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Nonproliferation Regimes At Risk

CROSS-CUTTING CHALLENGES TO THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES

by Michael Barletta

Fourteen members of the Monterey Nonproliferation Strategy Group met at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies for the Groups inaugural meeting, July 5-7, 1999.

Members reviewed the findings and policy options detailed in briefing papers prepared for the meeting (and reproduced in the preceding sections of this occasional paper) on the NPT, BWC, CWC, and MTCR, and on regional challenges to these regimes in Russia and the NIS, the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia. They examined these topics through not-for-attribution discussions in which members participated as individuals rather than as institutional or national representatives.

This summary report was prepared by Strategy Group coordinator Michael Barletta, who sought to capture the sense of the members deliberations but is alone responsible for their specific expression here. This report does not necessarily reflect the opinions of the group as a whole or of its individual members.

MEETING PARTICIPANTS

Strategy Group Members
Ambassador Serguei Batsanov, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Mr. Joseph Cirincione, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Mme. Thérèse Delpech, Atomic Energy Commission, France
Dr. Lewis Dunn, Science Applications International Corporation
Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, Embassy of Sweden
Dr. Robert Gallucci, Georgetown University
Dr. Neil Joeck, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Ms. Rebecca Johnson, The Acronym Institute
Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Dr. William C. Potter, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Dr. Amy Sands, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Dr. Larry Scheinman, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Dr. Dean Wilkening, Stanford University
Dr. Christine Wing, Ford Foundation

Strategy Group Coordinator
Mr. Michael Barletta, Monterey Institute of International Studies

Discussion Paper Authors
Mr. Timothy V. McCarthy, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Mr. Evan S. Medeiros, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Dr. Clay Moltz, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Mr. Tariq Rauf, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Mr. Amin Tarzi, Monterey Institute of International Studies
Dr. Jonathan B. Tucker, Monterey Institute of International Studies

The long-term viability of the major nonproliferation regimes is at risk. Review of the state of health of the NPT, the BWC, the CWC, and the MTCR indicates that these regimes face dozens of challenges, many potentially quite serious in nature. During the next six to eighteen months, the nonproliferation community can expect few if any positive developments. We must instead brace for a series of upcoming events and probable developments that may constitute turning points toward rapid deterioration of the regimes. This coming period will require effective nonproliferation crisis management, as the most likely "surprises" in the near term are apt to be unfortunate ones.

Iraq and the DPRKand to a lesser degree India, Iran, and Pakistanpose near-term proliferation threats. Less obviously, some states routinely presumed reliable adherents to nonproliferation regimes, notably Egypt and Japan, may come to reconsider their commitments to the NPT. Of particular concern, several possible factors might initiate a "chain reaction" in Asia that could culminate in a sudden shift in Japans position on nuclear nonproliferation.

Looming challenges to nonproliferation regimes would best be addressed through proactive and creative leadership. There are scant grounds for optimism, however, that the European Community, Russia, the United States, or other potential international leaders will undertake any major initiatives in the near future. In addition to very low expectations for leadership during the next two years, in significant ways Russian and US policies are actually undermining the nonproliferation regimes that the United States and Soviet Union were instrumental in creating.

Experts disagree whether missile defenses offer a sound basis for sustaining nonproliferation, or for addressing regional security challenges to the regimes. However, most concur that the prospective and actual development of missile defenses will likely have significant, unintended, and in some cases negative consequences for nonproliferation regimes.

The CWC appears relatively less endangered than the other three regimes. The grounds for this evaluation are based, however, less on the strength of the CWC than on the weaknesses increasingly evident in the other nonproliferation regimes.

CROSS-CUTTING CHALLENGES TO NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES

Systematic examination of the diverse challenges to the nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile nonproliferation regimes reveals that although manifested in different ways and degrees of severity, most types of challenges are common to all the regimes. None enjoys universal adherence or compliance. All are of limited efficacy in meeting their established goals, yet it remains uncertain whether even the complete fulfillment of their objectives would be sufficient to sustain nonproliferation.

Moreover, security and political imperatives overshadow the influence of nonproliferation regimes in key regions of the world, while exogenous national and international developments have significant negative consequences for the regimes. Linkages between sensitive technologies, nonproliferation regimes, and conflict-ridden regions create vicious cycles in which progress toward one nonproliferation goal may undermine prospects for success in another. Despite the evident need to address the full diversity and gravity of these challenges to nonproliferation regimes, meager political will among potential leaders of the international community, as well as disagreement regarding tactics, strategies, and goals, hinders the international cooperation that is necessary to sustain the regimes.

The remainder of this summary report considers these overarching challenges in further detail, as they are manifest across the nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile regimes.

