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Outside Publications by CNS Staff

An op-ed for the South China Morning Post.
Monday, October 14, 2002
Copyright © 2002, South China Morning Post Ltd.

As Presidents Jiang Zemin and George W. Bush prepare to meet in Crawford, Texas, later this month, their third meeting in a year, world attention will again turn to one of the most critical bilateral relationships in international relations.

Sino-United States relations have experienced uneven developments during the past decade as the two major powers grappled with the evolving post-Cold War international security environment, shifting domestic agendas and foreign policy priorities. While economic interdependence has contributed to growing trade, investment and technology transfers between the two countries, other aspects of the bilateral relationship remain tenuous.

One is the status of military-to-military ties between Beijing and Washington. Since the end of the Cold War, the bilateral military relationship has undergone a period of resumption and exploration, important achievements and major setbacks and sporadic efforts at improving mutual trust and understanding.

Among the key features of this relationship are high-level exchange visits of defence ministers and military leaders; confidence-building measures, including the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, annual Defence Consultation Talks and port visits; and regular contacts at the functional level between the two countries' national defence universities and military academies.

Through these contacts, the two militaries have started to exchange views on threat perceptions, perspectives on global arms control and regional security, defence conversion, military doctrines and broader politico-security issues.

Apart from official contacts, several Track-II programmes have been initiated. These include People's Liberation Army (PLA) officers attending seminars at US educational institutions and participating in regional multilateral security dialogues.

Although not considered as part of the military-to-military exchange programmes, these initiatives have contributed to the promotion of mutual trust and better understanding.

However, Sino-US military ties have experienced difficulties and severe setbacks, including almost a complete suspension following last year's EP-3E spy-plane incident.

Despite a steady increase in contact between the two militaries, the foundation for a stable bilateral military relationship remains lacking. There are a number of reasons.

First, the objectives, approaches and expectations are different for the two militaries and are based on their divergent interests. Progress has been possible where these interests coincide, while the disappointments are bound to arise as each expects outcomes that the other cannot deliver due to differences in perceptions, agenda and core values.

Under the premise of engagement and recognising the importance of the PLA in China's national security decision-making, the Pentagon has sought to achieve several broad objectives in its military contacts with China.

These include, but are not confined to: better communication between military commanders to avoid miscalculation and accidents; encouraging greater PLA transparency in defence budgets, military doctrines and force structure to better understand the scope and extent of PLA modernisation; conducting mutually beneficial functional and professional exchanges; and encouraging PLA participation in multinational military activities.

The PLA has several reasons for developing military contacts with the US. Beijing regards the Sino-US military relationship as an important component of the overall bilateral relationship; hence enhanced military contacts should reflect improved bilateral relations and vise versa.

There are also important psychological factors in that the PLA wants to be seen as a peer of the US military. Port visits enable the PLA navy to show itself off to the US public and at home. The PLA also wants to gain a better understanding of US military thinking, particularly in the revolution in military affairs, and explore the possibility of greater co-operation in the transfer of military technology.

Second, China and the US have different agendas and preferences even as they share some common interests in developing and maintaining bilateral military ties. The Chinese emphasise the importance of dialogue and exchange of ideas to clarify strategic intent, while the US is more interested in seeking greater transparency from the PLA, especially concerning defence budgets, force structure and military procurement.

In this respect, the US views the PLA as less than forthcoming in military transparency and reciprocity. Lack of reciprocity has fanned accusation from detractors and frustrated US defence officials. The US sources complain that PLA delegations normally receive detailed briefings and are allowed to visit US military facilities, whereas US visits tend to be show rather than substance, with limited access to personnel and facilities.

Not surprisingly, US-China military contacts have been attacked by conservatives who worry the PLA would use these contacts to learn about US doctrines, fighting strategies, joint training methods and other sensitive information that could improve PLA capabilities to fight the US military one day. Objections range from opposing PLA officers touring sensitive US military facilities and receiving briefings, to questions about high-ranking US military officials feeding PLA officers on sensitive military topics.

However, the PLA interpretation of, and interest in, military transparency differs from that of the US. The purpose of transparency should be to enhance security rather undermine it. PLA officers consider transparency in strategic intent as more important than detailed information about defence budgets and military facilities. But the PLA is gradually opening up, with the publication of defence white papers in 1998 and 2000 (a third white paper may also be published later this year) and limited military educational programmes offered at the National Defence University for foreign military officers.

The development of a stable bilateral military relationship is also hampered because of important differences in the security outlooks and military strategies between the two countries. The US sees its continued military presence and active engagement in regional security through bilateral defence alliances as crucial to regional stability.

It regards quick reaction and the ability to intervene as important post-Cold War strategic requirements. The Chinese want to regain regional prominence and freedom in dealing with what they regard either as domestic or purely bilateral issues.[an error occurred while processing this directive]

China's change of attitude towards multilateral security structures and an emphasis on security co-operation partnerships run directly opposed to US reliance on bilateral security alliances and forward military deployments. The September 11 terrorist attacks against the US provided additional impetus for rebuilding US-China bilateral relationships, including efforts to restore military-to-military contact.

The May visit by Vice-President Hu Jintao to the United States, and in particular his meeting with Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, and the subsequent visit by Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs Peter Rudman to China in June, are part of such endeavours.

However, challenges remain. Washington continues to give mixed signals.

The latest Quadrennial Defence Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon Report on China's military and the US National Security Strategy hint at the rise of China as a future military power that could challenge US interests in East Asia. Bilateral military relations will continue to operate under such constraints.

For a more stable bilateral military relationship to develop and be sustained, longer-term strategies must be formulated that emphasise engagement, exchange and better understanding of each others interests, priorities and policy options.

Such a relationship cannot be left untended to be swayed by the vicissitudes of bilateral relations during a crucial period of transition in international politics and adjustments for both. It must be constantly nurtured.

The importance of a stable US-China military relationship cannot be over-emphasised. It is critical for regional and global peace and stability. While the task of rebuilding such a relationship is daunting, China and the US must make their best efforts. The reason was captured succinctly by General John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a speech he delivered in 1997 at the PLA National Defence University.

''Improving our military-to-military contacts will not be easy. And, in order to earn big dividends, we must make a big investment. If we listen to the suspicious side of our military minds, if we don't pursue exchanges on a fair and equitable basis, if we lack openness, transparency or reciprocity, or if we hold back even routine information on our military forces, then we will fail.''