CNS Occasional Papers: #3

Nonproliferation Regimes At Risk

THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES AT RISK

by Amy Sands

Concern has emerged about the future of nonproliferation efforts, as many proliferation issues remain unresolved, inadequately addressed, and in some cases ignored. The uneven record to date of addressing nonproliferation problems quickly and effectively is undermining the normative and organizational foundations of the nonproliferation regimes. Neglect, weak leadership, pressing domestic issues, post-Cold War uncertainties, and "New World Order" tensions are all hastening this erosion. Over the next few years, events with potentially disastrous impact may confront the nonproliferation regimes with significant challenges.

We are at a watershed that will determine whether the various nonproliferation regimes will collapse, muddle through, or become effective parts of the nonproliferation game plan. Despite considerable growth in nonproliferation efforts and widespread rhetorical support for the nonproliferation norm, the regimes appear threatened by an outbreak of weapons proliferation. Weaker regimes will lead to growing security threats, the increasing likelihood of violent conflicts, and the intensification of conflicts should they occur.

Significant progress has occurred in the nonproliferation treaty regime in the last decade. Less than five years ago, nuclear nonproliferation efforts made great advances with the permanent, indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force; and progress appeared to be occurring in developing enhanced compliance measures for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Also, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), all dealing with more traditional arms control areas, helped redefine the European security environment in the early part of the decade. Confrontational relations between the two largest nuclear weapon states, while still in transition, have become much less intense as each state reduces its nuclear weapons arsenal and the likelihood of military conflict between them is minimized.

Several other events raised expectations that the threat of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile proliferation might be significantly reduced and eventually eliminated. Argentina and Brazil ceased pursuing nuclear and missile capabilities and developed effective bilateral nuclear safeguards and confidence-building measures. South Africa, after admitting it had developed a small nuclear arsenal, dismantled its program and then gave access to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to verify the elimination of the weapons and the related weapons program. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all voluntarily gave up the nuclear and missile capabilities left in their territories when the Soviet Union collapsed. Finally, the threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was contained and its capabilities largely dismantled because of the activities of United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM).

The norm of nuclear nonproliferation also gained significant support, as reflected in the near universality of membership in the NPT (only Cuba, Israel, India, and Pakistan remain non-members). In addition, most of the southern hemisphere is now covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), as the Treaty of Pelindaba, the Treaty of Raratonga, and the South East Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone were finalized and came into effect. As the decade ends, the trends appear to be positive: more states gave up nuclear weapons this decade than are actively trying to obtain them, and the number of states interested in acquiring chemical or biological weapons appears to have stabilized. Thus, the nonproliferation record in the 1990s seems quite impressive. The nonproliferation regimes have helped to create predictability, stability, and security in many regions of the world.

The long-term success of many of these nonproliferation arrangements is still to be proven, however, and depends largely on how member states implement and enforce them. So far, the record is mixed. Traditional arms control efforts, such as the INF, CFE, and START I treaties, appear to have made significant progress in halting or least slowing various arms races. But even these treaties have experienced serious bumps in the road, and at times substantial questions about compliance have been raised. The picture becomes increasingly bleak when the multilateral nonproliferation agreements and treaties covering chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons are examined. Here there are many unresolved issues that could cripple the specific treaties involved and undermine the entire nonproliferation regime.

Problems debilitate or threaten the effective implementation of specific treaties such as the NPT, BWC, and the CWC, and there are significant country-compliance concerns involving states such as Iraq, North Korea, and Russia. Also, the bilateral relations between the United States and China and the United States and Russia, critical to successful nonproliferation efforts, are facing difficult times. While proliferation may have been removed as an issue in parts of the world, it remains a substantial threat in several regions and is capable of acting as a catalyst to other states rethinking their own decisions not to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Moreover, as this decade ends, interest in and concern about proliferation seem to be wavering, creating uncertainty about the international community’s commitment to nonproliferation. The message is a garbled one. States have engaged in efforts to strengthen several regimes—the IAEA’s Model Protocol, the enhanced NPT review process, the Ad Hoc Group for the BWC, and the CWC verification regime—but these efforts appear to be losing momentum. Instead of strengthening their respective regimes, such efforts may be revealing the hollowness of commitments that states are making today. Nonproliferation rhetoric is not being supported by resources or political will, as is evident in the continued inadequate funding given to the IAEA, to the Agreed Framework with North Korea, and to Russian chemical weapons dismantlement. Examples where political support has been inconsistent and insufficient include the failures to complete the dismantlement of Iraq’s WMD programs, negotiate a verification protocol for the BWC, and bring the CTBT into force.

