James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

CNS Occasional Papers: #2

The first significant step towards a DPRK missile capability occurred during the latter part of 1960 within the area of surface-to-air missiles (SAM). At that point, a long-term agreement was concluded with the Soviet Union to modernize the DPRK’s military arsenal. This included provisions for delivery of what would be the DPRK’s first missile system, the V–75 Dvina (SA–2a guideline) SAM.(2) This acquisition distinguished the DPRK as the third non–Warsaw Pact country (after the PRC and Cuba) to operationally deploy the SA–2.(3)

In late 1962 or early 1963, the first battalion of SA-2s arrived and was deployed near the capital city of P’yongyang.(4) Included within the SA-2 agreement were provisions for the Soviets to establish a rudimentary capability to assemble, maintain, and test these systems. Delivery of the SA-2s, however, came just as DPRK-Soviet relations began to deteriorate: in late 1962 Moscow suspended all negotiations for future military aid in response to the DPRK’s support for Beijing in the worsening Sino-Soviet split. Despite this suspension, Moscow did honor commitments made in late 1960 for aid to the DPRK through 1964. On at least one occasion during the arms moratorium, the DPRK approached the Soviet Union seeking missile-related assistance. On August 3, 1963, Brigadier General Kang Hyong-su, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) military attaché in Moscow, contacted First Deputy Minister of Defense Andrey A. Grechko to discuss possible cooperation in manpower training and acquisition of missile development technology.(5) The results of this effort are unknown; however, the Soviet arms moratorium continued until 1965 and seriously damaged DPRK-Soviet relations.

During 1965, Premier Kim Il-song laid the basis of the DPRK’s missile infrastructure by establishing the Hamhung Military Academy (a.k.a., Hamhung Defense Academy or Military Academy of Hamhung) to support development of modern weapons, including missiles. The Hamhung Academy was made directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (now Ministry of People’s Armed Forces).(6) In establishing the new organization Kim stated:

If war breaks out, the US and Japan will also be involved. In order to prevent their involvement, we have to be able to produce rockets which fly as far as Japan. Therefore it is the mandate of the Military Academy to nurture those personnel which are able to develop mid- and long-range missiles.(7)

Within the academy, the First Department was the Department of Missile Engines. This department closely studied the German V-1 (Fieseler Fi 103) and V-2 (A4) and Soviet Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG), among other topics. Other departments are believed to include Missile Design (including anti-ship and surface-to-air), Physics (i.e., nuclear), and Chemical (i.e., chemical and biological warfare). Following the DPRK’s capture of the US surveillance ship Pueblo in 1968, P’yongyang feared a retaliatory US attack on its strategic sites and many facilities relocated to isolated parts of the country. The academy was moved to Kanggye, where it became known as the Kanggye Military Academy (a.k.a., National Defense College, Kanggye Defense College, Kanggye Defense Academy, or Military Academy of Kanggye).(8)

Following the removal of Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev from office in October 1964, P’yongyang’s relations with Moscow improved and negotiations for further aid re-opened. Military aid subsequently resumed under agreements made in May 1965 and March 1967. This renewed assistance had considerable impact on missile development within the DPRK, as the Soviets agreed to provide the S-2 Sopka (SSC-2b samlet) coastal-defense cruise missile, P-20 (SS-N-2 styx) anti-ship missile, and the 3R10 Luna-2 (FROG-5) artillery rocket.(9) The first consignment of SSC-2b samlets apparently consisted of two launch batteries, target acquisition radars, and support equipment. US intelligence first observed this consignment in September 1965.(10) Additional SSC-2b deliveries brought the total to eight launchers and 32 missiles that were organized into a single regiment of four batteries. The first SS-N-2 styx probably arrived during 1967-1968 with the delivery of four komar-class fast attack craft.(11) The first FROG-5 transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) probably arrived in 1968.(12)

As with the SA-2s, the Soviets provided training that allowed the DPRK to assemble, test, and maintain SS-N-2 styx and SSC-2b samlets. This training—along with experience gained in producing multiple-rocket launchers (MRL) and operating the FROG-5 and SA-2a—provided the foundation upon which the DPRK subsequently developed an indigenous missile production capability.

PRC Assistance

In the late 1960s, DPRK–Soviet relations began to sour once again. Moscow declined to provide additional missile systems or upgrades for those already delivered, forcing the DPRK to seek other means to modernize its rudimentary assembly and maintenance capabilities. As a result, the DPRK turned to the PRC to facilitate expansion of its missile efforts.

