James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction with training & analysis

The Russian Federation and Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems:
Threats, Assessments, Problems and Solutions

CNS translation of a Russian government white paper on nonproliferation policy.

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Preface

The transparency of any state regarding its priorities in the sphere of international security is the most important means of strengthening confidence, increasing predictability in international affairs, and facilitating multilateral solutions to difficult problems. The National Security Concept, Foreign Policy Concept, and Russian Federation Military Doctrine are the basic policy documents in which these priorities are formalized.

The present publication is dedicated to one of the most important issues in the area of international security: nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means of their delivery. This topic has recently acquired even greater urgency thanks to the danger of terrorist use of various types of WMD. Russian President Vladimir Putin has called the problem of nonproliferation the "most important issue of our time."

Proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their missile delivery systems, is one of the major factors determining the nature of the threats to the national security of the Russian Federation, taking into account its geographical location and the length of its borders. The Russian leadership is paying particular attention to this question. The adoption last year of the Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Sphere of the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Their Delivery, the Comprehensive Program on the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Their Delivery for the Period Until 2010, and a series of normative legal documents concerning issues of nonproliferation and export control illustrate this concern.

The Russian Federation is actively participating in international efforts focused on issues of the nonproliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. Russia contributes to the resolution of these questions by political and diplomatic means.

As chair of the Group of Eight (G8) and organizer of the July 15-17, 2006 summit in St. Petersburg, the Russian Federation is giving due consideration to the topic of nonproliferation in that forum and will do everything possible to ensure that the Action Plan on Nonproliferation adopted by the G8 at Sea Island in 2004 will be fully implemented.

The aim of this document is to present the Russian view of key problems in this sphere, to elucidate possible methods for their solution, to draw the attention of experts and the general public to the steps that have been taken and will be taken by the Russian Federation in order to combat the proliferation of WMD and delivery systems.

CHAPTER I

Global and Regional Trends in WMD and Delivery System Proliferation, and Associated Risks and Threats to the Security of the Russian Federation and the International Community

Adherence to the principle of nonproliferation is one of the basic tenets of Russian foreign policy. According to Russia's National Security Concept, strengthening the WMD nonproliferation regime is one of the state's principal tasks. Proliferation of WMD is one of the main threats to Russian national security. An increase in the number of countries possessing WMD, particularly when these states are in regions bordering Russia, unquestionably presents a major threat to Russian security.

An expansion in the number of members of the WMD "club" is dangerous as it erodes the nonproliferation regime and could initiate a "chain reaction" of new states possessing the most deadly kinds of armaments.

There are still nuclear weapons on the territory of several non-nuclear states that do not formally possess such weapons, particularly in Europe. This situation cannot but elicit disquiet from the standpoint of nuclear weapons proliferation.

It must be emphasized that during the last 10-15 years, approaches to nonproliferation have become ever more politicized. The assessment of proliferation threats largely depends on the geopolitical posture of a given state, its relations with its allies, economic interests, and historical experience. Therefore, depending on their understanding of this term, individual states employ political, economic, diplomatic, and at times even force to achieve their WMD nonproliferation goals.

The Russian Federation remains committed to solving these questions primarily by political and diplomatic means. It considers the use of force an extreme measure that can only be employed on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution.

For the foreseeable future, the greatest threat faced by Russia and other states in the area of nonproliferation will emanate from the possible use by terrorists of some type of WMD. While the value of the doctrine of deterrence will remain as it relates to countries with WMD capabilities, where terrorists are concerned it will obviously not apply. As possible sources of WMD components for non-state actors (terrorists or their accomplices) one must consider not just military and scientific facilities, but also improvised designs that make use of "black markets" for access to WMD materials and technologies.

1.1. Trends in the Nonproliferation of WMD and Delivery Systems, and Related Risks and Threats

The global geopolitical changes associated with the end of the Cold War have affected the entire system of international relations. Instead of opposing blocs, there are now numerous crises and conflicts caused, among other reasons, by the tendency of certain countries to act hastily, without consideration for the global community and its universally recognized institutions. Simultaneously, the threat of international terrorism has grown sharply.

At the global level there is a clear weakening of the guarantee of national sovereignty, and interference, including by force, into the internal affairs of other countries, sometimes under the pretext of solving nonproliferation problems. There have also been dangerous attempts to justify the possible use of nuclear weapons in a "non-nuclear" conflict to strike "hard and deeply buried targets." Under these circumstances, some states are beginning to contemplate the nuclear choice as a means of deterring aggression, as a factor that would enhance their international status, and as a tool for attaining superiority over their neighbors and reaping economic benefits. In some states, where territorial disputes are being aggravated and there are political, economic, ethnic and religious problems, these issues are acquiring particular importance.

A serious factor that increases the risk posed by the emergence of new states possessing WMD and delivery systems is that a number of countries lack effective systems of physical protection and export controls over dual-use goods and technologies. This situation could lead to proliferation, including WMD materials and technologies falling into the hands of terrorists.

To date, the consequences of technological progress and the revolutionary development of information technologies have received insufficient attention as factors facilitating the rapid spread of knowledge about WMD.

1.1.1. Nuclear Proliferation Threats

When the international nuclear nonproliferation regime was being formed (the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT), one of its goals was to limit the number of states that possessed nuclear weapons (NW). This goal was basically achieved. Argentina, Brazil, and the Republic of South Africa gave up the military nuclear programs they had earlier. The "non-nuclear" option was chosen by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. At present, in addition to the "official" nuclear "five," India and Pakistan have military nuclear programs. Israel neither confirms nor denies the presence of nuclear weapons in that country. The DPRK has declared that it possesses these weapons. According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) data, approximately 20 more countries have the capacity for military nuclear capabilities; however, for various reasons they have showed restraint in seeking nuclear status. For some of them the "nuclear option" is only a question of political will given the current weakening state of the NPT regime: from the technological standpoint they possess all of the necessary means and components to build nuclear explosive devices. Given a threat to their national security or sovereignty, these countries could produce NW fairly rapidly.

Thus, there remain several main paths towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons today:

• unauthorized transfer of technology and expertise in the NW sphere to non-nuclear states (as confirmed by the A.Q. Khan network);
• indigenous development through the establishment of the necessary scientific and technical base, using open-source information;
• leakage of NW production technologies and other "sensitive" information as a result of the weakness or absence of adequate national controls.

The problems enumerated above are augmented and exacerbated by the growing threat of nuclear terrorism.

Although the probability of independent production of nuclear explosive devices by terrorists is low, given its technical complexity, it is possible that terrorists might develop primitive weapons using radioactive materials (so-called "dirty bombs").

1.1.2. Chemical proliferation

Despite the existence of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), the participation of states in this Convention is not yet universal, while the fulfillment of its provisions on the national level leaves much to be desired.

Factors conducive to the proliferation of CW are:

• the relative simplicity of the technologies for producing toxic substances given the current level of development of the chemical industry;
• the possibility of the legal acquisition of "dual-use" technologies, equipment, and materials suitable for CW production;
• the economic profitability and relative simplicity of programs to develop CW in comparison with other forms of WMD, as well as the difficulty of detecting such programs.

