James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

Outside Publications by CNS Staff

An article for The Chronicle of Higher Education.
Volume 52, Issue 15, Page B16
December 2, 2005 © The Chronicle of Higher Education. All rights reserved.

Nearly 30 years ago an indefatigable Canadian gadfly and sometime international civil servant by the name of William Epstein published a seminal book about the spread of nuclear weapons. Although long out of print and rarely cited by today's nonproliferation pundits, Epstein's The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control (Free Press, 1976) reads as if it were written only yesterday. The potential catalytic effects of India's "peaceful" nuclear explosion, the failure of the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to live up to its expectations, and the danger of terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons led Epstein to conclude that the mid-1970s represented "probably the last chance for the NPT" and the prevention of an uncontrollable nuclear arms race. The burden of responsibility for meeting this challenge, he maintained, was on the superpowers which, alone by their leadership and example, could gain acceptance for nonproliferation as a global norm.

A great deal has changed in the intervening three decades, not the least being the demise of one of the superpowers and the end of the cold war. A number of Epstein's worst fears also have not materialized. India's 1974 nuclear explosion did not lead to a dramatic acceleration of the pace of nuclear proliferation; the treaty has not collapsed; and terrorists have yet to steal, manufacture, or use a nuclear weapon.

Although one may take some comfort in that, many of the underlying problems with the nonproliferation regime remain as vexing and relevant today as they were in the 1970s. Moreover, recent revelations about the clandestine nuclear suppliers' network headed by A.Q. Khan of Pakistan, efforts by terrorists to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and the defection of North Korea from the nonproliferation treaty have led some experts to question both the durability and utility of the present nonproliferation regime. As one observer puts it, the regime is like a damaged safety-glass window, battered but still clinging to its frame and needing but one final blow to fall into a thousand tiny shards. The pieces still hold together, but for how long?

Recent books on the topic share the perspective that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is at risk and in need of major repair and reinforcement. In that, they concur with the Bush administration about the need for a new approach in U.S. nonproliferation policy. They vary significantly, however, in their ranking of specific proliferation threats and their preferred strategies for dealing with them.

Until recently prevailing views have tended to be very state-centric in their definition of the proliferation problem and to discount the risks posed by nonstate actors. That orientation is reflected in the nonproliferation treaty, which ignores the dangers of nuclear terrorism. A fixation on states has also long been the norm in the scholarly literature, although one can point to several significant exceptions, including the Epstein book. Because of that conceptual myopia, both the academic and policy communities have been slow to develop adequate frameworks for assessing and counteracting proliferation risks from nonstate actors.

Those challenges are the focus of Graham Allison's timely, frightening, and accessible volume, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. According to Allison, of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, the highest nonproliferation priority today is to prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or the material to manufacture them. Allison applauds the Bush administration for recognizing the inadequacy of current multilateral mechanisms to combat nuclear terrorism but castigates the White House for failing to devise a comprehensive alternative. He argues persuasively that by devoting most of its energy and leverage to Iraq, the United States neglected higher-priority proliferation threats and undermined key alliances necessary to combat terrorism effectively. Allison is particularly cogent in demonstrating the gaps in U.S. policy that could allow nonstate actors to acquire weapons-usable material and deliver a crude nuclear weapon to U.S. territory. He points out that huge expenditures on the last line of defense — antiballistic missiles — are a poor substitute for securing and eliminating nuclear weapons and materials at their source.

Under the nonproliferation treaty, U.S. policy has been to oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to any additional states. That course of nonexceptionalism, although not always adhered to strictly in practice, prevailed through the 1970s and 1980s when the countries of greatest proliferation concern — states such as Argentina, Brazil, Israel, South Africa, Taiwan, South Korea, and even India and Pakistan — were either friends of the United States, or at least not its adversaries. A similar policy persisted during the 1990s at a time when the number of states of proliferation concern diminished but were perceived by Washington to be more anti-American (e.g., Iraq and Iran).

In recent years, however, a new and more differentiated policy has come into effect. As one defense expert and supporter of the change observes, when it comes to nonproliferation, "the Bush administration is not afraid to distinguish between friends and foes." The reorientation has meant applying higher standards for nonproliferation compliance to some states and discounting the proliferation risks posed by others. In addition, it has had the effect of recasting the nature of the proliferation challenge from bad weapons to evil regimes and the preferred nonproliferation solution from weapons elimination to regime change.

Universal Compliance, a creative study by five associates of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offers a generally critical appraisal of the Bush administration's strategy of exceptionalism. As the Carnegie authors correctly observe, a fixation on combating a small number of "axis of evil" states — Iraq, Iran, and North Korea — ignores the lesson of history "that today's ally can become tomorrow's 'rogue' state." It also gives inadequate attention to the fact that terrorists pursuing nuclear weapons or weapons-usable material will go to the source regardless of the state's geopolitical orientation. From Al Qaeda's perspective, for example, it makes no difference if the weapons-usable material it acquires is of Russian, Iranian, or Pakistani origin. This shift in nonproliferation emphasis from what (weapons and material) to whom (outlaw states) has already resulted in missed opportunities and squandered resources. Those include the redirection of U.S. intelligence assets from nuclear terrorism to the war in Iraq, and a waste of taxpayer dollars on a missile-defense system that is unlikely to provide any protection from nonstate actors who constitute the "greatest single nuclear threat."

