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Outside Publications by CNS Staff

An op-ed for the South China Morning Post.
Wednesday, January 15, 2003

The nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula shows no sign of abating as Pyongyang continues its brinkmanship, while the international community is trying to address the impasse.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, has issued its clearest warning yet to North Korea to reverse course or it will refer the issue to the UN Security Council, potentially leading to sanctions.

Washington, while not ruling out a diplomatic resolution, has scoffed at the idea of negotiating with Pyongyang unless the latter renounces its nuclear weapons programme.

Since last October's revelation of Pyongyang's covert nuclear weapons programme - a clear violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea - the Bush administration's positions and the international community's responses have been rightly driven by concerns over nuclear proliferation.

But what triggered the nuclear standoff? Until this critical issue is resolved, future nuclear crises could yet again break out, even if the current one is averted.

Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programme and its development of ballistic missiles have been driven largely by its acute sense of vulnerability in what it perceives to be a deteriorating security environment since the end of the Cold War. For most of the four decades following the Korean War ceasefire in 1953, North Korea's security had been guaranteed by its two key allies - the Soviet Union and China. Pyongyang was even persuaded by Moscow to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985.

But the end of the Cold War has drastically eroded North Korea's sense of security. In 1990 and 1992, Moscow and Beijing respectively normalised diplomatic ties with South Korea. The Soviet Union (and later Russia) and China were no longer willing to bankroll North Korea's failing economy, as South Korea's economic takeoff in the 1970s and 1980s widened the gap between North and South. Feeling extremely vulnerable and alone, Pyongyang embarked on the nuclear path to ensure deterrence and regime survival.

The 1994 Agreed Framework failed to remove the reason behind North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang waited in vain for the political windfall it had expected - expanded economic and political contacts with Washington in the hope of replacing the 1953 ceasefire with a peace treaty with the US.

The unfulfilled promise was followed by one of the worst natural disasters in North Korean history, leading to widespread famine and the death of around two million people. While humanitarian assistance from outside has helped to prevent a potential implosion in the North, the collapse of the Kim Jong-il regime has never been far away. Its security environment remains fragile, if not worsening. Mr Kim rightly concludes that time is not on North Korea's side and his nuclear brinkmanship seeks to draw attention to his country's security plight.

Amid the debate on how best to head off another nuclear crisis - whether through concerted international pressure, economic sanctions, engagement and dialogue - security analysts and policymakers should also start thinking (and re-thinking) broader strategies. These must pursue long-term stability for the Korean peninsula and be implemented at the bilateral and multilateral levels through a series of consecutive and supplementary steps.

The new strategies should focus not only on defusing the current nuclear crisis but also on moving beyond the non-proliferation prism. They should allow Seoul to continue playing an active role through its "sunshine policy" to clear long-held mistrust between the two Koreas and to explore ways to enhance economic, cultural and familial contacts.

However, that policy must also be supported by multilateral efforts to address North Korea's humanitarian, energy and economic development needs. These efforts should include the EU, Canada and Australia, with the aim of providing both the necessary short-term assistance and long-term infrastructural and human resource development.

A multilateral security framework seeking to address North Korea's security concerns through security assurance under the auspices of the UN can be undertaken with the implementation of the 1991 inter-Korea conventional arms control agreement and the denuclearisation treaty on one hand, and the return of the US and North Korea to the Agreed Framework on the other hand. Security guarantees from nuclear weapons states, a US-North Korea non-aggression pact, and a possible Northeast Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone would go a long way to ensuring long-term peace and stability in the region.

Finally, international efforts should focus on seeing Pyongyang return to its non-proliferation commitments, with the IAEA playing its role of monitoring and verification.

While the immediate concern would be to defuse the nuclear crisis, it is never too early to think beyond nuclear non-proliferation and crisis management to develop broader strategies aimed at long-term peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.