James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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CNS Occasional Papers: #2

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has pursued a ballistic missile capability for over 30 years. In the late 1970s, the missile program became a national priority equal to that of the nuclear program; consequently, over the past decade it has achieved consistent progress and a number of successes despite economic collapse and famine. Today, P’yongyang fields the largest ballistic missile force in the Third World—comprising some 36 launchers and 700 missiles—and stands on the verge of deploying ballistic missiles that could threaten the continental United States. This is an ominous development since there is little doubt that the DPRK perceives the ballistic missile to be the delivery system of choice for nuclear weapons.(1)

The DPRK not only builds ballistic missiles but sells them as well. Twenty years of success in marketing complete systems, components, and production technologies have established P’yongyang as the world’s leading ballistic missile proliferator. The DPRK has exported missiles or missile technology to a range of countries including Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. These exports make a significant contribution to the capabilities and development programs of the receiving states and serve to increase tension in regions already characterized by political and military instability.

The most impressive attribute of the DPRK’s missile program is the speed at which it has grown, particularly the rapid expansion of capabilities over the last decade. Given the known levels of science, technology, and industrial infrastructure within the DPRK, it is difficult to believe that it has reached such an advanced status of missile proficiency (especially in the areas of guidance and engines) without significant external assistance. The questions then become “Who provided this assistance and when?” and “What was the nature of the assistance?” Although a complete picture remains elusive, what is known is that the DPRK has: (1) engaged in missile technology exchanges with Egypt, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and possibly Iraq; (2) both openly and covertly obtained—and is continually seeking to obtain—ballistic missile technologies, components, and materials from Europe, Japan, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC); and (3) over the years, acquired the services of small numbers of foreign missile designers, engineers, and specialists. Indeed, the DPRK’s acquisition of missile services may be a key—though difficult to quantify—factor in its missile success. That said, it would be imprudent to underestimate the dedication and abilities of the DPRK’s own missile designers, engineers, and specialists. The ballistic missile program has long been a national development priority and has consistently received the high level of resources and attention that this designation implies.

This paper details the roots and history of P’yongyang’s ballistic missile program. It traces the distinct chronological stages of the DPRK’s development effort, moving from artillery rockets, to short-range ballistic missiles, to medium-range ballistic missiles, and finally to longer range systems. The analysis incorporates discussions of DPRK missile exports, as well as development of other systems relevant to the ballistic missile program.

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