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Outside Publications by CNS Staff

Friday, May 4, 2001
International Herald Tribune
Monterey, California

President George W. Bush, in a speech on Tuesday, established missile defense as his top military priority. His remarks focused almost exclusively on European concerns and U.S.-Russian relations. He mentioned China once and Japan not at all, yet the principal diplomatic and security challenges lie not in Europe but in Asia.

Several close U.S. allies in Asia face serious ballistic missile threats. China has, and North Korea is developing, missiles capable of reaching the United States. The region is going through a strategic transition as China's military capabilities increase, Japan debates its security role and the dangerous standoff on the Korean Peninsula continues. These challenges demand nuanced diplomacy that reassures allies, deters potential aggressors and creates a firm foundation for regional stability.

If missile defenses are deployed without a comprehensive regional strategy, they could aggravate U.S. relations with allies, further complicate tense relations with China and inject uncertainty into the regional security environment.

Mr. Bush is hoping to prevent this by starting a consultation process that includes sending envoys to the region for talks in the next few days.

The Japanese government views missile defense as one way to defend Japan against threats from missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Tokyo has agreed to conduct joint research on certain technologies for theater missile defense, but it is not committed to full-scale development or deployment. Japan's go-slow approach is based on concerns about cost, effectiveness and the potential negative impact on Chinese-Japanese relations and global arms control efforts.

Yet many U.S. strategists increasingly view theater missile defense as a litmus test of Japan's commitment to the alliance. The system is supposed to protect U.S. allies and forces in Asia. But it forces Japan's political system, when it is already under extreme stress, to publicly confront difficult issues such as security concerns about China, the degree of U.S. and Japanese military integration, and the Japanese military's future role in Asia.

Pressuring Tokyo to deploy theater missile defense could strain relations at a time when the United States is seeking to entrench the U.S.-Japanese security alliance as the centerpiece of the American security strategy in Asia.

The troubled visit to Washington in March of President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea showed that missile defense can aggravate relations with allies.

Mr. Kim, author of the "sunshine policy" of engagement with North Korea, believes that negotiations are the best means to deal with the North Korean missile threat. During the summit, Mr. Bush rejected negotiations by declaring that North Korea could not be trusted. The net result was to damage Mr. Kim's domestic political standing and inject tension in U.S.-South Korean relations. It also left the impression that America prefers a nuclear-armed North Korea - which would justify deployment of a national missile defense system in America - to a negotiated solution.

Missile defense raises even more troubling implications for Chinese-U.S. relations. U.S. policymakers see it as an insurance policy in case deterrence fails, which they view as a real possibility. In contrast, China believes that it is structured to negate its relatively small nuclear forces. Beijing sees missile defense as part of a political strategy to contain China's rise.

Beijing will react to U.S. plans to deploy national missile defense by developing countermeasures to defeat the system and by accelerating plans to modernize and enlarge its nuclear force.

Strategic dialogue and confidence-building steps could help diffuse tensions. China should be more transparent about its doctrine and the ultimate size and composition of its strategic forces. In exchange, Washington should reassure Beijing that missile defense is not intended to negate the Chinese nuclear deterrent.

Engaging in this kind of dialogue requires the Bush administration to clarify its thinking about China and develop an overall strategy for the relationship. The recent spy plane incident revealed the degree of mistrust and suspicion on both sides. Without such a framework, decisions on missile defenses or arms sales to Taiwan could spark a downward spiral in relations.

The threat of weapons of mass destruction spreading is real, but technology should not drive strategy.