New risks are appearing in connection with research and development of so-called non-lethal chemical weapons. Work in this area includes the study of the latest advances in the pharmaceutical industry for the purpose of determining their possible use for the creation of non-lethal chemical weapons. Full-scale tests are being conducted on the effective radius of action of such chemical agents and on the basis of these tests means of delivery are being designed.

The Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan provided an example of chemical terrorism. There is currently a real possibility that toxic chemical substances could be used by non-state actors. The probability of terrorist use of toxic chemicals is considerably higher than the risk that terrorists will develop and/or use nuclear explosive devices.

There is a great risk that terrorists could use toxic industrial chemicals. They could also sabotage chemical facilities with effects comparable, for example, to the industrial catastrophe at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India. Collective efforts are needed to ensure the security of such facilities, including their protection against terrorists.

1.1.3. Proliferation of Biological Weapons and Dangerous Biological Agents

During the 30 years of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) not one state has declared its possession of such weapons. However, there is also no reliable information demonstrating the complete cessation of work on biological weapons (BW). Considering this uncertainty, and the fact that a significant number of countries are not prepared to join the BWC, it is clear that the threat of BW use in an inter-state conflict is real.

Scientific and technical developments and advances in recent years in the field of biology, biotechnology, genomics, proteinomics, and bioinformatics have opened up extensive possibilities for genetic engineering modifications of conventional biological agents, and have created the prerequisites for the development of new types of BW. With increased knowledge about living matter, it has become possible not only to destroy a living organism using biological methods, but also to manipulate it and affect its development, vital activity, reproduction, and heredity. New advances in biology and medicine combined with the latest computer and information technologies can be used to develop new types of biological warfare agents.

The following factors motivate the interest of BWC nonmembers in BW:

• the high economic profitability and simplicity of implementing a BW program compared to other WMD programs;
• the dual use of technologies, equipment, and materials suitable for the creation of BW (i.e. the possibility of their use for both civilian and military purposes), and the difficulty of detecting relevant infrastructure;
• the possibility of covert military programs in the BW sphere given the lack of a clear distinction between offensive and defensive activities.

The risk of the proliferation of BW is principally conditioned by the continued uncontrolled exchange (trade, transfer) of components for its procurement--strains of causative agents of dangerous infectious diseases, dual-use equipment, culture media, and technological information existence

Terrorism with the use of dangerous biological agents is an ever increasing threat. There is evidence that some terrorist organizations (in particular, Al-Qaeda) are considering the possibility of acquiring the relevant materials.

The 2001 distribution of anthrax spores through the U.S. postal system confirms the real possibility that terrorists may use biological agents. The use of the smallpox virus for a bioattack is no less of a danger. The termination of regular vaccination against this infection in the majority of states could lead to catastrophic consequences.

1.1.4. Proliferation of Missile Means of Delivering WMD

At present more than 25 states have missile complexes with ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD, or possess the scientific and industrial capacity for their production. At the same time, many states urgently need rocketry in order to implement civilian space programs.

In contrast to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, where legally binding agreements (the NPT, CWC, and BWC) limit their spread or ban them outright, there are no such agreements in the area of missile delivery systems. It is extremely difficult to differentiate between means of WMD delivery and legal conventional weapons - conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and space vehicle launch equipment. Conventional weapons (aircraft, missiles, UAVs, multiple launch rocket systems, and bombardment artillery) can also be used as means to deliver WMD.

At the present time, the main multilateral missile nonproliferation efforts are the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC). These agreements bring together a limited number of states with missile capabilities and cannot completely prevent the proliferation of missile means of WMD delivery.

The absence of clear international legal regulation of missile-related activities is one factor that contributes to the spread of technology, including those technologies needed to build intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The production of long-range ballistic missiles can be undertaken under the cover of developing or modernizing space launch vehicles. Some states aspire to acquire rocket technologies, final subsystems and components (control systems, fuel mixtures, engine casings, and electronics), and to purchase obsolete rocket models in order to use them as a basis for the development of systems with improved characteristics (primarily, in terms of payload and maximum flight range).

A serious concern is so-called "secondary proliferation," through which some countries that are not bound by obligations in the sphere of missile nonproliferation, and have already acquired related technologies, are working, sometimes together with other states, toward the improvement and development of new missile systems, as well as their sale overseas. Until recently, this sort of activity was typical of the DPRK and a number of other countries.

In addition, there are cases of exports of missiles and missile technologies from MTCR member states, including in violation of international commitments, in particular by Ukraine. U.S. research plans for the creation of space weapons are also a source of concern. These plans could provoke a number of states to acquire "cheaper" counterweapons, including WMD.

CHAPTER 2

International Efforts in the Area of the Nonproliferation of WMD and Means of Their Delivery

2.1. The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

The basis of the international regime for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the NPT. It has 189 member states.

India, Pakistan, and Israel remain outside of the treaty. In addition, North Korea [DPRK] announced its withdrawal from the treaty in January 2003.

During its 35 years in existence, the NPT has ensured that the global community made progress in preventing WMD proliferation. The recent emergence of new challenges to the nonproliferation regime, including the appearance of "black markets" for nuclear materials and technologies, can and must be addressed on the basis of the NPT. This approach was endorsed at the seventh NPT Review Conference that took place in New York in May 2005.

The NPT places obligations on non-nuclear weapons states to retain their non-nuclear status while at the same time it guarantees their right to the peaceful use of atomic energy. However, the examples of Libya, and to a certain extent the DPRK, show that the creation of a military nuclear capability is possible under the cover of the development of nuclear energy. Iran has thus far not clarified its past nuclear activity.

The IAEA monitors the implementation of NPT obligations regarding the peaceful use of atomic energy. The disclosure of Iraq's undeclared nuclear activity in the early 1990s demonstrated certain deficiencies in the system of IAEA safeguards with regard to detecting prohibited activities. These deficiencies prompted the Agency to adopt measures to strengthen the effectiveness and efficacy of the safeguards system. In 1997 a Model Additional Protocol to IAEA safeguards agreements was developed that significantly expanded the scope of monitoring of peaceful nuclear activity. The Additional Protocol has now been signed by 104 states, including all of the nuclear weapons states; it has entered into force in 69 states.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) made a significant contribution to the strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 2006 marks the tenth anniversary of the opening of the CTBT for signature; however, the prospects that it will enter into force remain uncertain. At this time, the CTBT has been signed by 176 states, 132 of which have ratified it.

Of the 44 states which must adhere to the CTBT for it to enter into force, it has not been ratified by China, Columbia, the DPRK, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and the United States. The position of the United States, which has refused to ratify the treaty, is not helping accelerate the entry of the CTBT into force.

Measures to control the transfers of nuclear materials and technologies, as well as dual-use commodities that can be used for the creation of NW, are carried out by multilateral export control regimes: the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The Zangger Committee (ZC) was created in 1971 (it now unites 35 states) for the technical interpretation of Article III.2 of the NPT, according to which each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide nuclear materials and equipment to any state that is not under IAEA safeguards. A list of such materials and equipment has been drawn up within the ZC framework.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was established in 1974, uniting the main exporters and producers of nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies, as well as non-nuclear materials for reactors. The NSG includes states that were not NPT members at the moment of its creation. In 1992, the NSG set up a regime for the control of transfers of dual-use goods. Today there are 45 states in the group.

