Outside Publications by CNS Staff

Will We Be Ready?

Whether if it’s a bioterrorist hoax or the real thing, Canada is unprepared. Let's learn from the States, say security analysts GARY ACKERMAN and JEFFREY ALLAN

by Gary Ackerman and Jeffrey Allan

Copyright © 2001 The Globe and Mail
Thursday, February 8, 2001
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/

Most Canadians take pride in the belief that their country has been spared some of the less pleasant realities south of the border. Gun violence is more pervasive in the States; until last week, so was the threat of biological terrorism.

That perception changed abruptly when three major cities -- Victoria, Ottawa and Toronto experienced what turned out to be hoaxes. Although investigations have only just begun, in the Victoria case, the RCMP quickly noted similarities between the suspicious envelope sent to a Wal-Mart and nearly two dozen hoaxes that occurred in the United States in previous weeks. Because people, goods and information move freely across our mutual border, if s hardly surprising that incidents of this kind are now occurring in Canada.

In the emotion-charged atmosphere characteristic of a bioterrorist threat, it is easy to assume at first glance that any threatening letter could contain spores of the deadly anthrax bacteria, the biological agent mentioned in almost all bioterrorist threats to date. While if s true that anyone who inhales anthrax spores and becomes infected will almost certainly die if left untreated, the disease is not contagious and there's no risk of spreading it from one person to another. Most anthrax cases can also be successfully treated with antibiotics if diagnosed in time.

Besides, it seems highly unlikely that would-be terrorists would use it to kill off a mailroom clerk. What they would want is to cause as much disruption as possible. They can only do that if we let them.

Canadian authorities are understandably reluctant to appear to rely too heavily on U.S. experience in handling bioterrorist threats. Nevertheless a great deal can be learned, particularly when it comes to anthrax hoaxes. According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey, Calif., more than 200 anthrax threats have been made in the United States in the past 36 months. Not one of these cases turned out to be more than a costly public nuisance.

Almost half were linked to the expression of abortion-related sentiments. Although it is suspected that one person may have perpetrated multiple hoaxes, in the vast majority of U.S. cases, the culprit remains unidentified.

Anthrax hoaxes in the U.S. seem to come in waves where several consecutive threats are made against similar targets. This suggests that the media's reporting of an initial event may lead to copycat hoaxes. The point is illustrated by the case of Robert Peterson of Newark, Calif., in 1998. Court documents show that Mr. Peterson was inspired by previous media coverage of anthrax hoaxes and launched his own -- in the hope of being able to leave work early.

If there's anything to be learned from the U.S. experience, the Canadian media must exercise extreme caution when covering bioterrorism hoaxes, to avoid fuelling more incidents.

One of the most notorious cases of an exaggerated response to an anthrax threat occurred in Washington, D.C., in April 1997. Under-equipped emergency response teams stripped the people slated for decontamination in full view of the media and cordoned off buildings in a five-block radius. What the response teams lacked was a plan to coordinate their efforts.

Nearly four years and more than 200 anthrax hoaxes later, cases of overreaction persist. But local and federal U.S. officials in cities that have received appropriate training are more likely to know what is required when facing an incident of alleged bioterrorism. In addition to the training and equipment that the government makes available, various federal bodies attempt to educate both the public and those on the line of first response on how to recognize and react to such threats. While the FBI provides guidelines for local officials, the Atlanta-based Centers for Disease Control have developed notification protocols for bioterrorism incidents. The result is a more subdued response by emergency crews and less overall disruption.

What lessons have Canadian authorities drawn from the American experience?

Not enough, if press reports on the response to last week's threats are any indication. Indeed, their efforts echo the uncoordinated reaction typical of the earliest anthrax threats in the States. In the Ottawa case, employees working in the south tower of the Jean Edmonds building were detained for many hours, yet the tower itself was only shut down 12 hours after the incident began. Blaine Harvey, a spokesman for the Solicitor-General, admitted that Canada has no comprehensive interagency plan or procedures for dealing with bioterrorism.

While Canadian authorities must make citizen safety the priority, it's doubtful that taxpayers want to see their tax dollars spent on exaggerated responses to anthrax hoaxes. Individual U.S. incidents have cost authorities as much as $890,000 in Canadian dollars.

True, Health Canada, the Solicitor-General's office and the provincial and municipal governments have begun discussions, and the RCMP and Canadian Forces now have specially trained response units, but little seems to have been done to co-ordinate their efforts.

And more could be done to educate those most likely to deal with bioterrorist threats -- firefighters, local police, doctors and hospital staff. The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases conducted a worldwide satellite broadcast in September 2000, aimed at educating local officials about biological warfare and terrorism. Of 598 viewing sites worldwide, Canadians only applied for five sites -- and unlike U.S. sites, all were restricted, by invitation only. This is hardly the way to encourage broader understanding and a more coordinated response to bioterrorism threats.

Do the recent hoaxes point to a disturbing new trend in Canada? In a report in December, 1999, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service came to this conclusion and warned about the enormous disruption hoaxes can cause. Last week's events show what happens when there's little intergovernmental coordination. Let's hope authorities will step up their planning.

If dispersed efficiently (for example, sprayed from a plane) a bio-agent such as anthrax would present a serious danger of mass casualties and would likely come without a handy warning letter. This is a far cry from the risk posed by the average hoax envelope or telephone call. Canadians must prepare for both types of event, to ensure that a measured response is ready in either case.

Gary Ackerman and Jeffrey Allan are researchers at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California.

 

Author(s): Gary Ackerman, Jeffrey Allan
Related Resources: CBW, Americas
Date Created: 15 March 2001
Date Updated: -NA-
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