CNS Occasional Papers: #3

Nonproliferation Regimes At Risk

CHALLENGES IN SOUTH ASIA TO NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES

by Lawrence Scheinman

The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998 put the nuclear nonproliferation regime under great stress. For the first time in 34 years, a state openly declared itself to be a nuclear weapon state. Unlike India’s 1974 test—a single event, carefully defined by the government of the day as a peaceful nuclear explosion, and not followed by declarations regarding nuclear status—the 1998 event involved a series of tests, followed by the Prime Minister asserting that India was now a nuclear weapon state and that it would not hesitate, if it chose to do so, to deploy nuclear weapons. Pakistan followed suit toward the end of May.

While leaders in India and Pakistan stressed the strategic and political considerations that informed the decisions in both capitals, the general view from outside the region is that overt nuclearization has created uncertainty and risk for both countries and made the region a more dangerous place. The 1999 military clash over Kashmir, involving insurgents crossing into Indian-held Kashmir from Pakistan, and the downing of Indian jet fighters over Pakistani Kashmir, only serves to heighten those concerns.

Although as of July 1999 neither side has deployed nuclear weapons, that may not always be the case. Assembly, induction, and deployment of nuclear weapons by both sides will negatively impact regional stability and security. Moreover, tacit international acquiescence in such embedded proliferation may have significant negative spillover effects on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. These considerations underscore the importance of developing and maintaining focused policies to mitigate the consequences of the events that have taken place and to restrain the future course of nuclear development, and encouraging the Indian and Pakistani leadership to support measures that advance nonproliferation and nuclear arms control and disarmament, even if they are not prepared to adhere to the NPT.

Reactions to the tests in the P-5, the UN Security Council, and the group of eight advanced industrial nations (G-8) converged on common themes, which focused on averting a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent and protecting the nonproliferation regime. In addition to condemning the tests, responses included calls for:

  • no further testing;

  • adherence to the CTBT;

  • non-deployment of nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable ballistic missiles;

  • support for a fissile material production ban, and a moratorium on production while a treaty is being negotiated;

  • tightening export controls over materials, equipment, and technology that could contribute to the development of WMD or missiles capable of delivering WMD;

  • exercising restraint in the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons; and

  • taking political steps to address and resolve long-standing differences that could lead to military hostilities between the two states.

STATUS OF NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION IN THE REGION

Progress toward these goals has been slow and halting, and in some cases subject to backsliding. Initial expectations of early signing of the CTBT, based on public statements by Indian and Pakistani leadership, remain unfulfilled. India’s declared interest in achieving an as-yet-undefined minimal deterrent forecloses any rollback possibilities in the foreseeable future, and raises doubts about how effectively fissile material production, and nuclear weapons and missile development and deployment, can be curbed. A fissile material production cut-off remains a distant prospect. In the area of export controls, it initially appeared that measures to strengthen and broaden controls would be undertaken with dispatch. Yet the view has emerged in some quarters in India that there are no problems to be fixed, and that if strengthened controls are what the United States and other states want, then India should expect something in return. This raises the question whether nonproliferation is valued in its own right, or is an appropriate matter to be held "ransom." Missile tests have continued on a tit-for-tat basis, ratcheting up in range and provocative character. Proliferation is not an all-or-nothing affair, but rather a matter of steps and degrees. And there is little evidence from the past year to give comfort that South Asian proliferation is in anything more promising than a holding pattern.

Proliferation in South Asia is the consequence of a convergence of three classes of motivations: security perceptions, domestic political considerations, and—particularly in the case of India—concerns and frustrations about international equity. The nonproliferation regime can affect the first of these issues, and provide support to domestic constituencies opposed to proliferation insofar as the second is concerned. But it has a more limited effect on the third, especially as the regime acknowledges (but does not create or legitimate on a permanent basis) differential status between two classes of states. For India, unlike Pakistan, the question is not only one of national security but also of international status and position, which, looking at the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, India equates with nuclear status.

Thus, the issue of proliferation in South Asia cannot be addressed by the nonproliferation regime and the NPT alone. More attention needs to be given to political incentives and intentions than has traditionally been the case, as reflected in the supply-side constraint strategies articulated by NPT leadership states. In the post-Cold War environment, in which local and regional interests, considerations, and concerns have risen in priority, closer attention needs to be given to the factors that motivate states. As long as nuclear weapon states maintain doctrines and postures that confirm the relevance of nuclear weapons to national security, and as long as the perception endures that nuclear status buys political standing, it will be difficult to move India away from its current positions on the NPT, a regional nuclear-weapon-free zone for South Asia, and implementation of some form of deterrence. This is true despite the fact that the security attained by such a unilateral deterrent is problematic at best, while the potential for negative spillover is high.

This situation calls for a policy agenda aimed at blunting the effects of South Asian proliferation, mitigating its potentially damaging impact on the NPT and nonproliferation regimes, and fostering an environment that amplifies incentives to inhibit, if not, at least in the near term, reverse, proliferation behavior. Steps in this direction have to be such that they neither reward nor are seen to reward proliferators for their behavior. This places outside the realm of plausible options:

  • engaging in nuclear-specific cooperation on anything other than the terms and conditions established by the NPT and the nuclear supplier consensus;

  • considering granting status such as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council to a state that has crossed the nuclear proliferation threshold;

  • acquiescing in "the new reality" by giving priority to "other" interests rather than to nonproliferation;

  • assisting the proliferators with transfers of relevant equipment and technology to stabilize their newly acquired nuclear weapons against risks of misuse, miscalculation, or accidental launch.

