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CNS Occasional Papers: #9Return to Occasional Paper #9. Commentaryby Dr. Jack Woodall
1. Port Source The first official scenario was that the index case, a fisheries researcher, became infected with smallpox when she went ashore at one of three port cities visited by the ship. But in 2002 the scientist said she never went ashore and that female passengers were in fact expressly prohibited from doing so (no explanation for the prohibition was provided). The official report further stated that she had bought a towel, some fabric, and a dress at the market in Muynak on August 4. Contaminated fabrics are well known to transmit smallpox viruses; viz. the contaminated blankets distributed to American Indians in the past. But although she remembers the port call at Muynak, she denies going ashore, let alone buying anything there. However, it is presumably possible that she asked somebody else to get those items for her, and she simply has forgotten that. As the translators note, the official report contains many conflicting dates. The most important for purposes of analysis are those of the port calls and the arrival in Aralsk at the end of the voyage. To quote the official report (p. 26):
In fact, Patient 1 did state in her phone interview that no one on board the Lev Berg developed illness or fever. But the official report states on p. 29: "Patient 1 and her friend P., who fell ill a day earlier, associated their illness with the fact that they had felt very cold a few days prior, when they were casting nets from the boat." P.'s blood was tested but the results are not included in the report. It seems unlikely that P. would have been blood tested if she had not been ill. Note that the port dates are consistent in the two sections of the report, but the arrival date varies between August 8 and 11, and the onset of illness between August 6 and 11. Thus the official report excludes Muynak as the place where the index case contracted smallpox. Zelicoff also excludes Muynak on the grounds that the incubation time is too short, quoting a period of 11-15 days (95% CI). Based on their onset dates in relation to the earliest appearance of rash -- and therefore of infectivity -- in their contacts, Patients 6, 8, and 9 could have had incubation periods as short as eight days. Therefore, if Patient 1 fell ill on August 6, as stated in the official report, there was only enough time for her to have become infected during the port call on July 29, not at the one on July 31 or at Muynak on August 4. On the other hand, if her illness began on the day of her return home to Aralsk, as she recalls -- while not remembering the actual date -- whether that was August 8, 10, or 11, it brings the July 31 port call into contention (assuming that the port dates are correct). It seems unlikely that she would have forgotten being confined to her bunk for the last 5 days of the voyage, as the official report has it and which she denies. Whatever the reality of the dates, it seems that the ship was visiting ports and sailing in waters south of the island test range during dates that would fit the incubation period of her illness. According to the second scenario (below), teams from the Aralsk shipping company were sent to the port of Termez, where they transferred ship cargos from Afghanistan to trains, and one such team was en route back to Aralsk from Termez during August. Could a team (not necessarily the same one), northbound from Termez to Aralsk, have been in one of the ports at the same time that the ship called? 2. Trade Route Source The second scenario was that the virus originated in Afghanistan, where smallpox was still endemic at the time, and reached Aralsk from the southern border regions of Kazakhstan by land or waterway. This scenario differs from the first in that it postulates direct infection of Aralsk from the south without involving other Aral Sea ports and land transit points. Atshabar, in the Foreword, states that this hypothesis is less plausible because the disease could only have been transported from Afghanistan to Aralsk through Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. If people had become ill with smallpox in those republics, he says they certainly would have been detected, yet no such cases were reported. Zelicoff states: "In and of itself, the failure of the Soviet Union to notify the World Health Organization (WHO) of the 1971 outbreak suggests a sinister source for the epidemic." But non-reporting of infectious disease outbreaks in the USSR was routine at the time -- see the Introduction: "Epidemics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) often went unreported because they undermined the propaganda image of the socialist workers' paradise." On Zelicoff's premise, every failure to report cholera to the WHO would suggest a sinister source. The USSR reported importations of smallpox into the region from Afghanistan to the WHO in 1959 (one non-fatal case arrived by land at Termez in July) and 1961 (one non-fatal case arrived by land at Kirovabad in October), and none thereafter [1]. However, the big breakout of smallpox from Afghanistan to the west began in 1970, when the disease first reached Mashhad, which is located on Iran's northern border with the USSR, in October. From there it followed trade routes south to the Persian Gulf and west to Iraq, arriving in that nation by the end of 1971. Smallpox then spread through Turkey to Yugoslavia by 1972 [2]. It is logical that in the same time frame the disease would also have followed the road north from Mashhad, along the west coast of the Aral Sea to Komsomolsk-on-Ustyurt and Aralsk, and the Amu-Darya River from the Afghan border to Muynak on the Aral Sea and across it to Aralsk. The official report states (p. 30):
Since Patient 1 was already ill before August 29, as was her brother, Patient 2, and all subsequent cases were linked to her household, this scenario is effectively ruled out. 3. Fomites in the Aralsk Market as a Possible Source According to the third hypothesis presented on page 30 of the official report:
But an artifact does not have to be made of wool to carry smallpox virus -- clothing and laundry have frequently been incriminated in the past as carriers of the virus. Imported raw cotton was suspected of causing some outbreaks in England [3]. But in any case, no smallpox case was recognized in Aralsk before Patient 1's arrival there, and all subsequent cases could be traced back to her household. 4. The Biological Weapons Field Test Site on Vozrozhdeniye Island as a Possible Source This scenario is based on information derived from an interview with Burgasov's published in 2001. Burgasov's spreading of the disinformation that the source of the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak was contaminated meat had earlier destroyed his credibility. Is he trying to re-establish it now by claiming that this outbreak was the result of a biological weapons test? Zelicoff points out there are inconsistencies in Burgasov's account of the Aralsk incident, as he remembered it 30 years later; for example, his assertion that all the smallpox victims died. Another is his statement that the researcher was collecting plankton, when both the official 1971 report and the researcher interviewed by Zelicoff agree that she was collecting fish. So why should we now believe his statement that the research ship sailed inside the 40 km exclusion zone? Although D.A. Henderson recently has stated that it is possible to dry the smallpox virus and add stabilizers so it can persist a long time in the air like anthrax [4], it is improbable that the technology to do so had been invented by 1971. The state of the art at the time was published in a 1970 WHO report; airborne viruses could not be expected to retain their lethality for aerosol transmission of more than 1 km -- in contrast to Bacillus anthracis spores with a range of more than 20 km [5]. So even if the ship did come as close as 15 km to the island, as stated by Burgasov, it is unlikely that airborne infection could have occurred after the virus had traveled that distance. Referring to the virulence of the virus that caused the 1971 outbreak, I quote from the official report:
Alternatively, it could have been that her previous vaccination protected her, as well as the three other mild cases that had previous vaccinations. Further, "The source of the infection was [Patients 1 and 2's] family, from which the infectious agent spread to four households. By September 27 (i.e., within 5 days), the outbreak was contained." Taken together, this does not suggest that a laboratory-produced strain with enhanced virulence caused the Aralsk outbreak. Summary I start from the premise that, when interviewed in 2002, Patient 1 had no reason to falsify her recollection of events in 1971, whereas if the outbreak was suspected of being linked to secret experiments, the writers of the 1971 reports had every reason to alter events to fit a version that excluded the possibility of airborne infection at sea. There are major discrepancies between the 2002 recollections of Patient 1 and the 1971 official report. If the official report was an attempt at a cover-up, the authors went to extraordinary lengths. According to Patient 1, they fabricated a story that she went ashore at all three ports, bought textiles at the August 4 port call -- even though, by their own calculations, that was already too late to have been the day of infection (so why invent it? To give an air of verisimilitude?) -- that she and a female friend called P. both fell ill on board, and that she was bunk-ridden for five days before the ship's arrival back in Aralsk. Was this all false, designed to bolster the hypothesis that the infection was contracted on July 29 or 31 at one of those port calls rather than at sea? The translators noticed that dates in the original reports are inconsistent. Was this the result of alterations designed to place the ship at a port within the supposed incubation period, or was it simply bureaucratic sloppiness? I recall that the written U.S. response to the Cuban allegation that an American aircraft had sprayed Thrips palmi insects over their island was so full of contradictions that it looked suspiciously like a badly designed cover-up [6]. If Patient 1 had contracted smallpox in a year when there was no smallpox activity in any neighboring country, it would have been reasonably conclusive of an unnatural origin. But smallpox was spreading in the region, and the absence of any reporting from the USSR was not unusual. Recall that examination of autopsy specimens from the 1979 Sverdlovsk epidemic revealed multiple strains of anthrax in the same patient, an unnatural finding [7]. In that case, the location downwind of a military laboratory was definitive. On the other hand, after a hitherto unknown strain of hantavirus appeared in humans in 1993 in the region of several military proving grounds in western U.S.A., field research demonstrated that the strain was widespread in humans and wild rodents nationwide, and had been so for years previously [8], thus reducing the likelihood that it was an escapee from a military test. The location of the outbreak therefore appears to have been coincidental to the virus' natural range. Likewise, the location of the 1971 smallpox outbreak in Aralsk could have been coincidental to the presence of the smallpox virus in Afghanistan and other nearby countries. In spite of the two deaths from hemorrhagic smallpox, there is evidence for the strain involved not having been exceptionally virulent. Unless nucleic acid sequences can be obtained from the autopsy specimens, it will be impossible to say whether the smallpox strain involved was the Afghanistan 1970-71 strain or a laboratory strain. Of course, if an isolate from the Aralsk outbreak still exists in a deep freeze somewhere, and can be shown to be significantly different from the contemporary Afghan strain, then all would be clear. To conclude, my opinion is that there is at present insufficient evidence to decide between scenarios 1 and 4. Suggestions follow as to how the issue might be clarified. Further questions to Patient 1:
Suggestions for further research:
References [1] Fenner, F., Henderson, D.A.,
Arita, L., Jezek, Z., and Ladnyi, I.D. Smallpox and Its Eradication
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 1988), Table 23.2.
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