Of great concern to policymakers and analysts is the significant, willful noncompliance by Iraq, the Soviet Union/Russia, and North Korea. Various methods and tactics have been used in each of these cases, but so far, none have been very successful, and none give great hope for future success. The recent failure to develop a consensus in the international community or in the United Nations Security Council to deal with the continued Iraqi intransigence about revealing weapons of mass destruction and verifying their destruction is a glaring gap in the strategy to defeat an ongoing proliferation threat. This problem was seen earlier in the decade when the Security Council was faced with North Korea’s noncompliant behavior under the NPT, and remains a potential concern each time the Agreed Framework is called into question. It was also evident a decade ago when nothing was done after Iraq used chemical weapons during its war with Iran in direct violation of its obligations under the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

The lack of clarity about determining compliance, whether it involves questions about Iraqi weaponization of the chemical agent VX or concerns about the Soviet biological weapons program, is only one aspect of the problem. There are no internationally accepted processes for determining what happens once noncompliant behavior becomes evident or for deciding who will have ultimate responsibility for resolving these issues. Thus, the approaches taken to deal with noncompliance appear to be empty shells, giving rise to doubts concerning the commitment of states to their nonproliferation rhetoric and the credibility of the regime.

At the same time, the ambiguous commitments by key states such as Russia and the United States to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons disarmament create a subtler, but no less insidious set of problems. If the nuclear weapons states do not treat their obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT seriously, or are not sufficiently transparent about their chemical or biological activities, they undermine their ability to convince other, less secure states to follow through on their own commitments. It forces states to rely on their own capabilities to ensure national security, rather than trust the commitment and verification provisions of an international treaty.

How did the euphoria of the international community in the early 1990s turn to such pessimism about UNSCOM, the NPT, the CTBT, the CWC, and the BWC? What has happened to make so many experts worried about the direction of these regimes?

CONTEXTUAL TRENDS AFFECTING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

Efforts to combat proliferation now have to overcome numerous obstacles. These impediments range from uncooperative state behavior to the intrinsic nature of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Specifically, the challenges include:

  • increasing numbers of actors, state and non-state, involved in arms control;

  • the different technical capabilities of states engaged in multilateral arms control;

  • continued international diffusion of information and global technological advancement;

  • the dual-use nature of the materials and equipment involved in chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons;

  • a lack of consistent leadership and political will to deal with proliferation issues when they emerge;

  • an increasing focus on domestic issues and domestic pressures at the expense of international nonproliferation concerns;

  • the critical role of regional dynamics;

  • inter-regime dynamics; and

  • the unproductive tenor of the discussion.

Briefly stated, today’s nonproliferation environment is different in some fundamental ways from previous times. Not only are there more players and more issues, and thus, more complexity, but destructive technologies are more available and societies are more vulnerable. It is a new world, multilateral, multifaceted, diverse, and perhaps more chaotic than it has been since the end of World War II. This oft-repeated litany about the post-Cold War era reflects not only the shift from bilateral arms control to multilateral nonproliferation efforts, but also the introduction of multiple actors with diverse characteristics and interests, and uncertain and changing economic and political situations and relationships. This new configuration of forces presents more than just new problems heaped on the old ones—there should also be opportunities for innovative approaches and new dynamics.

The transitional nature of today’s world brings with it an uncertainty that pushes states to protect their own needs first and worry about international or long-term implications second. States have become more reluctant to relinquish sovereign rights to international agreements or organizations. The hopes of the early 1990s for a "New World Order" of transnational networks, increased transparency, and greater inter-state trust have not been achieved. Moreover, with so many actors perceiving varied national security needs, the salience of nonproliferation in general and any individual issues will differ considerably from actor to actor, making it much more difficult to develop and sustain the international consensus needed for most nonproliferation activities.

Key actors also appear to lack the political will to address looming nonproliferation challenges consistently and forcefully. The United States, especially in President Clinton’s second term, has not demonstrated the kind of leadership and diplomatic initiative that would convince others to follow. Distracted by domestic politics and concerns, the executive branch has no strong plan for completing the efforts of the Ad Hoc Group to strengthen the BWC. Also, it did not pursue an effective strategy for CTBT ratification by the US Senate, and it has wavered in its support for UNSCOM, strong export controls, and implementation of the CWC. Meanwhile, conservatives who distrust international organizations and multilateral arms control dominate Congress. The result has been to create uncertainty and mistrust of US intentions in the international community: does the United States want to insure the longevity of its unipolar moment, withdraw into isolation, or lead the world into a new world order based on collaborative multilateralism?

Two additional aspects of US leadership affect today’s nonproliferation efforts. One involves the realization by the United States that being the dominant military power in the current international political system does not necessarily result in its being able to control international organizations or events. The other involves the American public, which is resistant to pursuing hard-line approaches to proliferation threats if they might result in bloody conflicts. A majority of Americans, having been raised in the prosperous and stable second half of the 20th century, appear unprepared to sacrifice much to address international nonproliferation problems.