A major addition to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime has been the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ). At the present time four such zones have been formed: in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), in the South Pacific (the Treaty of Rarotonga), in Africa (the Treaty of Pelindaba), and in Southeast Asia (the Treaty of Bangkok). The number of states covered by the NWFZ regime now exceeds 100. Work on creating a Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is being completed. At the same time, efforts to establish this type of zone in the Middle East have not yet been successful.

The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material entered into force on February 8, 1987. There are 116 states that belong to this convention today. At a Diplomatic Conference in Vienna held in July 2005, amendments to the Convention were adopted that significantly expanded its range of application.

The Convention now covers the storage, use, and transport of nuclear materials in member states, as well as measures to protect nuclear materials and nuclear installations from sabotage (or the diversion of materials). Provisions on international cooperation in the area of physical protection have been expanded, particularly where thefts of nuclear material are concerned. The convention also reflects the need to maintain confidentiality regarding information on physical protection.

Significant international cooperation is taking under the auspices of the IAEA Action Plan to combat nuclear terrorism. The Plan has existed since 2002 and provides for specific measures to improve agency activity in this sphere, particularly in such areas as strengthening national systems of nuclear materials physical protection, control, and accounting, and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

One aspect of this plan is the agency's establishment of a program for the creation and maintenance of a database on illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. The database, which is confidential in nature, contains information about cases involving the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials. The database program has existed since 1996 and now has 82 participating states.

2.2. International Agreements in the Area of the Nonproliferation of Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons

The Protocol for the Prohibition of Poisonous Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare of June 17, 1925 (the Geneva Protocol of 1925) made it illegal to use chemical and bacteriological weapons, but did not ban their development, production, and stockpiling. When signing this document, a number of states (including the Soviet Union, in 1928) made reservations, in accordance with which these types of weapons could be used as a retaliatory measure.

In 1992 Russia renounced its reservations to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 where they concerned the retaliatory use of BW.

In 2000, Russia adopted a law rescinding all reservations to the Geneva Protocol that had been made by the Soviet Union in 1928.

The CWC entered into force on April 29, 1997. It is the first global agreement providing for the elimination of an entire class of weapon of mass destruction under rigorous international control and the prevention of its reappearance. Russia was one of the initiators of its development.

As of January 1, 2006, five of six state possessors of chemical weapons (Albania, India, Libya, the Russian Federation, the United States and one additional country, which voluntarily declared the presence of chemical weapons and is undertaking their elimination) had destroyed more than 12,000 tons of toxic agents, which is about 17% of all declared reserves.

An increase in the number of countries belonging to the CWC is as an important measure of the effectiveness of the regime of the nonproliferation of chemical weapons. Today it has 178 member states.

In order to carry out the objectives and goals of the convention, ensure the fulfillment of its provisions, provide international verification of its observance, and create a forum for consultations and cooperation between member states, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established in 1997 with its headquarters in The Hague (Kingdom of the Netherlands).

The OPCW is working to expand the number of participants in the convention. A corresponding plan of action has been developed put into operation; in 2004-05 alone it resulted in 18 new states joining the CWC.

There are eight states that have signed, but not ratified, the CWC, including Israel. Eight additional states, including Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, have yet to sign the Convention.

The BWC was opened for signature on April 10, 1972. It entered into force on March 26, 1975. 155 states have submitted instruments of ratification and accession to the convention. Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are the BWC depositary states. Conferences are held every five years conferences to review the action of the convention.

Since 1995 there have been negotiations in Geneva by the so-called Ad Hoc Group of the States parties to the BWC (established by a Special Conference in 1994), that are tasked with developing a legal document (protocol) that establishes arrangements to verify BWC compliance. In July 2001, the United States rejected the nearly completed protocol to the Convention.

Plans call for the discussion of the issue of the further strengthening the BWC at the Sixth BWC Review Conference in the end of 2006. It is likely that a concrete plan of action will be adopted during the Review Conference.

BWC States Parties are obligated to report to the United Nations on a yearly basis--under the framework of agreed confidence-building measures--on their activity in the biological sphere, contributing to the establishment of greater openness and predictability.

The Australia Group (AG) (which unites 39 states) is an informal, voluntary export control regime. Its purpose is to limit the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons by establishing controls over transfers of dual-use chemical and biological products and related technologies.

Russia, while not a member of the AG, adheres to its rules and control lists.

2.3. International Arrangements to Prevent the Proliferation of Means of WMD Delivery

The MTCR was established in 1987 and brings together 34 states. Russia joined the regime in 1995. The main goal of the MTCR is to combat the spread of missile means for WMD delivery through the establishment of export controls on transfers of dual-use goods and technologies to nonmember states. The regime's basic documents are the guidelines and technology annex (a list of goods subject to control). Member states have agreed to exercise restraint in transfers of items listed in the technology annex. Taking into account new challenges and threats, the guidelines have been augmented with provisions that take into account the probability that controlled goods may be used by terrorists.

The HCOC was opened for accession in November 2002. Russia joined the Code that same year. The HCOC now has 123 member states.

The code is a compilation of basic principles of conduct in the sphere of missile nonproliferation. It declares the shared intention to deter and prevent the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering WMD. The code contains provisions for certain transparency measures: the submission of annual declarations on missile activity and notifications of missile launches to the HCOC Immediate Central Contact point (the Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Russia submits its annual declarations on a timely basis, and since 2004 has provided advance notification of missile launches. However, not all HCOC member states, including several that are very significant in the missile sphere, provide advance notification of missile launches.

2.4. UN Measures to Prevent the Proliferation of WMD and Means of Their Delivery

The main purpose of the UN, as set down in Article I of its charter, is to maintain international peace and security. The organization serves as the most important forum for resolving global problems, including the nonproliferation of WMD and means of their delivery.

The U.N. Security Council (UNSC) plays a fundamental role in questions of nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament. The UNSC's principal approaches in this sphere were set down in its corresponding declaration of January 31, 1992.

In April 2004 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1540, obliging the international community to combat the proliferation of WMD and delivery systems, and to prevent them from falling into the hands of non-state actors, terrorists first and foremost. In order to implement the resolution, a special committee (the 1540 Committee) was formed, which informs the Security Council about progress in the implementation of the resolution, and also makes relevant recommendations when necessary.

Issues tied to international security and disarmament are examined by the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) at its annual sessions. More than 50 draft resolutions and decrees, including those dealing with issues of WMD proliferation, are discussed there every year and then forwarded for UNGA approval.

In April 2005 the UNGA adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which was opened for signature on September 14, 2005 at the 2005 Summit. Negotiated following an initiative by Russia, this convention is the first universal agreement aimed at preventing terrorist acts with the use of nuclear material, which could result in the mass destruction of populations. The convention is designed to ensure the protection of both civilian and military nuclear facilities against terrorists.

In recent years, a group of governmental experts has been assisting the U.N. Secretary General to prepare a report on all aspects of the missile question. The first such report was approved at the 57th session of the UNGA. In 2004, the group renewed its activity; however, adoption of the new report was blocked by some states that are against the active involvement of the U.N. in resolving problems related to missiles. The group's work will be continued in 2007.

