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CNS Occasional Papers: #3

Nonproliferation Regimes At Risk

CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST TO NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES

by Michael Barletta and Amin Tarzi

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other challenges to international nonproliferation regimes emerging from the Middle East have global as well as regional consequences. The patterns of WMD acquisition and regime nonparticipation in the Middle East restrict the scope and effectiveness of the NPT and BWC, and even more so of the CWC and MTCR.

The Middle East—with South Asia and Northeast Asia—is among the three regions of the world most likely to suffer the future use of WMD. Unlike South Asia, Middle East history includes significant instances of the use of chemical weapons, and unlike Northeast Asia, its past conflicts have involved extensive use of ballistic and cruise missiles. The Middle East has endured many destructive wars in recent decades, has been the focus of repeated threats to wage war with WMD, and includes most of the world’s active chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs. The region includes one of only four states in the world that refuse to join the NPT, most of the states that refuse to sign the CWC, and eight states armed with Scud-B or longer-range ballistic missiles.

As an interrelated security complex, the region encompasses North Africa, the Middle East proper (including Turkey), and the Persian Gulf. But states in these three sub-regions are not the only actors shaping the prospects for nonproliferation. Non-state actors such as Islamic Jihad and Al Qa’ida have threatened to employ biological and chemical weapons. Moreover, nonproliferation in the region is affected by the military forces and political influence of such external powers as Britain, France, Russia, and the United States, as well as technologies supplied by external actors, including China, North Korea, and "freelancing" Russian firms.

STATUS OF NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Four types of challenge in this region threaten international nonproliferation regimes: nonparticipation, subversion, defiance, and what can be termed "demonstration effects."

Nonparticipation

• Israel is the only state in the region—and one of only four around the entire globe—that refuses to sign the NPT.
• Algeria, Israel, and the Sudan have not signed the BWC. Egypt and Syria signed the accord in 1972, but they have declined to ratify it.
• Egypt, Eritrea, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, and Syria are among the very few states in the world that have failed to sign the CWC. Jordan has acceded to the treaty, while Israel, the UAE, and Yemen have signed but not ratified the accord. In these respects, nonparticipation in the CWC is greater in the Middle East and North Africa than in any other region of the world.

• No state in the region except Turkey is a formal member of the MTCR, although Israel has pledged to abide by MTCR guidelines.

• Iraq deliberately subverted the purpose of the NPT by ostensibly complying with the accord while it secretly engaged in a vast nuclear weapons production program.
• Iran may be likewise subverting the purpose of nonproliferation accords, if warnings by US and Israeli intelligence sources are correct. It may be difficult to unequivocally confirm possible transgressions by Iran, and to date no undisputed evidence has been made public to confirm these allegations.
• The nuclear weapon states have made only limited progress toward fulfilling their NPT Article VI commitments. This raises doubt among the 21 Middle East non-nuclear weapon state signatories regarding the legitimacy of the NPT, and whether its indefinite extension in 1995 undercut the prospects for nuclear disarmament.
• Implicit reliance by the United States on nuclear weapons to deter the use of biological and chemical weapons against its military forces and allies legitimates the possession of nuclear weapons, and contravenes US negative security assurances to non-nuclear NPT signatories.

• Iraq has endured the sacrifice of the lives of hundreds of thousands of its citizens, tens of billions of dollars, and prospects for normalized international relations in its determination to prevent implementation of UN Security Council resolutions mandating verification of its disarmament of WMD.
• The vexing example of persistent Iraqi defiance of its international commitments has limited prospects for building political coalitions to provide security or economic inducements to—or to generate political or military pressures on—other states to conform to international nonproliferation norms.

Demonstration Effects

Widespread acquisition of WMD by states in the region and unequivocal evidence of significant instances of the use of chemical weapons—compounded by international non-action in the face of acquisition and use—motivates and legitimates further acquisition of WMD capabilities.

Acquisition

• Israel possesses a relatively sophisticated nuclear arsenal, and there is significant risk that Iraq and Iran may acquire nuclear weapons in the medium to long term.
• UNSCOM inspectors have been unable to verify that Iraq does not possess agents and production capabilities for biological weapons. There are also unverified reports that Egypt, Iran, and Israel may have BW programs.
• Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria have all produced chemical weapons.
• Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates have all acquired ballistic missiles with range/payload exceeding MTCR objectives. Presently, at least, Iraqi missile programs are constrained by UN-mandated restrictions.

• Since 1945, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Libya have carried out chemical weapons attacks on neighbors in the region. During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), Iraq made extensive use of chemical weapons, provoking Iran to follow suit. Iraq also wreaked deadly CW attacks on unarmed Kurdish civilians within its territory in 1988.
• Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen have used ballistic missiles in the region. During their "War of the Cities" in 1988, Iraq and Iran fired hundreds of ballistic missiles in indiscriminate attacks on respective urban areas.
• Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Syria, and the United States have used cruise missiles in Middle East conflicts. The United States has made the most extensive use of cruise missiles in the region, launching limited attacks on Iran and the Sudan, and hundreds of missiles against Iraq since 1991.

