CNS Occasional Papers: #3

Nonproliferation Regimes At Risk

NORTHEAST ASIA 1999: CURRENT THREATS TO NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES

by Evan S. Medeiros

Northeast Asia stands out as a region of significant concern regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles. North Korea and China continue to engage in activities inconsistent with international nonproliferation norms. In the last year, North Korea became increasingly intransigent about its suspected nuclear weapon program and even threatened several times to abandon the United States-North Korea Agreed Framework and restart its nuclear program. Furthermore, North Korea—and to a lesser extent China—remain countries of concern regarding transfers of sensitive technologies to known proliferators, and both nations have pushed the limit of—or even violated—widely accepted nonproliferation norms of the international community.

Moreover, these security problems are unfolding in the context of a significant regional economic downturn and in the absence of an effective regional security mechanism to ameliorate and resolve many of the underlying economic and security issues. The acute economic problems enveloping the region create uncertainties regarding political stability and regime continuity that could, in the future, generate new proliferation risks. Indeed, the lack of a regional security mechanism means that the region as a whole is not adequately prepared to address effectively the increasingly complex arms control and nonproliferation agenda that confronts it.

CHINA

In the last decade, China’s overall participation in arms control and nonproliferation has increased dramatically. China signed the NPT, the CWC, and the CTBT. (It has been a BWC member since 1984.) China has also agreed to abide by the MTCR, and Beijing supports FMCT negotiations. However, many concerns persist regarding Beijing’s interpretations of its commitments and its ability to implement and enforce them. China’s missile, nuclear and chemical exports merit particular attention. Prospects for resolving these problems are uncertain, because China’s positions on arms control and nonproliferation are increasingly being politicized by Beijing and, therefore, are being tied to shifts in Sino-US relations.

First, regarding missile nonproliferation, China is not yet a full member of the MTCR and its current commitments to the regime are vague and weak. China has only committed to abide by the MTCR’s original 1987 guidelines and parameters; it has not agreed to accept the 1993 revisions. China has also never accepted the MTCR’s annex that outlines the technologies controlled under the accord. Without acceptance of the MTCR’s annex, meaningful implementation of MTCR restrictions is difficult to carry out. In addition, China has never openly published export controls covering MTCR-controlled technologies, making it unclear how and the extent to which Beijing controls the export of MTCR items.

These ambiguities have allowed China to maintain its exports of missile-related equipment and technologies to Iran, and possibly to Pakistan. China continues to provide Iran with missile sub-systems and production technologies for short-range missiles not covered by the MTCR, yet these items could also be used for Iran’s medium- and long-range programs. Moreover, China provides Iran with many dual-use technologies (e.g., titanium-stabilized duplex stainless steel), which are also likely used for proscribed missile programs.

Although China’s past missile assistance to Pakistan was extensive and involved the export of complete M-11 missiles, Chinese missile aid to Pakistan may have ceased following the May 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia. In a June 1998 United States-China Statement on South Asia, China pledged to stop all missile and missile technology exports to Pakistan. China’s adherence to this pledge requires continued monitoring and verification. But in any case, prospects for China’s full membership in the MTCR are bleak. Chinese officials state they are "actively studying" MTCR membership, but little progress is expected due to China’s concerns about the US sale of theater missile defense systems to Taiwan.

Second, Chinese exports of nuclear equipment, materials, and technologies to Pakistan remain of concern. Although the Chinese government promised in 1996 to halt nuclear assistance to unsafeguarded facilities, China’s longstanding nuclear weapons-related assistance to Pakistan has created technical relationships and channels of communication that will be difficult to limit. Some Chinese entities may continue to export dual-use nuclear items to Pakistan that could be diverted to the country’s military nuclear program. Such assistance could also be provided under the guise of China’s ongoing civilian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan. Furthermore, the ongoing restructuring of China’s nuclear industry has created managerial uncertainty that in the short term could facilitate illicit nuclear exports to Pakistan.

