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CNS Occasional Papers: #3

Nonproliferation Regimes At Risk

THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

by Timothy V. McCarthy

It is no small irony that just two weeks after the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was signed in April 1987, Iraq conducted the first successful flight test of its extended-range ballistic missile, the Al-Hussein. The Iraqi missile program—heavily dependent on foreign pro-curement and, hence, vulnerable to a supply cut-off—represented just the type of proliferation activity the MTCR was designed to obstruct or terminate. In the event, Iraq did develop the Al-Hussein and several other longer-range missile systems, but Baghdad was ultimately unable to fully realize its missile ambitions, in part due to the MTCR. The Iraqi case exemplifies the mixed results achieved through the MTCR’s export denial and related efforts.

In the intervening years since the Al-Hussein test and the MTCR signing, the scope and perhaps even the pace of missile proliferation have grown. Fueled to a greater or lesser extent by foreign technology acquisition, programs have advanced in India, North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan, to name just a few. Acquisition of increasingly capable and longer-range missile systems has exacerbated already tenuous military-strategic environments in the Middle East, South Asia, and Northeast Asia.

Therefore, the debatable question is not if there is indeed a missile proliferation "problem." Rather, the key issues are first, the extent to which MTCR restrictions (or diplomatic efforts) have prevented or delayed even greater technical advances than would otherwise be the case, and second, whether the MTCR is well-positioned to address current and future missile threats. In that regard, the MTCR now sits on the horns of a dilemma: it is increasingly under fire for its perceived failure to stem the missile proliferation tide at the same time it is admonished for aggressive and discriminatory technology denial.

One obvious difference between the MTCR and the other major nonproliferation regimes is its relatively informal nature. Unlike a treaty-based regime, the MTCR is, at its core, simply an association of states seeking to coordinate their export licensing practices relevant to missile technology. In this sense, it acts as a supplier cartel, with all the inherent advantages and problems associated with that type of arrangement. It is this lack of a more formal international legal standing that, to a large extent, drives both praise and criticism of the regime.

THREATS

There are a number of issues that in the short to medium term may jeopardize MTCR objectives, weaken established missile nonproliferation norms, or even undermine the regime altogether.

• Supply: Continued sales of both Category I and Category II technologies—by members, non-members, and adherents—threaten to undermine the key regime objective: to make it more difficult to develop delivery means for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons. Such sales enfeeble the "no undercut policy," which dictates that one member’s export denial must be met by similar denials from other members. In addition, divergent interpretations of the "space program" clause found in the Guidelines have led, and may continue to lead, to sensitive exports to programs of potential concern. An example of this type of case is Russian propulsion technology exports to the Indian Space Research Organization.

• Expanding Membership and Diffusion of Goals and Standards: The MTCR lost focus as membership expanded over the last six years. As initially conceived, the regime was not intended to facilitate access to space technology or to reward governments for close diplomatic relationships. The regime’s expansion—while legitimizing MTCR objectives as an international nonproliferation norm—required significant erosion of entry standards, leading to the inclusion of states lacking viable institutions and/or the will to control missile exports. Critics cite Russian membership, in particular, as a textbook case where entry standards and core objectives were sacrificed on the altar of political expediencies not necessarily related to missile nonproliferation. Moreover, consensus is increasingly difficult to achieve as membership grows, especially on politically sensitive issues like the creation of enforcement procedures.

• Discrimination: Detractors argue that because the MTCR is meant primarily to serve founding member interests, it is inherently discriminatory, creating a two-tiered structure of missile "haves" and "have-nots." This discrimination finds expression in, for example, the regime’s failure to explicitly include air defense systems (particularly anti-tactical ballistic missiles [ATBM]), its omission of controls on manned aircraft delivery systems, and demands that certain new members forego Category I offensive missile capabilities prior to joining. Similarly odious is the implicit position of several founding members that they will not support new and even ongoing space launch vehicle (SLV) programs. This stance limits the willingness of certain missile-capable states (India, for example) to seek membership or adhere to regime guidelines, and may ultimately lead some current members to view the regime as lacking legitimacy.

• Missile Defenses: Deployment of ATBM in Taiwan, development of an East Asian missile defense consortium, and unilateral modification or abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty are key issues on the missile proliferation horizon. While the impact of missile defense developments on the MTCR is difficult to predict, one possible response would be qualitative and quantitative increases in missile technology sales from China, in the former cases, and Russia, in the latter.

RESPONSES

While a number of options may be available to deal with the threats outlined above, in certain cases these approaches may be mutually exclusive. Further analysis of the risks, benefits, and implementation problems associated with each will be required to choose the best way forward.

• Retrenchment: The MTCR could consider returning to its roots as a relatively exclusive club of states whose sole purpose is to stop missile technology exports. At this point, of course, it would be extremely difficult to remove wayward members. Instead, retrenchment would set a high bar for new entry and strenuously avoid any expansion of objectives. Conceptually, the focus of the regime would be narrowed to just a few problem states and suppliers, such as North Korea. Retrenchment also takes into account the technical plateaus that many developing missile programs have reached. To move beyond these plateaus, technologies and equipment that fall unambiguously within MTCR guidelines are needed, and it is here that the restrictions will have their biggest—and intended—effect. In taking this step, the regime must be willing to cope with the political consequences that will inevitably arise from the decision. Those states that consider the regime discriminatory simply need not join, nor should they be provided inducements to do so.

• Regime-Based Enforcement: One way to increase MTCR viability is to establish, at least informally, a regime-based means to punish missile proliferation behavior. Arguably, unilateral sanctions have only a limited effect on the offending country. The MTCR should therefore begin serious negotiations on a broader sanctions policy, beginning with discussions of an enforcement trigger mechanism. This would involve a mandatory meeting if and when any member levies sanctions; the meeting would allow the sanctioning country to present its case and press other participants for additional responses. Additionally, the MTCR should seek to develop and standardize a "commercial enforcement" process. This would entail, for instance, a consistent policy of making prime contractors explicitly responsible for sub-contractor behavior when the former is involved in space-related projects with a regime member. Here, Russian contractors participating in construction of the inter-national space station would be responsible for companies within their supply network down to, for instance, the subsystem level.

• Expansion: The MTCR could continue to seek new members and adherents to further internationalize the regime’s nonproliferation norms. This expansion should be prudent, but there should be no litmus test with respect to short-range ballistic missile capabilities or SLV programs. Moreover, as the only international body with a mandate to pursue missile nonproliferation, the regime should use its diplomatic weight to seek creative solutions to missile-related problems that extend beyond a narrow, export licensing focus. Members, as a group, might support nonproliferation initiatives such as missile non-deployment negotiations, ballistic-missile-free zones, or flight test bans.

• Inclusion and Integration: To more completely address the problem of NBC delivery systems, the MTCR might begin discussions on incorporating manned aircraft exports into the regime, and add specific language to the Guidelines dealing with air defense systems. One variant of this option would be to stabilize the missile offense-defense balance by incorporating ABM Treaty concepts into the Guidelines (for example, by explicitly including systems capable of strategic interception as a Category I item).

• Treaty: The MTCR could serve as the basis for an internationally negotiated treaty to deal with missile proliferation in general—including indigenous developments and deployments—instead of its current narrow focus on export issues. The treaty might entail an NPT-like grand bargain offering enhanced access to civilian space technology and participation in space projects in exchange for missile non-deployment or "no-sales" commitments. The regime would be formalized and, as such, would include a verification-inspection body with a mandate to develop and enforce safeguards over missile and space trade.