• In the 1980s, the international community offered merely rhetorical opposition to Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian military forces and Iraqi Kurds, while maintaining extensive aid for Iraqi conventional military and WMD procurement.
• Key international suppliers have accepted and facilitated WMD proliferation by maintaining military and political support and economic relations with clients, even when such states violate nonproliferation norms. For example, the United States accepts Israeli nuclear weapons development and refusal to sign the NPT. In the 1980s, France accepted Iraqi assurances that its nuclear development would remain pacific. Recently, France and Russia have sought to lift UN sanctions on Iraq without requiring UNSCOM-verified WMD disarmament, while Russian firms provide aid to Iranian nuclear and missile programs.

OBSTACLES TO PROMOTING NONPROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Three general problems hinder the promotion of nonproliferation regimes in the Middle East: mutual reinforcement among states’ respective WMD programs; multiple actors with veto power; and subordination of nonproliferation to other security, political, and economic objectives.

First, with a few important exceptions (notably Iraqi designs to make aggressive use of WMD, use of CW by Egypt in the 1963-67 Yemeni war, and use of CW by Libya against Chad in 1987), most states’ chemical weapons and ballistic missile programs aim to match or compensate for their rivals’ military capabilities, and thus to enhance their security and regional prestige. Yet even when reactive, this pattern creates serious difficulties for nonproliferation policymaking. Due to linkages among nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile proliferation, efforts to promote nonproliferation in any one area are apt to have only limited success, or to actually encourage another form of WMD proliferation. For example, Israeli conventional military predominance in the last 20 years, along with that state’s nuclear proliferation, stimulated Egyptian and Syrian interest in acquiring chemical weapons and ballistic missiles, while Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and use of CW and ballistic missiles provided strong incentives for Iran to develop counterbalancing capabilities.

Second, at least three, and possibly five, states in the region have effective veto power over the prospects for nonproliferation regimes and other regional security arrangements (Egypt, Iran, and Israel, and perhaps Iraq and Syria). The intransigence of key actors—e.g., Israel regarding the NPT, Iraq regarding UN Security Council-mandated WMD disarmament, and Iran’s disruptive power regarding the Arab-Israeli peace process—tends to be mutually sustaining. Each of these states’ WMD programs creates powerful incentives for matching and rivalry among neighboring states, which, in turn, provides incentives for other actors to match or counterbalance. Furthermore, multiple and shifting alliances and enmities in the region, coupled with ideological and geopolitical rivalries, create a cascading series of regional security dilemmas.

Third, nonproliferation efforts in the Middle East are routinely subordinated to other foreign policy objectives. WMD proliferants in the region value perceived advantages in military capability and prestige more than nonproliferation. Foreign suppliers consider access to oil, investment opportunities, and conventional arms export earnings more important than nonproliferation. For example, China, North Korea, and Russia are willing to export WMD technology or equipment to gain access to large sums of capital, while for China and Russia WMD exports to the Middle East also provide political leverage in relations with the United States. Moreover, US prioritization of its special relationship with Israel undermines the legitimacy of US nonproliferation initiatives in the region, due to its preferential treatment of Israel with regard to enforcing nonproliferation norms and UN Security Council resolutions. Several Arab states apparently judge efforts to redress perceived inequalities in military capabilities, resource distributions, and international relations as being more important than the security risks incurred by unrestrained CW and missile proliferation.

PROMISE AND PROSPECTS

Some recent developments in the region are promising. Initial signals from the new Israeli government are encouraging with regard to the Arab-Israeli peace process and initiation of an Israeli-Syrian dialogue on a comprehensive settlement. The recent Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement—which has included calls for making the Middle East a zone free from WMD—could serve as a bridge from Iran’s confrontational posture toward more cooperative relations with its Arab neighbors, based initially on economic cooperation among the Gulf states. Regional isolation of the Iraqi regime constrains Iraq’s hegemonic ambitions, while providing a cautionary lesson for potential proliferants. Despite these encouraging signs, the unresolved inter-linked proliferation and security issues of the region continue to pose serious nonproliferation challenges.

Given the three general problems identified above, initiatives that focus narrowly on any of the four nonproliferation regimes alone, or that address challenges posed by particular countries considered in isolation, are unlikely to succeed. The best prospects for promoting nonproliferation will be provided in the context of broad frameworks that address linkages, incorporate key actors, and provide tangible security, political, and economic benefits for participation in and compliance with nonproliferation regimes.

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