2.5. The Group of Eight and WMD Nonproliferation Issues

The issue of WMD nonproliferation occupies an important place in the activity of the G8. A G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation was adopted at the Sea Island summit in 2004. At the 2005 summit in Gleneagles a G8 Statement on Non-Proliferation was approved. These documents are directed at combating the proliferation of WMD and preventing them from falling into terrorist hands.

The G8 has declared its resolve to continue efforts to preserve and strengthen the NPT, has confirmed its support for IAEA activities, and the need for the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol.

The G8 has also confirmed its commitment to strengthening chemical and biological nonproliferation.

2.6. Other International Programs and Initiatives to Foster the Regime for the Nonproliferation of WMD and Delivery Systems

Cooperation with the countries of the CIS in WMD and delivery system nonproliferation plays a major role in ensuring Russian national security.

In 2003, the President of the Russian Federation approved a program of long-term cooperation with the CIS states in WMD nonproliferation, which is currently being implemented. It provides for consulting and technical assistance to the CIS countries in improving national legislation on WMD nonproliferation and export control. The program emphasizes the development of cooperation for the purpose of uncovering and suppressing the illicit trafficking of dual-use goods and technologies.

The Russian Federation is also actively cooperating with CIS states under international treaties and agreements, the most important of which are the Collective Security Treaty, the Treaty on the Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community, as well as the Agreement on the Formation of the Single Economic Space.

Given the appearance of new threats in the area of the proliferation of WMD and delivery systems, as well as the persistence of networks of "black markets" for "sensitive" materials, which are taking on sophisticated forms, it has became clear that traditional nonproliferation tools are inadequate. Multilateral treaties in the area of nonproliferation, developed with the expectation that states would adhere to them, are proving at times to be ineffective in preventing access to WMD by non-state actors and terrorists.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), proposed by the United States in May 2003, is one of the new tools. Its declared purpose is to strengthen the fight against the proliferation of such weapons and means of their delivery by tightening control over transportation and suppressing illicit trafficking in WMD materials.

The Russian Federation is currently planning to use the capabilities of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) for PSI. At the same time, it is pursuing the establishment of a similar structure in the Caspian region.

The Russia-NATO Council, in which views are exchanged on global trends in the sphere of the proliferation of WMD and means of their delivery, is becoming an additional arrangement for furthering the nonproliferation regime; modalities for possible joint political action to advance effective multilateral efforts to combat proliferation are under examination in the council.

CHAPTER 3

Russian Federation State Policy on the WMD and Delivery System Nonproliferation

3.1. The Legal Basis for Resolving WMD Nonproliferation Issues

Russia's strategic goals regarding nonproliferation of WMD and delivery systems coincide with the interests of most members of the global community. The Russian Federation is interested in maintaining and strengthening the image of a predictable and serious state, from the territory of which no sensitive technologies are being spread. It carries out an active policy to strengthen the WMD nonproliferation regime, participating in the work of the relevant international forums and organizations, primarily the UN, IAEA, the CTBT Organization Preparatory Commission, OPCW, and measures under the BWC and HCOC on preventing the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Russia participates in practically all international export control arrangements. The only exception for now is the Australia Group. Broad international cooperation helps Russia to adopt and consider the experience of partners in developing and strengthening its national system for the nonproliferation of WMD and means of their delivery.

The legal basis of Russian Federation state policy in the area of the WMD nonproliferation consists of international treaties and agreements. The national export control system in force in the Russian Federation with respect to dual-use goods and technologies that can be used for the creation of WMD and means of their delivery completely meets the requirements of multilateral export control arrangements, including legislation, licensing system, control lists, etc.

The main provisions of Russian Federation policy in the sphere of the nonproliferation of WMD and means of their delivery are reflected in the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, Principles of State Policy in the Sphere of the Nonproliferation of WMD and Means of Their Delivery, and the Principles of State Policy in the Sphere of Ensuring Chemical and Biological Security for the Period up to 2010 and in the Future. Specifically, the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept sets as one of its main priorities: "Russia reaffirms its unswerving course toward participating jointly with other states in averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, as well as related materials and technologies. The Russian Federation is an ardent supporter of strengthening and developing relevant nonproliferation regimes."

3.2. Main Directions of Russian Federation Policy in the Sphere of Nuclear Nonproliferation

Russia, as an initiator of the development of the NPT, is committed to its strengthening and universalization. The Russian Federation adheres to its NPT obligations arising from the treaty, including with respect to nuclear disarmament. Russia is consistently working to attract new countries that remain outside the treaty into the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.

At the U.N. Millennium Summit in New York in 2000, Russian Federation President Putin presented a new initiative on energy security to ensure the sustained development of humankind, a basic solution to nuclear weapons nonproliferation issues, and the environmental rehabilitation of the planet Earth. In implementing this initiative, Russia is supporting the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) at the IAEA. Thus far, methodologies for evaluating nuclear technologies according to a number of parameters have been developed under this project. The most important of these design parameters is security from the standpoint of proliferation. Research on existing and promising nuclear technologies is being conducted via this methodology.

In January 2006, Russian President Putin put forward an initiative on the development of cooperation in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Its main goal is to create a prototype of infrastructure that would ensure the access of all interested states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy while simultaneously strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The initiative, among other things, provides for the creation of international centers for nuclear fuel cycle services, primarily enrichment and the chemical processing of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) under IAEA control, as well as assistance in the development of nuclear power. It is open to all states that are observing their nonproliferation obligations.

Russia is providing assistance in strengthening the IAEA's safeguards system, including by funding a national program for scientific and technical support of Agency activity.

Russia advocates the universalization of the Additional Protocol, a major tool for ensuring the nonproliferation of NW. Joining the Additional Protocol should be one of the main factors taken into consideration when making decisions about possible nuclear exports.

Russia supports the activity of the IAEA on enhancing the safety and security of radioactive sources, and is harmonizing its national standards and regulations with international principles.

Russia's actions to repatriate highly enriched uranium (HEU) fresh nuclear fuel from Russian-built research reactors in third countries, with the participation of the IAEA, is of great significance in preventing HEU from falling into the hands of terrorists. This type of fuel has been returned to Russia from Serbia and Montenegro, Romania, Bulgaria, Libya, the Czech Republic and Latvia. Along with fresh HEU fuel, spent HEU fuel has also been repatriated from a research reactor in Uzbekistan.

Russia supports the IAEA program on reducing the enrichment of nuclear fuel for research reactors to a level below 20% [U-235], when it pertains to reactor installations located in third countries. Its implementation will significantly reduce the risk of the proliferation of HEU.

A proven measure for strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. Russia has supported the existing zone agreements for this reason, as well as the draft Central Asian NWFZ Treaty. Russia also advocates the creation of a zone free of nuclear and other types of WMD in the Middle East.

In addition to strengthening the system of existing agreements in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, Russia has consistently advocated the expansion of the international legal foundation in this field. In particular, among Russian priorities is a speedy beginning to the development at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament of a Treaty to Ban the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices.

