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Outside Publications by CNS Staff

An Op-Ed for the South China Morning Post
Copyright 2002 South China Morning Post Ltd.
July 24, 2002
SECTION: News; Pg. 14

The recently released US Department of Defence report on China's military power has focused attention on the nation's growing military capabilities and its intentions as a rising power.

While much of the information in the report is already known, the tone and emphasis are markedly different from the previous report released during the administration of Democrat president Bill Clinton.

The latest report reflects the suspicious attitude towards China prevalent in the Pentagon and among the more hawkish elements of the George W. Bush administration.

US China policy is in transition. The Bush administration has taken pains to differentiate its China policy from that of the Clinton administration. Important shifts, particularly with regard to the tactics of dealing with China, are evident in at least four areas. First, China's importance is being consciously downplayed. China is not considered as playing a vital role in advancing US strategic interests.

If anything, Beijing's strategic interests and policies are viewed as in direct conflict with Washington's interests.

Second, there is greater emphasis on conflicts in the bilateral relationship. During his election campaign, Mr Bush several times called China a "strategic competitor". While subsequent US official statements have retreated from that characterisation, the Pentagon continues to hold a very suspicious view of China.

The Quadrennial Defence Review and the Nuclear Posture Review reflect this perspective. All three documents implicitly or explicitly identify China as a potential military competitor in Asia-Pacific and a future challenge to critical US interests in the region.

Third, the Bush administration has moved away from a Taiwan policy anchored in "strategic ambiguity". The Clinton administration tilted towards a more explicit "one China" position expressed in these three principles: no to Taiwan independence, no to one China, one Taiwan, and no support of Taiwan membership in international organisations where statehood is required.

However, Bush administration officials have emphasised American obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, a strong preference for peaceful resolution of the issue, and explicit opposition to coercion and the use of force. Washington has made its commitment to defend Taiwan from an attack by the mainland very clear.

In April last year, the Bush administration approved the largest arms sales to Taiwan in more than a decade. Taiwan Defence Minister Tang Yao-ming was granted permission to travel to the US in March this year for a conference organised by private defence contractors. This was the first such high-level visit since 1978 and Mr Tang also met high-ranking US officials.

The administration signed a bill supporting Taiwan's entry into the World Health Organisation. Washington and Taipei are also engaged in substantive discussions about boosting bilateral defence co-operation.

US and Taiwanese officials held their latest round of biannual strategic talks last week in Monterey, California. All of these developments add substance to Mr Bush's controversial statement that the US would do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself.

Finally, the Bush administration has adopted tougher tactics in dealing with China. The administration will seek Beijing's co-operation where it can, but will also be firm in dealing with China when necessary.

Unlike the Clinton White House, the Bush administration will not subordinate concerns over specific issues to the broader goal of preserving the overall bilateral relationship.

A good example is in the area of nonproliferation. Whereas the Clinton administration sought to use the threat of sanctions as leverage to change Chinese behaviour, the Bush administration has used sanctions to penalise Chinese companies and individuals for alleged nonproliferation violations. Indeed, the Clinton administration imposed sanctions against China twice during its eight years of office, but the Bush administration has done so five times (including economic sanctions against eight Chinese companies announced last Friday).

The Bush administration is determined not to allow China to get away with what it considers to be irresponsible behaviour.

This shift in China policy has important underlying causes. The Clinton administration sought to deal with China through a strategy of conditional engagement. That policy was premised on an assumption that the United States could facilitate an orderly entry of China into international and regional institutions, allowing the world to avoid the conflicts that accompanied the rise of great powers in the past.

The Bush administration's approach to China has a different philosophical underpinning.

Many of Mr Bush's foreign policy advisers served in the previous Bush or Reagan administrations and were schooled in Cold War concepts. The world views of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice are informed by their Cold War experiences.

They deplore the Clinton administration's foreign policy as too soft, too focused on multilateral forms rather than bottom-line results and too indecisive. Not surprisingly, this group of policymakers has pursued realpolitik and decidedly unilateralist foreign policies.

Because of its self-conscious emphasis on alliance relations, the Bush administration largely ignored Beijing until the EP-3E spy plane crisis in April last year. Ironically, that incident raised China's importance on the immediate policy agenda and tested the administration's ability to manage a crisis through diplomatic means. The resolution of the incident illustrated the need for better dialogue between Washington and Beijing.

The September 11 terrorist attacks provided an additional impetus for rebuilding the bilateral relationship. Mr Bush travelled twice to China following the attacks, and Vice-President Hu Jintao visited the US in April -May this year. China and the US have engaged in other high-level exchanges, including discussions on the resumption of military to military ties and implementation of anti-terrorism measures.

Changes in US priorities following the terrorist attacks provide an opportunity to reformulate China policy. The need to build the broadest possible coalition against international terrorism has forced Washington to retreat somewhat from its tendency to rely on unilateral foreign policy actions.

This new US security agenda might have eased Chinese suspicions about US intentions, but efforts by the Bush administration to use the terrorist attacks to push for rapid deployment of missile defences, a larger military presence in Central and South Asia and a tougher policy towards China on the Taiwan issue have kept these concerns alive.

While the terrorist attacks and Mr Bush's visits to China may have arrested the downward trends and provided an opportunity for bilateral co-operation, the foundation of post-Cold War Sino-US relations remains fragile and many of the dividing issues remain unresolved.

Suspicions, distrust and apprehensions run deep underneath the veil of normalcy. The US has supported an expanded role for Japan's Self-Defence Forces under the name of anti-terrorism.

Washington has strengthened its relationship with New Delhi. Although both the US and India declare that their growing ties are not directed at any other power, the fact that some administration officials want Beijing to factor growing Indian-US ties into its security calculus points to broader strategic considerations.

Sino-US relations remain tenuous, which does not bode well for regional stability and longer-term international security.

The Pentagon report and the US-China Security Review Commission's report to Congress highlight the growth of China's military capabilities and infer what they view as its possible future malign intentions.

While both the Clinton and Bush administrations shared the same strategic vision of integrating China into the international system as a peaceful and responsible power, their tactics have been markedly different. Only time can tell whether Mr Bush's approach will be more effective. In this respect, the larger issue of how to effectively handle a rising China remains unresolved, and will continue to pose a serious challenge for the Bush administration.