Universality

Although it is the most widely subscribed security treaty in history, even the NPT is bedeviled by four holdouts: Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan. In terms of the total number and of the importance of some states that have not signed and ratified the CWC and BWC, these regimes remain even farther from enjoying universal adherence. Limited membership is inherent to the MTCR as an arrangement among leading suppliers, but the refusal of some important suppliers to participate fully likewise limits the scope of its contribution to missile nonproliferation.

Efficacy

The efficacy of nonproliferation regimes in meeting their stated objectiveseither among states party to the regimes or with regard to targets of the regimesare challenged by problems related to compliance, verification, resources, and organization.

The linchpin of nonproliferation regimes, the NPT, is at risk of becoming a "hollow" regime insofar as it proves unable to resolve the challenge posed by defiant proliferants and treaty violators, notably Iraq and the DPRK, or to contribute to the disarmament of the nuclear weapon states. Similarly, nagging questions about Russian compliance with the BWC, due to inadequate transparency regarding current operations of former biological weapon facilities, cast doubt on the regimes efficacy. The expulsion of UNSCOM inspectors charged with verifying Iraqs biological and chemical disarmament undermines the effectiveness of the BWC. The lack of adequate international or national enforcement of the MTCR similarly undermines its efficacy.

Without universal acceptance and full implementation of the IAEAs 93+2 program of enhanced nuclear safeguards, considerable doubt will remain as to the ability of the agency to verify state parties compliance with the NPT. Negotiations to conclude a BWC protocol on verification show no promise of early conclusion, and it is unclear whether negotiating parties will grant access sufficient to justify confidence that the regime can be verified. Challenges to the verification of the CWC range from incomplete reporting by national authorities to national security and commercial exemptions unilaterally decreed by some member states. Lacking an implementing agency, the MTCR lacks any verification capability beyond that provided ad hoc by member states.

Resource constraints plague international efforts to support nonproliferation regimes. Despite increasingly demanding responsibilities, notably with regard to undeclared nuclear facilities, the IAEAs budget has remained consistently inadequate. US-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction programs to address Soviet nuclear legacies are likewise under-funded. Insufficient resources are a primary reason why Russia will almost certainly fall short of fulfilling its commitment to destroy chemical weapon munitions according to the schedule set for CWC implementation.

Organizational factors are one source of the incapacity of the NPT review process to fulfill states parties expectations that it would contribute to nonproliferation and disarmament. The OPCWs organizational culture of secrecy may be detrimental to the regime, insofar as it complicates judgments regarding compliance by member states. The lack of international legal obligations and inconsistent criteria for membership limit the MTCRs effectiveness.

Adequacy

Some extant challenges to nonproliferation regimes fall outside their scope or cast doubt on their fundamental principles. The ongoing diffusion of sensitive nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile technologies makes it increasingly difficult to sustain international cooperation, creates new types of proliferation threats, and may allow ever more actors to circumvent the regimes. Normative deficits imperil nuclear and especially missile nonproliferation, while the allure of weapons of mass destruction continues to motivate some actors to reject or subvert the regimes.

Denying proliferation-relevant technologies is increasingly problematic due to the commercially driven diffusion of dual-use technologies. The uncertain security of fissile materials produced by the Soviet Union calls into question a fundamental assumption underpinning international safeguards: that access to fissile material is the primary hurdle to nuclear weapon capability. Commercial interests in biotechnologyand technological develop-ments that constitute a veritable revolution in the fieldreduce confidence that a reliable control regime can be established, even as they create the possibility of biological weapons of greater utility for military and terrorist use. The latter threats may include, for example, "innovative" attacks on agriculture. The pace, scope, and sophistication of missile proliferation appears to be simply outstripping the MTCR, with eight states in the Middle East region alone currently deploying Scud-B or even longer-range ballistic missiles.

Disintegration of the military-industrial complex of the former Soviet Union, Russias deep economic crisis, and the ensuing risk of a "brain drain" of nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile knowledge and technologies to potential proliferants, constitutes a background threat of uncertain proportions and no obvious remedy.

The nonproliferation regimes lack sufficiently strong norms against weapons of mass destruction. This normative deficit is manifest both in relatively weak opposition to WMD acquisition and to a lesser degree to WMD use, as well as by the enduring international allure of nuclear weapons and especially ballistic missiles. Tepid international response to the South Asian tests both reflected and further contributed to the weakness of the norm against nuclear proliferation, while the slow implementation of the NPT by parties to the treaty limits the regimes legitimacy. Continued reliance by the P-5 on nuclear weapons to assure their security, as well as renewed US interest in the military utility of nuclear weapons to confront biological and chemical weapon threats and Russian interest in tactical nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional military shortfalls, demonstrate that some leading states believe their possession is both licit and wise.

