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Outside Publications by CNS StaffPakistan's Missile Tests Highlight Growing South Asia Nuclear Arms Race, Despite New Confidence Building MeasuresSharad Joshi Copyright © WMD Insights. All rights reserved April 2007.
On February 23, Pakistan tested its intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Hatf VI/Shaheen II, which has a range of 2,000 kilometers (km). [2] According to a spokesman for the Pakistani military, the missile can carry “nuclear and conventional warheads with great accuracy,” and was previously tested in April 2006. It is unclear whether upgrades to the system, which can reach major cities in western and central India, were introduced between the two launches. [3] General Ehsan Ul-Haq, chairman of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, who witnessed the February 23 test, stated that it achieved “an important milestone in Pakistan’s quest for sustaining strategic balance in South Asia.” [4] He also stated, “Pakistan’s strategy of achieving credible minimum deterrence was fully in place and a guarantor of peace in the region.” [5] Several weeks later, on March 3, 2007, Islamabad successfully carried out a test of the Hatf-II/Abdali short-range missile, able to reach targets up to 200 km away. [6] According to a Defense Ministry statement in Islamabad, the test’s objective was to validate “desired technical parameters which [have] been successfully achieved.” [7] Pakistan’s missile tests in 2007 came a little over two months after Islamabad tested three other nuclear capable ballistic missiles in quick succession, as part of exercises conducted by the Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC). The first of the three tests, on November 16, 2006, was that of the Hatf V/Ghauri I missile, which has a range of 1,300 km. [8] The second test, on November 29, 2006, was of the 700-km-range Hatf IV/Shaheen I missile. [9] Then on December 9, Pakistan test-fired the 290-km-range Hatf III/Ghaznavi missile, which can strike several cities in northern and western India. [10] All three missiles were delivered to the ASFC at least two years ago. Some reports in the past have also stated that Pakistan is developing a 3,500-km-range ballistic missile, the Ghauri III, but so far no tests of this system are known to have been conducted, despite reports in 2004 suggesting that one was imminent. [11] Missiles and Credible Deterrence
Ballistic missiles are essential to Pakistan’s official policy of maintaining a credible minimum deterrent against India. [12] The importance of these systems has grown in large part because, for more than fifteen years, the expansion of the Pakistani Air Force has been constrained by U.S. sanctions, which have prevented Pakistan from obtaining advanced U.S. warplanes. [13] According to former Pakistan Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat, Islamabad’s emphasis on ballistic missiles is due to the disparity in air power with India, especially after 1990, when the United States imposed these sanctions under the Pressler Amendment, barring further military assistance and sales to Pakistan because of its acquisition of nuclear weapons. [14] In 1999, Congress granted the President authority to waive the Pressler Amendment, but only in 2006, after extensive negotiations, did the U.S. government approve a sizeable sale of U.S. strike aircraft to Islamabad, in a transaction to provide Pakistan 36 F-16 fighter-bombers that was finalized in September 2006. [15] Pakistan had originally sought 75 F-16s, but scaled back its purchase because of the competing financial demands of providing relief to the victims of the October 2005 earthquake in northeast Pakistan. [16] These aircraft can be modified for the delivery of nuclear weapons, and U.S. Congressional research reports have stated that Pakistan is believed to have refitted the F-16s it received in the 1980s from the United States to make them nuclear-capable. [17] U.S. officials, in response to Congressional queries, have stated that the planes to be supplied in the 2006 consignment “will not be nuclear capable,” adding that Pakistani officials have “given no indications that they will want to modify the F-16s to deliver nuclear weapons.” [18] Thus, the actual impact of these aircraft on Pakistan’s quest for a credible nuclear deterrent is unclear. Moreover, even though the F-16 sale was cleared, the newly installed Democratic-led U.S. House of Representatives has expressed concern over Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programs and has passed legislation which ties military assistance to an increase in Pakistan’s efforts to combat terrorism and nuclear and missile