James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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Outside Publications by CNS Staff

Published in the South China Morning Post. Copyright (C) 2003. All rights reserved.
Tuesday, July 22, 2003

On July 3, the US State Department imposed new sanctions on five Chinese companies for transferring unspecified materials to Iran. This follows the imposition of sanctions a month ago on China's North Industries Group Corporation (Norinco), also for trading with Iran.

As if to illustrate US concerns, a few days later Iran successfully tested a medium-range ballistic missile capable of reaching Israel and US forces in the Middle East. US concerns about Iran's nuclear and missile ambitions are warranted, but will these sanctions actually help block Iran's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development programmes?

Chinese exports of missile and WMD technology to the Middle East have been an important focus of US non-proliferation policy since the mid-1980s. In part due to US pressure, China promulgated a comprehensive set of export controls last year. Fulfilling its earlier pledges, its new rules comply (for the most part) with international export control regimes such as the MTCR and the Australia Group.

Although US authorities have not specified which items triggered the sanctions, most reports suggest the offending items were missile-related materials not on internationally recognised control lists. These latest measures were authorised by invoking legal instruments that allow sanctions in the case of transfers of any item that the US believes could assist with WMD development, regardless of whether or not the item was covered by international control lists.

These sanctions reflect demands that China use "catch-all" clauses in its export controls more vigorously to block any transfers that the White House might find objectionable. This shift unilaterally lowers the threshold of what activities are sanctionable and substitutes US judgments for international standards.

China has been reluctant to link its export licensing decisions to US assessments of non-proliferation threats. The Chinese government disagrees that exports of the low-level, dual-use items that provoked the recent sanctions contribute significantly to Iranian WMD development. China remains suspicious of US efforts to isolate and pressure Iran, having been itself on the receiving end of US pressure in the past.

Iran's recent missile test and revelations about the development of suspicious nuclear facilities illustrate that the US is right to worry about the destabilising effects Iran's weapons and missile programmes might have on Middle East security. The US has valid reasons to dissuade Chinese entities from transferring questionable dual-use items.

However, the recent sanctions are unlikely to achieve US objectives. At best, the latest sanctions amount to a slap on the wrist that is unlikely to deter trade or change behaviour. At worst, sanctions will be viewed by China as unwarranted US bullying.

China increasingly recognises the danger that the spread of WMD technology poses to its own national security. The nation's active role in seeking to broker a resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis is one indicator, as is its progress in building an export control regime that meets international standards.

If the US wants China to move beyond international non-proliferation standards, then it must persuade China that tougher enforcement of export controls are in China's own security interests. Lasting improvements will require Chinese officials to internalise non-proliferation norms. The US should recognise this and approach the problem of Chinese-Iranian trade more constructively.

A proactive policy aimed at assisting the development and enforcement of China's export controls could help halt Chinese trade in questionable materials. US export control assistance to countries of the former Soviet Union provides a successful example of how proactive policies help shape the non-proliferation policy of other countries. Measures under the Nunn-Lugar Co-operative Threat Reduction Programmes have helped other countries develop effective export control systems and increased awareness of the threat posed by WMD proliferation. To date, China has been left out of these activities.

Lingering problems of limited state capacity hinder effective implementation of China's new export control system. While the recent transfers to Iran are probably not the product of licences granted in error or transfers that slipped through the system, assistance from the US would enhance China's export controls and give America a channel to influence China's own proliferation threat assessments.

The latest sanctions appear to reflect the Bush administration's desire to isolate Iran, rather than concerns about the impact of the Chinese transfers. It needs to recognise that in the long run, unilateral policies that focus only on US security assessments and ignore established agreements and international regimes will not foster sustainable change nor stop other countries trading with Iran.

A Chinese export control policy based on a clear understanding of the global threat that proliferation plays is more likely to be sustainable and effective than one based on US coercion.