International norms against the use of chemical and biological weapons are certainly stronger, though of unclear potency in curbing their acquisition. However, the international normative context of missile proliferation is unfavorable to nonproliferation regimes: ballistic and cruise missiles are commonplace and almost universally accepted components of advanced arsenals and military conflict. Even within the regime, working definitions of missiles and missile-relevant technologies are problematic. For those outside of the MTCR, its "cartel" nature creates, moreover, perceptions that the regime is discriminatory and thus illegitimate.

Regional Imperatives and Regime Linkages

In at least two senses, regional dynamics "trump" nonproliferation regimes. First, security and political factors outweigh the influence of global regimes in East Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, and arguably Europe. Second, nonproliferation policies and security arrangements designed to address particular regional circumstances may undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the regimes in other contexts or at the global level. Linkages between types of proliferation within regional contexts, as well as exogenous developments, compound these challenges. Despite the nonproliferation regimes contributions to global security, resolving the challenges to the regimes that result from regional dynamics will require a clear understanding of the security needs and other considerations that motivate states within the regions.

To date, the NPT regime lacks a fully credible response to nuclear proliferation challenges emerging in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and South Asia. Most immediately, the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia were driven by regional security and political causes, but their ensuing consequences may unfold in the Middle East, the NPT review process, and the UN Security Council. International perceptions of positive or negative changes in status afforded India and Pakistan will be particularly important in determining the cumulative impact of the weapons tests. In the Middle East, Israels possession of nuclear weapons may lead to an intense near-term challenge if Egypt seeks to use it to block agreement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Causal linkages among nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile proliferation also afflict the region, such that efforts to promote nonproliferation in any one area may unintentionally encourage another form of WMD proliferation. Missile arms races in all three of these regions indicate the extent to which negative regional dynamics overshadow the positive contributions that nonproliferation regimes can make in promoting national and international security.

With regard to policy responses, the United States-DPRK Agreed Framework exemplifies the tough challenge of devising measures that can work within a regional context without setting precedents that undermine nonproliferation regimes. Less obviously, compromises on the implementation of verification provisions of the CWC that may be made to meet certain national and regional demands could well have negative consequences in other contexts, and for standards and expectations that will be established for the BWC.

While linkages between regions, regimes, and types of proliferation are evident, they are difficult to grasp analytically and even harder to address through consistent, integrated policy. The most important and ironic example is that the success of the nuclear nonproliferation regime may provide incentives for states to seek biological and chemical alternatives. Arguably at least, difficulties in strengthening nonproliferation regimes may be traced to the stalemate on efforts to negotiate measures toward disarmament in the UN Conference on Disarmament. And as noted above, successfully addressing one type of proliferation in the Middle East, and thus shoring up one nonproliferation regime, may unwittingly exacerbate pressures for the acquisition of alternative weapons of mass destruction. Hopes that all challenges in this or other key regions could be resolved simultaneously, however, remain dim.

Finally, exogenous events and trends affect the nonproliferation regimes. For example, Russian economic problems and NATOs recent conflict with Yugoslavia are among the factors undermining US-Russian cooperation on nonproliferation. These types of challenges cannot be addressed by the regimes, but their consequences must be mitigated.

Insufficient Political Will

Scant political will and inconstant attention among potential leaders of the international community pose an across-the-board challenge to sustaining and strengthening all of the nonproliferation regimes, and to related arms control measures such as the CTBT and START. The paucity of high-level commitment is a product of the dominance of domestic factors in setting the agendas of key states, the low priority of nonproliferation among foreign and security affairs, and commercial incentives overriding efforts to control technological diffusion.

Public statements about the severity of the WMD threat notwithstanding, the United States and other influential states do not have a coherent, long-term strategy to sustain the regimes. Instead, new policy initiatives lag behind trends and emerge sporadically only in response to crises. Senior US policymakers rarely devote serious or sustained attention to the regimes, with predictably negative consequences for the long-term health of the regimes. In these respects, nonproliferation is allocated a low priority among foreign and security issues.

Despite the pace of international change in the post-Cold War era, domestic political factors ranging from electoral schedules to bureaucratic interests to sectoral interests dominate agenda setting among key states. The Russian Dumas obstructionism with regard to START is perhaps the most obvious example. However, the US agenda is likewise plagued by such "provincial" pressures, ranging from policy stagnation during the presidential electoral cycle, to bureaucratic drift on negotiations on a BWC protocol, to pressures to reduce controls on sensitive technologies. The traditional US penchant for unilateralism in its foreign relations, in the context of a militarily unipolar world, allows immoderate influences at home while provoking opposition to nonproliferation regimes among domestic polities and decisionmakers abroad. Similar examples of domestic factors dominating national agendas can be identified in many other states today.