In September 1971, the DPRK signed a wide-ranging military agreement with the PRC for the acquisition, development, and production of modern weapon systems. The agreement included acquisition of PRC missiles, transfer of PRC missile research-and-development technology, and training of DPRK personnel within the PRC. The first tangible result of this cooperation was the PRC’s assistance in reorganizing the Soviet-established assembly and maintenance programs for the SA-2, SS-N-2 styx, and SSC-2b samlet.(13) Interestingly, the Soviet Union continued to provide SS-N-2 styx and SSC-2b samlet missiles during the early 1970s at irregular rates in fulfillment of previous contracts.

Soon after the PRC’s reorganization assistance, the DPRK acquired PRC-produced HQ-1 and HQ-2 (CSA-1) SAMs and SY-1 (CSS-N-1 scrubbrush) anti-ship cruise missiles.(14) The HQ-1 is a PRC reverse-engineered version of the SA-2, the HQ-2 is an enhanced version of the HQ-1 with improved range and guidance, and the SY-1 is a license-produced version of the Soviet SS-N-2 styx. Initial examples of these systems are believed to have been delivered directly from People’s Liberation Army and Navy stocks.(15) During the mid-1970s, the DPRK also began to acquire the HY-1 in both its coastal defense version (CSSC-2 silkworm) and later in its ship-launched version (CSS-N-2 safflower).(16) System deliveries were accompanied by a PRC-supported effort to expand the DPRK’s existing missile programs to include the assembly, upgrade, and eventually the production of both the HQ-2 and HY-1.(17) As the programs developed, this effort proceeded from technical assistance to the provision of complete missile systems, to “knocked-down” kits, and then to sub-assemblies.

The DPRK probably achieved an indigenous HQ-2 and HY-1 production capability sometime during the late 1970s, although it was most likely still heavily dependent on the PRC for critical sub-components.

Establishment of a Ballistic Missile Program

Available evidence strongly suggests that the DPRK initiated a multifaceted ballistic missile program in 1975. One of the primary factors precipitating this move was the establishment of a Republic of Korea (ROK) program to develop a short-range ballistic missile—the Paekkom (“White Bear”).(18) The ROK program was itself a response to the threat posed by the DPRK’s FROG-5 capability—P’yongyang could strike Seoul but the ROK had no missile system capable of reaching P’yongyang. The Paekkom prototype was developed from the US-supplied Nike-Hercules SAM and was first successfully flight tested on September 26, 1978. Paekkom, however, never entered production due to political pressure from the United States, which feared it would lead to an escalation of tension and an arms race in the region.(19)

Aside from the Paekkom program, factors that contributed to the DPRK’s decision to establish a ballistic missile program included: the continued instability in DPRK-Soviet relations and the Soviet refusal to provide additional missiles and FROG-5 rockets; the solidification of the internal situation within the DPRK as embodied in Chu’che (self-reliance) and the national military policies of “Fortress Korea” and “Four Military Lines”; the growing military and economic strength of the ROK; and the Egyptian and Syrian use of tactical ballistic, coastal-defense, and anti-ship cruise missiles during the October 1973 War.(20)

As best as can be presently determined, the ballistic missile program established by the DPRK in 1975 consisted of three discrete though concurrent efforts—FROG-5/6/7, HQ-2, and the DF-61.(21) The intent appears to have been for the FROG and HQ-2 (in a surface-to-surface role) to provide a modest, near-term improvement in ballistic missile capabilities, while the DF-61 would provide a highly capable, short-range ballistic missile in the longer term. The DF-61 program was the primary effort; the FROG and HQ-2 programs provided the “fall-back” position. Because information concerning this period is especially scarce, many of the details concerning the FROG and HQ-2 programs presented in the following sections should be considered tentative.

FROG-5 (Luna-2) and FROG-7B (Luna-M)

As part of the military assistance agreements concluded with the Soviet Union in 1965 and 1967, the DPRK received approximately 27 to 63 FROG-5 (3R10 Luna-2) artillery rockets, nine TELs, and associated equipment. The weapon systems were delivered in 1968, along with approximately 12 FROG-6 trainer vehicles. Although numerous sources indicate that the DPRK also received a number of 3R9 (FROG-3) rockets, this has yet to be confirmed.(22) The Soviet Union may have provided a small number of these rockets for training or, alternatively, the similar appearance of the 3R9 and 3R10 may be a source of confusion.

