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Outside Publications by CNS StaffIndia Successfully Tests Agni-III: A Stepping Stone To An ICBM?Sharad Joshi and Peter Crail - Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies Copyright © WMD Insights. All rights reserved May 2007.
Agni-III Test, Take Two On April 12, 2007, India tested its longest range ballistic missile, the Agni-III (Agni means “fire” in Hindi), which can strike targets up to 3,500 kilometers (km) away. The Agni-III, a two-stage, solid propellant missile, roughly 50 feet long and weighing 48 metric tonnes, was fired from a rail-mobile platform. [2] The test validated crucial technologies, especially the warhead detonation system. [3] The test’s success also suggests that the technical flaws, in particular problems with the staging system and the re-entry vehicle, which caused the failure of the first Agni-III test in July 2006, have been resolved. [4] (See “India’s Agni-III Test Makes Few Waves Abroad, More at Home,” in the September 2006 issue of WMD Insights.) Indian defense scientists have stated that induction of the missile into the armed forces would take place after more tests in the next two to three years. [5] The latest Agni-III test can be seen as a signal to India’s regional rivals. India’s two potential adversaries, China and Pakistan, both possess nuclear-capable ballistic missiles that can cover much of India. China’s land-based deployed missiles include the DF-21 (2,100 km), DF-3 (3,100 km), the DF-4 (5,500 km), and the DF-5 (13,00 km). [6] China is expected to add the DF-31 (approximately 8,000 km) in the near future, and this missile, like the DF-4, is said to include India as a target. [7] Though India’s missiles do not match those at Beijing’s command, the Agni-III will significantly enhance the retaliatory capabilities available to India vis-à-vis Chinese cities. [8] Pakistan’s missile arsenal includes the Ghaznavi/Hatf III (290 km), the Shaheen I/Hatf IV (600-800 km), and the Ghauri/Hatf V (1,500 km); it is currently flight-testing the Shaheen II/Hatf VI (2,000-3,000 km). [9] Officials from the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which designed the Agni-III, have stated that in addition to future tests of the Agni-III, they would conduct the second test of India’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in May-June 2007. [10] This system, involving an endo-atmospheric interceptor missile, was first tested successfully in November 2006. India’s development of long-range ballistic missile programs and BMD should be seen in the context of Pakistan’s progress with its own ballistic and cruise missiles. [11]
According to a former head of India’s Strategic Forces Command, Air Marshal Ajit Bhavnani, the Agni-III test was “an important milestone, and if the missile is operationalized in the next two years, it would be sufficient to meet most of our current threat perceptions.” [13] Senior defense scientists also highlighted the fact that about 85 percent of the components of the Agni-III were made indigenously. [14] Approximately 258 private firms were involved in the missile’s construction. [15] Prelude to an ICBM? Riding on the success of the Agni-III test, Indian defense scientists are now considering the possibility of developing an ICBM, tentatively called Surya (“sun” in Hindi),which would require adding a third stage to the Agni-III, thus extending its range to 5,000-5,500 km. [16] The DRDO envisions a 1.5 ton payload for the proposed ICBM. [17] However, the head of the DRDO, M. Natarajan, has been careful to point out that while defense scientists could possibly achieve this technical capability in the next three years, India’s political leaders must first decide whether an ICBM should be developed. [18] Some influential retired officials with links to the DRDO and the military have stated that, given India’s threat perceptions, the 3,500-km-range Agni-III is sufficient for India’s defense needs. [19] They also note that pursuit of such a project could negatively impact ties with Washington during the critical negotiations on implementing the nuclear cooperation agreement signed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush on July 15, 2005. [20] (See “Commerical Motivations Add Impetus to Indo-U.S. Nuclear Agreement,” in this issue of the WMD Insights.) Some Indian defense analysts argue that once the Agni-III is deployed, India should direct new efforts toward developing a nuclear capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM), an option that would enhance India’s assured second-strike capability. [21] Some reports suggest that India is secretly developing this capability based on a SLCM known as the Sagarika (“oceanic” in Hindi) – a name formerly associated with a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) project – although they note that this missile system will not be inducted for at least five years. [22] In the meantime, India is also pursuing the Dhanush 250-km-range SLBM, which was reportedly test fired at the end of March 2007; the system is based on the ground-launched Prithvi. [23] Mild Reactions to a Suspected Development Despite concerns regarding the arms race in South Asia, official reactions to Indian missile tests have been sparse and coverage in the international media has been generally limited to factual reporting of the event. Reaction to the first attempted test of the Agni-III in July 2006, was somewhat different. At that time, the primary criticism was that India’s test followed too closely after the far more provocative missile tests Washington’s response to the test was non-committal. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack acknowledged that India has an “active missile program” and that India and Pakistan were implementing an agreement on prior notification of ballistic missile tests. [26] He did not express any concern that the tests would be destabilizing for the region. [27] While China is seen as the country most directly affected by the development of the Agni-III, official Chinese reactions to India’s missile test have been generally subdued. In response to the April 12 launch, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang stated that China hoped that India, “…as a country with an important influence in the region, can work to maintain and promote peace and stability in the region.” [28] Indian officials and analysts downplayed China’s response. One senior government official stated that the missile test was not a threat to China and that it was merely a test-firing. [29] A senior defense analyst in New Delhi, C. Uday Bhaskar, stated that in the contemporary period, “weapons of mass destruction capability is not predicated on a single point threat,” and that the tests should be seen as part of India’s effort to “enhance its overall strategic profile.” [30] Pakistan, India’s primary strategic rival, was notably silent in the aftermath of the test. In response to previous tests, Pakistan had simply confirmed that it received prior notice of the launch from India, in accordance with a 2005 bilateral agreement on missile test notifications. (Sitanshu Kar, an Indian Defense Ministry spokesperson, announced after the test that Pakistan had been notified in advance of the impending launch.) [31] Even before the missile test, there were reports of the planned firing in the Pakistani media. Pakistani press accounts noted that the Agni-III would be more powerful than any of Pakistan’s missiles. [32] The lack of a Pakistani response is likely indicative of the mutual understanding with India that both South Asian states intend to continue developing and testing new missile systems. Pakistan may also have been following China’s lead in playing down the Agni-III launch. Australia was an exception to the generally mild international response to the event, with commentators expressing particular concern over the emerging regional arms race in South Asia. Australian foreign affairs and defense commentator Graeme Dobell, for example, characterized the test as another step in an Asian arms race that will provide further impetus for China to enhance its own missile and space capabilities. Given this concern, and noting Australia’s significant uranium reserves, he stated, “India’s missile test will add one more issue to the debate about whether Australia should follow the U.S. to recognize India as a normal nuclear power even though New Delhi won’t sign the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.” [33] Likewise, an article in The Australian highlighted the strong desire of “Indian nationalists” to build an ICBM and thus provide India with strategic influence outside the region. The author pointed out that India’s pursuit of an ICBM is occurring alongside Chinese efforts to develop new-generation ICBMs. [34] In one of the more in-depth analyses of the test, Canadian commentator Gwynne Dyer argued that the development of the Agni-III is indicative of India’s desire to engage in great-power politics. Answering the question as to why India would want to develop the ability to counter China at this time, he stated, “Because India, with U.S. encouragement, has finally decided, after a half-century of ‘non-alignment,’ that it wants to play the great-power game, too.” [35] This “U.S. encouragement” is largely seen as a U.S. effort to surround China with strategic partners in response to the challenge posed by China’s economic and military growth. [36] Conclusion The successful test of India’s longest-range missile provides some degree of vindication for the DRDO after the failure of the system’s first test in July 2006, although further testing will be required before the Agni-III can be deployed. Furthermore, with a nuclear capability and the successful development of a range of missiles capable of reaching key targets in both its neighboring rivals, India is currently on the threshold of obtaining a fully credible minimum deterrent for the first time. Although India may consider developing missiles having an intercontinental range, it is not apparent that it has potential adversaries that it might seek to counter with such systems. Thus, India is more likely to concentrate on diversifying its medium- and intermediate-range missile delivery platforms to establish a secure second strike capability. Given other Indian delivery capabilities, the Agni-III appears unnecessary as a direct counter to Pakistan. Nonetheless, the new system, with its ability to target China, could provide India additional room to maneuver in a future Indo-Pakistani crisis by making Beijing more cautious about intervening to support Islamabad.
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In mid-April, India took a further step to establish a credible nuclear deterrent against its regional rivals with the successful test of the Agni-III, an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). Once deployed, the system will enable India to strike key Chinese cities, including Shanghai, and possibly Beijing. India currently maintains one of the most advanced missile capabilities in the industrializing world, including both ballistic and cruise missiles. Indian defense technicians have claimed that they can develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching Europe, and potentially the United States, within two to three years. [1] Thus far, new advances in India’s missile systems have been largely anticipated and have been met with minimal criticism both within the region and farther afield. It is unclear, however, whether India’s aspirations for an intercontinental missile will receive the same degree of tacit acceptance by the international community, should India proceed down this path.
Most recently, in March 2007, Pakistan tested the Babur land attack cruise missile (LACM), which has an extended range of 700 km and is said by some Indian analysts to be sufficiently accurate to hit Indian missile deployment sites within this range; this could introduce the possibility of Pakistan initiating a preemptive first strike. [12] With the Agni-III, however, India will be able to deploy its strategic forces beyond the range of Pakistan’s most accurate system.
conducted by North Korea on July 5, 2006, and complicated international efforts to condemn and respond to that development. With regard to the April 12 Agni-III test, the only criticism internationally was voiced by Indonesia, which accused India of failing to provide prior notification of the launch after an Indonesian airliner was forced to return to Jakarta upon entering closed Indian airspace during the test. [24] India, however, claimed that notification was provided a week prior to the launch. [25]
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