proliferation. [19] Pakistan’s efforts to acquire advanced aircraft from China have also faced obstacles. In a recent setback, in January 2007, the Russian government announced, under pressure from India, that it would not allow China to deliver JF-17 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. The fighters are powered with Russian-made Klimov RD-93 engines. [20] Islamabad had planned to acquire at least 150 JF-17/FC-1 planes, which have been jointly developed by Pakistan and China, and President Musharraf had announced in August 2006 that these planes would be flying in Pakistani skies by March 2007. [21] Despite Russia’s January 2007 announcement, reports in March 2007 have stated that Beijing has transferred two JF-17 jets to Pakistan for flight tests. [22] It is unclear what engines were used in these prototypes. Pakistan’s missile tests also come at a time when the Indian government is considering major conventional military purchases that could enhance its nuclear weapons delivery potential and airspace defense capabilities. These include the proposed acquisition of 126 fighter aircraft for which the U.S. F-16 and F-18 and the Russian MiG-35 warplanes are among the candidates. [23] Given the uncertainty over Islamabad’s aircraft acquisition plans and the substantial aircraft purchases being considered by India, it is no surprise that Pakistan is working to strengthen its missile capabilities, as evidenced by its tests in late 2006 and early 2007. Indian Missile Defenses Pose New Challenge More recently, Pakistan’s missile development program has also been driven by concerns that India’s quest for reliable anti-ballistic missile systems could degrade Islamabad’s deterrent. [24] Indeed, on November 27, 2006, shortly before the second of the Pakistani ballistic missile tests noted above, New Delhi successfully conducted the first test of its fledgling indigenous anti-ballistic missile system. [25] Additionally, New Delhi has sought advanced missile defense systems from foreign suppliers, especially the Arrow system from Israel, although that deal was not ultimately concluded. Pakistani analysts have expressed concern that related technologies that have already been transferred to India, especially the Green Pine radar system (part of the Arrow framework) and the impending transfer of the Phalcon airborne warning and control system, could be combined with existing missile defense capabilities to augment India’s first strike potential. [26] A delegation of U.S. experts visiting New Delhi in mid-February 2007 may have added further to Islamabad’s concerns when it underscored the threat to India from short-range missiles and recommended that India become a partner in the U.S. missile defense framework. [27] Pakistani analysts believe that the most cost effective means to counter New Delhi’s strategic advantage and saturate its missile defenses is to improve Pakistan’s missile arsenal, qualitatively and quantitatively. [28] This also implies a corresponding increase in the production of nuclear warheads for these systems. [29] Confidence Building Measures Advance, as Arms Race Gains Momentum Islamabad notified India before conducting its early 2007 missile tests, and apparently provided such notifications before the late 2006 tests as
well. This procedure had been formalized in the In an attempt to expand bilateral confidence building measures in the nuclear arena, on February 21, 2007, two days before Pakistan’s first missile test of the year, the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan signed an agreement on reducing the risk posed by accidents involving nuclear weapons, an agreement that had been in negotiation since 1999. [33] The key provision of the agreement states: The Parties shall notify each other immediately in the event of any accident relating to nuclear weapons, under their respective jurisdiction or control, which could create the risk of radioactive fallout, with adverse consequences for both sides, or create the risk of an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries. In the event of such an accident the Party within whose jurisdiction or control the accident has taken place will immediately take necessary measures to minimize the radiological consequences of such an accident. [34]In addition to this notable diplomatic initiative, in January 2007, New Delhi and Islamabad carried out a familiar ritual for the 16th time – exchanging lists of nuclear installations under a 1988 agreement prohibiting attacks on each other’s nuclear facilities. [35] And, in a further effort to reduce tensions, during the first week in March 2007, the two sides held the first meeting of the Joint Mechanism on Terrorism. This mechanism