The FROG-5 consists of a transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) based upon the PT-76 chassis and the 3R10 artillery rocket. The 3R10 is a solid-fuel, unguided, spin-stabilized rocket with a maximum range of 55 km and a 408-kg high-explosive (HE) warhead (the Soviet Union provided only HE warheads). It has a circular error probable (CEP) of approximately 880 m at a range of 40 km.(23) Reaction time from arrival at a pre-surveyed site is 15 to 30 minutes.(24) Associated equipment includes a ZIL-157V rocket transloader, K-51 crane, and a RVS-1 Malakhit (bread bin) meteorological data receiver. The FROG-6 is a training system with a non-operational dummy rocket and launch rail that is mounted on a modified ZIL-157 wheeled vehicle.(25)

The FROG-5s were initially organized into three battalions subordinate to the Artillery Command and deployed near P’yongyang, within the III Corps. Each battalion had three TELs, approximately 167 personnel, and was organized into a headquarters and three firing batteries. Headquarters consisted of a small staff; technical, communications, and rear services platoons; and meteorological and survey sections. Each firing battery consisted of a launcher section with one TEL. During this period, the standard Soviet organization for a FROG battalion called for meteorological and survey sections to be included in each launch battery. It appears, however, that since radars were in short supply, the KPA may have established meteorological and survey sections within the battalion headquarters, or independent target-acquisition batteries that served both the FROG battalions and multiple-rocket-launcher units.

This structure did not change until the late 1980s. At that time, each firing battery added an air defense section and the RMS-1 (end tray) may have replaced the bread bin meteorological data receiver.

With the establishment of a ballistic missile program, it appears that P’yongyang made a decision to enhance and expand the FROG force. This effort is believed to have consisted of three sub-components: acquisition of the 9M21E Luna-M (FROG-7B) or, failing that, additional FROG-5s; reverse-engineering the FROG-5 and possibly the FROG-7B; and development of chemical warheads for the systems.

Due to the poor state of relations between Moscow and P’yongyang, the DPRK was not able to secure the FROG-7B directly from the Soviet Union. Attempts to acquire the FROG-7B were therefore limited to those countries that had previously received the system from the Soviet Union; were on good terms with the DPRK; and were willing to incur Moscow’s displeasure by selling or transferring the systems to the DPRK. At the time only a few countries met all of those conditions, including Egypt, Romania, and Syria.

As a result of the precipitous decline in Egyptian-Soviet relations and in return for the DPRK’s assistance during the October 1973 War, Egypt’s President Anwar el Sadat transferred a small number of Soviet-supplied FROG-7B TELs and rockets to the DPRK and agreed to cooperate in the field of missile development. This transaction may have been repayment for DPRK assistance during the 1973 War, or for spare parts and weapons acquired after the war. Approximately 24 to 56 9M21E Luna-M (FROG-7B) rockets, six to eight TELs, and six to eight rocket transporter vehicles were delivered in 1975 and 1976. Syria may have been involved in this particular transfer or Damascus may have, in a separate move, provided a small number of its own FROG-7B rockets. This, however, remains unconfirmed.(27)

The FROG-7B consisted of a new TEL (based upon the Soviet eight-wheeled ZIL-135LM vehicle) and the 9M21E artillery rocket. Like the 3R10, the 9M21E is a solid-fuel, unguided, spin-stabilized rocket. However, it has a longer maximum range (65 km) and a larger HE warhead (450 kg) than its 3R10 predecessor. Reaction time from arrival at a pre-surveyed site is 15 to 30 minutes.

Upon arrival in the DPRK, these systems were organized into two battalions subordinate to the Artillery Command that were modeled on those of the existing FROG-5 battalions. Possible differences include two instead of three firing batteries (each with two TELs) and the end tray radar may have been substituted for the bread bin meteorological data receiver in the meteorological section.(28)

Following receipt of the Egyptian FROG-7Bs, the program to reverse-engineer or acquire additional FROG-5s was probably refocused to the FROG-7B. Defectors report that by the end of the 1970s, the DPRK was producing a reverse-engineered FROG (presumably the FROG-7B) at the January 18th Machine Factory in P’yongyang, P’yongyang-si.(29) Numbers produced and the length of the production run are unknown. It is probable, however, that low-rate production continued at least into the mid-1980s.