Third, China is a member of the CWC and has taken several steps—arguably more than has the United States—to implement its commitments, including the promulgation of a series of export control laws covering CWC items. China, however, has had difficulty implementing and enforcing the CWC’s export prohibitions. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency, in 1998 Chinese entities exported CW-related chemicals to Iran, Syria, and possibly Iraq. In 1997, the United States imposed sanctions on seven Chinese entities for engaging in CW-related exports. China’s large and sprawling domestic chemical industry has made it difficult for the central government to control the business activities of its chemical industry. Often, Chinese companies are simply unaware of the CWC’s export prohibitions.

Another source of concern has been China’s position on the Australia Group. China rejects the AG on the grounds that it is not a multilateral treaty like the CWC, it interferes in the operation of the CWC, and it unfairly targets countries like Iran. As a result, Chinese companies continue to export dual-use chemicals that are controlled by the AG, but not the CWC. China’s position on the AG has been the source of several bilateral disputes with the United States, and resulted in the imposition of US sanctions in 1997.

Lastly, one overarching factor that will likely influence China’s participation in a host of global arms control and nonproliferation accords is the US plan to deploy NMD and TMD systems in Northeast Asia. Chinese officials and analysts fear that NMD deployments will significantly undercut China’s strategic deterrent and, as a result, they contend that China will need to reconsider its existing and future commitments to the CTBT and the FMCT. NMD deployment by the United States may also catalyze vertical proliferation of China’s missile arsenal (possibly including development of MIRVed missiles) in an effort to overcome the perceived strategic imbalance created by a US missile defense system. Furthermore, Chinese officials see TMD as a form of missile proliferation that, at a minimum, will delay their consideration of MTCR membership. TMD deployments in Japan or Taiwan, moreover, could lead China to reconsider its previous MTCR commitments and prompt resumption of exports of complete missile systems to countries in the Middle East.

NORTH KOREA

North Korea’s extensive domestic WMD development programs and its flagrant missile export activities arguably rank it as the world’s "Number One Proliferator." Pyongyang’s activities represent a serious and immediate threat to global nonproliferation efforts. Yet measures to resolve these multiple WMD issues are largely tied to broader issues of the scale and pace of US diplomatic engagement with North Korea, as well as Washington’s approach to Korean reunification.

North Korea’s nuclear program remains a persistent threat to nuclear nonproliferation efforts. Pyongyang signed the NPT in 1985, but has not signed the CTBT. Nor is the North in complete compliance with its NPT obligations: the IAEA has not been able to verify the North’s initial declaration of the amount of nuclear material it possesses. Based on inspections in 1991, the IAEA calculated that the North produced more than the declared 90 grams of plutonium, but the IAEA does not know how much more. The US intelligence community estimates that the North may have enough plutonium for one or two basic, implosion-type nuclear devices. It is currently not clear when or whether the IAEA will be able to verify the North’s initial declaration, because the inspections necessary to resolve this issue are tied to implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework (AF), which continues to experience delays. If these delays persist, the IAEA may not be able to determine conclusively North Korea’s past plutonium production, possibly allowing the North to keep a small cache of weapons-usable material.

Moreover, the North’s implementation of the AF has been inconsistent. Since 1994, North Korea has maintained its freeze on the operation of several key nuclear facilities and halted the construction of two larger reactors. However, the construction at Kumchangri of an underground facility possibly intended for production of nuclear materials raises questions about the North’s intentions. Although inspections in May 1999 revealed that the facility was little more than a concrete shell, the North most likely initiated the construction as a political signal of objection to the perceived shortcomings in US implementation of the AF, and as an attempt to extract concessions from the United States. Alternatively, factions in North Korea may still harbor nuclear ambitions and seek to secretly reconstitute the North’s nuclear weapon program. North Korea has not relied on outside suppliers for its nuclear programs, and there have not been any reports of North Korean exports of nuclear materials, equipment, or technologies.

North Korea is not a signatory to the CWC and has not expressed any interest in joining the treaty. Since the late 1980s, North Korea has been capable of producing large quantities of chemical weapon agents, including blister, nerve, choking, and blood agents. Many of these CW agents have been weaponized in artillery, aerial bombs, and missile warhead munitions. Beginning in the early 1990s, the North expanded and accelerated its CW production efforts, and according to US intelligence it currently posses "a sizeable stockpile of chemical weapons."