Russia advocates the development of stricter, but objective, criteria that regulate the transfer of the most sensitive nuclear technologies, such as uranium enrichment and the chemical reprocessing of nuclear fuel. The Russian Federation does not transfer such technologies to non-nuclear states that do not possess them.

3.3. Russian Federation State Policy on Nonproliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

Russian Federation state policy on nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons is defined in the Principles of State Policy in the Area of Ensuring the Chemical and Biological Safety of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2010 and the Future, and in the Principles of Russian Federation State Policy in the Area of the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Means of Their Delivery.

Russian foreign policy priorities in this area are:

• strengthening international institutions (organizations) responsible for issues related to the nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons, including by strengthening the regimes covering the exports (imports) of goods;
• the complete elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and the industrial base for their production, in addition to making it impossible to renew such production;
• harmonizing national legislation and standardizing the approaches of all states with the generally accepted standards of international law.

The Russian approach is based on the active encouragement of the participation of all states in international treaties, which would make possible the geographic expansion of the scope of prohibitions, and enforce universal observance.

From the standpoint of domestic factors that eliminate the possibility that chemical weapons and biological materials will be spread, a primary role is played by the presence of the relevant legislative and normative basis and its harmonization with international treaties in the area of nonproliferation. A critical role in this sphere is played by the enforcement of effective criminal prosecution for prohibited acts, and the creation of the arrangements and procedures needed to support comprehensive and effective legal cooperation among member states.

The Russian Federation bases its position on the fact that meeting the requirements of the CWC and BWC in full by every member state without exception is a necessary condition for achieving the goal of the nonproliferation of these kinds of WMD.

Russia has consistently advocated the strengthening of the BWC by renewing the work on a verification arrangement that was stopped in 2001.

To meet its international obligations, Russia submits an annual report to the UN--within the framework of agreed confidence-building measures--with information on its activity in the biological sphere, which is conducive to creating greater openness and predictability in this field.

On the national level, the Russian Federation is carrying out the following basic measures:

• as a priority measure, chemical weapons are being destroyed (to shorten the time during which chemical weapons will remain potentially vulnerable to theft or attack);
• in order to rule out the possibility of the proliferation of CW and biological materials, they are provided with reliable physical protection, the corresponding normative legal base has been created and is being refined and harmonized with international treaties;
• criminal responsibility has been established for violations of the CWC and BWC;
• mechanisms and procedures have been created to support comprehensive and effective legal cooperation between states;
• export controls have been established that cover dual-use chemicals, biological materials, equipment and technologies, and criminal and administrative responsibility has been introduced for foreign trade violations involving them.

3.4. Russian Approaches to Resolving Missile Nonproliferation Issues

Russia has set the establishment of a Global Missile Nonproliferation Regime, based on a legally binding agreement, as a strategic goal. Ensuring the transparency of activities related to missile launches and programs, and excluding unauthorized and uncontrolled transfers of missile technologies from states that have them to other states, are of fundamental importance. The Global Missile Nonproliferation Regime would be a free-standing arrangement that would supplement existing accords (the MTCR and HCOC). Moreover, it is important that all major missile nations be brought into the regime.

Based on this approach, Russia proposed the step-by-step establishment of the Global Missile Nonproliferation Regime in 1999. As a first step, Russia suggested the creation of a Global Control System (GCS) for the nonproliferation of missiles and missile technologies that includes transparency of missile launches, security guarantees and economic incentives for states that choose not to have missile means of WMD delivery, and consultations. The proposal envisions that the GCS would be developed and operated on a multilateral basis under UN auspices. However, Russia's initiative has yet to achieve any significant practical development.

The HCOC is a useful tool. In order to entice major missile nations that are not MTCR members into participating in the code, Russia has proposed making amendments that account for the interests of "third" states (voluntary acceptance of obligations under the code, security guarantees, and economic incentives for states that renounce missile programs). This proposal remains a major direction of Russia's actions in the HCOC.

In the MTCR, Russia's approach is to enhance the effectiveness of this arrangement primarily by upgrading national export control systems (updating control lists, strengthening licensing and law enforcement, preventing missile components from falling into the hands of terrorists, monitoring transit and transshipping points, intangible technology transfers, and so on).

Russia intends to continue its efforts in support of conceptual proposals for the establishment of a Global Missile Nonproliferation Regime under UN auspices.

CHAPTER 4

Export Controls: An Essential Practical Tool for Preventing the Proliferation of WMD and Delivery Systems

4.1 State Policy Regarding Export Controls over Transfers of Technologies Related to the Production of WMD and Delivery Systems

State policy regarding export controls over transfers of dual-use goods and technologies is a constituent element of Russian Federation domestic and foreign policy, and is carried out for the purpose of ensuring national security and achieving state political, economic, and military interests.

State policy in this field is based on the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the 1999 federal law On Export Control, and other Russian Federation federal laws and normative legal acts.

The President of the Russian Federation determines the basic direction of state export control policy and ensures the coordinated operation and interaction of state agencies.

The basic principles of state export control policy are:

• the good faith fulfillment international obligations in the area of the nonproliferation of WMD and means of their delivery, as well as in the area of export controls over military and dual-use goods;
• the priority of national security concerns;
• the legality, transparency, and accessibility of information regarding export control issues;
• the implementation of export controls to the extent necessary to attain its goals;
• the unity of the customs territory of the Russian Federation;
• the harmonization of export control procedures and regulations with generally accepted international standards and practices;
• cooperation with international organizations and foreign states in the area of export controls in order to strengthen international security and stability and prevent the proliferation of WMD and delivery systems.

The main goals of export controls in the Russian Federation are:

• the protection of the interests of the Russian Federation;
• meeting the requirements of international treaties in the area of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery, as well as in the area of controls over the export of military and dual-use goods;
• the creation of the conditions for the integration of the Russian Federation economy into the world economy;
• the harmonization of export regulations with CIS nations.

In order to achieve these goals, a national export control system that conforms to internationally recognized standards has been established in the Russian Federation.

Export controls are carried out via procedures that have been established by the normative legal acts currently in force, in conformance with control lists of goods and services.

At present there are six control lists in effect in the Russian Federation, which have been approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation:

1. A list of nuclear materials, equipment, special non-nuclear materials, and related technologies subject to export controls;
2. A list of dual-use equipment and materials and related technologies that are used for nuclear purposes subject to export controls;
3. A list of goods and technologies that can be used to create weapons and military equipment that are subject to export controls;
4. A list of causative agents (pathogens) of human, animal, and plant diseases, genetically modified microorganisms, toxins, and equipment and technologies subject to export control;
5. A list of equipment, materials, and technologies that can be used for the production of missiles, subject to export control;
6. A list of chemicals, equipment, and technologies that can be used for the production of chemical weapons, subject to export control.

These control lists are harmonized with the control lists of goods and technologies that are currently in effect in industrially developed nations, and are based on the requirements of international export control regimes (the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, and Australia Group).

The Commission for Export Control of the Russian Federation coordinates the activity of federal agencies and provides managerial supervision of activities in the area of export controls. Commission members include the directors of federal agencies that are involved in export controls, the Russian Federation Government Administration, and other government agencies.

