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Uranium Smuggling Allegations Raise Questions Concerning Nuclear Security In The Democratic Republic Of Congo

Peter Crail and Johan Bergenas

Copyright © WMD Insights. All rights reserved

April 2007.

On March 6, 2007, Kinshasa authorities arrested two senior nuclear officials of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) for their joint involvement in illicit uranium exports. [1] According to press accounts, the accusations levied against Fortunat Lumu, the Commissioner General for Atomic Energy, and Bere Bemba Paulin, the Head of the Center for Nuclear Studies, involve each official in two different episodes: the disappearance of unspecified quantities of low-enriched uranium fuel from the Regional Center for Nuclear Studies in Kinshasa; and an illegal operation to export uranium ore from the country’s uranium mines. [2] While the two suspects were released four days after their arrests, they remain under investigation by DRC authorities, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has also expressed interest in examining the situation. [3] The allegations of uranium smuggling are only the latest reminder of long-standing international concerns regarding the poor physical protection and accounting measures in the DRC’s nuclear sector. While these episodes may ultimately prove to be false alarms, the continued vulnerability of nuclear material in the DRC poses a significant risk of exploitation by states seeking a clandestine source of uranium for weapons or by terrorists seeking material for a radiological dispersal device (“dirty bomb”).

Alleged Missing Uranium Fuel from the Kinshasa Research Reactor

Initial, unconfirmed, reports from the DRC newspaper Le Phare indicated that the arrests were in response to the disappearance in recent years of “more than 100 bars of uranium” and an additional unknown quantity of uranium contained in 25 helmet-shaped casings from the Regional Center for Nuclear Studies in Kinshasa (CREN/K). [4] Subsequent reports, however, left questions concerning the specific quantity and nature of the suspected missing material. DRC state prosecutor Tshimanga Mukeba, for example, said only that an “important quantity” of uranium fuel was taken from the facility. [5] Scientific Research Minister Sylvanus Mushi, the DRC’s top nuclear official, rejected reports that uranium fuel was missing, but offered conflicting statements regarding the storage of such material at CREN/K. He claimed on the one hand that, “We’ll verify, but you should know that there is no uranium stocked at the center,” while on the other hand adding, “if there is uranium over there, it is for research.” [6]

Given the differences in the press accounts and the claims being made by Congolese officials,

further efforts will be needed to verify reports regarding the missing uranium. It is known, for example, that contrary to Mr. Mushi’s initial comment that no uranium is stored at the center, spent uranium fuel was stored at the retired research reactor at CREN/K beginning in 2001 and is not known to have been removed. The center also maintains an operational research reactor that has been using uranium fuel provided by the United States. [7] The “bars of uranium” identified in the press most likely refer to the fuel rods used to run the operational research reactor, since the term “bars” is also being used in these reports to describe two fuel rods that were determined to be missing from the center in the 1970s (one of which was recovered from the Italian mafia.) [8] The helmet shaped-casings, however, are understood not to be uranium, but empty lead containers used to hold radioactive sources. In a frequently seen scam, the harmless lead containers, which carry radiation warning symbols, are spuriously labeled as unenriched uranium. [9]

The fuel rods in question each contain approximately 280 grams of uranium enriched to slightly less than 20 percent, material unsuitable for use in nuclear weapons. [10] (Uranium enriched to more than 20 percent in the most readily split uranium isotope, uranium-235, is considered usable for nuclear weapons, but actual nuclear arms use material enriched to considerably higher levels, usually 90 percent or more.) Moreover, even if a state that possessed the capability to enrich uranium were able to obtain the 100 fuel rods said by Le Phare to have been stolen, this material would contain only 28 kilograms of uranium metal, and further enrichment of the material would yield only approximately 6 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, well under the 25 kilograms the IAEA specifies as the “significant quantity” needed for a nuclear device. Nonetheless, the rods might be of interest to criminal actors seeking to profit from the sale of enriched uranium to unwitting purchasers on the black market, apparently the basis for the Italian mafia’s acquisition of at least one fuel rod from the Kinshasa facility several years ago. [11] Until clear evidence comes to light that uranium fuel is missing from the CREN/K, however, the allegations regarding the theft of uranium from the facility must be considered unsubstantiated.

Uranium Smuggling or Legitimate Commercial Agreement?