The Carnegie authors' discussion of how to deal with those few states outside of the treaty regime anticipates the most striking example of the Bush administration's selective approach toward proliferation — the July 2005 decision to adjust U.S. nuclear-export laws to accommodate full civil nuclear-energy cooperation with India. That momentous shift in policy toward a nontreaty state in possession of nuclear weapons may bring foreign-policy dividends in Asia as the United States seeks to promote India as an economic and military counterweight to China. It is apt to do so, however, at the cost of further eroding the perceived benefits of membership in the treaty, encouraging states that previously renounced nuclear weapons to reconsider, and undermining global efforts to strengthen nuclear-export controls. As the authors of Universal Compliance put it, Washington's first nonproliferation maxim should be Hippocratic: "Do no harm to states that could readily produce nuclear weapons but have chosen not to."

Who are these potential proliferators, and what factors account for their decisions to pursue or forgo nuclear weapons? The authors of the revised edition of Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats provide a convenient guide to the weapons capabilities of the five declared nuclear-weapons states; the nontreaty states with nuclear weapons; a country (Iran) that the Bush administration is persuaded is seeking nuclear weapons; and eight states that voluntarily chose, or were compelled, to forsake nuclear weapons. The volume displays a great deal of information concisely in tabular form. In addition to excellent analyses of the difficult proliferation cases of Iran and North Korea, Deadly Arsenals has the virtue of demonstrating that nuclear proliferation is not a one-way street and can be reversed, as was the case with three of the Soviet successor states (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), as well as South Africa. Regrettably, the chapters on the non-Russian successor states and South Africa provide only superficial commentary on the factors responsible for those countries' decisions to renounce nuclear weapons. Like most studies in the nonproliferation field, they largely ignore the domestic context in which key nuclear choices were made. Nevertheless, these chapters, as well as others in the book on "nonproliferation successes," are a useful corrective to many analyses that treat possession of nuclear weapons as a permanent condition.

The inability of participants at the May 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to overcome procedural paralysis and agree on any substantive recommendations almost certainly reinforced an existing conviction among the architects of current U.S. policy that international treaties are an inadequate means of dealing with today's pressing proliferation threats. From their vantage point, progress in nonproliferation will be achieved only by more streamlined coalitions of the willing. What these policy makers fail to acknowledge is the degree to which their lack of investment in preparations for the meeting, the inexperience of the U.S. delegation (no member had attended a previous Review Conference), and the uncompromising U.S. stance on disarmament issues contributed to a self-fulfilling prophecy.

As the authors of Universal Compliance point out, even the most powerful nation today cannot expect to curb nuclear proliferation by itself; international teamwork is imperative. Like Epstein many years ago, the Carnegie authors argue persuasively that the nuclear-weapons states, particularly the United States, must provide nonproliferation leadership by example, and demonstrate that tougher export controls and higher standards for compliance apply to all. "Success," they observe, "will depend on the United States' ability to marshal legitimate authority that motivates others to follow."

A similar theme is sounded by Stephen M. Walt, also of the Kennedy School, in his penetrating study Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy. He asserts that in order for the United States to succeed in its legitimate efforts to restrict access to portions of the nuclear fuel cycle and intercept nuclear contraband on the high seas, Washington must alter its own nuclear-weapons policies. Drawing on a metaphor used by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Walt notes that too often the United States resembles a nonsmoking crusader who tells everyone else to quit the habit while continuing to dangle a cigarette from his mouth. What is required, Walt suggests, is a "grand bargain" in which the United States accepts greater constraints on its own nuclear arsenal and offers security assurances to states vulnerable to U.S. military power, in exchange for more-stringent global controls on nuclear materials and improved means to verify treaty compliance by suspect states.

There is much to recommend in Walt's approach in tempering opposition to Washington's perceived arrogance in exercising its power. But his book offers few concrete recommendations on countering specific proliferation threats such as nuclear terrorism. The five Carnegie Endowment authors and Graham Allison are more precise in that regard. Universal Compliance includes 12 pages of recommendations devoted to strengthening law enforcement, blocking nuclear supply, and abating demand with special reference to regional crises. They include such practical steps as developing model national laws on the export and protection of nuclear materials, delegitimizing the commercial use of highly enriched uranium, and providing reliable and economically attractive fuel services to states that choose not to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium.

Allison sometimes stretches the facts to make a point, as when he overstates the confirmed loss of weapons-usable material in the former Soviet Union. It is misleading, for example, to assert — without reference to any sources — "that enough nuclear material to build more than 20 nuclear weapons was lost in the transition from the Soviet Union to Russia." Although significant quantities of fissile material may well have been diverted, the number of confirmed cases involving highly enriched uranium and plutonium is low (under 20), and the aggregate amount of material, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, is less than that required to manufacture a single nuclear bomb. There is also no basis for Allison's repeated claim that uranium must be enriched to more than 20 percent U-235 in order for it to be "pure enough to create a nuclear explosion."