was established by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the Havana Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in September 2006 as part of the ongoing bilateral peace process. Conclusion Pakistan’s tests of five different missiles highlight the intensifying strategic competition between Islamabad and New Delhi, with each side attempting to develop larger and more diverse delivery capabilities to counter advances each observes across their mutual border. The latest challenge from Pakistan’s perspective is India’s pursuit of missile defenses, which seems to be creating pressures for Islamabad to enlarge its offensive missile capabilities – and, presumably, its output of nuclear warheads to arm these systems. Although significant confidence building measures between the two South Asian states are also gaining importance, for the moment they do not appear to be sufficiently powerful to blunt the pressures that are fueling an escalating nuclear arms race in the region. SOURCES AND NOTES [1] For a summary of Indian and Pakistani nuclear delivery systems, see “Indian Nuclear Forces, 2006,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/India.pdf; [View Article] and “Pakistani Nuclear Forces,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/Pakistan.pdf. [View Article] [2] “Pakistan Successfully Test Fires Shaheen II Missile,” Dawn, February 23, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/02/23/welcome.htm. [View Article] [3] Munir Ahmad, “Pakistan Test-Fires Long-Range Missile,” Boston Globe, February 23, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2007/02/23/pakistan_test_fires_long_range_missile_1172220123/. [4] Ibid. [5] Ibid. [6] “Pakistan Tests Hatf-II Missile,” Hindu, March 4, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/03/04/stories/2007030406400100.htm. [View Article] [7] “Pakistan Test Fires Short Range Missile,” Reuters India, March 3, 2007, http://in.today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-03-03T100733Z_01_NOOTR_RTRJONC_0_India-289873-2.xml. [View Article] [8] “Islamabad Test-Fires Ghauri Missile,” Press Trust of India, November 16, 2006, Lexis-Nexis. [9] “Pakistan Test-Fires Medium-Range Ballistic Missile Hatf-4,” Press Trust of India, November 29, 2006, Lexis-Nexis. [10] “Pakistan Test-Fires Nuclear Capable Ballistic Missile,” Press Trust of India, December 9, 2006, Lexis-Nexis. [11] For a summary of the various reports see “Pakistan: Missile Chronology 2003-04,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/pakistan_missile.pdf?_=1316466791. [View Article] [12] For more on Pakistan’s missile development policy, see Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Pakistan’s Missile Development: Priorities, Challenges, Myths and Reality,” Strategic Studies, Spring 2002, http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002_files/no_1/article/7a.htm. [View Article] [13] Peter R. Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 21, 2007, p. 8, http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20070121-Lavoy-PakistanNuclearPosture&PDFFolder=Essays. [View Article] [14] Jehangir Karamat, “Missile Acquisition by Pakistan: Military Strategic Imperatives,” South Asian Survey, 11:2, 2004, pg. 173. [15] K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” CRS Report for Congress, October 26, 006, pp. 14-15, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33498.pdf. [View Article] [16] Farhan Bokhari, “Pakistan Scales Back F-16 Purchases from U.S.,” Financial Times, April 28, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c82f265e-d6a3-11da-b64c-0000779e2340.html. [View Article] [17] Christopher Bolkcom, Richard F. Grimmett, and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Combat Aircraft Sales to South Asia: Potential Implications,” CRS Report for Congress, July 6, 2006, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33515.pdf. [18] Wade Boese, “Pakistan, Saudi Arabia Cleared for U.S. Arms Buys,” Arms Control Today, September 2006, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_09/armsbuys.asp. [View Article] [19] “White House Should Temper Bill on Military Aid, Pakistan Says,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur (DPA), January 31, 2007, Lexis-Nexis. [20] Ashok Mehta, “Arms and the Cash,” Daily News and Analysis, March 7, 2007, http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?NewsID=1083580; [View Article] Vladimir Radyuhin, “Russia Blocks Sale of Chinese Jets to Pakistan,” Hindu, January 22, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/01/22/stories/2007012206341400.htm. [21] C. Raja Mohan, “China Pressing Russia on Pak Fighter Project,” Indian Express, November 13, 