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James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
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Outside Publications by CNS StaffNorth Korea Claims South Plans to Produce Nuclear SubmarineBy Daniel A. Pinkston An analysis for the WMD Insights.
The document excerpts on the DAPA website included references to South Korean plans to build three "medium-size next generation" submarines between 2010 and 2022, under the "SSX project." [2] Although details of the submarine design were not released, the extraordinary size of the budget allocation for the three submarines (?3.074 trillion, which is about $3.24 billion) led some analysts to conclude that Seoul is planning to develop nuclear-powered vessels. [3] The South Korean Ministry of National Defense and DAPA, however, have denied any plans to develop nuclear-propelled submarines. On January 9, 2006, DAPA Director Kim Chong-il insisted that there are no plans to develop a nuclear-powered submarine and that it was "absurd nonsense" to suggest that the next generation of South Korean submarines under the "SSX project" would be nuclear-powered. [4] Other South Korean military sources, however, say no decision has been made regarding propulsion systems for the vessels. [5] Questions regarding South Korea’s submarine plans first emerged in January 2004, when Choson Ilbo (Seoul) journalist Yu Yong-won reported that South Korean military authorities were debating whether to develop and deploy nuclear submarines after 2012. According to Yu, South Korean officials in May 2003 began to discuss the construction of nuclear submarines in order to deal with "potential security threats from other strong powers in the region following Korean unification." The South Korean Navy reportedly formed a working group of about 30 specialists to begin design work for the project. [6] In August 2004, Wolgan Choson, a South Korean monthly news magazine, provided more details on South Korean nuclear submarine production planning. According to reporter Kim Yong-sam, the Ministry of National Defense approved concept designs in June 2003. The inter-agency working group for the submarine project reportedly included officials from the ROK Navy, the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI). Former Defense Minister Cho Yong-gil is said to have been the driving force within the No Mu-hyon (Roh Moo-hyun) government to develop a nuclear submarine. Cho reportedly approved initial plans for developing such vessels in May 2003, as part of an "Independent National Defense Vision Report." [7] Although South Korea would face many legal and political obstacles to developing and deploying a nuclear-powered submarine, South Korean defense planners might see development of such a capability as a hedge against future uncertainties and potential instability in the Northeast Asia security environment. Nuclear submarines can remain submerged for extended periods, providing far greater range and improved survivability compared to conventionally powered submarines. Political and Technical Challenges According to the Wolgan Choson, South Korea would use a variant of the SMART (System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor) reactor, which KAERI has been developing since July 1994, in the next generation submarine. [7] The SMART reactor is a 330 MWt pressurized water reactor with integral steam generators and advanced safety features. It is designed for generating electricity (up to 100 MWe) and/or thermal applications, such as seawater desalination. Design life is 60 years, with a 3-year refueling cycle. A one-fifth scale plant (65 MWt) is being constructed for operation in 2007. [8] Apparently, the reactor will use low-enriched uranium fuel. [9] A South Korean nuclear-powered submarine would require enriched uranium fuel, which would raise a host of issues. The ability to enrich uranium would not only provide South Korea with the means for producing fuel for nuclear submarines; it could also be used for producing highly enriched uranium, usable for nuclear weapons. Seoul has long refrained from enriching uranium domestically, as part of its broader program of nuclear cooperation with the United States, from which it purchases enriched uranium for its nuclear power plants. At a time when the United States is seeking to halt the spread of enrichment capabilities to additional states, a South Korean decision to build a uranium enrichment facility would certainly roil relations with Washington. [10] In addition, the disclosure in 2004 of South Korea’s secret experiments in 2000 to enrich uranium using lasers raised significant international concerns that could cast a shadow over any future enrichment activity Seoul might undertake, triggering suspicions that would raise difficult diplomatic issues for the country. [11] These diplomatic problems could be exacerbated because of a special provision of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the treaty, non-nuclear weapon states like South Korea are required to place all their nuclear materials under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to ensure they are not used for the development of nuclear weapons. However, the treaty and the