A specially authorized federal agency in the area of export control--the Federal Technical and Export Control Service of Russia (FSTEK)--is responsible for direct implementation of national policy, regulatory functions, and organization of interagency cooperation in the export control field.

The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (Articles 188 and 189) provides for criminal responsibility for violations of established procedures for exporting goods and technologies subject to export control. Criminal investigations needed to detect and intercept such violations under current legislation are conducted by the Russian Federation Federal Security Service (FSB) and customs agencies.

The Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation (Article 14.20) provides for the application of administrative sanctions to corporate entities and individuals who have violated statutory regulations in the export of goods, information, work, services, and intellectual property subject to export controls.
4.3 Status, Trends, and Refinement of the Russian Federation Export Control System

The presence of significant scientific, technical, and industrial capabilities in the field of the development and production of military and dual-use high-technology goods in Russia, together with continued increases in imported "sensitive" goods and technologies make the resolution of problems related to Russian Federation export controls an issue of strategic importance. A considerable number of federal executive agencies have been brought into the national export control system. The primary agencies involved include the Federal Technical and Export Control Service (coordinator), the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense, Russian Industry Agency, the Federal Space Agency, the Federal Atomic Energy Agency, the Russian Federation Federal Security Service, and other agencies.

Export controls in the Russian Federation are based on administrative procedures that cover foreign economic activities involving controlled goods and technologies, such as licensing or other forms of state approval for the export of such goods. The basis for granting a license is the conclusion of an expert review of an export deal. So-called "intangible" transfers also fall under export controls.

The national export control system applies the principle of "catch-all controls" with respect to goods and technologies that are not on control lists when there is information regarding their possible use in the production of WMD or delivery systems. Authorization for an export transaction in such cases is granted by the Russian Federation Export Control Commission.

A crucial stage in the exercise of export controls is the matching of particular materials, equipment, scientific and technical information, work, services, and intellectual property being exported with goods and technologies on the control lists: the so-called identification of controlled items and technologies.

The identification of controlled items and technologies in the Russian Federation is the obligation of the exporter who, however, has the right to transfer that obligation to an organization that has received special permission to perform this activity under a procedure established by the Russian Federation government. In this case, the expert organization bears the responsibility for the correct and substantiated results of the identification of controlled goods and technologies.

The presence of a system of independent expert identification is an important legal enforcement tool; expert support of customs and control agencies expands capabilities for keeping track of exports of "sensitive" goods and technologies in order to prevent their unauthorized transfer.

Considerable attention is being given to the development and improvement of this system in the Russian Federation.

Organizations [firms and companies] themselves play a significant role in the effective management of export activity in the national export control system. This activity is done on the basis of internal export control programs that are being set up in the organizations. According to Russian legislation, the creation of programs of this kind is mandatory for organizations engaged in scientific and/or production activity related to the defense and security of the Russian Federation, and that systematically receive income from exports of controlled goods and technologies.

The Russian Federation attaches great significance to activities that inform and explain policies to those involved in export activities. These activities are primarily targeted at those individuals responsible for export controls at industrial and research organizations producing and selling dual-use items. The aim of these activities is to establish a norm, under which all parties involved in exports understand and comply with Russian Federation export control regulations.

In addition, Russia pays considerable attention to enforcement measures against violators of export control legislation. For example, in the last few years alone there have been more than 60 criminal trials involving charges of unauthorized export of controlled items.

Furthermore, Russian security agencies have discovered and stopped more than 30 foreign citizens and companies that had illegal possession of goods and technologies that could be used for making WMD and delivery systems and attempted to smuggle them out of the Russian Federation.

Specifically:

U.S. citizen Nader Modanlo, President of Final Analysis, Inc., was refused entry to the Russian Federation for attempting to circumvent Russian export control legislation in order to acquire technical documentation on missiles and satellites for subsequent transfer to Iran;

Pakistani citizen Muhammad Aslam was refused entry to the Russian Federation for using his position as an employee of the Tabani Corporation's Moscow office to conceal efforts to acquire Russian weapons, strategic materials, and dual-use goods for the Pakistani missile and nuclear programs;

Iran's Sanam Industrial Group was foiled in its attempt to place an order with Trud Science and Production Association for the fabrication of missile engine components under the guise of gas pumping equipment. The Sanam Group's activities in the Russian Federation have been suspended.

The principle of the inevitability of punishment accompanied by an intensification of export control measures is among the current priorities of the Russian Federation export control system.

Russia, in cooperation with several CIS states, is working hard to unify national legislation in the field of export regulations. This activity is primarily being undertaken under the auspices of membership in the Eurasian Economic Community and the Single Economic Space. For this purpose, Russia has developed a model normative document on export control. In addition to furthering integration, one of the major goals of this work is to increase controls over international transfers of "sensitive" goods, including the establishment of information exchange between state control agencies.

The present priority areas for improving the national export control system are:

The further development of the normative legal base for export controls both through the regular adoption of national legislation to reflect decisions that have been made under international export control arrangements, and through the improvement of the legislative foundation for export control activities by federal executive agencies, including the resolution of issues related to combating international terrorism;

Improvement of informational and analytical support for export control activities, including an increase in national agencies' information-gathering capabilities and ability to share the results of international data exchange;

Further improvement of law enforcement activities in the field of export control through the elimination of "bottlenecks" in its legislative support, and the development of cooperation between law enforcement, customs, and control agencies;

Continued efforts to introduce internal export control programs in organizations [firms and companies];

Development and institution of a coordinated interagency position with regards to bilateral and multilateral cooperation with foreign states in the field of nonproliferation and export controls based on Russian national interests and priorities;

Continued development of cooperation with CIS nations in the field of the nonproliferation of WMD and delivery systems, including assistance in developing national export control systems that meet international standards.

CHAPTER 5

Practical Steps of the Russian Federation in the Reduction and Elimination of WMD and the Provision of Physical Protection for Nuclear Facilities

5.1 Strategic Weapons Reductions

The effectiveness of efforts in the area of nonproliferation is linked to the status of nuclear disarmament.

It is the position of the Russian Federation that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is only possible through gradual, incremental, progress based on a comprehensive approach in which all nuclear states participate while maintaining strategic stability. Russia is rigorously fulfilling its obligations in the field of nuclear disarmament.

According to the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START, signed on July 31, 1991; entered into force on December 5, 1994), as of December 5, 2001, Russia was to have reduced its strategic offensive arms to 6,000 nuclear warheads attributed to not more than 1,600 deployed launchers (intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers (HB)). In fact, at that time Russia had 5,518 nuclear warheads attributed to 1,136 launch systems.

The further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms is now being undertaken with funds allocated through Russian state defense orders, as well as with aid provided by the United States under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (hereinafter the Program).