The second set of allegations against the Congolese nuclear officials relates to an effort to illegally export uranium from the country’s reserves, which have not been mined commercially for the last decade. According to Minister Mushi, the suspects were part of a “vast network aimed at the fraudulent exploitation of DR Congo’s uranium.” [12] This allegation revived concerns that have arisen over the last few years regarding unconfirmed reports that North Korea and Iran have been attempting to obtain uranium clandestinely mined in the DRC. However, according to statements made by one of the accused, Mr. Lumu, and subsequent interviews with former officials, the “network” cited by Minister Mushi is actually a legitimate commercial arrangement concluded between Mr. Lumu and Brinkley Mining Ltd., a London-based uranium prospecting and mining firm. This agreement grants Brinkley Mining preferential rights to conduct uranium prospecting and extraction in specified areas in the DRC. When interviewed about the agreement, Gerard Kamanda Wa Kamanda, the former Scientific Research Minister and Minister Mushi’s predecessor, stated, “I approved that partnership and we had informed all the authorities of the country about it.” [13] Rather than reflecting a potential proliferation threat regarding uranium smuggling, the accusations of uranium smuggling may be the result of a dispute within the DRC leadership, with members of the new government taking aim at officials who concluded agreements with Brinkley Africa Ltd., a subsidiary of Brinkley Mining, under the country’s transitional government, which ceded power in July 2006. Indeed, if the agreement with Brinkley Africa moves forward and commercial mining operations commence, it may improve the security at the DRC’s uranium mines by limiting or preventing unauthorized mining activities. Moreover, the memorandum of understanding stipulates that Brinkley Africa will help to install equipment to control the export of nuclear and radioactive material, thereby enhancing the DRC’s ability to prevent the smuggling of such materials out of the country. [14]

Uranium Smuggling: A Recurring DRC Concern

These recent cases arise against a background that includes numerous reported incidents of the smuggling of uranium and radioactive materials from the DRC in the recent past. In July 2006, for example, the United Nations Group of Experts established by the UN Security Council to monitor the situation in the DRC reported that “organs of State security have, during the past six years, confiscated over 50 cases containing uranium or cesium [a highly radioactive substance used in industry, medicine, and research] in and around Kinshasa.” They added: “The last significant incident occurred in March 2004 when two containers with over 100 kilograms of stable uranium-238 and uranium-235 were secured.” [15] In August 2006, unverified news reports claimed that Iran was smuggling uranium from the DRC through Tanzania, and in February 2004, President Joseph Kabila briefly prohibited access to the Shinkolobwe mine site due to concerns regarding illegal mining. [16]

Given the details that have unfolded thus far regarding the current allegations of uranium smuggling from the DRC, there is reason to question whether the arrested individuals were, in fact, involved in illicit uranium procurement activities. However, these cases do call attention to the continued risk posed by imperfect controls over nuclear material in the DRC. The fact that Congolese officials could not readily determine whether uranium fuel rods were missing from the Kinshasa Center for Nuclear Studies suggests that nuclear accounting measures at the site are less than optimal. Although it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which the theft from the facility of uranium fuel enriched to less than 20 percent might contribute to the development of a nuclear weapon, irradiated spent fuel is a radioactive material potentially usable in a dirty bomb. The illicit acquisition of uranium ore could also provide countries seeking nuclear weapons that are subject to monitoring by the IAEA with a source of uranium that might elude the agency’s inspection system. Previous uranium procurement activities, however, have been focused on the acquisition of milled uranium, rather than natural uranium ore. [17]

Although IAEA assistance has facilitated improvements in nuclear safety and security in the DRC since the end of the country’s civil war in 2003, the DRC is facing the dual challenge of needing new capacity to meet internationally recognized nuclear security standards, at a time when further development of its nuclear regulatory infrastructure is receiving a low priority domestically. Given the nature of the agreements with Brinkley Mining, it appears that the British firm may be in a position to assist in building that capacity. In addition, continued participation in IAEA initiatives, cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy with regard to the return of spent fuel, and obtaining international assistance to help Kinshasa implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (requiring all states to adopt effective measures to protect nuclear materials) are all steps that can help alleviate some of the recurring concerns regarding the security of the DRC’s nuclear resources. [18]

SOURCES AND NOTES

[1] “DRCongo Police Arrest Officials for Uranium Trafficking,” Le Phare, March 7, 2007, OSC Document FEA20070309100306.

[2] “DR Congo ‘Uranium Ring Smashed’,” BBC News, March 8, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6432363.stm.

[View Article]

[3] Joe Bavier “Congo Frees Scientists in Uranium Smuggling Scandal,” Reuters Africa, March 13, 2007.