The Soviets provided only HE warheads for the FROG-5s transferred to the DPRK. Similarly, the FROG-7Bs provided to Egypt (and subsequently to the DPRK) had only HE warheads. However the DPRK was apparently successful in developing chemical warheads for both the FROG-5 and FROG-7B.(30)

HQ-2/SA-2 Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM)

The DPRK “mirrored” the ROK’s Paekkom program (which developed a ballistic missile from the Nike-Hercules SAM) by either assigning the surface-to-surface mission to a small number of its HQ-2/SA-2 units, or by establishing a project to develop a dedicated SSM version of the HQ-2/SA-2. It is conceivable that both paths were pursued for a short time.(31)

Almost all early Soviet (e.g., SA-2, SA-3, and SA-5) and US (e.g., Nike-Hercules) SAMs were designed with the capability to conduct surface-to-surface fires as a secondary mission.(32) SAMs employed in this role generally have their fuzing systems changed, self-destruct sub-systems deactivated, and the timer for thrust termination reset. Once launched, they are actively guided to a specific point in the sky and then allowed to fly a ballistic path to their ground targets. In this role, the missiles have surprisingly good range (for example an HQ-2/SA-2 has a range of approximately 150 to 200 km, compared to the FROG-7B’s 65 km). Because of their small HE charge and fragmentation rather than blast warheads (190 kg in the SA-2, compared to the FROG-7B’s 420 to 457 kg) they have limited destructive effect, however. The KPA’s rudimentary target acquisition capabilities did not diminish the HQ-2/SA-2’s potential as a surface-to-surface weapon, since its likely mission was to attack high-value fixed targets (e.g., Seoul, airfields, radar installations, etc.).

DF-61(33)

The DF-61 program was the primary—and most sophisticated—component of the DPRK’s early ballistic missile program. At Mao Zedong’s invitation, Kim Il-song traveled to Beijing in April 1975. Beijing saw the visit as an opportunity to continue its policy of pulling the DPRK away from the Soviet orbit, while P’yongyang saw the trip as an opportunity to elicit greater PRC political and military support for its struggle against the ROK.(34) During this nine-day state visit, DPRK Defense Minister O Jin-u asked if the PRC could equip the KPA with short-range ballistic missiles. The PRC did not have such missiles in its arsenal but the request coincided with internal interests, and later that year the PRC initiated feasibility studies on tactical ballistic missile development. The following year, General Chen Xilian from the PRC’s Central Military Commission authorized a full-scale development project for a liquid-fuelled tactical ballistic missile to be designated the DF-61.

Two versions of the DF-61 were intended for production—domestic and export (i.e., for the DPRK). The export version was designed with a 600-km range and a 1,000-kg conventional warhead, while the domestic version was to have a 1,000-km range with a 500-kg nuclear warhead. The 600-km range was an important requirement for the DPRK: it would provide the capability to strike targets anywhere within the ROK, including the southernmost island of Cheju-do. Conventional warheads considered for the export DF-61 included high explosive, fuel-air explosive, and cluster. Sub-munitions for the latter warhead were given varying aerodynamic properties; once the ballistic windshield was released, the sub-munitions would all travel with slightly different trajectories. Guidance was to be provided by a new, PRC-developed inertial strap-down system (CEP is currently unknown). The liquid rocket engine relied on a high-pressure turbo pump, but the fuel itself was not pressurized. The production missile was to be approximately 9 m in length, 1 m in diameter, and constructed with a relatively thick-gauge steel skin (this would allow the DF-61 to be transported without fear of damage—a requirement for both the PRC and the DPRK).

Development of the DF-61 progressed for approximately one year; then, for internal PRC political reasons, it was suspended. In 1978 the project was cancelled after General Chen Xilian was removed from office.

The extent to which the DPRK was involved in the design of the DF-61 is unknown. A small number of DPRK personnel were apparently allowed access to the PRC design bureau and were kept abreast of most DF-61 developments. Possible exceptions to this access were in the areas of guidance system and warhead (especially nuclear) development.

Other Missile Systems

The DPRK was involved in a number of smaller missile-related projects during this period. In 1975, P’yongyang began to manufacture a reverse-engineered version of the Soviet PUR-61 Shmel (AT-1 snapper) anti-tank guided missile (ATGM). This development is regarded by some as the first missile system in the DPRK to be totally manufactured with indigenous components.(35) During 1974, both the DPRK and the PRC are believed to have acquired examples of the Soviet PUR-64 Malyutka (AT-3 sagger) ATGM and 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 grail) SAM from Egypt. These systems were subsequently reverse-engineered by the DPRK and placed in service with the KPA in the late 1970s.(36)

Continue on to the First Ballistic Missiles.
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