IAEA permit nuclear material to be kept outside the inspection system if it is used in a military program that does not involve nuclear explosives, e.g., for submarine propulsion. [12] The purpose of the exception, which has never been invoked, is to permit non-nuclear weapon states to avoid divulging classified details about their naval nuclear propulsion systems, such as the quality and quantity of fuel their submarine reactors use (factors that might yield insights into the boats’ ranges and other capabilities). The exception would thus permit a state to produce uranium of any enrichment level without oversight because the material was destined for submarine propulsion and to keep the material, once produced, from being inspected—at which point it might potentially be used for other secret purposes, such as for nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances, South Korea would inevitably stir controversy were it to produce enriched uranium submarine fuel and invoke this special NPT rule. Also restraining South Korea from developing a domestic uranium enrichment capability for a nuclear submarine program is that Seoul has pledged not to enrich uranium under the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" of 1992. [13] However, inasmuch as North Korea is accused by the United States and others of breaking this provision of the agreement and as Pyongyang has refused to implement other key elements of the accord, such as mutual nuclear inspections, under the principles of international law, it is not clear whether South Korea would consider itself bound by this understanding in future years. The alternative of obtaining enriched uranium from abroad for a nuclear submarine program would also pose difficulties. Not only are the United States and other nuclear suppliers unlikely to endorse Seoul’s pursuit of nuclear submarines, but the guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (composed of the 45 leading nuclear supplier states) require all transferred nuclear materials to be placed under IAEA inspection, a rule that Seoul presumably would not want to apply to its submarine propulsion program. Surmounting the political and legal obstacles to nuclear submarine deployment would thus carry considerable diplomatic costs for Seoul, an issue South Korean political leaders would need to address. Ultimately, the decision regarding the propulsion system for the next generation submarine will be left for the next president of South Korea to decide. South Korea, it may be noted, has considerable capabilities in the area of basic submarine technology. In 1970, the Agency for Defense Development began developing a small, conventionally powered submarine, the Tolgorae (Dolphin), which was deployed on March 1, 1985. [7] [14] South Korea decided in 1985 to suspend its submarine development program and procure vessels from abroad, but the ADD was able to train about 100 specialists in submarine design and construction. DPRK Response to Suspicions Surrounding the South Korean Nuclear-Powered Sub Project On April 1, 2006, the Korean Anti-Nuke Peace Committee, a Pyongyang-based organization under the Korean Workers Party, issued a statement condemning South Korea’s plans to build a nuclear submarine. The Korean-language version of the statement goes into greater detail than the English translation issued by the Korean Central News Agency; the Korean version cites the January 2006 DAPA Internet incident and other South Korean sources to support its argument. However, the statement is misleading in that it suggests the DAPA documents revealed the South Korean submarine reactor would use uranium fuel enriched to 90 percent U-235 - ideal for nuclear weapons - even though no direct references to the type of propulsion system were revealed. Some nuclear submarines use low-enriched uranium fuel that is not usable for nuclear arms and, as noted, the South Korean SMART reactor, which in some reports would be the basis for the South Korean submarine propulsion system, will use low-enriched uranium fuel. The Korean Anti-Nuke Peace Committee statement also accuses the United States of encouraging or defending South Korea’s plans. The allegation of U.S. complicity appears to be based on South Korean reports quoting anonymous South Korean Ministry of National Defense officials as saying it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to hide a nuclear submarine development program from the United States for very long. The Committee’s statement concludes that the DPRK has no choice in light of South Korea’s plans but to "strengthen its nuclear deterrent." [15] The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the (North) Korean Workers Party, carried an editorial on April 5, 2006, condemning South Korea for its nuclear submarine plans and accusing the United States of cooperating with South Korea to develop nuclear weapons in order to target the DPRK. The editorial criticized Washington for ignoring Seoul’s nuclear programs, while demanding that Pyongyang abandon its nuclear activities. This editorial also concludes that in this context, the DPRK must strengthen its "self-defensive nuclear activities" in response. [16] Sources:
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