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Outside Publications by CNS Staff

An op-ed for the Chosun Ilbo.
October 30, 2002.
Copyright © 2002, Digital Chosun.

The United States and its allies in East Asia are struggling to develop a strategy to address the growing threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Earlier this month, Pyongyang revealed that it is pursuing a program to produce highly enriched uranium, one of the two materials that have been used as the core of a nuclear weapon. The new program parallels the DPRK program of the late 1980s and early 1990s to produce plutonium, the other nuclear weapons material.

Fortunately, it appears that the new program is a number of years away from producing bomb-grade uranium. This could allow time for negotiations to shut down the enrichment program before it can add to the DPRK nuclear arsenal.

The plutonium program is a more immediate concern. Based on facilities in Yongbyon, this program was frozen under the 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework.

The U.S. government believes that by that time, North Korea had secretly produced enough plutonium for one to two nuclear weapons and has actually built those weapons.

Still, for the past eight years, the North apparently produced no more plutonium, and the facilities that would have allowed it to produce more have remained shut down and under monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The plutonium program is an immediate threat because at Yongbyon, North Korea has the ingredients for four to five additional plutonium bombs. The plutonium is contained in spent nuclear fuel from the Yongbyon reactor, which is stored at the reactor site next to the closed facility that was used to separate the plutonium for the North's first weapons.

What prevents the North from seizing this material and enlarging its arsenal? The only restraints are the pledges that the North made in the 1994 Agreed Framework and the presence of IAEA inspectors.

The United States has accused the North of breaching the 1994 understanding and has announced that it will suspend shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, which are required under the Agreed Framework to compensate for the lost energy output of the shut down Yongbyon reactor.

For its part, the North has called the Agreed Framework a "nullity."

Nonetheless, it is striking that North Korea has not demanded that the inspector leave Yongbyon. This is powerful evidence that Pyongyang still is looking for a grand bargain with Washington under which the DPRK would end its nuclear program and take other steps to meet U.S. concerns, in return for normalization of relations and economic assistance.

In May 1994, Kim Il Sung prevented inspectors from monitoring the Yongbyon site, as his nuclear specialists unloaded the spent fuel from the reactor there. This undermined the IAEA's efforts to learn the history of the fuel, from which the agency could have calculated how much plutonium the Yongbyon reactor had produced since it began operating.

The episode intensified the international furor over the North's nuclear activities, leading to the crisis that was finally resolved through the Agreed Framework.

Kim Jong Il may well see his father's exclusion of inspectors as successful nuclear brinksmanship. Still, despite his bold revelation of his country's clandestine uranium enrichment program, so far Kim Jong Il is not repeating the Great Leader's desperate gamble by ousting the IAEA from Yongbyon.

This is a significant departure and leaves the door open for talks with the United States (and Japan and South Korea) while avoiding a crisis atmosphere.

If talks are successful, tracking down North Korea's plutonium program will not be easy, but the parties already know what must be done. The history of the Yongbyon reactor and plutonium separation plant must be established, and the DPRK must place any plutonium separated before 1994 under IAEA monitoring.

The enrichment program, however, raises more difficult challenges because it is easier to hide than the plutonium program, with its large facilities.

The danger is that while Pyongyang might reveal a laboratory or pilot-scale enrichment facility as part of its deal with Washington, it will retain the technical knowledge to pursue uranium enrichment. This means it could simply replicate this capability in another, secret location.

Continued inspections at Yongbyon today are crucial to allow serious negotiations to proceed. Far more intrusive and comprehensive inspections will be required, however, to finally end the DPRK nuclear threat.