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Outside Publications by CNS Staff

An op-ed for the Asian Times.
January 8, 2003

The looming crisis on the Korean Peninsula poses a major test for Chinese diplomacy. As the United States and North Korea head toward a possible nuclear confrontation, China is positioned to play a critical role in defusing the crisis. To do so, Beijing may need to abandon its traditional passive posture in favor of a more active diplomatic role. Korea could be the crucible that reveals whether China's emerging status as a responsible great power is real or illusory.

China clearly has important economic and security interests at stake. These include both substantive interests such as maintaining a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and procedural interests in how the crisis is managed. In the past, Beijing has kept a low profile on Korean security issues and attempted to exercise its influence quietly. China's cautious efforts to preserve the security status quo and to maintain stability have placed it in a passive and reactive diplomatic posture.

China's response to the current crisis reflects this pattern. Chinese Foreign Ministry statements have called for supporting a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, maintaining peace and stability, solving the problem through dialogue, and preserving the Agreed Framework. The recent joint statement by Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed concern about the North Korean nuclear program and called on North Korea and the United States to normalize their relations through "constructive and equal" dialogue. These statements have highlighted the gravity of the situation, but do little to point the way toward a solution.

As Washington and Pyongyang continue on their collision course, both sides appear determined not to be the one to back down first. Their confrontation could force China to become more active. North Korea's admission of a covert nuclear-weapons program and the George W Bush administration's suspension of fuel-oil deliveries have probably destroyed the political basis for the Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang. China could play a key role in providing both sides with a graceful diplomatic exit to the current crisis, while laying the foundations for a longer-term resolution of the nuclear issue. Efforts to return to the status quo of North Korean nuclear ambiguity are unlikely to maintain stability for long.

There are several reasons Beijing should be more active. First is the urgent need to head off negative consequences for Chinese security interests. China's substantive concerns about Korea are defined mainly in terms of outcomes that should be avoided. The worst scenario is a nuclear domino effect where an overtly nuclear-armed North Korea forces Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan to go nuclear. This would profoundly reshape the security environment in Northeast Asia and prompt the United States to accelerate deployment of ballistic-missile defenses.

From China's perspective, a North Korean collapse would be almost as bad. South Korea might inherit the North's nuclear arsenal, and US forces based in a reunified Korea could have direct access to China's border. China would have little ability to influence future security arrangements on the Korean peninsula, and would have to deal with the economic burden of refugees fleeing a collapsing North Korean regime.

China also worries that the United States might use force to try to resolve the nuclear crisis. A war on the Korean peninsula would have major strategic, economic, environmental, and humanitarian consequences for China, even if weapons of mass destruction were not used. Economic damages would be tremendous, along with serious environmental degradation. China has strong incentives to play a more active diplomatic role in order to avoid these worst-case scenarios.

In addition to these substantive interests, Beijing also has procedural concerns about how the crisis is managed. These include a strong preference for a peaceful outcome, avoiding a unilateral US use of force without United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization, and having a voice in future security arrangements on the Korean Peninsula.

Advancing China's interests will require diplomatic acumen and a willingness to make some hard choices. China has historically been the least active member of the P-5 (the five permanent members of the UNSC) in tackling international security issues, with a tendency to abstain on critical votes. It has also sought to maintain balanced relations with both North and South Korea. But if Beijing wants to demonstrate its sincerity in promoting regional peace and stability and prove its credentials as a responsible great power, more will be required.

One way Beijing could help is by using its influence to persuade Pyongyang to halt its nuclear activities. China can convey to North Korea the seriousness with which not only the United States, but also South Korea, Japan, Russia and the international community views its nuclear brinkmanship. The recent visit to Beijing by South Korean officials shows Seouls desire for China to play a more active role. China should relay the message that overt possession of nuclear weapons will preclude the positive economic and political relationship with the United States that North Korea says it wants. At the same time, Beijing can credibly play the role of an honest broker in conveying North Korea's legitimate concerns to the United States. This will be especially important if the Bush administration persists in refusing to deal directly with the North.

Given China's own stake in a peaceful resolution of the crisis, Beijing might need to be more direct in warning North Korea that its actions threaten fundamental Chinese security interests. China's status as a donor provides important leverage. Continued intransigence in Pyongyang could force Beijing to reconsider its policy of providing sufficient economic assistance to help keep the North Korean regime afloat, including 90 percent of North Korea's fuel imports and 40 percent of its food imports. Threatening to cut off this aid would be risky, but might be the only way to head off even worse consequences.

China might also lead a multilateral initiative to address North Korea's stated reason for reactivating the Yongbyon reactor - the need to generate electricity in response to the suspension of heavy-fuel-oil deliveries. China could also call for revitalization of the regional consultative process for addressing long-term security issues on the peninsula, including security assurance from major powers, a possible nuclear-weapons-free zone on the Korean Peninsula, and a new security framework for the region. Russia could be a potential partner in these initiatives. Although these measures are unlikely to resolve the crisis by themselves, they could help provide a face-saving exit for Pyongyang.

Beijing's helpfulness in finding a way out of the nuclear impasse could help consolidate a fragile US-Chinese bilateral relationship that has gradually been rebuilt in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States and the war on terrorism. Successful resolution of the crisis could also reinforce the treaties that make up the international non-proliferation regime, which are China's preferred method of dealing with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

While there are good arguments for a more active Chinese role, it remains to be seen what specific measures Beijing will take. China played a positive role in defusing the 1993-94 nuclear crisis by working behind the scenes. However, this time Beijing's sought-after role as a responsible great power may require it to get its hands dirty.