James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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Outside Publications by CNS Staff

An op-ed for the South China Morning Post, p.12.
August 29, 2002
Copyright © 2002, South China Morning Post Ltd.

China has issued long-awaited regulations on missile technology exports and a control list on specific items - an important step in nonproliferation policy which should be applauded.

Announced a few hours before US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage arrived in Beijing, it signals the leadership is seeking to remove a major sticking point in relations in preparation for President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States.

The regulations fulfil a November 2000 pledge to tighten controls on missile-related transfers, but this is not the closure of the contentious issue of nonproliferation between China and the US. However, the general trend has been a positive one.

Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing has made gradual, yet significant, progress in its nonproliferation policy, including joining major international arms control and nonproliferation treaties and conventions such as the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the development of a domestic export-control system.

This progress in policy stands in sharp contrast to its arms-transfer practices in the 1980s, when it was a major supplier to developing countries, including nuclear and missile related transfers.

Among the controversial exports were the sale of the Dong Feng 3 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia, HY-2 (Silkworm) anti-ship missiles to Iran, a nuclear-reactor deal with Algeria, and missile-related transfers to Pakistan.

The factors contributing to these positive developments include China's realisation of the danger that proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can pose to its own security, and its interest in maintaining a stable relationship with the US.

Despite these generally positive developments, serious concerns remain over Beijing's general approach to nonproliferation principles and practices. On the one hand, China has acceded to most international treaties and conventions that are broadly based with universal membership, and has, by and large, complied with their norms and rules.

On the other hand, it remains critical of the key multilateral export-control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Missile Technology Control Regime and has declined to join them.

This apparent word-deed gap is due to the different perspectives China and the US have on proliferation issues and thus Beijing's interpretations of its obligations and commitments. While the US has introduced broad-ranging nonproliferation measures and targeted particular states in implementing its policy, China has committed only to the global nonproliferation norms as embodied in the NPT and the CWC.

There are also differences in interests. Washington seeks to stem proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia out of its interests for the protection of US troops deployed in these regions, secure supplies of oil, the security of Israel, and stability in India-Pakistan relations.

Beijing regards its nuclear and missile exports as an important source of foreign exchange as well as ways of gaining influence in these regions. China may deliberately choose not to enforce its nonproliferation commitments as a way to retain its bargaining leverage with the US on issues such as missile defences and arms sales. The immature nature of its domestic export control system also explains its inability to monitor, much less control, export activities of companies competently.

The evolution of China offers important lessons for US policy-makers. First, China values its relationship with the US even as it has serious disputes with Washington. This enables the US to sensitise Beijing to its nonproliferation concerns through a mixture of inducement, incentives and sanctions. Engagement of China has served US interests and must remain an important policy instrument.

Second, Washington needs a clear sense of balance and priorities in managing US-China relations, promoting global nonproliferation agendas, protecting the US against ballistic missile threats, and honouring its commitment to supporting a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue.

Third, while China has introduced some elements of a domestic export-control system, a lot remains to be done and the US can and should encourage and assist efforts in this direction by offering training and institutional development support.

Finally, judicious and selective use of sanctions may continue to serve their purposes, especially when there are undeniable violations of nonproliferation commitments and when such activities are clearly sanctioned by the government. However, a rush to impose sanctions without giving time for clarification, checking evidence, and negotiation can generate a lot of animosity but not necessarily produce the desired outcomes.