Another characteristic of current times is that domestic politics dominate the ways that many states are responding to international concerns. The end of the Cold War not only lessened the global threat of nuclear war; it also shifted the focus for many states to internal issues and problems. States do not see many current external threats that are worth fighting over, and most do not have a long-term perspective on international issues. One lesson of the Iraq quagmire is that the world does not deal well with long-term proliferation problems. Moreover, without strong political leadership to promote the nonproliferation agenda consistently and intensely, states will tend to focus on domestic concerns until an international crisis or catastrophe is close at hand. Until then, engaging in lengthy, costly sanctions or even limited military actions will not be attractive policy options to most states.

Particularly sobering is the centrality of domestic politics in several key states, such as Russia, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan. In each case, leaders have shown themselves reluctant to pursue policies unpopular at home or costly for some domestic constituency. Whether it is the Russian leadership’s unwillingness to crack down on questionable nuclear and missile sales or Pakistan’s decision that it too had to test nuclear weapons, the situation remains that states are looking inward for their priorities and guideposts. The result is that nonproliferation is rarely the highest priority of states, despite the extensive rhetoric claiming that proliferation is one of the most significant threats to international security and stability. While it is easy to be critical of this mindset, it has to be recognized as a real limitation on how states will be willing to address international proliferation threats.

Special attention needs to be given to the unsettled relationships between the United States and Russia and the United States and China. In both cases, internal politics now significantly constrain the abilities of governments to engage in constructive dialogues and to work collaboratively in the field of nonproliferation. What had once been an area of cooperation during the Cold War for the Soviet Union and the United States, is now one of differing agendas and priorities, set against a backdrop that will for some time into the future include ultra-conservatives on both sides and an extreme imbalance of power and capabilities. With presidential elections approaching in both states, it is unlikely that much headway will be made on several fronts that are critical to the health of the nonproliferation regimes.

The relationship between the United States and China faces a separate set of issues. The US interest in national missile defense (NMD), US support for Taiwan, and possible Chinese espionage have combined with recent events in Kosovo to unhinge a relationship that in the last year had gotten onto a constructive diplomatic track. Cooperative nonproliferation efforts, whether they involve Iraq, North Korea, or sales of WMD materials, will now be more difficult, if not infeasible for some time.

Regional dynamics must also be acknowledged as critical factors when trying to address the proliferation threat and the nonproliferation regime’s weaknesses. Many experts believe that expansions of NATO have affected the US-Russian relationship negatively, limiting progress on strategic and tactical arms control and making discussions on a host of other issues much more difficult. The decision by NATO to use military force in Kosovo further hampered constructive US-Russian arms control discussions and definitely stalled US-Chinese cooperation.

In other areas of the world, regional relationships are even more central to proliferation issues. In the Middle East, the success of the peace process will be at the core of the ability to move forward on nonproliferation efforts. Similarly, in Northeast Asia and South Asia, progress on nonproliferation will not occur until significant movement occurs in the political dynamic of key states. Since so many of the remaining proliferation challenges are based in regional struggles, we must recognize the primacy of the regional dynamic and work with the key regional states to develop constructive regional initiatives that will not undermine international nonproliferation agreements and norms.

In addition to states, non-state actors covering a broad spectrum of societal organizations, such as industry, media, non-profit organizations, non-governmental grassroots groups, and users of the Internet, must now be recognized as influential actors. Each of these now second-guesses and pressures governments, often defining what the public understands or sees about certain situations, whether it is in the Sudan, Russia, or New York City. Groups attuned to the new information technologies are playing an increasingly significant role in molding the views of others and in defining the agenda. Moreover, the speed of information dissemination and the global scope of coverage means that government officials, already suffering from insufficient time to integrate and analyze information, are further pressured for quick responses and actions as well as being quickly second-guessed. States are losing their ability to set and control the agenda to bring to successful fruition efforts at preventing and containing proliferation threats.

Finally, the tenor of the discussion about nonproliferation issues has become increasingly unproductive. States seem to be promoting indecision by staking out positions they know will prevent a consensus from emerging. Whether it is Egypt’s hard-line position on a resolution dealing with the Israeli nuclear capabilities and a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, or the unwillingness of the United States and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5) to find a way to discuss nuclear disarmament in a multilateral forum, the bottom line is intransigence. In addition, the news media tends to polarize discussions. Reaching a compromise becomes much harder in this context, especially when pressure mounts for taking action and diplomacy becomes public knowledge very quickly.

WILL THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME MEET FUTURE CHALLENGES?

Will the progress made on various nonproliferation regimes in the early 1990s be sustainable, or will the regimes crumble? If they muddle through, will belief and trust in them have been so undermined that they are eventually discarded? Answers to these questions revolve around how states recognize the implications of the various contextual trends described and respond to several existing proliferation challenges and unresolved issues.