International commercial competitionoften real if sometimes overblownposes a serious challenge to sustaining political support for controlling sensitive technologies. This negative factor is manifest in negotiations on the BWC verification protocol, and in willful US delay in implementing the CWC. Industry reluctance to support effective implementation of nonproliferation regimes must be overcome if the regimes are to be sustained. Member states must avoid fixation on narrow commercial interests as well as unilateral action in fulfilling their commitments to the CWC. Similarly, commercial space-launch interests of MTCR members and non-members pose a serious impediment to sustaining the missile control regime.

Lack of Consensus

The viability of nonproliferation regimes is challenged by international and national discord on specific tactics, general strategies, and even fundamental goals of nonproliferation. In some cases, the disputes result in part from the sheer difficulty of the problem: e.g., in coping with the Iraqi and North Korean challenges to the regimes. In other areas entrenched differences impede cooperation, as evidenced by the perennial debates over Article VI of the NPT. With respect to some key issues, including missile defenses and BWC verification, the United States and other key actors have yet to decide upon their priorities with respect to the regimes.

Tactical disagreements make it difficult to sustain and strengthen nonproliferation regimes. With regard to all four regimes, many states have shown a predilection for technical and unilateral solutions, giving scant attention to political dimensions or the need for international collaboration to successfully meet challenges to the regimes. In some cases, the "best" solution has been at odds with a "good" approach to sustaining a regime. For example, some state parties have sought to employ the NPT Review Conference process primarily as a vehicle for promoting disarmament. While the Review Conference may contribute to disarmament, it also fulfills other regime objectives, and the NPT may be unable to bear the weight of some members aspirations to promote disarmament. Likewise, negotiation of the BWC verification protocol must be carried out with regard to the trade-off between taking time to build consensus on a technically sound protocol, against the risk that indefinite delay could result in no protocol whatsoever. A merely symbolic protocol, however, might well be worse than none at all.

Disagreements over strategies to sustain the nonproliferation regimes are sharpest and most vexing with regard to the hardest cases: how to cope with defiant proliferants that cheat on their nonproliferation commitments. In this regard, Iraq and North Korea have demonstrated an impressive and lamentable capacity for sowing dissent among the leaders of the nonproliferation regimes. US deployment of national missile defenses or of theater missile defenses in East Asia may play a damaging role by furthering disagreement over strategies to sustain non-proliferation regimes. National missile defenses will likely have a significant and negative impact on the ABM Treaty, and perhaps on the NPT. Regional systems provide incentives for increased acquisition of ballistic missiles, and may provoke defiant countermeasures that could include irresponsible WMD exports by suppliers who believe their political or security interests are harmed by missile defenses. While the potential contradictions between missile defenses and nonproliferation regimes are sometimes overdrawn, and potentially complementary aspects under-recognized, their cumulative impact may be quite negative and due to political as much as security factors.

Effective multilateral nonproliferation regimes depend as much or more on effective leadership as they do on inclusive and meaningful participation by all parties. While strong leadership by the United States is by itself insufficient, its absence provides little confidence for the success of the regimes. Despite the importance of US leadership in meeting challenges to the regimes, many in the nonproliferation community believe that in some important ways the United States itself may pose threats to the regimes. There is no consensual judgment why this is the case, however. Depending on ideological, political, and professional perspective, analysts make divergent attributions of responsibility: Republicans or Democrats, myopic isolationists or export-oriented free marketeers, the "military-industrial complex" or the arms control "theocracy."

Like many international endeavors, nonproliferation regimes serve as means to divergent ends, ranging in this case from peace to prestige to security to power. The predominant motivations in specific cases may be quite contradictory, which may call into question the long-term prospects for the regimes. Some states, such as Japan, South Africa, and Sweden, may see nonproliferation as an institutional and normative means to promote international disarmament. Others, such as Argentina and Brazil, may see their participation in the regimes primarily as means to gain credentials in the international community that serve other foreign policy objectives. A few, notably Iraq and North Korea, have viewed nonproliferation commitments as instruments for deceitas smokescreens for the clandestine pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Key sectors in at least one actor, the United States, view the nonproliferation regimes in part as means to sustain the nations conventional military dominance and to enhance its operational capacity for foreign military intervention.

There is no reason, a priori, why divergent motivations cannot indefinitely sustain the support of many countries. But in practice, divergent objectives may cause friction or even lead some states to withdraw support from nonproliferation regimes. For example, increasing US reliance on nuclear weapons to address CBW threats helps to sustain the international legitimacy of possessing and threatening to use nuclear weapons. Increased Russian reliance on tactical nuclear weapons to meet perceived conventional security threats could likewise be of pernicious effect in demonstrating how sharply some key states diverge over the purpose of the nonproliferation regimes. Most profoundly, key supporters of the NPT regime disagree whether it is threatened by the lack of progress or by the risk of progress toward nuclear disarmament.

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