest a T'aepo-dong 1 length of 27 m, weight of 22 tonnes carrying a 0.8 tonnes warhead to a range of 2,200 km. Author interview data.

(146) The diameter may be closer to 2.8 m.

(147) Author interview data; Bill Gertz, “China Assists North Korea in Space Launches,” Washington Times, February 23, 1999, p. A1; “Taepodong Missile ‘Does Not Make Technical Sense’,” Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, May 19, 1998 <http://www.jmr.janes.com>; and “North Reportedly Deploying Nodong-1 Missiles,” Kyodo, September 12, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-177 (September 13, 1995).

(148) Although most sources attribute the first sighting of these missiles at Sanum-dong, this would appear to be incorrect. Until a national identifier becomes known, US intelligence usually names a new weapon system after the nearest geographic feature in which it is first sighted. Therefore, if the missiles were first sighted at Sanum-dong, they would have been labeled the “Sanum-dong 1/2.” But since they are, in fact, labeled “Taep’o-dong 1/2” it would appear that they were first identified at Taep’o-dong near the Musudan-ri launch facility.

(149) Author interview data; and Starr, “North Korean Missile R&D Gains New Pace,” p. 10.

(150) Starr, “North Korean Missile R&D Gains New Pace,” p. 10.

(151) Shunji Taoka, “Demonstration of Military Power Will Adversely Affect Negotiations with the United States,” Aera, June 13, 1994, p. 17.

(152) Author interview data. DPRK sources suggest that their space interests date to much earlier. See “DPRK’s Power in Launching Satellite Lauded,” Korean Central Broadcasting Network, October 6, 1998, in FBIS-EAS-98-28 (October 8, 1998).

(153) Given the timing of the various Taep’o-dong sub-programs it is possible that the Taep’o-dong 1 was always intended as an SLV and that the Taep’o-dong 2 is the ICBM component.

(154) Kwangmyongsong is the name Kim Il-song gave Kim Chong-il on his 50th birthday. It is also meant as a slight to the ROK Uribyol satellites. Uribyol means “Our Star.”

(155) Author interview data; and Gertz,“China Assists North Korea in Space Launches,” p. A1.

(156) Author interview data; “P’yongyang Found Constructing 5 Underground Facilities;” “US Military Detects Underground Bases in DPRK;” and “Says Long-range Missile Bases Built.”

(157) Author interview data; Phillip Clark, “Fact and Fiction: North Korea’s Satellite Launch,” Spacelaunch 4, January/February 1999, pp. 39-41; “DPRK’s Power in Launching Satellite Lauded;” and Hae-ch’ol Han, “Common Knowledge About Artificial Satellite,” Nodong Sinmun, September 16, 1998, p. 4, in FBIS-EAS-98-281 (October 8, 1998).

(158) “N. Korea Says It Launched ‘Satellite’,” UPI, September 4, 1998.

(159) “DPRK’s Power in Launching Satellite Lauded;” and Han, “Common Knowledge About Artificial Satellite,” p. 4.

(160) “Kwangmyongsong 1 Moves Round Earth 770 Times,” KCNA, December 8, 1998, in FBIS-EAS-98-342 (December 9, 1998); “KCNA Reports on Awards Given to Satellite Scientists,” KCNA, December 1, 1998, in FBIS-EAS-98-335 (December 2, 1998); and “Satellite Scientists Receive State Citation, Gifts,” Korean Central Broadcasting Network, November 30, 1998, in FBIS-EAS-98-335 (December 1, 1998).

(161) “No Advance Announcement for 2nd Launch,” Asahi Shimbun (on-line version), December 11, 1998, in FBIS-EAS-98-345 (December 11, 1998).

(162) Author interview data; Gertz, “North Korea Continues to Develop Missiles;” David E. Sanger, “North Korea Warns US It Can Launch Another Missile,” New York Times, December 26, 1998, p. A1; “Ground Zero,” Inside Missile Defense, February 10, 1999, p. 1; “Intell Says Taepodong 2 Could Strike Entire US,” Defense Week, January 25, 1999; Central Intelligence Agency, North Korea’s Taepo Dong Launch and Some Implications on the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, speech by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 8, 1998; Gertz, “Pentagon: N. Korea’s Missiles Operational US Forces in Japan Now Within Range,” p. A9; and Central Intelligence Agency, Speech by Robert D. Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 17, 1998.

(163) Ibid.

(164) Ibid.

(165) Author interview data; “Iran Attends DPRK Test,” Iran Brief, September 8, 1998; and “Second Shehab Test Planned,” Iran Brief, February 8, 1998.

(166) Dina Nath Mishra, “The Essence of Intolerance,” Observer, March 30, 1998, p. 1.

(167) Author interview data; “North Korea's Taepodong I Missile Priced at $6 Million;” and “DPRK Reportedly Asking $6 Million Per Taepo Dong Missile.”

(168) Iran is also reported to have acquired BGM-109 tomahawk wreckage from Bosnia. Zvi Barel, “A (Missile) Shot in the Dark,” Ha'aretz, July 31, 1998 <http://www.haaretzdaily.com>.

(169) “Better firepower for Syria's Assad,” p. 20.

(170) Bill Gertz, “Cuba, North Korea Getting Cozy, US Fears,” Washington Times, November 29, 1991, p. A1; and “DPRK-Cuba Contract for Missiles Export Alleged,” Choson Ilbo, March 20, 1991, p. 2, in FBIS-EAS-91-054 (March 20, 1991), p. 23.

(171) Statements of Colonel Joo-hwal Choi and Young-hwan Ko, Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services; Gertz, “N. Korea Building Missiles that Could Hit American Forces Alaska,” p. A1; and “NK Said to Target 200,000 US Casualties: Defector,” Korea Herald, October 22, 1997 <http://www.koreaherald. co.kr>.

(172) DIA, North Korea Handbook, p. 6-80; and US Marine Corps, North Korea Country Handbook, p. A-70.


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