These postulates can be subject to some flexibility, in the context of packaged agreements that do not sacrifice the regime to momentary expediency. For example, it would be appropriate to consider flexibility on limited nuclear cooperation (e.g., on nuclear safety), in the context of South Asian participation in the CTBT and FMCT, and acceptance of international safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.

POLICY OPTIONS

There are no silver bullets, no quick and easy solutions, and no clever strategies that will survive the discerning eyes of Indian and Pakistani politicians and bureaucrats. Rather, a mix of incentives and disincentives is required. The following approaches will not be surprising or show-stopping, and are consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1172 of 1998, the G-8 communiqué, and other multinational communiqués and statements. If the nonproliferation treaty and regime are not to be compromised, then these goals, including eventual universalization of the NPT, should remain paramount for the international community.

  1. Focus on global nuclear arms control and disarmament measures, in particular the CTBT and FMCT negotiations. These are major building blocks for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. They are non-discriminatory, universally applicable arrangements that respectively cap qualitative and quantitative dimensions of nuclear development and acquisition. They should not be proposed as end points, but rather as building blocks in a long-term process leading toward the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons—an objective that the P-5 should collectively reaffirm, as they did at the 1997 NPT PrepCom. Thus the issue of existing stocks, which is a sticking point in FMCT, can be compartmentalized and addressed subsequently in the context of treaties that are universally adhered to and effectively verified.

    2. A first step toward progress on the CTBT is for those of the five weapon states that have not yet done so to ratify the treaty themselves. Preaching what one does not practice is a poor recipe for successful leadership. The United States has a special responsibility in this regard.

    In the case of the FMCT, China is the only nuclear weapon state that has not formally asserted that it no longer produces fissile material for weapon purposes. Given Indian security concerns, a first step would be for China to make such a formal declaration. A second step would be for the five de jure weapon states to codify their position on fissile material production, affirm a moratorium while an FMCT is being negotiated, and call upon India and Pakistan to do likewise and to work constructively for successful negotiation of a treaty in the UN Conference on Disarmament.

    Implicit in all of this is a need to ensure sustained commitment to nonproliferation among the nuclear weapon states. Breaks in the ranks—reflected in export policies, nuclear cooperation with proliferants, or tacit political support for them in areas suggesting their behavior is legitimate—will undermine nonproliferation in the long run.

  2. Although in the foreseeable future it is not even remotely plausible that India or Pakistan will reverse the actions that they have taken, Indian emphasis on the lack of progress toward nuclear disarmament underscores a concern shared by many NPT adherents. Indian pressure for negotiation of nuclear disarmament in the CD on the basis of a time-bound framework is not a plausible option from the point of view of the nuclear weapon states. But resistance to even allowing discussion of nuclear disarmament in the CD is overwrought: even given the principle of slippery slopes, discussion will not lead automatically to negotiations.

    3. While there has been little progress toward nuclear disarmament in the past year, over the past decade the bilateral negotiations and reciprocal unilateral measures taken by the United States and the Russian Federation have constituted considerable progress. Getting START back on track is more important than enlarging the number of players in the dialogue; that process has worked and is the only tenable approach for the present. Multilateralization can complicate the process and even be counter-productive. However, it should be possible for the nuclear weapon states to discuss disarmament, and to agree on and implement one or two measures to demonstrate another step toward nuclear disarmament in the NPT review conferences. These could include not only measures to reduce numbers, but also to increase transparency and to lock in irreversibility.

    Revitalized bilateral or bilateral-plus arms control and disarmament negotiations, coupled with discussion of the general issue in the CD, would remove a point of leverage for India with the non-aligned states. It could also serve to remove one rationale for whatever actions toward "weaponization" or development of a "minimal deterrent" that India might take. At the very least, it would provide ammunition to cooler heads in New Delhi regarding the pace at which nuclearization proceeds. It could also bear on the important issue of deployment of nuclear-armed missiles, and could help dampen the process of further development and refining of medium-range and especially intercontinental ballistic missiles.

  3. Confidence-building measures aimed at addressing legitimate security concerns that serve as an incentive to acquiring nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction need to be developed and implemented. These should include not only the regional players, but also China. Outside states may play a constructive role in assisting in the identification, development, and implementation (through technological assistance) of confidence-building measures that reinforce commitments such as those made in the Lahore Memorandum of Understanding.

  4. Missile proliferation restraint is critical. India has substantial indigenous capability in missile development and production, and Pakistan has become increasingly self-reliant. Both, however, remain reliant to some degree on external assistance, as demonstrated by India’s effort to acquire cryogenic engine technology from Russia and Pakistan’s long-standing cooperation program with China. This underscores the importance of strengthening the MTCR. But equally important is the need for increased efforts to persuade India and Pakistan to exercise restraint in missile activity, especially deployment of nuclear-capable missiles.

  5. Both India and Pakistan have ratified the CWC and BWC, and India has made a frank declaration of its past CW production activities. Full adherence to all aspects of these treaties would not only reinforce the global regimes they represent, but also remove any concern between the two parties that treaty-prohibited activities are taking place. This is an added element of a confidence-building regime that can help dampen proliferation-oriented behavior.


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