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Outside Publications by CNS Staff

For The Straits Times.
September 15, 2003
Copyright © 2003 Singapore Press Holdings. All Rights reserved.

IN HIS recent speech at the George Washington University, United States Secretary of State Colin Powell described current Sino-US relations as 'the best they have been since President Richard Nixon's first visit'.

Indeed, one could hardly have expected that this would be the state of bilateral relations when the Bush administration first came into office in January 2001.

Describing the Sino-US relationship as one of 'strategic competitor', President George W. Bush and his key foreign policy advisers began their term seeking to strengthen US military alliances in Asia and providing greater and more explicit support to the defence of Taiwan.

The April 2001 mid-air collision of a US EP-3 spy plane and a Chinese fighter aircraft, and the subsequent detention of the US crew members touched off a serious crisis. President Bush's statement pledging 'whatever it takes' to help defend Taiwan and the largest arms sale to what Beijing considers as a renegade island province further strained the bilateral relationship.

Ironically, it was the EP-3 crisis that refocused the administration's attention to one of its key bilateral relationships. However, it was the Sept 11 terrorist attacks that turned the bilateral relationship around from one of mutual suspicion, if not open hostility, to one of cooperation. Over the past two years, there have been four presidential summits. High-level exchange visits and bilateral consultation have been more frequent. Military-to-military dialogue has been resumed. And bilateral economic ties continue apace.

Beijing and Washington have also pursued close cooperation on key international issues. Two areas stand out in particular: anti-terrorism and the North Korean nuclear issue. Chinese responses to the Sept 11 terrorist attacks have been strong solidarity with the international community in its efforts to combat global terrorism.

While clearly preferring a prominent role for the United Nations, China nevertheless has cooperated closely with the US on cutting off financial sources for terrorist groups, greater intelligence sharing, closing off borders with Afghanistan, allowing the establishment of an FBI office in Beijing and, more recently, participating in the US-proposed Container Security Initiative, a plan under which high-risk maritime cargo containers are identified and examined for weapons of mass destruction at foreign ports before they are shipped to the US.

Beijing's active diplomacy in seeking a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis has also won praises from the Bush administration.

Mr Powell commended China's 'leadership role', in particular its efforts in hosting the April trilateral talks and bringing North Koreans to the recently concluded six-party talks.

While the substance and future prospects of the talks remain an issue of debates, the very fact that China has exerted diplomatic pressure over - and risk alienating - its long-time ally demonstrates how the two countries can collaborate on critical security interests in North-east Asia, something unheard of in the past.

No single factor can explain the turnaround of their bilateral ties. But there are strong indicators that both sides recognise the importance of developing and maintaining stable relations in the post-Sept 11 world and the need for policy adjustments.

For the US, homeland security, anti-terrorism and the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction have moved up on its agenda for the foreseeable future. While Washington very much desires a sustained American primacy and thus remains attentive to the emergence of great powers on the horizon, its pragmatic strategy now is one of seeking partnership even as it continues to display unilateralism and indeed has resorted to pre-emption to protect what it considers as its fundamental interests.

Beijing's leadership has seized the opportunity that 9/11 has provided to broaden the base of Sino-US cooperation and minimise and manage bilateral differences. This policy adjustment has been informed by a realistic assessment of the international strategic structure and China's priorities.

The US will remain as a sole superpower for a considerable period of time to come and will continue to be a key market for Chinese exports and a major source of foreign investment and technology transfers.

At the same time, cooperating with the US in combating global terrorism and resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is also conducive to achieving China's own security interests.

These are indeed laudable developments. But potential destabilising undercurrents remain, from the Taiwan issue to disputes over human rights and proliferation issues, and to differences over currency and trade balances.

The Taiwan issue will remain the most important and complex issue in Sino-US relations. While cross-Strait economic ties have deepened over the last decade with over US$100 billion (S$175 billion) in Taiwanese investment and 350,000 Taiwanese businessmen resident in the mainland, the politically touchy issues of unification and independence see no signs of any near-term resolution.

Handling these requires the highest attention from policymakers in Beijing and Washington, as well as their delicate signals and appropriate responses to developments in Taipei, in particular the run-up to next March's presidential election.

As the US presidential election approaches, contentious issues such as human rights, proliferation and trade are bound to emerge in, if not dominate, the domestic political debates. Sino-US controversies over trade deficits and what Washington considers to be an under-valued Chinese currency at a time of massive loss of American jobs will again test the resilience of the bilateral relationship in the months ahead.

While it may be true that 'all politics are local', in the US case, the ramifications may well spread beyond American borders and indeed across the Pacific Ocean. That is a challenge that both Beijing and Washington will do well to prepare themselves for now, not later.