[4] “DRCongo Police Arrest Officials for Uranium Trafficking,” see source in [1]. The Regional Center for Nuclear Studies in Kinshasa houses two nuclear research reactors. The first reactor, a Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomics (TRIGA) Mark I reactor, was constructed by the United States and Belgium in 1958 and retired in 1970. It was replaced by a TRIGA Mark II reactor constructed by the United States in 1970. See Tim Sullivan, “Congo Nurses Old Nuclear Reactor,” Associated Press, July 26, 2001, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/radsafe/0107/msg00559.html. [View Article]

[5] “DR Congo ‘Uranium Ring Smashed’,” see source in [2]. After indicating that 100 bars of uranium and 25 helmets were missing, the Congolese press later changed this amount to 2 bars of uranium and 50 helmets. See “DRC: Report Says Former Ministers to Be Questioned on Missing Uranium Case,” Kinshasa, Le Phare, March 8, 2007, OSC document AFP20070308636015.

[6] Joe Bavier, “Congo Scientist Planned to Export Uranium-Minister,” Reuters, March 8, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L0845529.htm. [View Article]

[7] Sullivan, “Congo Nurses Old Nuclear Reactor,” see source in [4]. See also “Congo Special Weapons,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/congo/index.html. [View Article]

[8] “DR Congo ‘Uranium Ring Smashed’,” see source in [2]. In the 1970s, two fuel rods from a shipment from the United States disappeared. The reason for their disappearance is still unknown, but one of the rods was found in the hands of an Italian smuggling operation associated with the mafia. Undercover agents posing as Middle Eastern buyers obtained the rod and arrested the smugglers in 1998. See Sara A. Daly, John V. Parachini, and William Rosenau, “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism,” The RAND Corporation, 2005, http://www.rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2005/RAND_DB458.pdf. [View Article]

[9] According to IAEA personnel contacted by WMD Insights staff, the helmet-shaped casings in question are lead source holders used by the oil industry, which are sold by scam artists all over central Africa as uranium due to the warning label and the weight of the material they contain.

[10] According to some U.S. Government officials, the enrichment levels for the fuel rods was 19.7-19.8 percent. See: Daly et. al., “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Nuclear Terrorism,” in source [8].

[11] Ibid.

[12] “DR Congo ‘Uranium Ring Smashed’,” see source in [2].

[13] “DRC: Report Says Former Ministers to Be Questioned on Missing Uranium Case,” see source in [5].

[14] “Uranium, Democratic Republic of Congo: The West Acts to Prevent the Proliferation of Nuclear Material,” Africa Research Bulletin, January 2007, Vol. 43, No. 11.

[15] Letter dated 18 July 2006 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council, July 18, 2006, available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S2006525.pdf. [View Article]

[16] Jon Swain, David Leppard, and Brian Johnson-Thomas, “Iran’s Plot to Mine Uranium in Africa,” The Sunday Times, August 6, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article601432.ece. [View Article] The Shinkolobwe mines were sealed off by the Belgians in 1960; however, there have been numerous reports of illegal mining for cobalt and other minerals since the 1990s. After access to the Shinkolobwe mines was prohibited in February 2004, experts from the United States were sent to investigate activities at the mine and determined that there had not been any “worrisome movement” of uranium ore. See “Illegal Uranium Mining Continues in Congo,” Global Security Newswire, June 1, 2004, http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2004/6/1/7bb9a7b1-2bae-4580-8c1f-0169359c9776.html.

[17] International Atomic Energy Agency, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,” GOV/2004/59, August 30, 2004; Iraq Survey Final Report, Investigation Into Uranium Pursuits and Indigenous Production Capabilities,” GlobalSecurity.org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-report_vol2_nuclear-03.htm.

[View Article]

[18] The DRC participates in the IAEA’s Upgrading Radiation Protection Infrastructure and Integrated Safety Assessment of Research Reactors programs. See IAEA Annual Report 2005, Safety of Nuclear Installations, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Reports/Anrep2005/safety_nuclear.pdf. [View Article] In recent years, the U.S. Department of Energy has attempted to negotiate the return of spent fuel from the DRC research reactor, but one of the suspects, Fortunant Lumu, previously claimed that it would only return the fuel if the U.S. provided another reactor. See Sullivan, “Congo Nurses Old Nuclear Reactor,” in source [4]. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 requires all state to implement domestic legislation and regulations to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials; including accounting, physical protection and border and export control measures for nuclear materials. See: http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/. [View Article]