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/16509.html. [View Article] [22] “China Delivers 2 JF-17 Jets to Pakistan,” Rediff.com, March 14, 2007, http://www.rediff.com///news/2007/mar/14pak.htm. [View Article] [23] “Acquisition of 126 Jets for IAF Soon: Antony,” ExpressIndia.com, February 7, 2007, http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=80966. [View Article] In addition, the Indian Navy will also acquire the aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov (renamed INS Vikramaditya) from Russia by 2008. [24] For more on this point, see Maria Sultan, “Emerging NMD Technologies and India: Impact and Options for Pakistan,” Strategic Studies, XXII, Summer 2002, Number 2, http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002_files/no_2/article/1a.htm. [View Article] [25] Martin Sieff, “A Giant Leap Forward for Indian Missile Defense,” SpaceWar.com, December 1, 2006, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/A_Giant_Leap_Forward_For_Indian_Missile_Defense_999.html; [View Article] Sharad Joshi, “India’s Missile Program: Diverging Trajectories,” WMD Insights, February 2007, http://wmdinsights.org/I12/I12_SA1_IndiaMissileProgram.htm. [View Article] [26] “Seeking a Ballistic Missile Shield” (editorial), Hindu, November 30, 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/11/30/stories/2006113004631000.htm; [View Article] Ghazala Yasmin, “Missile Defense in South Asia: Implications for the Region,” Strategic Studies, Autumn 2006, http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2006_files/no_3/article/a4.htm. [View Article] [27] “India Facing Serious Threat From Short-Range Missiles: U.S. Experts,” Rediff.com, February 15, 2007, http://www.rediff.com/news/2007/feb/15missile1.htm. [View Article] [28] Ibid. [29] Ibid. [30] Eric Creegan, “India, Pakistan Sign Missile Notification Pact,” Arms Control Today, November 2005, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-IndiaPak.asp; [View Article] for full text of the agreement see “Agreement between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles,” Henry L. Stimson Center, http://www.stimson.org/?SN=SA20060207949. [View Article] WMD Insights staff has found confirmation of such notifications for the 2007 tests and for the November 16, 2006, Hatf V test. No confirmations were found in published reports for the two other 2006 tests (which may have been included in the notice of the November 16 launch), but research also did not disclose any concerns expressed by India on the issue, suggesting that it received appropriate notice of all of the ballistic missile launches. [31] “Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile,” International Herald Tribune, August 11, 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/11/asia/web.0811pakistan.php. [View Article] Regarding the March 22, 2007, test, see “Pak Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile,” The Times of India, March 22, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Pakistan_test-fires_nuclear-capable_cruise_missile/articleshow/1791698.cms. [32] Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, “Lessons from Regional Approaches to Managing Missiles,” Disarmament Forum, pg. 25, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2597.pdf. [View Article] [33] Elizabeth Roche, “India, Pakistan Sign Nuke Deal in Defiance of Train Attacks,” Yahoo News, February 21, 2007, [http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070221/wl_afp/indiapakistanblast_070221153712]; see also Shamshad Ahmad, “Unending Peace Pretensions,” Dawn, March 6, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/06/op.htm;
[View Article] [34] “Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons,” see source in [33]. [35] “India, Pakistan Exchange Lists of Nuclear Facilities,” People’s Daily Online, January 2, 2007, http://english.people.com.cn/200701/02/eng20070102_337637.html. [View Article]
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Recent Ballistic Missile Tests
Access to Advanced Combat Aircraft Restricted
two states’ October 2005 agreement on prior
notification of ballistic missile tests. [30] It may be noted, however, that this agreement covers only ballistic missiles and not cruise missiles, and as recent tests of the latter systems have demonstrated, no notifications before test-firing cruise missiles have been made. Most recently, on March 22, 2007, local time, Pakistan tested its Hatf VII Babur nuclear-capable cruise missile for the third time. [31] Indeed, some analysts have stated that the 2005 agreement was possible only because the scope of this confidence building measure was deliberately restricted in this way. [32]
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