By the end of 2005:

• 252 SLBMs of various types had been removed from the Russian Navy and eliminated: 91 in 2002, 84 in 2003, 48 in 2004, and 29 in 2005;
• 154 liquid-propellant ICBMs had been eliminated: 48 in 2002, 31 in 2003, 47 in 2004, and 28 in 2005;
• 34 solid-propellant RS-22 ICBMs had been eliminated: 4 in 2003, 15 in 2004, and 15 in 2005;
• 96 RS-20 ICBM launch silos had been eliminated;
• 28 rail-mobile launchers (RMLs) had been eliminated: 1 in 2002, 9 in 2003, 9 in 2004, and 9 in 2005;
• modernization of industrial facilities used to dispose of solid propellant through incineration was being completed (completion is scheduled for 2007). The incineration of solid-propellant RS-22 and RS-12M ICBM engines was begun in 2004;
• a center for the elimination of solid-propellant RS-12M ICBMs (the Votkinskiy Zavod federal state unitary enterprise) with a capacity of 48 ICBMs per year went into service in 2005. To date 19 ICBMs have been eliminated;
• a facility for the storage of 59 ICBMs and solid-propellant missile engines to ensure the pace of ICBM decommissioning, as well as reserve storage in case of a stoppage of the incineration rigs;
• modernization of a Russian Ministry of Defense facility for the elimination of ground mobile launchers (GMLs) in conformance with START, with a capacity of 50 units per year, as been carried out. Work has begun on the elimination of GMLs and demilitarization of launch-related facilities;
• strategic missile complexes of various types have been decommissioned, and special infrastructure at decommissioned Russian Ministry of Defense facilities has been dismantled: 3 in 2002, 5 in 2003, 4 in 2004, and 5 in 2005.

The decommissioning and dismantlement of strategic offensive weapons will be continued under the plan for the reform of the Russian Federation Armed Forces.

The commissioning of rigs for the incineration of solid-propellant engines in Perm and Krasnoarmeysk, the continued decommissioning and elimination of Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) launch areas, and the elimination of various types of ICBMs and SLBMs is planned.

According to the US-Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT, signed on May 24, 2002, entered into force on June 1, 2003), the total number of strategic nuclear warheads of each side shall not exceed 1,700-2,200 as of December 31, 2012.

The START treaty will expire on December 5, 2009. The U.S. and Russia face challenges connected with meeting the deadline requirements of the SORT and START treaties. This situation calls for the adoption of mutually agreed solutions.

The Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range Shorter-Range Missiles (signed on December 8, 1987; entered into force on June 1, 1988), which is of indefinite duration, remains in force. In accordance with this treaty, in the first three years of its operation Russia eliminated two classes of nuclear missiles: intermediate-range (from 1,000 to 5,500 km) and shorter-range (from 500 to 1,000 km). A total of 1,846 missiles, 825 launchers, and 1,761 pieces of auxiliary equipment were destroyed; 74 missile operations bases and 31 auxiliary installations were shut down.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, all nuclear warheads located on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan were shipped to Russia for elimination.

By the year 2005, the arsenal of the Russian Federation's non-strategic weapons had been reduced to three fourths of the size of the Soviet arsenal.

Thus, by the year 2005, Russia had reduced its nuclear arsenal to less than a fifth of its former size.

At the 2002 summit in Kananaskis, Canada, the G8 Global Partnership (GP) Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was established, calling on G8 states to allocate up to $20 billion over a ten-year period, primarily for cooperation in areas declared priorities at Kananaskis: dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines (NS), destroying chemical weapons, eliminating fissile materials, and creating jobs for former nuclear scientists.

Initially, the GP will focus on carrying out projects in our nation. For Russia, the priority areas for cooperation are in the dismantlement of decommissioned navy NS and the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles. Doing so will make it possible to fulfill Russia's international obligations related to the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as ecological problems that have resulted from the accumulation of a considerable number of NS and nuclear-powered surface vessels that await dismantlement.

5.2 Disposition of Radioactive Materials

Russia's contribution to ensuring the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament in the context of the NPT includes the implementation of a program for the processing of 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) extracted from Russian nuclear weapons into nuclear fuel (low enriched uranium (LEU)) for nuclear power plants.

The 20-year Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons (the HEU-LEU Agreement or "Megatons to Megawatts") of February 18, 1993 has been successfully executed over the course of ten years. In the fall of 2005, in cooperation with the United States, a quantitative "equator" was crossed: 250 metric tons of highly enriched uranium had been down-blended. That is the equivalent of about 10,000 nuclear warheads.

As a result, today Russian LEU from HEU is meeting 50% of the demand for fuel by U.S. NPPs, which generate 10% of all of the electricity used in the United States.

5.3 The Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles in the Russian Federation

The deadline for the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles that has been set by the President of the Russian Federation is April 29, 2012, which corresponds to the conditions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Russian Program for the Destruction of Chemical Weapons Stockpiles calls for the construction and operation of seven CW destruction facilities: in Kambarka, Udmurt Republic beginning in December 2005, in Maradykovskiy, Kirov Oblast beginning in the second half of 2006, in Leonidovka, Penza Oblast, in Pochep, Bryansk Oblast, and in Shchuchye, Kurgan Oblast beginning in 2008, and in Kizner, Udmurt Republic beginning in 2009. Operations in Gornyy, Saratov Oblast, were completed in December 2005.

Russia is meeting its international obligations under the CWC on the basis of relevant federal law, as well as the federal target program for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles (hereinafter, the Program).

In order to coordinate activity with the executive agencies of Russian Federation constituent entities and with federal executive agencies in carrying out the Program, a State Commission for Chemical Disarmament has been established by decree of the President of the Russian Federation.

The main source of funding for measures to fulfill the Convention is federal budgetary funds.

The Russian Federation is committed to the goals of the Convention, and is fully resolved to destroy its stockpiled CW by the deadline.

In 2000-2001, 100% of Category 3 CW stockpiles were destroyed (a total of 330,024 units of Category 3 CW were destroyed, including 4,737 pieces of unarmed airborne ordnance casings, 3 pieces of unarmed missile nose cone casings, 85,324 units of primer charges, and 239,960 units of explosive charges).

In the period from April 2001 through March 2002, 100% of Category 2 CW stockpiles were destroyed (3,844 rounds for conventional 112-mm caliber artillery were destroyed, amounting to a total of 10.6 metric tons of phosgene gas).

Plans call for the destruction of Category 1 CW stockpiles to take into account intermediate stages as well as the total requirements for the amount of toxic agent to be destroyed.

Considering its financial difficulties, the Russian Federation appealed to the OPCW in 2001, requesting an extension of the deadline for the destruction of 1% of Category 1 CW stockpiles (to April 29, 2003), and of the deadline for completing destruction of all stockpiles of chemical weapons to the year 2012 (prolonging the total time by five years). By a resolution of the Seventh Session of the Conference of the States Parties, in 2002 the Russian Federation was given a deadline of May 31, 2003 for the destruction of 1% of Category 1 CW stockpiles. In October 2003 at the Eighth Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Convention, the deadline for Russia's completion of the second stage of destruction of Category 1 CW (8,000 metric tons - 20% of the stockpiles of these weapons) was approved: April 29, 2007. Postponement of the deadlines for completion of subsequent stages, the third and fourth stages (45% and 100%, respectively, of Category 1 CW) was agreed to in principle by Convention States Parties.

In December 2002, industrial-scale destruction of Category 1 CW began at the first Russian CW destruction facility in Gornyy, Saratov Oblast. This facility was built with the assistance of Germany, the European Union, Finland, and the Netherlands. Most of the expenses for the construction of the facility were allocated by the Russian federal budget (77.7% of expenditures).