Current Critical Proliferation Challenges

Nonproliferation efforts face significant challenges with the situations in North Korea and Iraq. In both cases, states have violated obligations they undertook as parties to nonproliferation treaties, and in both cases, they have succeeded in delaying full compliance with the normative and legal aspects of these obligations. In each case, the international community has failed to show resilience or intensity of concern beyond rhetorical statements. If these two countries are permitted to have nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile capabilities, what lesson will other states draw from this situation? And, what capabilities will other states seek if they must confront the threats emerging from Iraq and North Korea? The ways in which these two situations are addressed will be at the crux of whether countries continue to perceive the NPT, the CWC, and the BWC as being in their best interests.

Another critical issue is how the nuclear weapon states, especially Russia and the United States, discuss and perceive their inventories of nuclear weapons. Even as progress in strategic arms control continues, the nuclear weapon states need to be truly committed to their NPT Article VI obligations. Only the nuclear weapon states can demonstrate their intent to lessen the role of nuclear weapons and delegitimize their value. Without such activities, not only is the underlying agreement of the NPT threatened, but India and Pakistan (and others?) are also provided justifications for going down their nuclear paths.

A third issue is BW: though it has long been ignored as unusable and therefore not a threat, changes in technology and motivations may combine to make this type of weaponry a more threatening concern than nuclear weapons. Yet we have an ineffective treaty that many would argue has substantial compliance problems and to which many key states are not even party. Meanwhile, the technical base of biological weapons is rapidly evolving and increasingly available, making BW attractive to terrorists and states with concerns about redressing asymmetries in power. The dual-use nature of BW technology also makes it hard to develop adequate transparency, given the sensitivities of the biotechnology industry to commercial proprietary information. Without more attention, efforts to strengthen the BWC are probably doomed; without more concern about noncompliance regarding the BWC now, efforts to limit the future use of BW are also probably doomed to fail. An effective use of BW that is met with weak international response will open the proliferation Pandora’s box.

Future Nonproliferation Challenges

As we look to the future, two other issues emerge as substantial challenges. First, what will be the role of the United Nations? Will the secretary-general be a key player in monitoring nonproliferation progress? Will the Security Council fulfill its responsibilities to address nuclear, chemical, and biological proliferation threats? Will the Security Council again be as effective as it was initially with Iraq, or will it be stymied by the insufficient commitments and differing agendas of its permanent members? If not the United Nations, then what other groups or methods will be developed to respond to future threats?

Second, new threats have surfaced that are not addressed by any one treaty or regime: WMD terrorism, and infowarfare. States and subnational groups may find both attractive, and yet we are just beginning to develop adequate national, much less international, responses and consequence-management capabilities. Much more needs to be done, sooner rather than later, if we are to avoid a major catastrophe. But given the state of affairs of the current nonproliferation agenda, is it realistic to think much will happen on the international level to address these new threats?

The Way Forward

With the Cold War behind us, we have an opportunity to transition from relying almost entirely on arms for a state’s national security to relying on arms control to reduce or eliminate many threats. In the early 1990s, many thought we had entered an era wherein entrusting part of our security to arms control and nonproliferation appeared to make excellent sense: the political context encouraged high expectations for continued progress in nonproliferation activities. Arms control helped reduce the threat of military conflict, it was cost effective, and it set the stage for additional arms control.

All this changed by the end of the decade, when several issues developed into serious challenges to the viability of the nonproliferation regimes. This crisis in nonproliferation will take time to address, both to recognize problems in the regimes and to develop lasting ways of dealing with them. It will also require policymakers to be patient, consistent, and politically committed to nonproliferation, rather than unilateral military force. Given the uncertainty of the new world order, old approaches that rely on military capabilities will not be quickly discarded, but also may not be very effective against the new emerging transnational threats. Each challenge to the nonproliferation regimes will require its own tailor-made response. But at the core of every successful nonproliferation effort will have to be not only US leadership, but also a broad international political commitment to take the necessary actions and expend the needed resources.

Is there a common commitment to nonproliferation? The usual assumption is that, even if the treaty regime might not function as smoothly as it could, there is an international norm against nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons proliferation. Looking at the record of some states, however, makes one doubt the existence of such a norm: the rhetoric appears hollow, even in the nuclear arena. In addition, states that accepted nonproliferation agreements because it was in their own interest may reconsider as nonproliferation efforts appear ineffective. The possibility increases substantially that states will seek their own means to protect themselves, rejecting international norms and legal obligations against weapons of mass destruction. If this were to happen, the nonproliferation regimes would collapse, leaving states without an international nonproliferation framework, yet still struggling with dangerous WMD arms races and proliferation threats.


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