Moreover, although North Korea signed the BWC, it may possess an operational biological weapons program. Over the past few decades, Pyongyang has had an active BW research and development program, and its current bio-technical infrastructure is sufficient to produce limited amounts of BW agents. The North is not known to have exported chemical or biological weapons-related items to other countries.

North Korea is notorious for its exports of complete missiles and missile production technologies. The North’s ongoing missile sales to Iran and Pakistan represent the most immediate and direct challenge to global missile nonproliferation efforts. The North can almost single-handedly undermine global missile nonproliferation efforts with its export policies. In the past North Korea sold missiles and related technologies to Egypt, Syria, and possibly Iraq, and—most significantly—the North even supplied Iran and Syria with production and assembly technologies for Scud-B and Scud-C missiles. Pyongyang also sold Iran the Nodong missile, for which Tehran reportedly provided advance funding. More recently, North Korea may have sold Nodong missiles to Pakistan, which Islamabad calls the "Ghuari" and claims as indigenous.

North Korea’s principal motivation for exporting missiles has been to earn hard currency to help its faltering economy. The United States has twice engaged the North in talks about missile proliferation and the MTCR, but North Korean officials say they will only halt missile exports if the United States offers compensation at the level of $1 billion per year. The United States has categorically rejected that offer as blackmail. North Korea is not a member of the MTCR and has expressed no interest in joining the regime.

North Korea’s domestic missile development program is also of proliferation concern, because Pyongyang has shown a proclivity to export any item in its inventory. North Korea’s August 1998 test flight of the Taepodong-1 suggests that this system could be deployed or available for sale at some point in the near future. Export of this new system could be particularly likely if its development was funded by another country, such as Iran or Pakistan.

TAIWAN

Given the threat Taiwan faces from China, combined with the Chinese military’s overwhelming numerical superiority, Taiwan’s development of chemical weapons to deter or to rebuke an invasion would seem a reasonable option for military planners. Taiwan is not a member of the CWC and may possess an active CW program. It is unclear from open-source information whether Taiwan possesses chemical weapons. The Taiwanese government denies that it has an offensive CW program, and claims that it only engages in defensive CW activities. In fact, even though Taiwan says that it wants to join the CWC, it is not allowed to join. China has objected to Taiwan’s membership in the CWC because it would signal Taiwan’s status as a sovereign entity rather than part of mainland China. When CWC members implement export-import restrictions to non-members, Taiwan’s chemical industry stands to suffer, as it will be unable to purchase certain CWC-controlled chemicals. A series of creative, legal solutions to this problem may exist (such as joint inspections) but they would likely require a degree of cooperation between China and Taiwan that is difficult to envision during the currently tense period in cross-strait relations.

JAPAN

Japan’s possible future development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles is an issue of medium- to long-term proliferation concern. Japan possesses the technical capability and the materials to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Japan operates an extensive civilian plutonium production program that has allowed it to amass a large stockpile of weapons-usable plutonium, and the country’s highly advanced space launch vehicle program could easily facilitate the development of ballistic missiles, possibly of intercontinental ranges.

It is unclear, however, what changes in the international security environment would lead Tokyo to revisit its current nonproliferation pledges. Possible developments include the emergence of a number of new nuclear weapon states such as India, Pakistan, and possibly Ukraine. Other, more dramatic changes could include a weakening of the US security commitment to Japan, or the emergence of China as a highly aggressive actor in the East Asian theater.

Neither of these developments is likely to occur in the short to medium term, however, especially given the recent redefinition of the United States-Japan Defense Guidelines and expanding missile defense cooperation between Washington and Tokyo. In addition, Japan would have to overcome several internal legal barriers and much domestic and international opposition to develop nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. Most notably, Japan would be forced to undertake the complex legal step of amending its constitution. Nevertheless, given Japan’s latent capabilities, attention to debates within Japan is warranted, as well as continuing consideration of the impact of non-Asian proliferation developments (such as the nuclear status of India, Pakistan, and Ukraine) on attitudes in Japan.


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