In April 2003, the Russian Federation carried out the first phase of the destruction of Category 1 CW: 400 metric tons of mustard--1% of total Category 1 CW stockpiles --were destroyed at the facility in Gornyy, Saratov Oblast. And in December 2005, 1143.2 metric tons of toxic agent were destroyed there, or 100% of Category 1 CW stockpiles.

In December 2005, CW destruction was initiated at the destruction facility in Kambarka, Udmurt Republic. In the course of comprehensive testing of process equipment in the first installation there, 1.759 metric tons of lewisite were destroyed. Destruction of CW was renewed in mid-February 2006. In March 2006, the second installation was commissioned. The facility is being incrementally brought up to design capacity under standard operating conditions. As of April 21, 2006, more than 140 metric tons of lewisite had been destroyed.

The completion of the destruction of CW at the Gornyy facility and the planned commissioning of the second CW destruction facility at Kambarka clearly demonstrate the efforts of the Russian Federation to adhere strictly to its international obligations, and are a confirmation of the fact that Russia is exercising its political will, consistently expanding the chemical disarmament process, making a weighty contribution to meeting the obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

In mid-2006, the Russian Federation intends to begin operating the first line at the CW destruction facility at Maradykovskiy, Kirov Oblast.

Plans call for the destruction of a total of about 8,000 metric tons of Category 1 toxic agent by April 29, 2007 (20% of Russian stockpiles of this type of CW). Facilities in Kambarka, Udmurt Republic, and Maradykovskiy, Kirov Oblast (operation of the first line at the facility) will be brought on line for that purpose.

By December 31, 2009, plans call for completion of the third phase with the destruction of 45% of Category 1 CW stockpiles, including the CW stockpiles that have been destroyed at facility in Gornyy, Saratov Oblast.

The facilities brought on line to destroy the 45% of Category 1 CW stockpiles will be those in Kambarka, Udmurt Republic, Maradykovskiy, Kirov Oblast, Leonidovka, Penza Oblast, Pochep, as well as the facilities in Shchuchye, Kurgan Oblast, and Kizner, Udmurt Republic.

All remaining Category 1 CW stockpiles are to be totally destroyed by April 29, 2012.

The facilities brought on line to carry out phase 4 of the destruction of Category 1 CW stockpiles will be those in Maradykovskiy, Kirov Oblast, Leonidovka, Penza Oblast, and Pochep, Bryansk Oblast, as well as the facilities in Shchuchye, Kurgan Oblast, and Kizner, Udmurt Republic.

The process of eliminating toxic agents is being carried out under the supervision of international inspectors from the OPCW.

In the destruction of chemical weapons, unconditional priority is given to issues of safety, the environment, and a favorable social climate conducive to carrying out this difficult task.

Extensive international cooperation is of additional assistance to Russia in the realization of its plans for the destruction of chemical weapons. At the present time, cooperation is under way with Canada, the Czech Republic, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The current task is the universal expansion of this cooperation to a scale commensurate with the global scale of the problem. Its expansion is evidence of the political support for Russia's efforts in this field.

5.4 Issues Related to the Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities

One of the main tasks of Russian Federation state policy in the field of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the improvement of the physical protection and guarding of facilities for WMD storage, operation, and destruction.

Activities to reduce vulnerability and improve the physical protection of facilities for the operation and storage of nuclear weapons is being done as provided for in the "Integrated Plan for Activities to Improve the Physical Protection and Guarding of Highest Priority and Critical Facilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces."

This plan calls for the annual delivery of integrated packages of physical protection hardware (PPH), and installation of this equipment in 6-7 nuclear facilities under the Russian Ministry of Defense. The upgrading of existing guard systems is being accomplished through the incremental introduction of modern PPH.

An important component of improving the physical security of nuclear facilities is international cooperation in this field being carried out under the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America Regarding Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Materials Accounting, Control and Physical Protection and the G-8 Global Partnership.

At the present time, Russia has well-developed practical cooperation with Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Consultations are being held, and pertinent documents are being formalized with the European Community, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and other states.

CONCLUSION

Resolving the problems related to the nonproliferation of WMD and means of their delivery directly affects Russian national security interests and the maintenance of strategic stability. This issue ranks among the priority areas of Russian Federation activity.

An important area of foreign policy activity is the strengthening and improvement of the system of international treaties and agreements regarding WMD nonproliferation and export control. The primary challenges in this area are the universalization of such agreements and accords, and ensuring that all states meet their nonproliferation obligations. There can be no exceptions to observing these obligations. Multilateral export control regimes must not be used to impose unfair terms of competition and force competitors out of international markets in weapons and high technology.

The Russian Federation has instituted and put into practice a legal basis that ensures the fulfillment of international nonproliferation obligations. Russian legislation provides for the implementation of a package of measures that ensure reliable physical protection, control, and accounting of nuclear weapons, hazardous radioactive, chemical, and biological materials. These measures also rule out unauthorized access to such materials and technologies.

A national export control system that meets world standards has been put into place and is steadily working to control transfers of goods and technologies that can be used for producing WMD, delivery systems, and other types of arms and military equipment. This system is constantly evolving to take into account new challenges and threats.

Recent events indicate that some state and non-state actors are not reducing their efforts to acquire WMD related goods and technologies. To achieve these goals, and conceal their plans and programs for producing WMD, they are attempting to find loopholes in states' export control systems, developing and putting into practice various workarounds and other methods to purchase and procure goods and advanced technologies. Existing international agreements and export control regimes are unable to entirely prevent transfers of this kind.

Therefore, it remains urgent that both international laws related to nonproliferation and Russian Federation legislation in the area of export control be improved in order more effectively to combat terrorism and carry out the provisions of UNSC Resolution 1540 on the nonproliferation of WMD. In addition, a regularly scheduled in-depth analysis must be made of this kind of legislation, and coordinated responses have to be worked out on both the national and international level. The constant monitoring of trends in the production of WMD and delivery systems by some states, as well as attempts by terrorist and extremist groups to gain access to such weapons and their components, remains urgent.

The Global Partnership Program that was developed by the G8 and is being put into practice provides many opportunities for solving problems pertaining to the area of WMD nonproliferation at the national level. Despite the current delay in the amount of assistance actually received, as compared to our partners' declarations, ongoing work is making overall progress in the priority areas identified by the President of the Russian Federation: dismantling decommissioned submarines and destroying chemical weapons stockpiles.

A basic component of Russian national security policy is the strengthening of relations with close neighbors, especially CIS nations. Deepening of trade ties is an important aspect of this policy. As a result, export control cooperation aimed at removing administrative barriers to mutual commerce in high-tech is an important goal. Of considerable significance is the enhancement of the effectiveness of controls over "sensitive" exports beyond the borders of the CIS states. In this regard, the gradual implementation of the Program approved by the President of the Russian Federation for Long-Term Cooperation between the Russian Federation and CIS Nations in the Area of Nonproliferation of WMD and Delivery Systems, and further development of cooperation with partners in the Eurasian Economic Community and the Single Economic Space, is a strategic objective.