Nevertheless, he outlines a number of sound principles whose timely pursuit could significantly reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. They include effecting a global clean-out of all fissile material that is not under adequate safeguards, halting the production of new fissile material, and adopting a "gold standard" for nuclear weapons and material to ensure that they are protected as well as the gold in Fort Knox. Underlying his recommendations is the simple but profound dictum: "no fissile material, no nuclear explosion, no nuclear terrorism."

The Carnegie Endowment authors and Allison also offer constructive ideas about how to improve the embarrassing condition of U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass destruction. They point, for example, to the need for the U.S. government to make much greater use of publicly available sources of information. Although there have been some recent advances in that regard, the prevailing mind-set in Washington still equates information that is classified with that which is correct and important. As a consequence, far too little use is made of open sources, especially those in languages other than English. As the late Sen. Patrick Moynihan once put it when asked what needed to be done to improve the then $27-billion-a-year U.S. intelligence effort, "it might help if the American foreign-relations community would learn to read." Today one might expand that sound advice: Learn to read blogs and conduct Google searches in Arabic, Chinese, Farsi, Korean, and Russian. The U.S. nonproliferation-intelligence and scholarly communities also would be well advised to be more attentive to the technical and political analyses available in often expensive but unclassified nuclear trade publications like Nuclear Fuel, Nucleonics Week, and Nuclear Engineering International.

The authors of Universal Compliance suggest that open sources can also be employed in the form of "societal verification" to enhance the capacity of international organizations to monitor nations' compliance with their nonproliferation obligations. For example, individual scholars or nongovernmental organizations might review and publicize the extent to which governments are fulfilling their nonproliferation-treaty and United Nations-mandated commitments, including the recent U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, designed to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Effective societal verification, however, depends on well-informed publics. Regrettably, far too little is being done in the United States to train the next generation of nonproliferation specialists or to provide basic education to its citizens about the danger of proliferation and means for its control.

Although not generally identified as such, complacency and ignorance may, in fact, be today's greatest proliferation challenges. They find expression in most national parliaments, which remain woefully uneducated about nonproliferation issues and unprepared to allocate sufficient resources to them. Otherwise well-educated citizens also know deplorably little about proliferation, although that's understandable given how few opportunities there are to study it. Few high schools have curricula that expose students to issues of weapons proliferation and strategies for their control, and opportunities at the university level are not much better.

According to a 2002 survey conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, less than one-third of the 75 leading colleges and universities in the United States offered any undergraduate courses devoted principally to issues involving weapons of mass destruction. Even at the graduate level, there are no more than a handful of universities in the world that offer a concentration in nonproliferation. As a result, at a time when the spread of weapons of mass destruction gravely threatens U.S. national security, there are few venues available for training the next generation of specialists or for introducing our future leaders to the subject.

The lack of an adequate pool of well-trained analysts with area-studies, language, and nonproliferation skills helps to explain the inability on the part of the U.S. intelligence community to forecast proliferation developments. As Walt points out, "the United States has starved its intelligence services, gutted its international-affairs budget, done little to attract the ablest members of its society to government service, neglected the study of foreign languages and cultures, and basically behaved as though it simply didn't matter whether U.S. foreign policy were run well or not." That approach, he argues, may have been sufficient in the past, but will not serve us well in today's world where otherwise weak and impoverished states may seek to deter the application of American military power by acquiring an arsenal of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

A useful step in bolstering graduate education in the topic would be to pass legislation creating a National Nonproliferation Education Act. Such legislation, perhaps modeled after the National Defense Education Act, could provide fellowships to U.S. and select foreign graduate students for advanced multidisciplinary training in nonproliferation. Such a bill could offer financial inducements to attract the brightest students to the field and to encourage more universities to offer relevant courses, especially those of a multidisciplinary nature and with a focus on regional security issues.

Writing about nuclear proliferation in 1976, William Epstein observed, "a feeling of pessimism and fear, almost of hopelessness, is abroad in the world." Recent books suggest that, if anything, the dangers of proliferation, regime collapse, and terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear explosives have increased manyfold in the past three decades. The routine assessment by political leaders of both major parties today is that terrorist use of nuclear materials is the paramount threat to U.S. national security.

What then accounts for the failure on the part of the most powerful nation on earth to take corrective action commensurate with that threat? Is it a lack of political leadership, a failure of imagination, faulty conceptualization, domestic politics, bureaucratic inertia, competing national-security objectives, wishful thinking, the intractable nature of the problem, or simply incompetence?

All of those factors contribute to our current predicament, but some are more amenable to correction than others. Perhaps the most fundamental shortcoming, and one that can be remedied, is the failure by government and academic analysts alike to distinguish clearly between the proliferation risks posed by state and nonstate actors, and to devise and employ tools that are appropriate for combating these very different threats. The challenge is an urgent but manageable one, affording us a second and perhaps last chance.